From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:30 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016443 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAD3F1580 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB48626253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id AF2772857E; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:50 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24E672857B for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726572AbfFYVyt (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:54:49 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:49303 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726037AbfFYVyt (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:54:49 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrGC3019781 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:17 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrClH038556; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:12 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 01/10] fs,security: Add a new file access type: MAY_CHROOT Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:30 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-2-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP For compatibility reason, MAY_CHROOT is always set with MAY_CHDIR. However, this new flag enable to differentiate a chdir form a chroot. This is needed for the Landlock LSM to be able to evaluate a new root directory. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: James Morris Cc: John Johansen Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Paul Moore Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Stephen Smalley Cc: Tetsuo Handa Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org --- fs/open.c | 3 ++- include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index b5b80469b93d..e8767318fd03 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -494,7 +494,8 @@ int ksys_chroot(const char __user *filename) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); + error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR | + MAY_CHROOT); if (error) goto dput_and_out; diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index f7fdfe93e25d..fa6c9d0c152b 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ typedef int (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset, #define MAY_CHDIR 0x00000040 /* called from RCU mode, don't block */ #define MAY_NOT_BLOCK 0x00000080 +#define MAY_CHROOT 0x00000100 /* * flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:31 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016445 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 551EC14BB for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42F092675C for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 36A4A2857E; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 109E42675C for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726594AbfFYVyv (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:54:51 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:37583 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726341AbfFYVyv (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:54:51 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrIZC019790 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:18 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrHgZ038672; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:17 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 02/10] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:31 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-3-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The goal of the program subtype is to be able to have different static fine-grained verifications for a unique program type. The struct bpf_verifier_ops gets a new optional function: is_valid_subtype(). This new verifier is called at the beginning of the eBPF program verification to check if the (optional) program subtype is valid. The new helper bpf_load_program_xattr() enables to verify a program with subtypes. For now, only Landlock eBPF programs are using a program subtype (see next commits) but this could be used by other program types in the future. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160827205559.GA43880@ast-mbp.thefacebook.com --- Changes since v8: * use bpf_load_program_xattr() instead of bpf_load_program() and add bpf_verify_program_xattr() to deal with subtypes * remove put_extra() since there is no more "previous" field (for now) Changes since v7: * rename LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_* to LANDLOCK_* * move subtype in bpf_prog_aux and use only one bit for has_subtype (suggested by Alexei Starovoitov) * wrap the prog_subtype with a prog_extra to be able to reference kernel pointers: * add an optional put_extra() function to struct bpf_prog_ops to be able to free the pointed data * replace all the prog_subtype with prog_extra in the struct bpf_verifier_ops functions * remove the ABI field (requested by Alexei Starovoitov) * rename subtype fields Changes since v6: * rename Landlock version to ABI to better reflect its purpose * fix unsigned integer checks * fix pointer cast * constify pointers * rebase Changes since v5: * use a prog_subtype pointer and make it future-proof * add subtype test * constify bpf_load_program()'s subtype argument * cleanup subtype initialization * rebase Changes since v4: * replace the "status" field with "version" (more generic) * replace the "access" field with "ability" (less confusing) Changes since v3: * remove the "origin" field * add an "option" field * cleanup comments --- include/linux/bpf.h | 8 +++++ include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 9 ++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 1 + kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 +++++++ net/core/filter.c | 25 ++++++++------- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 9 ++++++ tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c | 10 +++++- tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h | 2 ++ tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 26 +++++++++++++-- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c | 10 ++++++ 12 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index a62e7889b0b6..da167d3afecc 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -294,6 +294,11 @@ bpf_ctx_record_field_size(struct bpf_insn_access_aux *aux, u32 size) aux->ctx_field_size = size; } +/* specific data per program type */ +struct bpf_prog_extra { + union bpf_prog_subtype subtype; +}; + struct bpf_prog_ops { int (*test_run)(struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *kattr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr); @@ -319,6 +324,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_ops { const struct bpf_insn *src, struct bpf_insn *dst, struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 *target_size); + // TODO?: convert to bool (*is_valid_subtype)(struct bpf_prog *prog); + bool (*is_valid_subtype)(struct bpf_prog_extra *prog_extra); }; struct bpf_prog_offload_ops { @@ -418,6 +425,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux { struct work_struct work; struct rcu_head rcu; }; + struct bpf_prog_extra *extra; }; struct bpf_array { diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index b077507efa3f..ddae50373d58 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -355,6 +355,13 @@ struct bpf_stack_build_id { }; }; +union bpf_prog_subtype { + struct { + __u32 type; /* enum landlock_hook_type */ + __aligned_u64 triggers; /* LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_* */ + } landlock_hook; +} __attribute__((aligned(8))); + union bpf_attr { struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_CREATE command */ __u32 map_type; /* one of enum bpf_map_type */ @@ -409,6 +416,8 @@ union bpf_attr { __u32 line_info_rec_size; /* userspace bpf_line_info size */ __aligned_u64 line_info; /* line info */ __u32 line_info_cnt; /* number of bpf_line_info records */ + __aligned_u64 prog_subtype; /* bpf_prog_subtype address */ + __u32 prog_subtype_size; }; struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_OBJ_* commands */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index ad3be85f1411..8ad392e52328 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ void __bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp) { if (fp->aux) { free_percpu(fp->aux->stats); + kfree(fp->aux->extra); kfree(fp->aux); } vfree(fp); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 7713cf39795a..7dd3376904d4 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -1596,7 +1596,7 @@ bpf_prog_load_check_attach_type(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type, } /* last field in 'union bpf_attr' used by this command */ -#define BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD line_info_cnt +#define BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD prog_subtype_size static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr) { @@ -1686,6 +1686,36 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr) if (err) goto free_prog; + /* copy eBPF program subtype from user space */ + if (attr->prog_subtype) { + u32 size; + + err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero( + u64_to_user_ptr(attr->prog_subtype), + sizeof(prog->aux->extra->subtype), + attr->prog_subtype_size); + if (err) + goto free_prog; + size = min_t(u32, attr->prog_subtype_size, + sizeof(prog->aux->extra->subtype)); + + prog->aux->extra = kzalloc(sizeof(*prog->aux->extra), + GFP_KERNEL | GFP_USER); + if (!prog->aux->extra) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto free_prog; + } + if (copy_from_user(&prog->aux->extra->subtype, + u64_to_user_ptr(attr->prog_subtype), size) + != 0) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto free_prog; + } + } else if (attr->prog_subtype_size != 0) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto free_prog; + } + /* run eBPF verifier */ err = bpf_check(&prog, attr, uattr); if (err < 0) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 0e079b2298f8..930260683d0a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -9167,6 +9167,17 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, if (ret < 0) goto skip_full_check; + if (env->ops->is_valid_subtype) { + if (!env->ops->is_valid_subtype(env->prog->aux->extra)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_unlock; + } + } else if (env->prog->aux->extra) { + /* do not accept a subtype if the program does not handle it */ + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_unlock; + } + if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) { ret = bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(env->prog); if (ret) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 2014d76e0d2a..0160237e5cd8 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -5846,7 +5846,8 @@ bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func) } static const struct bpf_func_proto * -bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +bpf_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, + const struct bpf_prog_extra *prog_extra) { switch (func_id) { case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: @@ -5902,7 +5903,7 @@ sock_filter_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage: return &bpf_get_local_storage_proto; default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -5942,7 +5943,7 @@ sock_addr_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete: return &bpf_sk_storage_delete_proto; default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -5959,7 +5960,7 @@ sk_filter_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_get_socket_uid: return &bpf_get_socket_uid_proto; default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -6096,7 +6097,7 @@ tc_cls_act_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return &bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce_proto; #endif default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -6135,7 +6136,7 @@ xdp_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return &bpf_tcp_check_syncookie_proto; #endif default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -6171,7 +6172,7 @@ sock_ops_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return &bpf_tcp_sock_proto; #endif /* CONFIG_INET */ default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -6197,7 +6198,7 @@ sk_msg_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_msg_pop_data: return &bpf_msg_pop_data_proto; default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -6237,7 +6238,7 @@ sk_skb_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return &bpf_skc_lookup_tcp_proto; #endif default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -6248,7 +6249,7 @@ flow_dissector_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes: return &bpf_flow_dissector_load_bytes_proto; default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -6275,7 +6276,7 @@ lwt_out_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: return &bpf_skb_under_cgroup_proto; default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } @@ -8611,7 +8612,7 @@ sk_reuseport_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, case BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes_relative: return &sk_reuseport_load_bytes_relative_proto; default: - return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id); + return bpf_base_func_proto(func_id, prog->aux->extra); } } diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index b077507efa3f..ddae50373d58 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -355,6 +355,13 @@ struct bpf_stack_build_id { }; }; +union bpf_prog_subtype { + struct { + __u32 type; /* enum landlock_hook_type */ + __aligned_u64 triggers; /* LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_* */ + } landlock_hook; +} __attribute__((aligned(8))); + union bpf_attr { struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_CREATE command */ __u32 map_type; /* one of enum bpf_map_type */ @@ -409,6 +416,8 @@ union bpf_attr { __u32 line_info_rec_size; /* userspace bpf_line_info size */ __aligned_u64 line_info; /* line