@@ -1085,8 +1085,15 @@ int arch_set_info_guest(
if ( is_pv_domain(d) )
{
for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v->arch.dr); i++ )
- if ( !access_ok(c(debugreg[i]), sizeof(long)) )
+ {
+ unsigned long val = c(debugreg[i]);
+
+ if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d)
+ ? val + sizeof(long) > HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(d)
+ : val + sizeof(long) > (1UL << (VADDR_BITS - 1)) &&
+ val < HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END )
return -EINVAL;
+ }
/*
* Prior to Xen 4.11, dr5 was used to hold the emulated-only
* subset of dr7, and dr4 was unused.
@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@ long set_debugreg(struct vcpu *v, unsign
switch ( reg )
{
case 0 ... 3:
- if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) )
+ if ( is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v)
+ ? value + sizeof(long) > HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(v->domain)
+ : value + sizeof(long) > (1UL << (VADDR_BITS - 1)) &&
+ value < HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END )
return -EPERM;
v->arch.dr[reg] = value;
access_ok() is not be applicable here; we really only want a linear address check for breakpoint addresses, as putting those in debug register isn't going to result in actual memory accesses. Furthermore access_ok() assumes to be acting on current, which isn't the case here when called from arch_set_info_guest(). Note that access_ok() was too lax anyway for 32-bit domains. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- The questionable use of sizeof(long) is left in place for the moment, as it's not clear how to best deal with the upper bound of breakpoint covered ranges: We'd like those to not cover Xen space. --- v2: Duplicate the change to arch_set_info_guest().