From patchwork Wed May 29 22:48:43 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Richard Weinberger X-Patchwork-Id: 10967915 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88BFD76 for ; Wed, 29 May 2019 22:55:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 799C628662 for ; Wed, 29 May 2019 22:55:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 6AC952871A; Wed, 29 May 2019 22:55:40 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0AB6628662 for ; Wed, 29 May 2019 22:55:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726408AbfE2Wzi (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 18:55:38 -0400 Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([109.75.188.150]:56270 "EHLO lilium.sigma-star.at" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726189AbfE2Wzi (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 18:55:38 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 386 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Wed, 29 May 2019 18:55:37 EDT Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by lilium.sigma-star.at (Postfix) with ESMTP id A75C71809AD8C; Thu, 30 May 2019 00:49:08 +0200 (CEST) From: Richard Weinberger To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-imx@nxp.com, festevam@gmail.com, kernel@pengutronix.de, s.hauer@pengutronix.de, shawnguo@kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, david@sigma-star.at, Richard Weinberger Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/2] crypto: Allow working with key references Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 00:48:43 +0200 Message-Id: <20190529224844.25203-1-richard@nod.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Some crypto accelerators allow working with secure or hidden keys. This keys are not exposed to Linux nor main memory. To use them for a crypto operation they are referenced with a device specific id. This patch adds a new flag, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_REF_KEY. If this flag is set, crypto drivers should tread the key as specified via setkey as reference and not as regular key. Since we reuse the key data structure such a reference is limited by the key size of the chiper and is chip specific. TODO: If the cipher implementation or the driver does not support reference keys, we need a way to detect this an fail upon setkey. How should the driver indicate that it supports this feature? Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger --- include/linux/crypto.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/linux/crypto.h b/include/linux/crypto.h index f2565a103158..737ea00e026b 100644 --- a/include/linux/crypto.h +++ b/include/linux/crypto.h @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ #define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS 0x00000100 #define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP 0x00000200 #define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG 0x00000400 +#define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_REF_KEY 0x00000800 #define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY 0x00100000 #define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN 0x00200000 #define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED 0x00400000 From patchwork Wed May 29 22:48:44 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Richard Weinberger X-Patchwork-Id: 10967917 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9818876 for ; Wed, 29 May 2019 22:55:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 890F828662 for ; Wed, 29 May 2019 22:55:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 7C4862871A; Wed, 29 May 2019 22:55:41 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0EEC628662 for ; Wed, 29 May 2019 22:55:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726189AbfE2Wzk (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 18:55:40 -0400 Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([109.75.188.150]:56276 "EHLO lilium.sigma-star.at" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726395AbfE2Wzk (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 18:55:40 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by lilium.sigma-star.at (Postfix) with ESMTP id D92FE1803086A; Thu, 30 May 2019 00:49:09 +0200 (CEST) From: Richard Weinberger To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-imx@nxp.com, festevam@gmail.com, kernel@pengutronix.de, s.hauer@pengutronix.de, shawnguo@kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, david@sigma-star.at, Richard Weinberger Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/2] crypto: mxs-dcp: Implement reference keys Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 00:48:44 +0200 Message-Id: <20190529224844.25203-2-richard@nod.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 In-Reply-To: <20190529224844.25203-1-richard@nod.at> References: <20190529224844.25203-1-richard@nod.at> Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP DCP allows working with secure keys. These keys can reside in a protected memory region of the crypto accelerator, burned in eFuses or being an internal chip key. To use these keys a key reference is transferred to the chip instead of a AES key. For DCP these references can be: 0x00 to 0x03: Key slot number in the secure memory region 0xfe: Unique device key 0xff: OTP key (burned in eFuse) To utilize this functionality we check for the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_REF_KEY flag, if it is set the key as provided via mxs_dcp_aes_setkey() is used as reference. Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger --- drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c index b4429891e368..22b048a3a91b 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c @@ -147,6 +147,10 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTEXT 0x50 +#define MXS_DCP_KEY 0x60 +#define MXS_DCP_KEY_IDX(id, word) (((id) << 4) | (word)) +#define MXS_DCP_KEYDATA 0x70 + #define MXS_DCP_CH_N_CMDPTR(n) (0x100 + ((n) * 0x40)) #define MXS_DCP_CH_N_SEMA(n) (0x110 + ((n) * 0x40)) @@ -158,6 +162,7 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_TERM (1 << 13) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_INIT (1 << 12) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY (1 << 11) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY (1 << 10) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT (1 << 8) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_INIT (1 << 9) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_HASH (1 << 6) @@ -222,15 +227,22 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp; struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan]; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = ablkcipher_request_ctx(req); + struct crypto_async_request *arq = &req->base; + bool key_referenced = !!(crypto_tfm_get_flags(arq->tfm) & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_REF_KEY); + dma_addr_t src_phys, dst_phys, key_phys = {0}; int ret; - dma_addr_t key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, - 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - dma_addr_t src_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_in_buf, - DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); - dma_addr_t dst_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_out_buf, - DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + if (!key_referenced) { + key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, + 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); + } + + src_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_in_buf, + DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + dst_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_out_buf, + DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); if (actx->fill % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { dev_err(sdcp->dev, "Invalid block size!\n"); @@ -243,8 +255,12 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_INTERRUPT | MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_CIPHER; - /* Payload contains the key. */ - desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; + if (key_referenced) { + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY; + } else { + /* Payload contains the key. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; + } if (rctx->enc) desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT; @@ -258,18 +274,26 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, else desc->control1 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_CBC; + if (key_referenced) + desc->control1 |= sdcp->coh->aes_key[0] << 8; + desc->next_cmd_addr = 0; desc->source = src_phys; desc->destination = dst_phys; desc->size = actx->fill; - desc->payload = key_phys; + if (key_referenced) + desc->payload = 0; + else + desc->payload = key_phys; desc->status = 0; ret = mxs_dcp_start_dma(actx); aes_done_run: - dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); + if (!key_referenced) { + dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); + } dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, src_phys, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, dst_phys, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); @@ -498,15 +522,40 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int len) { struct dcp_async_ctx *actx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(tfm); + bool key_referenced = !!(crypto_ablkcipher_get_flags(tfm) & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_REF_KEY); unsigned int ret; /* - * AES 128 is supposed by the hardware, store key into temporary + * AES 128 is supported by the hardware, store key into temporary * buffer and exit. We must use the temporary buffer here, since * there can still be an operation in progress. */ actx->key_len = len; - if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) { + + if (key_referenced) { + /* + * If a hardware key is used, no software fallback is possible. + */ + if (len != AES_KEYSIZE_128) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * DCP supports the following key slots. + */ + switch (key[0]) { + case 0x00: + case 0x01: + case 0x02: + case 0x03: + case 0xfe: + case 0xff: + memcpy(actx->key, key, len); + return 0; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } else if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) { memcpy(actx->key, key, len); return 0; }