info */ __u32 line_info_cnt; /* number of bpf_line_info records */ + __aligned_u64 prog_subtype; /* bpf_prog_subtype address */ + __u32 prog_subtype_size; }; struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_OBJ_* commands */ diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c index c7d7993c44bb..ecd894344bbd 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c @@ -227,6 +227,9 @@ int bpf_load_program_xattr(const struct bpf_load_program_attr *load_attr, memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr)); attr.prog_type = load_attr->prog_type; + attr.prog_subtype = ptr_to_u64(load_attr->prog_subtype); + attr.prog_subtype_size = load_attr->prog_subtype ? + sizeof(*load_attr->prog_subtype) : 0; attr.expected_attach_type = load_attr->expected_attach_type; attr.insn_cnt = (__u32)load_attr->insns_cnt; attr.insns = ptr_to_u64(load_attr->insns); @@ -332,6 +335,11 @@ int bpf_load_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns, return bpf_load_program_xattr(&load_attr, log_buf, log_buf_sz); } +int bpf_verify_program_xattr(union bpf_attr *attr, size_t attr_sz) +{ + return sys_bpf_prog_load(attr, attr_sz); +} + int bpf_verify_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns, size_t insns_cnt, __u32 prog_flags, const char *license, __u32 kern_version, char *log_buf, size_t log_buf_sz, @@ -351,7 +359,7 @@ int bpf_verify_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns, attr.kern_version = kern_version; attr.prog_flags = prog_flags; - return sys_bpf_prog_load(&attr, sizeof(attr)); + return bpf_verify_program_xattr(&attr, sizeof(attr)); } int bpf_map_update_elem(int fd, const void *key, const void *value, diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h index ff42ca043dc8..7cd600d49f9e 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ struct bpf_load_program_attr { __u32 line_info_cnt; __u32 log_level; __u32 prog_flags; + const union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype; }; /* Flags to direct loading requirements */ @@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ LIBBPF_API int bpf_load_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns, size_t insns_cnt, const char *license, __u32 kern_version, char *log_buf, size_t log_buf_sz); +LIBBPF_API int bpf_verify_program_xattr(union bpf_attr *attr, size_t attr_sz); LIBBPF_API int bpf_verify_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns, size_t insns_cnt, __u32 prog_flags, diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map index 2c6d835620d2..48c9269a0496 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ LIBBPF_0.0.1 { bpf_set_link_xdp_fd; bpf_task_fd_query; bpf_verify_program; + bpf_verify_program_xattr; btf__fd; btf__find_by_name; btf__free; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c index c5514daf8865..93faffd31fc3 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c @@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ struct bpf_test { __u64 data64[TEST_DATA_LEN / 8]; }; } retvals[MAX_TEST_RUNS]; + bool has_prog_subtype; + union bpf_prog_subtype prog_subtype; }; /* Note we want this to be 64 bit aligned so that the end of our array is @@ -122,6 +124,11 @@ struct other_val { long long bar; }; +static inline __u64 ptr_to_u64(const void *ptr) +{ + return (__u64) (unsigned long) ptr; +} + static void bpf_fill_ld_abs_vlan_push_pop(struct bpf_test *self) { /* test: {skb->data[0], vlan_push} x 51 + {skb->data[0], vlan_pop} x 51 */ @@ -856,6 +863,9 @@ static void do_test_single(struct bpf_test *test, bool unpriv, int fixup_skips; __u32 pflags; int i, err; + union bpf_attr attr; + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype = + test->has_prog_subtype ? &test->prog_subtype : NULL; for (i = 0; i < MAX_NR_MAPS; i++) map_fds[i] = -1; @@ -881,8 +891,20 @@ static void do_test_single(struct bpf_test *test, bool unpriv, pflags |= BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT; if (test->flags & F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) pflags |= BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT; - fd_prog = bpf_verify_program(prog_type, prog, prog_len, pflags, - "GPL", 0, bpf_vlog, sizeof(bpf_vlog), 4); + + memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr)); + attr.prog_type = prog_type; + attr.prog_subtype = ptr_to_u64(prog_subtype); + attr.prog_subtype_size = prog_subtype ? sizeof(*prog_subtype) : 0; + attr.insn_cnt = (__u32)prog_len; + attr.insns = ptr_to_u64(prog); + attr.license = ptr_to_u64("GPL"); + bpf_vlog[0] = 0; + attr.log_buf = ptr_to_u64(bpf_vlog); + attr.log_size = sizeof(bpf_vlog); + attr.log_level = 4; + attr.prog_flags = pflags; + fd_prog = bpf_verify_program_xattr(&attr, sizeof(attr)); if (fd_prog < 0 && !bpf_probe_prog_type(prog_type, 0)) { printf("SKIP (unsupported program type %d)\n", prog_type); skips++; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cf614223d53f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +{ + "superfluous subtype", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .errstr = "", + .result = REJECT, + .has_prog_subtype = true, +}, From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:32 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016449 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF62C14BB for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA16926253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id CA2E92856D; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:04 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3265F26253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726341AbfFYVzC (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:02 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:55633 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726587AbfFYVzC (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:02 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrJZ1019802 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:19 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrIHg038697; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:19 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 03/10] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:32 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-4-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Add a new type of eBPF program used by Landlock hooks. This type of program can be chained with the same eBPF program type (according to subtype rules). A state can be kept with a value available in the program's context (e.g. named "cookie" for Landlock programs). This new BPF program type will be registered with the Landlock LSM initialization. Add an initial Landlock Kconfig and update the MAINTAINERS file. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn --- Changes since v8: * Remove the chaining concept from the eBPF program contexts (chain and cookie). We need to keep these subtypes this way to be able to make them evolve, though. * remove bpf_landlock_put_extra() because there is no more a "previous" field to free (for now) Changes since v7: * cosmetic fixes * rename LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_* to LANDLOCK_* * cleanup UAPI definitions and move them from bpf.h to landlock.h (suggested by Alexei Starovoitov) * disable Landlock by default (suggested by Alexei Starovoitov) * rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_{RULE,HOOK} * update the Kconfig * update the MAINTAINERS file * replace the IOCTL, LOCK and FCNTL events with FS_PICK, FS_WALK and FS_GET hook types * add the ability to chain programs with an eBPF program file descriptor (i.e. the "previous" field in a Landlock subtype) and keep a state with a "cookie" value available from the context * add a "triggers" subtype bitfield to match specific actions (e.g. append, chdir, read...) Changes since v6: * add 3 more sub-events: IOCTL, LOCK, FCNTL https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2fbc99a6-f190-f335-bd14-04bdeed35571@digikod.net * rename LANDLOCK_VERSION to LANDLOCK_ABI to better reflect its purpose, and move it from landlock.h to common.h * rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK to BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULE: an eBPF program could be used for something else than a rule * simplify struct landlock_context by removing the arch and syscall_nr fields * remove all eBPF map functions call, remove ABILITY_WRITE * refactor bpf_landlock_func_proto() (suggested by Kees Cook) * constify pointers * fix doc inclusion Changes since v5: * rename file hooks.c to init.c * fix spelling Changes since v4: * merge a minimal (not enabled) LSM code and Kconfig in this commit Changes since v3: * split commit * revamp the landlock_context: * add arch, syscall_nr and syscall_cmd (ioctl, fcntl…) to be able to cross-check action with the event type * replace args array with dedicated fields to ease the addition of new fields --- MAINTAINERS | 13 ++++ include/linux/bpf_types.h | 3 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 1 + security/Makefile | 2 + security/landlock/Kconfig | 18 +++++ security/landlock/Makefile | 3 + security/landlock/common.h | 26 +++++++ security/landlock/init.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 1 + tools/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 1 + tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c | 1 + 14 files changed, 398 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 security/landlock/common.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/init.c create mode 100644 tools/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 606d1f80bc49..4a5edc14ee84 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -8807,6 +8807,19 @@ F: net/core/skmsg.c F: net/core/sock_map.c F: net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +LANDLOCK SECURITY MODULE +M: Mickaël Salaün +S: Supported +F: Documentation/security/landlock/ +F: include/linux/landlock.h +F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +F: samples/bpf/landlock* +F: security/landlock/ +F: tools/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +F: tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ +K: landlock +K: LANDLOCK + LANTIQ / INTEL Ethernet drivers M: Hauke Mehrtens L: netdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_types.h b/include/linux/bpf_types.h index 5a9975678d6f..dee8b82e31b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_types.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_types.h @@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LIRC_MODE2, lirc_mode2) #ifdef CONFIG_INET BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT, sk_reuseport) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK +BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, landlock) +#endif BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY, array_map_ops) BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY, percpu_array_map_ops) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index ddae50373d58..50145d448bc3 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ enum bpf_prog_type { BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR, BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL, BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE, + BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, }; enum bpf_attach_type { diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9e6d8e10ec2c --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * Landlock - UAPI headers + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__ +#define _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__ + +#include + +#define LANDLOCK_RET_ALLOW 0 +#define LANDLOCK_RET_DENY 1 + +/** + * enum landlock_hook_type - hook type for which a Landlock program is called + * + * A hook is a policy decision point which exposes the same context type for + * each program evaluation. + * + * @LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK: called for the last element of a file path + * @LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK: called for each directory of a file path (excluding + * the directory passed to fs_pick, if any) + */ +enum landlock_hook_type { + LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK = 1, + LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK, +}; + +/** + * DOC: landlock_triggers + * + * A landlock trigger is used as a bitmask in subtype.landlock_hook.triggers + * for a fs_pick program. It defines a set of actions for which the program + * should verify an access request. + * + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_APPEND + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHDIR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHROOT + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_FCNTL + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_IOCTL + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINK + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINKTO + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LOCK + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MAP + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MOUNTON + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RECEIVE + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAME + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAMETO + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RMDIR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_TRANSFER + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_UNLINK + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE + */ +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_APPEND (1ULL << 0) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHDIR (1ULL << 1) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHROOT (1ULL << 2) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE (1ULL << 3) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE (1ULL << 4) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_FCNTL (1ULL << 5) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR (1ULL << 6) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_IOCTL (1ULL << 7) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINK (1ULL << 8) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINKTO (1ULL << 9) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LOCK (1ULL << 10) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MAP (1ULL << 11) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MOUNTON (1ULL << 12) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN (1ULL << 13) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ (1ULL << 14) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR (1ULL << 15) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RECEIVE (1ULL << 16) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAME (1ULL << 17) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAMETO (1ULL << 18) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RMDIR (1ULL << 19) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR (1ULL << 20) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_TRANSFER (1ULL << 21) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_UNLINK (1ULL << 22) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE (1ULL << 23) + +/** + * struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick - context accessible to a fs_pick program + * + * @inode: pointer to the current kernel object that can be used to compare + * inodes from an inode map. + */ +struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick { + __u64 inode; +}; + +/** + * struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk - context accessible to a fs_walk program + * + * @inode: pointer to the current kernel object that can be used to compare + * inodes from an inode map. + */ +struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk { + __u64 inode; +}; + +#endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__ */ diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 466cc1f8ffed..d3c070a01470 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ source "security/apparmor/Kconfig" source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" +source "security/landlock/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index c598b904938f..396ff107f70d 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8bd103102008 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +config SECURITY_LANDLOCK + bool "Landlock support" + depends on SECURITY + depends on BPF_SYSCALL + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER + default n + help + This selects Landlock, a programmatic access control. It enables to + restrict processes on the fly (i.e. create a sandbox). The security + policy is a set of eBPF programs, dedicated to deny a list of actions + on specific kernel objects (e.g. file). + + You need to enable seccomp filter to apply a security policy to a + process hierarchy (e.g. application with built-in sandboxing). + + See Documentation/security/landlock/ for further information. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7205f9a7a2ee --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o + +landlock-y := init.o diff --git a/security/landlock/common.h b/security/landlock/common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fd63ed1592a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - private headers + * + * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H + +#include /* enum bpf_prog_aux */ +#include /* bpf_prog */ +#include /* refcount_t */ +#include /* enum landlock_hook_type */ + +#define LANDLOCK_NAME "landlock" + +/* UAPI bounds and bitmasks */ + +#define _LANDLOCK_HOOK_LAST LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK + +#define _LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LAST LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE +#define _LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MASK ((_LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LAST << 1ULL) - 1) + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/init.c b/security/landlock/init.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..03073cd0fc4e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/init.c @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - init + * + * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#include /* enum bpf_access_type */ +#include /* capable */ +#include /* struct bpf_prog */ + +#include "common.h" /* LANDLOCK_* */ + +static bool bpf_landlock_is_valid_access(int off, int size, + enum bpf_access_type type, const struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info) +{ + const union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype; + enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = NOT_INIT; + int max_size = 0; + + if (WARN_ON(!prog->aux->extra)) + return false; + prog_subtype = &prog->aux->extra->subtype; + + if (off < 0) + return false; + if (size <= 0 || size > sizeof(__u64)) + return false; + + /* check memory range access */ + switch (reg_type) { + case NOT_INIT: + return false; + case SCALAR_VALUE: + /* allow partial raw value */ + if (size > max_size) + return false; + info->ctx_field_size = max_size; + break; + default: + /* deny partial pointer */ + if (size != max_size) + return false; + } + + info->reg_type = reg_type; + return true; +} + +static bool bpf_landlock_is_valid_subtype(struct bpf_prog_extra *prog_extra) +{ + const union bpf_prog_subtype *subtype; + + if (!prog_extra) + return false; + subtype = &prog_extra->subtype; + + switch (subtype->landlock_hook.type) { + case LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK: + if (!subtype->landlock_hook.triggers || + subtype->landlock_hook.triggers & + ~_LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MASK) + return false; + break; + case LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK: + if (subtype->landlock_hook.triggers) + return false; + break; + default: + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_landlock_func_proto( + enum bpf_func_id func_id, + const struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + u64 hook_type; + + if (WARN_ON(!prog->aux->extra)) + return NULL; + hook_type = prog->aux->extra->subtype.landlock_hook.type; + + /* generic functions */ + /* TODO: do we need/want update/delete functions for every LL prog? + * => impurity vs. audit */ + switch (func_id) { + case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: + return &bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem: + return &bpf_map_update_elem_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: + return &bpf_map_delete_elem_proto; + default: + break; + } + return NULL; +} + +const struct bpf_verifier_ops landlock_verifier_ops = { + .get_func_proto = bpf_landlock_func_proto, + .is_valid_access = bpf_landlock_is_valid_access, + .is_valid_subtype = bpf_landlock_is_valid_subtype, +}; + +const struct bpf_prog_ops landlock_prog_ops = {}; diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index ddae50373d58..50145d448bc3 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ enum bpf_prog_type { BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR, BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL, BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE, + BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, }; enum bpf_attach_type { diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9e6d8e10ec2c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * Landlock - UAPI headers + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__ +#define _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__ + +#include + +#define LANDLOCK_RET_ALLOW 0 +#define LANDLOCK_RET_DENY 1 + +/** + * enum landlock_hook_type - hook type for which a Landlock program is called + * + * A hook is a policy decision point which exposes the same context type for + * each program evaluation. + * + * @LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK: called for the last element of a file path + * @LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK: called for each directory of a file path (excluding + * the directory passed to fs_pick, if any) + */ +enum landlock_hook_type { + LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK = 1, + LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK, +}; + +/** + * DOC: landlock_triggers + * + * A landlock trigger is used as a bitmask in subtype.landlock_hook.triggers + * for a fs_pick program. It defines a set of actions for which the program + * should verify an access request. + * + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_APPEND + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHDIR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHROOT + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_FCNTL + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_IOCTL + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINK + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINKTO + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LOCK + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MAP + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MOUNTON + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RECEIVE + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAME + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAMETO + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RMDIR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_TRANSFER + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_UNLINK + * - %LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE + */ +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_APPEND (1ULL << 0) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHDIR (1ULL << 1) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHROOT (1ULL << 2) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE (1ULL << 3) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE (1ULL << 4) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_FCNTL (1ULL << 5) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR (1ULL << 6) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_IOCTL (1ULL << 7) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINK (1ULL << 8) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINKTO (1ULL << 9) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LOCK (1ULL << 10) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MAP (1ULL << 11) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MOUNTON (1ULL << 12) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN (1ULL << 13) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ (1ULL << 14) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR (1ULL << 15) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RECEIVE (1ULL << 16) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAME (1ULL << 17) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAMETO (1ULL << 18) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RMDIR (1ULL << 19) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR (1ULL << 20) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_TRANSFER (1ULL << 21) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_UNLINK (1ULL << 22) +#define LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE (1ULL << 23) + +/** + * struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick - context accessible to a fs_pick program + * + * @inode: pointer to the current kernel object that can be used to compare + * inodes from an inode map. + */ +struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick { + __u64 inode; +}; + +/** + * struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk - context accessible to a fs_walk program + * + * @inode: pointer to the current kernel object that can be used to compare + * inodes from an inode map. + */ +struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk { + __u64 inode; +}; + +#endif /* _UAPI__LINUX_LANDLOCK_H__ */ diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c index 68f45a96769f..1b99c8da7a67 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c @@ -2646,6 +2646,7 @@ static bool bpf_prog_type__needs_kver(enum bpf_prog_type type) case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK: return false; case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: default: diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c index 6635a31a7a16..f4f34cb8869a 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ probe_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type, const struct bpf_insn *insns, case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK: default: break; } From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:33 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016461 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D6FD14BB for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08ECC26253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id EDD732675C; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:34 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 579D62675C for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726287AbfFYVzd (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:33 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:58213 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726542AbfFYVzc (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:32 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrK1v019814 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:20 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrKcg038719; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:20 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 04/10] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:33 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-5-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The seccomp(2) syscall can be used by a task to apply a Landlock program to itself. As a seccomp filter, a Landlock program is enforced for the current task and all its future children. A program is immutable and a task can only add new restricting programs to itself, forming a list of programss. A Landlock program is tied to a Landlock hook. If the action on a kernel object is allowed by the other Linux security mechanisms (e.g. DAC, capabilities, other LSM), then a Landlock hook related to this kind of object is triggered. The list of programs for this hook is then evaluated. Each program return a 32-bit value which can deny the action on a kernel object with a non-zero value. If every programs of the list return zero, then the action on the object is allowed. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: Will Drewry Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c10a503d-5e35-7785-2f3d-25ed8dd63fab@digikod.net --- Changes since v8: * Remove the chaining concept from the eBPF program contexts (chain and cookie). We need to keep these subtypes this way to be able to make them evolve, though. Changes since v7: * handle and verify program chains * split and rename providers.c to enforce.c and enforce_seccomp.c * rename LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_* to LANDLOCK_* Changes since v6: * rename some functions with more accurate names to reflect that an eBPF program for Landlock could be used for something else than a rule * reword rule "appending" to "prepending" and explain it * remove the superfluous no_new_privs check, only check global CAP_SYS_ADMIN when prepending a Landlock rule (needed for containers) * create and use {get,put}_seccomp_landlock() (suggested by Kees Cook) * replace ifdef with static inlined function (suggested by Kees Cook) * use get_user() (suggested by Kees Cook) * replace atomic_t with refcount_t (requested by Kees Cook) * move struct landlock_{rule,events} from landlock.h to common.h * cleanup headers Changes since v5: * remove struct landlock_node and use a similar inheritance mechanisme as seccomp-bpf (requested by Andy Lutomirski) * rename SECCOMP_ADD_LANDLOCK_RULE to SECCOMP_APPEND_LANDLOCK_RULE * rename file manager.c to providers.c * add comments * typo and cosmetic fixes Changes since v4: * merge manager and seccomp patches * return -EFAULT in seccomp(2) when user_bpf_fd is null to easely check if Landlock is supported * only allow a process with the global CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use Landlock (will be lifted in the future) * add an early check to exit as soon as possible if the current process does not have Landlock rules Changes since v3: * remove the hard link with seccomp (suggested by Andy Lutomirski and Kees Cook): * remove the cookie which could imply multiple evaluation of Landlock rules * remove the origin field in struct landlock_data * remove documentation fix (merged upstream) * rename the new seccomp command to SECCOMP_ADD_LANDLOCK_RULE * internal renaming * split commit * new design to be able to inherit on the fly the parent rules Changes since v2: * Landlock programs can now be run without seccomp filter but for any syscall (from the process) or interruption * move Landlock related functions and structs into security/landlock/* (to manage cgroups as well) * fix seccomp filter handling: run Landlock programs for each of their legitimate seccomp filter * properly clean up all seccomp results * cosmetic changes to ease the understanding * fix some ifdef --- include/linux/landlock.h | 34 ++++ include/linux/seccomp.h | 5 + include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 1 + kernel/fork.c | 8 +- kernel/seccomp.c | 4 + security/landlock/Makefile | 3 +- security/landlock/common.h | 45 +++++ security/landlock/enforce.c | 272 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/enforce.h | 18 ++ security/landlock/enforce_seccomp.c | 92 ++++++++++ 10 files changed, 480 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/landlock.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/enforce.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/enforce.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/enforce_seccomp.c diff --git a/include/linux/landlock.h b/include/linux/landlock.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8ac7942f50fc --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/landlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - public kernel headers + * + * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_LANDLOCK_H +#define _LINUX_LANDLOCK_H + +#include +#include /* task_struct */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) +extern int landlock_seccomp_prepend_prog(unsigned int flags, + const int __user *user_bpf_fd); +extern void put_seccomp_landlock(struct task_struct *tsk); +extern void get_seccomp_landlock(struct task_struct *tsk); +#else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ +static inline int landlock_seccomp_prepend_prog(unsigned int flags, + const int __user *user_bpf_fd) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} +static inline void put_seccomp_landlock(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +} +static inline void get_seccomp_landlock(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index 84868d37b35d..106a0ceff3d7 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP +#include #include #include @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ struct seccomp_filter; * system calls available to a process. * @filter: must always point to a valid seccomp-filter or NULL as it is * accessed without locking during system call entry. + * @landlock_prog_set: contains a set of Landlock programs. * * @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there * is no read locking. @@ -29,6 +31,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter; struct seccomp { int mode; struct seccomp_filter *filter; +#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) + struct landlock_prog_set *landlock_prog_set; +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER && CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ }; #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h index 90734aa5aa36..bce6534e7feb 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1 #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2 #define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3 +#define SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG 4 /* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 75675b9bf6df..a1ad5e80611b 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -454,6 +455,7 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk) rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk); ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk); put_seccomp_filter(tsk); + put_seccomp_landlock(tsk); arch_release_task_struct(tsk); if (tsk->flags & PF_KTHREAD) free_kthread_struct(tsk); @@ -884,7 +886,10 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) * the usage counts on the error path calling free_task. */ tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL; -#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK + tsk->seccomp.landlock_prog_set = NULL; +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */ +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */ setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig); clear_user_return_notifier(tsk); @@ -1598,6 +1603,7 @@ static void copy_seccomp(struct task_struct *p) /* Ref-count the new filter user, and assign it. */ get_seccomp_filter(current); + get_seccomp_landlock(current); p->seccomp = current->seccomp; /* diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 811b4a86cdf6..e5005a644b23 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include enum notify_state { SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT, @@ -1397,6 +1398,9 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, return -EINVAL; return seccomp_get_notif_sizes(uargs); + case SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG: + return landlock_seccomp_prepend_prog(flags, + (const int __user *)uargs); default: return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index 7205f9a7a2ee..2a1a7082a365 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o -landlock-y := init.o +landlock-y := init.o \ + enforce.o enforce_seccomp.o diff --git a/security/landlock/common.h b/security/landlock/common.h index fd63ed1592a7..0c9b5904e7f5 100644 --- a/security/landlock/common.h +++ b/security/landlock/common.h @@ -23,4 +23,49 @@ #define _LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LAST LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE #define _LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MASK ((_LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LAST << 1ULL) - 1) +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes; + +struct landlock_prog_list { + struct landlock_prog_list *prev; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + refcount_t usage; +}; + +/** + * struct landlock_prog_set - Landlock programs enforced on a thread + * + * This is used for low performance impact when forking a process. Instead of + * copying the full array and incrementing the usage of each entries, only + * create a pointer to &struct landlock_prog_set and increments its usage. When + * prepending a new program, if &struct landlock_prog_set is shared with other + * tasks, then duplicate it and prepend the program to this new &struct + * landlock_prog_set. + * + * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime. When a thread need to + * add Landlock programs and if @usage is greater than 1, then the + * thread must duplicate &struct landlock_prog_set to not change the + * children's programs as well. + * @programs: array of non-NULL &struct landlock_prog_list pointers + */ +struct landlock_prog_set { + struct landlock_prog_list *programs[_LANDLOCK_HOOK_LAST]; + refcount_t usage; +}; + +/** + * get_index - get an index for the programs of struct landlock_prog_set + * + * @type: a Landlock hook type + */ +static inline int get_index(enum landlock_hook_type type) +{ + /* type ID > 0 for loaded programs */ + return type - 1; +} + +static inline enum landlock_hook_type get_type(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return prog->aux->extra->subtype.landlock_hook.type; +} + #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/enforce.c b/security/landlock/enforce.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c06063d9d43d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/enforce.c @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - enforcing helpers + * + * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#include /* smp_store_release() */ +#include /* PAGE_SIZE */ +#include /* bpf_prog_put() */ +#include /* READ_ONCE() */ +#include /* PTR_ERR() */ +#include +#include /* struct bpf_prog */ +#include +#include /* alloc(), kfree() */ + +#include "common.h" /* struct landlock_prog_list */ + +/* TODO: use a dedicated kmem_cache_alloc() instead of k*alloc() */ + +static void put_landlock_prog_list(struct landlock_prog_list *prog_list) +{ + struct landlock_prog_list *orig = prog_list; + + /* clean up single-reference branches iteratively */ + while (orig && refcount_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) { + struct landlock_prog_list *freeme = orig; + + if (orig->prog) + bpf_prog_put(orig->prog); + orig = orig->prev; + kfree(freeme); + } +} + +void landlock_put_prog_set(struct landlock_prog_set *prog_set) +{ + if (prog_set && refcount_dec_and_test(&prog_set->usage)) { + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(prog_set->programs); i++) + put_landlock_prog_list(prog_set->programs[i]); + kfree(prog_set); + } +} + +void landlock_get_prog_set(struct landlock_prog_set *prog_set) +{ + if (!prog_set) + return; + refcount_inc(&prog_set->usage); +} + +static struct landlock_prog_set *new_landlock_prog_set(void) +{ + struct landlock_prog_set *ret; + + /* array filled with NULL values */ + ret = kzalloc(sizeof(*ret), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ret) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + refcount_set(&ret->usage, 1); + return ret; +} + +/** + * store_landlock_prog - prepend and deduplicate a Landlock prog_list + * + * Prepend @prog to @init_prog_set while ignoring @prog + * if they are already in @ref_prog_set. Whatever is the result of this + * function call, you can call bpf_prog_put(@prog) after. + * + * @init_prog_set: empty prog_set to prepend to + * @ref_prog_set: prog_set to check for duplicate programs + * @prog: program to prepend + * + * Return -errno on error or 0 if @prog was successfully stored. + */ +static int store_landlock_prog(struct landlock_prog_set *init_prog_set, + const struct landlock_prog_set *ref_prog_set, + struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + struct landlock_prog_list *tmp_list = NULL; + int err; + u32 hook_idx; + enum landlock_hook_type last_type; + struct bpf_prog *new = prog; + + /* allocate all the memory we need */ + struct landlock_prog_list *new_list; + + last_type = get_type(new); + + /* ignore duplicate programs */ + if (ref_prog_set) { + struct landlock_prog_list *ref; + + hook_idx = get_index(get_type(new)); + for (ref = ref_prog_set->programs[hook_idx]; + ref; ref = ref->prev) { + if (ref->prog == new) + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + new = bpf_prog_inc(new); + if (IS_ERR(new)) { + err = PTR_ERR(new); + goto put_tmp_list; + } + new_list = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_list), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_list) { + bpf_prog_put(new); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto put_tmp_list; + } + /* ignore Landlock types in this tmp_list */ + new_list->prog = new; + new_list->prev = tmp_list; + refcount_set(&new_list->usage, 1); + tmp_list = new_list; + + if (!tmp_list) + /* inform user space that this program was already added */ + return -EEXIST; + + /* properly store the list (without error cases) */ + while (tmp_list) { + struct landlock_prog_list *new_list; + + new_list = tmp_list; + tmp_list = tmp_list->prev; + /* do not increment the previous prog list usage */ + hook_idx = get_index(get_type(new_list->prog)); + new_list->prev = init_prog_set->programs[hook_idx]; + /* no need to add from the last program to the first because + * each of them are a different Landlock type */ + smp_store_release(&init_prog_set->programs[hook_idx], new_list); + } + return 0; + +put_tmp_list: + put_landlock_prog_list(tmp_list); + return err; +} + +/* limit Landlock programs set to 256KB */ +#define LANDLOCK_PROGRAMS_MAX_PAGES (1 << 6) + +/** + * landlock_prepend_prog - attach a Landlock prog_list to @current_prog_set + * + * Whatever is the result of this function call, you can call + * bpf_prog_put(@prog) after. + * + * @current_prog_set: landlock_prog_set pointer, must be locked (if needed) to + * prevent a concurrent put/free. This pointer must not be + * freed after the call. + * @prog: non-NULL Landlock prog_list to prepend to @current_prog_set. @prog + * will be owned by landlock_prepend_prog() and freed if an error + * happened. + * + * Return @current_prog_set or a new pointer when OK. Return a pointer error + * otherwise. + */ +struct landlock_prog_set *landlock_prepend_prog( + struct landlock_prog_set *current_prog_set, + struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + struct landlock_prog_set *new_prog_set = current_prog_set; + unsigned long pages; + int err; + size_t i; + struct landlock_prog_set tmp_prog_set = {}; + + if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* validate memory size allocation */ + pages = prog->pages; + if (current_prog_set) { + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(current_prog_set->programs); i++) { + struct landlock_prog_list *walker_p; + + for (walker_p = current_prog_set->programs[i]; + walker_p; walker_p = walker_p->prev) + pages += walker_p->prog->pages; + } + /* count a struct landlock_prog_set if we need to allocate one */ + if (refcount_read(¤t_prog_set->usage) != 1) + pages += round_up(sizeof(*current_prog_set), PAGE_SIZE) + / PAGE_SIZE; + } + if (pages > LANDLOCK_PROGRAMS_MAX_PAGES) + return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + + /* ensure early that we can allocate enough memory for the new + * prog_lists */ + err = store_landlock_prog(&tmp_prog_set, current_prog_set, prog); + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + + /* + * Each task_struct points to an array of prog list pointers. These + * tables are duplicated when additions are made (which means each + * table needs to be refcounted for the processes using it). When a new + * table is created, all the refcounters on the prog_list are bumped (to + * track each table that references the prog). When a new prog is + * added, it's just prepended to the list for the new table to point + * at. + * + * Manage all the possible errors before this step to not uselessly + * duplicate current_prog_set and avoid a rollback. + */ + if (!new_prog_set) { + /* + * If there is no Landlock program set used by the current task, + * then create a new one. + */ + new_prog_set = new_landlock_prog_set(); + if (IS_ERR(new_prog_set)) + goto put_tmp_lists; + } else if (refcount_read(¤t_prog_set->usage) > 1) { + /* + * If the current task is not the sole user of its Landlock + * program set, then duplicate them. + */ + new_prog_set = new_landlock_prog_set(); + if (IS_ERR(new_prog_set)) + goto put_tmp_lists; + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(new_prog_set->programs); i++) { + new_prog_set->programs[i] = + READ_ONCE(current_prog_set->programs[i]); + if (new_prog_set->programs[i]) + refcount_inc(&new_prog_set->programs[i]->usage); + } + + /* + * Landlock program set from the current task will not be freed + * here because the usage is strictly greater than 1. It is + * only prevented to be freed by another task thanks to the + * caller of landlock_prepend_prog() which should be locked if + * needed. + */ + landlock_put_prog_set(current_prog_set); + } + + /* prepend tmp_prog_set to new_prog_set */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tmp_prog_set.programs); i++) { + /* get the last new list */ + struct landlock_prog_list *last_list = + tmp_prog_set.programs[i]; + + if (last_list) { + while (last_list->prev) + last_list = last_list->prev; + /* no need to increment usage (pointer replacement) */ + last_list->prev = new_prog_set->programs[i]; + new_prog_set->programs[i] = tmp_prog_set.programs[i]; + } + } + return new_prog_set; + +put_tmp_lists: + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tmp_prog_set.programs); i++) + put_landlock_prog_list(tmp_prog_set.programs[i]); + return new_prog_set; +} diff --git a/security/landlock/enforce.h b/security/landlock/enforce.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..39b800d9999f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/enforce.h @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - enforcing helpers headers + * + * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ENFORCE_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ENFORCE_H + +struct landlock_prog_set *landlock_prepend_prog( + struct landlock_prog_set *current_prog_set, + struct bpf_prog *prog); +void landlock_put_prog_set(struct landlock_prog_set *prog_set); +void landlock_get_prog_set(struct landlock_prog_set *prog_set); + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ENFORCE_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/enforce_seccomp.c b/security/landlock/enforce_seccomp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c38c81e6b01a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/enforce_seccomp.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - enforcing with seccomp + * + * Copyright © 2016-2018 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + +#include /* bpf_prog_put() */ +#include +#include /* PTR_ERR() */ +#include +#include /* struct bpf_prog */ +#include +#include +#include /* current */ +#include /* get_user() */ + +#include "enforce.h" + +/* headers in include/linux/landlock.h */ + +/** + * landlock_seccomp_prepend_prog - attach a Landlock program to the current + * process + * + * current->seccomp.landlock_state->prog_set is lazily allocated. When a + * process fork, only a pointer is copied. When a new program is added by a + * process, if there is other references to this process' prog_set, then a new + * allocation is made to contain an array pointing to Landlock program lists. + * This design enable low-performance impact and is memory efficient while + * keeping the property of prepend-only programs. + * + * For now, installing a Landlock prog requires that the requesting task has + * the global CAP_SYS_ADMIN. We cannot force the use of no_new_privs to not + * exclude containers where a process may legitimately acquire more privileges + * thanks to an SUID binary. + * + * @flags: not used for now, but could be used for TSYNC + * @user_bpf_fd: file descriptor pointing to a loaded Landlock prog + */ +int landlock_seccomp_prepend_prog(unsigned int flags, + const int __user *user_bpf_fd) +{ + struct landlock_prog_set *new_prog_set; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + int bpf_fd, err; + + /* planned to be replaced with a no_new_privs check to allow + * unprivileged tasks */ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + /* enable to check if Landlock is supported with early EFAULT */ + if (!user_bpf_fd) + return -EFAULT; + if (flags) + return -EINVAL; + err = get_user(bpf_fd, user_bpf_fd); + if (err) + return err; + + prog = bpf_prog_get(bpf_fd); + if (IS_ERR(prog)) + return PTR_ERR(prog); + + /* + * We don't need to lock anything for the current process hierarchy, + * everything is guarded by the atomic counters. + */ + new_prog_set = landlock_prepend_prog( + current->seccomp.landlock_prog_set, prog); + bpf_prog_put(prog); + /* @prog is managed/freed by landlock_prepend_prog() */ + if (IS_ERR(new_prog_set)) + return PTR_ERR(new_prog_set); + current->seccomp.landlock_prog_set = new_prog_set; + return 0; +} + +void put_seccomp_landlock(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + landlock_put_prog_set(tsk->seccomp.landlock_prog_set); +} + +void get_seccomp_landlock(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + landlock_get_prog_set(tsk->seccomp.landlock_prog_set); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:34 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016493 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EA9B1580 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 22:04:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F15A285C4 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 22:04:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 51A8F285C7; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 22:04:02 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1058285C4 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 22:04:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725782AbfFYWD7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 18:03:59 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:43652 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725914AbfFYWD7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 18:03:59 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrLve019831 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:21 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrLhB038785; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:21 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 05/10] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:34 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-6-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This new map store arbitrary 64-bits values referenced by inode keys. The map can be updated from user space with file descriptor pointing to inodes tied to a file system. From an eBPF (Landlock) program point of view, such a map is read-only and can only be used to retrieved a 64-bits value tied to a given inode. This is useful to recognize an inode tagged by user space, without access right to this inode (i.e. no need to have a write access to this inode). Add dedicated BPF functions to handle this type of map: * bpf_inode_map_update_elem() * bpf_inode_map_lookup_elem() * bpf_inode_map_delete_elem() Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: Jann Horn --- Changes since v8: * remove prog chaining and object tagging to ease review * use bpf_map_init_from_attr() Changes since v7: * new design with a dedicated map and a BPF function to tie a value to an inode * add the ability to set or get a tag on an inode from a Landlock program Changes since v6: * remove WARN_ON() for missing dentry->d_inode * refactor bpf_landlock_func_proto() (suggested by Kees Cook) Changes since v5: * cosmetic fixes and rebase Changes since v4: * use a file abstraction (handle) to wrap inode, dentry, path and file structs * remove bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath() * rename the BPF helper and move it to kernel/bpf/ * tighten helpers accessible by a Landlock rule Changes since v3: * remove bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_prop() (suggested by Alexei Starovoitov) * add hooks dealing with struct inode and struct path pointers: inode_permission and inode_getattr * add abstraction over eBPF helper arguments thanks to wrapping structs * add bpf_landlock_get_fs_mode() helper to check file type and mode * merge WARN_ON() (suggested by Kees Cook) * fix and update bpf_helpers.h * use BPF_CALL_* for eBPF helpers (suggested by Alexei Starovoitov) * make handle arraymap safe (RCU) and remove buggy synchronize_rcu() * factor out the arraymay walk * use size_t to index array (suggested by Jann Horn) Changes since v2: * add MNT_INTERNAL check to only add file handle from user-visible FS (e.g. no anonymous inode) * replace struct file* with struct path* in map_landlock_handle * add BPF protos * fix bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_prop_with_struct_file() --- include/linux/bpf.h | 9 + include/linux/bpf_types.h | 3 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 12 +- kernel/bpf/Makefile | 3 + kernel/bpf/core.c | 2 + kernel/bpf/inodemap.c | 315 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 27 ++- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 14 ++ tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 12 +- tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c | 1 + 10 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/inodemap.c diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index da167d3afecc..cc72ec18f0f6 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ enum bpf_arg_type { ARG_PTR_TO_INT, /* pointer to int */ ARG_PTR_TO_LONG, /* pointer to long */ ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET, /* pointer to bpf_sock (fullsock) */ + + ARG_PTR_TO_INODE, /* pointer to a struct inode */ }; /* type of values returned from helper functions */ @@ -278,6 +280,7 @@ enum bpf_reg_type { PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL, /* reg points to struct tcp_sock or NULL */ PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER, /* reg points to a writable raw tp's buffer */ PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK, /* reg points to struct xdp_sock */ + PTR_TO_INODE, /* reg points to struct inode */ }; /* The information passed from prog-specific *_is_valid_access @@ -485,6 +488,7 @@ struct bpf_event_entry { struct rcu_head rcu; }; + bool bpf_prog_array_compatible(struct bpf_array *array, const struct bpf_prog *fp); int bpf_prog_calc_tag(struct bpf_prog *fp); @@ -689,6 +693,10 @@ int bpf_fd_array_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 *value); int bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *map_file, void *key, void *value, u64 map_flags); int bpf_fd_htab_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u32 *value); +int bpf_inode_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key, u64 *value, + u64 flags); +int bpf_inode_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key, u64 *value); +int bpf_inode_map_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key); int bpf_get_file_flag(int flags); int bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(void __user *uaddr, size_t expected_size, @@ -1059,6 +1067,7 @@ extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_spin_unlock_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_local_storage_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strtol_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strtoul_proto; +extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_inode_map_lookup_proto; /* Shared helpers among cBPF and eBPF. */ void bpf_user_rnd_init_once(void); diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_types.h b/include/linux/bpf_types.h index dee8b82e31b1..9e385473b57a 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_types.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_types.h @@ -79,3 +79,6 @@ BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY, reuseport_array_ops) #endif BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE, queue_map_ops) BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK, stack_map_ops) +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK +BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE, inode_ops) +#endif diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 50145d448bc3..08ff720835ba 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ enum bpf_map_type { BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE, BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK, BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE, }; /* Note that tracing related programs such as @@ -2716,6 +2717,14 @@ union bpf_attr { * **-EPERM** if no permission to send the *sig*. * * **-EAGAIN** if bpf program can try again. + * + * u64 bpf_inode_map_lookup(map, key) + * Description + * Perform a lookup in *map* for an entry associated to an inode + * *key*. + * Return + * Map value associated to *key*, or **NULL** if no entry was + * found. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -2827,7 +2836,8 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(strtoul), \ FN(sk_storage_get), \ FN(sk_storage_delete), \ - FN(send_signal), + FN(send_signal), \ + FN(inode_map_lookup), /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper * function eBPF program intends to call diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/Makefile index 29d781061cd5..e6fe613b3105 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/Makefile +++ b/kernel/bpf/Makefile @@ -22,3 +22,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF) += cgroup.o ifeq ($(CONFIG_INET),y) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += reuseport_array.o endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK),y) +obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += inodemap.o +endif diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 8ad392e52328..3cf5d16a8496 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -2032,6 +2032,8 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_comm_proto __weak; const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_cgroup_id_proto __weak; const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_local_storage_proto __weak; +const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_inode_map_update_proto __weak; + const struct bpf_func_proto * __weak bpf_get_trace_printk_proto(void) { return NULL; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inodemap.c b/kernel/bpf/inodemap.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fcad0de51557 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/bpf/inodemap.c @@ -0,0 +1,315 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * inode map for Landlock + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI + */ + +#include /* RLIMIT_NOFILE */ +#include +#include +#include /* fput() */ +#include /* BPF_CALL_2() */ +#include /* struct file */ +#include +#include /* MNT_INTERNAL */ +#include /* struct path */ +#include /* rlimit() */ +#include +#include + +struct inode_elem { + struct inode *inode; + u64 value; +}; + +struct inode_array { + struct bpf_map map; + size_t nb_entries; + struct inode_elem elems[0]; +}; + +/* must call iput(inode) after this call */ +static struct inode *inode_from_fd(int ufd, bool check_access) +{ + struct inode *ret; + struct fd f; + int deny; + + f = fdget(ufd); + if (unlikely(!f.file || !file_inode(f.file))) { + ret = ERR_PTR(-EBADF); + goto put_fd; + } + /* TODO: add this check when called from an eBPF program too (already + * checked by the LSM parent hooks anyway) */ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(f.file)))) { + ret = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto put_fd; + } + /* check if the FD is tied to a mount point */ + /* TODO: add this check when called from an eBPF program too */ + if (unlikely(!f.file->f_path.mnt || f.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & + MNT_INTERNAL)) { + ret = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto put_fd; + } + if (check_access) { + /* + * need to be allowed to access attributes from this file to + * then be able to compare an inode to this entry + */ + deny = security_inode_getattr(&f.file->f_path); + if (deny) { + ret = ERR_PTR(deny); + goto put_fd; + } + } + ret = file_inode(f.file); + ihold(ret); + +put_fd: + fdput(f); + return ret; +} + +/* (never) called from eBPF program */ +static int fake_map_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key) +{ + WARN_ON(1); + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* called from syscall */ +static int sys_inode_map_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, struct inode *key) +{ + struct inode_array *array = container_of(map, struct inode_array, map); + struct inode *inode; + int i; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + for (i = 0; i < array->map.max_entries; i++) { + if (array->elems[i].inode == key) { + inode = xchg(&array->elems[i].inode, NULL); + array->nb_entries--; + iput(inode); + return 0; + } + } + return -ENOENT; +} + +/* called from syscall */ +int bpf_inode_map_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key) +{ + struct inode *inode; + int err; + + inode = inode_from_fd(*key, false); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return PTR_ERR(inode); + err = sys_inode_map_delete_elem(map, inode); + iput(inode); + return err; +} + +static void inode_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + struct inode_array *array = container_of(map, struct inode_array, map); + int i; + + synchronize_rcu(); + for (i = 0; i < array->map.max_entries; i++) + iput(array->elems[i].inode); + bpf_map_area_free(array); +} + +static struct bpf_map *inode_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) +{ + int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr); + struct inode_array *array; + u64 array_size; + + /* only allow root to create this type of map (for now), should be + * removed when Landlock will be usable by unprivileged users */ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + + /* the key is a file descriptor and the value must be 64-bits (for + * now) */ + if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != sizeof(u32) || + attr->value_size != FIELD_SIZEOF(struct inode_elem, value) || + attr->map_flags & ~(BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY) || + numa_node != NUMA_NO_NODE) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (attr->value_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) + /* if value_size is bigger, the user space won't be able to + * access the elements. + */ + return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + + /* + * Limit number of entries in an inode map to the maximum number of + * open files for the current process. The maximum number of file + * references (including all inode maps) for a process is then + * (RLIMIT_NOFILE - 1) * RLIMIT_NOFILE. If the process' RLIMIT_NOFILE + * is 0, then any entry update is forbidden. + * + * An eBPF program can inherit all the inode map FD. The worse case is + * to fill a bunch of arraymaps, create an eBPF program, close the + * inode map FDs, and start again. The maximum number of inode map + * entries can then be close to RLIMIT_NOFILE^3. + */ + if (attr->max_entries > rlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE)) + return ERR_PTR(-EMFILE); + + array_size = sizeof(*array); + array_size += (u64) attr->max_entries * sizeof(struct inode_elem); + + /* make sure there is no u32 overflow later in round_up() */ + if (array_size >= U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + /* allocate all map elements and zero-initialize them */ + array = bpf_map_area_alloc(array_size, numa_node); + if (!array) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + /* copy mandatory map attributes */ + bpf_map_init_from_attr(&array->map, attr); + array->map.memory.pages = round_up(array_size, PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + return &array->map; +} + +/* (never) called from eBPF program */ +static void *fake_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key) +{ + WARN_ON(1); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); +} + +/* called from syscall (wrapped) and eBPF program */ +static u64 inode_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, struct inode *key) +{ + struct inode_array *array = container_of(map, struct inode_array, map); + size_t i; + u64 ret = 0; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + /* TODO: use rbtree to switch to O(log n) */ + for (i = 0; i < array->map.max_entries; i++) { + if (array->elems[i].inode == key) { + ret = array->elems[i].value; + break; + } + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * The key is a FD when called from a syscall, but an inode pointer when called + * from an eBPF program. + */ + +/* called from syscall */ +int bpf_inode_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key, u64 *value) +{ + struct inode *inode; + + inode = inode_from_fd(*key, false); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return PTR_ERR(inode); + *value = inode_map_lookup_elem(map, inode); + iput(inode); + if (!value) + return -ENOENT; + return 0; +} + +/* (never) called from eBPF program */ +static int fake_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value, + u64 flags) +{ + WARN_ON(1); + /* do not leak an inode accessed by a Landlock program */ + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* called from syscall */ +static int sys_inode_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, struct inode *key, + u64 *value, u64 flags) +{ + struct inode_array *array = container_of(map, struct inode_array, map); + size_t i; + + if (unlikely(flags != BPF_ANY)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (unlikely(array->nb_entries >= array->map.max_entries)) + /* all elements were pre-allocated, cannot insert a new one */ + return -E2BIG; + + for (i = 0; i < array->map.max_entries; i++) { + if (!array->elems[i].inode) { + /* the inode (key) is already grabbed by the caller */ + ihold(key); + array->elems[i].inode = key; + array->elems[i].value = *value; + array->nb_entries++; + return 0; + } + } + WARN_ON(1); + return -ENOENT; +} + +/* called from syscall */ +int bpf_inode_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key, u64 *value, + u64 flags) +{ + struct inode *inode; + int err; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + inode = inode_from_fd(*key, true); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return PTR_ERR(inode); + err = sys_inode_map_update_elem(map, inode, value, flags); + iput(inode); + return err; +} + +/* called from syscall or (never) from eBPF program */ +static int fake_map_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, + void *next_key) +{ + /* do not leak a file descriptor */ + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* void map for eBPF program */ +const struct bpf_map_ops inode_ops = { + .map_alloc = inode_map_alloc, + .map_free = inode_map_free, + .map_get_next_key = fake_map_get_next_key, + .map_lookup_elem = fake_map_lookup_elem, + .map_delete_elem = fake_map_delete_elem, + .map_update_elem = fake_map_update_elem, +}; + +BPF_CALL_2(bpf_inode_map_lookup, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) +{ + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + return inode_map_lookup_elem(map, key); +} + +const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_inode_map_lookup_proto = { + .func = bpf_inode_map_lookup, + .gpl_only = false, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, + .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_INODE, +}; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 7dd3376904d4..ba2a09a7f813 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -720,6 +720,22 @@ static void *__bpf_copy_key(void __user *ukey, u64 key_size) return NULL; } +int __weak bpf_inode_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key, + u64 *value, u64 flags) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} + +int __weak bpf_inode_map_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key, u64 *value) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} + +int __weak bpf_inode_map_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, int *key) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} + /* last field in 'union bpf_attr' used by this command */ #define BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM_LAST_FIELD flags @@ -801,6 +817,8 @@ static int map_lookup_elem(union bpf_attr *attr) } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE || map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) { err = map->ops->map_peek_elem(map, value); + } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE) { + err = bpf_inode_map_lookup_elem(map, key, value); } else { rcu_read_lock(); if (map->ops->map_lookup_elem_sys_only) @@ -951,6 +969,10 @@ static int map_update_elem(union bpf_attr *attr) } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE || map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) { err = map->ops->map_push_elem(map, value, attr->flags); + } else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE) { + rcu_read_lock(); + err = bpf_inode_map_update_elem(map, key, value, attr->flags); + rcu_read_unlock(); } else { rcu_read_lock(); err = map->ops->map_update_elem(map, key, value, attr->flags); @@ -1006,7 +1028,10 @@ static int map_delete_elem(union bpf_attr *attr) preempt_disable(); __this_cpu_inc(bpf_prog_active); rcu_read_lock(); - err = map->ops->map_delete_elem(map, key); + if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE) + err = bpf_inode_map_delete_elem(map, key); + else + err = map->ops->map_delete_elem(map, key); rcu_read_unlock(); __this_cpu_dec(bpf_prog_active); preempt_enable(); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 930260683d0a..ce3cd7fd8882 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null", [PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER] = "tp_buffer", [PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK] = "xdp_sock", + [PTR_TO_INODE] = "inode", }; static char slot_type_char[] = { @@ -1801,6 +1802,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: + case PTR_TO_INODE: return true; default: return false; @@ -3254,6 +3256,10 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); return -EFAULT; } + } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_INODE) { + expected_type = PTR_TO_INODE; + if (type != expected_type) + goto err_type; } else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) { expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be @@ -3462,6 +3468,10 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete) goto error; break; + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE: + if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_inode_map_lookup) + goto error; + break; default: break; } @@ -3530,6 +3540,10 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE) goto error; break; + case BPF_FUNC_inode_map_lookup: + if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE) + goto error; + break; default: break; } diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 50145d448bc3..08ff720835ba 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ enum bpf_map_type { BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE, BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK, BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE, + BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE, }; /* Note that tracing related programs such as @@ -2716,6 +2717,14 @@ union bpf_attr { * **-EPERM** if no permission to send the *sig*. * * **-EAGAIN** if bpf program can try again. + * + * u64 bpf_inode_map_lookup(map, key) + * Description + * Perform a lookup in *map* for an entry associated to an inode + * *key*. + * Return + * Map value associated to *key*, or **NULL** if no entry was + * found. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -2827,7 +2836,8 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(strtoul), \ FN(sk_storage_get), \ FN(sk_storage_delete), \ - FN(send_signal), + FN(send_signal), \ + FN(inode_map_lookup), /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper * function eBPF program intends to call diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c index f4f34cb8869a..000319a95bfb 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ bool bpf_probe_map_type(enum bpf_map_type map_type, __u32 ifindex) case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP: case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: case BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY: + case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE: default: break; } From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:35 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016475 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81DED14E5 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:58:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D2CD2852C for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:58:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 5E9352857B; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:58:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D3472852C for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:58:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726387AbfFYV6J (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:58:09 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:51732 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726591AbfFYV6I (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:58:08 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrM1M019856 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:22 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrMjQ038842; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:22 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 06/10] landlock: Handle filesystem access control Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:35 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-7-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This add two Landlock hooks: FS_WALK and FS_PICK. The FS_WALK hook is used to walk through a file path. A program tied to this hook will be evaluated for each directory traversal except the last one if it is the leaf of the path. It is important to differentiate this hook from FS_PICK to enable more powerful path evaluation in the future (cf. Landlock patch v8). The FS_PICK hook is used to validate a set of actions requested on a file. This actions are defined with triggers (e.g. read, write, open, append...). The Landlock LSM hook registration is done after other LSM to only run actions from user-space, via eBPF programs, if the access was granted by major (privileged) LSMs. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn --- Changes since v8: * add a new LSM_ORDER_LAST, cf. commit e2bc445b66ca ("LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order") * add WARN_ON() for pointer dereferencement * remove the FS_GET subtype which rely on program chaining * remove the subtype option which was only used for chaining (with the "previous" field) * remove inode_lookup which depends on the (removed) nameidata security blob * remove eBPF helpers to get and set Landlock inode tags * do not use task LSM credentials (for now) Changes since v7: * major rewrite with clean Landlock hooks able to deal with file paths Changes since v6: * add 3 more sub-events: IOCTL, LOCK, FCNTL https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2fbc99a6-f190-f335-bd14-04bdeed35571@digikod.net * use the new security_add_hooks() * explain the -Werror=unused-function * constify pointers * cleanup headers Changes since v5: * split hooks.[ch] into hooks.[ch] and hooks_fs.[ch] * add more documentation * cosmetic fixes * rebase (SCALAR_VALUE) Changes since v4: * add LSM hook abstraction called Landlock event * use the compiler type checking to verify hooks use by an event * handle all filesystem related LSM hooks (e.g. file_permission, mmap_file, sb_mount...) * register BPF programs for Landlock just after LSM hooks registration * move hooks registration after other LSMs * add failsafes to check if a hook is not used by the kernel * allow partial raw value access form the context (needed for programs generated by LLVM) Changes since v3: * split commit * add hooks dealing with struct inode and struct path pointers: inode_permission and inode_getattr * add abstraction over eBPF helper arguments thanks to wrapping structs --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/landlock/Makefile | 3 +- security/landlock/common.h | 10 + security/landlock/hooks.c | 95 ++++++ security/landlock/hooks.h | 31 ++ security/landlock/hooks_fs.c | 568 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/hooks_fs.h | 31 ++ security/landlock/init.c | 47 +++ security/security.c | 15 + 9 files changed, 800 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_fs.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_fs.h diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 47f58cfb6a19..eefe9f214f05 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -2092,6 +2092,7 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, enum lsm_order { LSM_ORDER_FIRST = -1, /* This is only for capabilities. */ LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE = 0, + LSM_ORDER_LAST = 1, /* potentially-unprivileged LSM */ }; struct lsm_info { diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index 2a1a7082a365..270ece5d93de 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o landlock-y := init.o \ - enforce.o enforce_seccomp.o + enforce.o enforce_seccomp.o \ + hooks.o hooks_fs.o diff --git a/security/landlock/common.h b/security/landlock/common.h index 0c9b5904e7f5..49b892515144 100644 --- a/security/landlock/common.h +++ b/security/landlock/common.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include /* enum bpf_prog_aux */ #include /* bpf_prog */ +#include /* lsm_blob_sizes */ #include /* refcount_t */ #include /* enum landlock_hook_type */ @@ -68,4 +69,13 @@ static inline enum landlock_hook_type get_type(struct bpf_prog *prog) return prog->aux->extra->subtype.landlock_hook.type; } +__maybe_unused +static bool current_has_prog_type(enum landlock_hook_type hook_type) +{ + struct landlock_prog_set *prog_set; + + prog_set = current->seccomp.landlock_prog_set; + return (prog_set && prog_set->programs[get_index(hook_type)]); +} + #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/hooks.c b/security/landlock/hooks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a1620d0481eb --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/hooks.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - hook helpers + * + * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include /* enum bpf_prog_aux */ +#include +#include /* BPF_PROG_RUN() */ +#include /* list_add_tail_rcu */ +#include /* struct landlock_context */ + +#include "common.h" /* struct landlock_rule, get_index() */ +#include "hooks.h" /* landlock_hook_ctx */ + +#include "hooks_fs.h" + +/* return a Landlock program context (e.g. hook_ctx->fs_walk.prog_ctx) */ +static const void *get_ctx(enum landlock_hook_type hook_type, + struct landlock_hook_ctx *hook_ctx) +{ + switch (hook_type) { + case LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK: + return landlock_get_ctx_fs_walk(hook_ctx->fs_walk); + case LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK: + return landlock_get_ctx_fs_pick(hook_ctx->fs_pick); + } + WARN_ON(1); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * landlock_access_deny - run Landlock programs tied to a hook + * + * @hook_idx: hook index in the programs array + * @ctx: non-NULL valid eBPF context + * @prog_set: Landlock program set pointer + * @triggers: a bitmask to check if a program should be run + * + * Return true if at least one program return deny. + */ +static bool landlock_access_deny(enum landlock_hook_type hook_type, + struct landlock_hook_ctx *hook_ctx, + struct landlock_prog_set *prog_set, u64 triggers) +{ + struct landlock_prog_list *prog_list, *prev_list = NULL; + u32 hook_idx = get_index(hook_type); + + if (!prog_set) + return false; + + for (prog_list = prog_set->programs[hook_idx]; + prog_list; prog_list = prog_list->prev) { + u32 ret; + const void *prog_ctx; + + /* check if @prog expect at least one of this triggers */ + if (triggers && !(triggers & prog_list->prog->aux->extra-> + subtype.landlock_hook.triggers)) + continue; + prog_ctx = get_ctx(hook_type, hook_ctx); + if (!prog_ctx || WARN_ON(IS_ERR(prog_ctx))) + return true; + rcu_read_lock(); + ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog_list->prog, prog_ctx); + rcu_read_unlock(); + /* deny access if a program returns a value different than 0 */ + if (ret) + return true; + if (prev_list && prog_list->prev && prog_list->prev->prog-> + aux->extra->subtype.landlock_hook.type == + prev_list->prog->aux->extra-> + subtype.landlock_hook.type) + WARN_ON(prog_list->prev != prev_list); + prev_list = prog_list; + } + return false; +} + +int landlock_decide(enum landlock_hook_type hook_type, + struct landlock_hook_ctx *hook_ctx, u64 triggers) +{ + bool deny = false; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + deny = landlock_access_deny(hook_type, hook_ctx, + current->seccomp.landlock_prog_set, triggers); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ + + /* should we use -EPERM or -EACCES? */ + return deny ? -EACCES : 0; +} diff --git a/security/landlock/hooks.h b/security/landlock/hooks.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..31446e6629fb --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/hooks.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - hooks helpers + * + * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include /* struct task_struct */ +#include + +#include "hooks_fs.h" + +struct landlock_hook_ctx { + union { + struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_walk *fs_walk; + struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_pick *fs_pick; + }; +}; + +static inline bool landlocked(const struct task_struct *task) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + return !!(task->seccomp.landlock_prog_set); +#else + return false; +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ +} + +int landlock_decide(enum landlock_hook_type, struct landlock_hook_ctx *, u64); diff --git a/security/landlock/hooks_fs.c b/security/landlock/hooks_fs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c3f0f60d72a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/hooks_fs.c @@ -0,0 +1,568 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - filesystem hooks + * + * Copyright © 2016-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#include /* enum bpf_access_type */ +#include /* ARRAY_SIZE */ +#include +#include /* synchronize_rcu() */ +#include /* S_ISDIR */ +#include /* offsetof */ +#include /* uintptr_t */ +#include /* INIT_WORK() */ + +/* permissions translation */ +#include /* MAY_* */ +#include /* PROT_* */ +#include + +/* hook arguments */ +#include /* struct dentry */ +#include /* struct inode, struct iattr */ +#include /* struct vm_area_struct */ +#include /* struct vfsmount */ +#include /* struct path */ +#include /* struct task_struct */ +#include /* struct timespec */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "hooks_fs.h" +#include "hooks.h" + +/* fs_pick */ + +#include /* PAGE_SIZE */ +#include +#include /* d_path, dentry_path_raw */ +#include /* *_ERR */ +#include /* __get_free_page, GFP_KERNEL */ +#include /* struct path */ + +bool landlock_is_valid_access_fs_pick(int off, enum bpf_access_type type, + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, int *max_size) +{ + switch (off) { + case offsetof(struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick, inode): + if (type != BPF_READ) + return false; + *reg_type = PTR_TO_INODE; + *max_size = sizeof(u64); + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +bool landlock_is_valid_access_fs_walk(int off, enum bpf_access_type type, + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, int *max_size) +{ + switch (off) { + case offsetof(struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk, inode): + if (type != BPF_READ) + return false; + *reg_type = PTR_TO_INODE; + *max_size = sizeof(u64); + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +/* fs_walk */ + +struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_walk { + struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk prog_ctx; +}; + +const struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk *landlock_get_ctx_fs_walk( + const struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_walk *hook_ctx) +{ + if (WARN_ON(!hook_ctx)) + return NULL; + + return &hook_ctx->prog_ctx; +} + +static int decide_fs_walk(int may_mask, struct inode *inode) +{ + struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_walk fs_walk = {}; + struct landlock_hook_ctx hook_ctx = { + .fs_walk = &fs_walk, + }; + const enum landlock_hook_type hook_type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK; + + if (!current_has_prog_type(hook_type)) + /* no fs_walk */ + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!inode)) + return -EFAULT; + + /* init common data: inode, is_dot, is_dotdot, is_root */ + fs_walk.prog_ctx.inode = (uintptr_t)inode; + return landlock_decide(hook_type, &hook_ctx, 0); +} + +/* fs_pick */ + +struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_pick { + __u64 triggers; + struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick prog_ctx; +}; + +const struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick *landlock_get_ctx_fs_pick( + const struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_pick *hook_ctx) +{ + if (WARN_ON(!hook_ctx)) + return NULL; + + return &hook_ctx->prog_ctx; +} + +static int decide_fs_pick(__u64 triggers, struct inode *inode) +{ + struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_pick fs_pick = {}; + struct landlock_hook_ctx hook_ctx = { + .fs_pick = &fs_pick, + }; + const enum landlock_hook_type hook_type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK; + + if (WARN_ON(!triggers)) + return 0; + if (!current_has_prog_type(hook_type)) + /* no fs_pick */ + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!inode)) + return -EFAULT; + + fs_pick.triggers = triggers, + /* init common data: inode */ + fs_pick.prog_ctx.inode = (uintptr_t)inode; + return landlock_decide(hook_type, &hook_ctx, fs_pick.triggers); +} + +/* helpers */ + +static u64 fs_may_to_triggers(int may_mask, umode_t mode) +{ + u64 ret = 0; + + if (may_mask & MAY_EXEC) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE; + if (may_mask & MAY_READ) { + if (S_ISDIR(mode)) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR; + else + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ; + } + if (may_mask & MAY_WRITE) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE; + if (may_mask & MAY_APPEND) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_APPEND; + if (may_mask & MAY_OPEN) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN; + if (may_mask & MAY_CHROOT) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHROOT; + else if (may_mask & MAY_CHDIR) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHDIR; + /* XXX: ignore MAY_ACCESS */ + WARN_ON(!ret); + return ret; +} + +static inline u64 mem_prot_to_triggers(unsigned long prot, bool private) +{ + u64 ret = LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MAP; + + /* private mapping do not write to files */ + if (!private && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE; + if (prot & PROT_READ) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ; + if (prot & PROT_EXEC) + ret |= LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE; + WARN_ON(!ret); + return ret; +} + +/* binder hooks */ + +static int hook_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!file)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_TRANSFER, + file_inode(file)); +} + +/* sb hooks */ + +static int hook_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR, + dentry->d_inode); +} + +/* TODO: handle mount source and remount */ +static int hook_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!path)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!path->dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MOUNTON, + path->dentry->d_inode); +} + +/* + * The @old_path is similar to a destination mount point. + */ +static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path) +{ + int err; + + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!old_path)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!old_path->dentry)) + return 0; + err = decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MOUNTON, + old_path->dentry->d_inode); + if (err) + return err; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHROOT, + new_path->dentry->d_inode); +} + +/* inode hooks */ + +/* a directory inode contains only one dentry */ +static int hook_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE, dir); +} + +static int hook_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!old_dentry)) { + int ret = decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINK, + old_dentry->d_inode); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINKTO, dir); +} + +static int hook_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_UNLINK, + dentry->d_inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE, dir); +} + +static int hook_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE, dir); +} + +static int hook_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RMDIR, dentry->d_inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode, dev_t dev) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE, dir); +} + +static int hook_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + /* TODO: add artificial walk session from old_dir to old_dentry */ + if (!WARN_ON(!old_dentry)) { + int ret = decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAME, + old_dentry->d_inode); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAMETO, new_dir); +} + +static int hook_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ, dentry->d_inode); +} + +/* + * ignore the inode_follow_link hook (could set is_symlink in the fs_walk + * context) + */ + +static int hook_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + u64 triggers; + + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!inode)) + return 0; + + triggers = fs_may_to_triggers(mask, inode->i_mode); + /* + * decide_fs_walk() is exclusive with decide_fs_pick(): in a path walk, + * ignore execute-only access on directory for any fs_pick program + */ + if (triggers == LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE && + S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + return decide_fs_walk(mask, inode); + + return decide_fs_pick(triggers, inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR, + dentry->d_inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) +{ + /* TODO: link parent inode and path */ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!path)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!path->dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR, + path->dentry->d_inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR, + dentry->d_inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR, + dentry->d_inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR, + dentry->d_inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!dentry)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR, + dentry->d_inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + void **buffer, bool alloc) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR, inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flag) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR, inode); +} + +static int hook_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, + size_t buffer_size) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR, inode); +} + +/* file hooks */ + +static int hook_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!file)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_IOCTL, + file_inode(file)); +} + +static int hook_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!file)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LOCK, file_inode(file)); +} + +static int hook_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!file)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_FCNTL, + file_inode(file)); +} + +static int hook_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + /* file can be null for anonymous mmap */ + if (!file) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(mem_prot_to_triggers(prot, flags & MAP_PRIVATE), + file_inode(file)); +} + +static int hook_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!vma)) + return 0; + if (!vma->vm_file) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(mem_prot_to_triggers(prot, + !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)), + file_inode(vma->vm_file)); +} + +static int hook_file_receive(struct file *file) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!file)) + return 0; + return decide_fs_pick(LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RECEIVE, + file_inode(file)); +} + +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, hook_binder_transfer_file), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, hook_sb_statfs), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, hook_inode_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, hook_inode_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, hook_inode_unlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, hook_inode_symlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, hook_inode_mkdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, hook_inode_rmdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, hook_inode_mknod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, hook_inode_rename), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, hook_inode_readlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, hook_inode_permission), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, hook_inode_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, hook_inode_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, hook_inode_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, hook_inode_getxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, hook_inode_listxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, hook_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, hook_inode_getsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, hook_inode_setsecurity), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, hook_inode_listsecurity), + + /* do not handle file_permission for now */ + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, hook_file_ioctl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, hook_file_lock), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, hook_file_fcntl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, hook_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, hook_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, hook_file_receive), + /* file_open is not handled, use inode_permission instead */ +}; + +__init void landlock_add_hooks_fs(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), + LANDLOCK_NAME); +} diff --git a/security/landlock/hooks_fs.h b/security/landlock/hooks_fs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..eeae4dcd842f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/hooks_fs.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - filesystem hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2019 ANSSI + */ + +#include /* enum bpf_access_type */ + +__init void landlock_add_hooks_fs(void); + +/* fs_pick */ + +struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_pick; + +bool landlock_is_valid_access_fs_pick(int off, enum bpf_access_type type, + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, int *max_size); + +const struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick *landlock_get_ctx_fs_pick( + const struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_pick *hook_ctx); + +/* fs_walk */ + +struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_walk; + +bool landlock_is_valid_access_fs_walk(int off, enum bpf_access_type type, + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, int *max_size); + +const struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk *landlock_get_ctx_fs_walk( + const struct landlock_hook_ctx_fs_walk *hook_ctx); diff --git a/security/landlock/init.c b/security/landlock/init.c index 03073cd0fc4e..68def2a7af71 100644 --- a/security/landlock/init.c +++ b/security/landlock/init.c @@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ #include /* enum bpf_access_type */ #include /* capable */ #include /* struct bpf_prog */ +#include #include "common.h" /* LANDLOCK_* */ +#include "hooks_fs.h" static bool bpf_landlock_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, const struct bpf_prog *prog, @@ -29,6 +31,23 @@ static bool bpf_landlock_is_valid_access(int off, int size, if (size <= 0 || size > sizeof(__u64)) return false; + /* set register type and max size */ + switch (prog_subtype->landlock_hook.type) { + case LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK: + if (!landlock_is_valid_access_fs_pick(off, type, ®_type, + &max_size)) + return false; + break; + case LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK: + if (!landlock_is_valid_access_fs_walk(off, type, ®_type, + &max_size)) + return false; + break; + default: + WARN_ON(1); + return false; + } + /* check memory range access */ switch (reg_type) { case NOT_INIT: @@ -98,6 +117,18 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_landlock_func_proto( default: break; } + + switch (hook_type) { + case LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK: + case LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK: + switch (func_id) { + case BPF_FUNC_inode_map_lookup: + return &bpf_inode_map_lookup_proto; + default: + break; + } + break; + } return NULL; } @@ -108,3 +139,19 @@ const struct bpf_verifier_ops landlock_verifier_ops = { }; const struct bpf_prog_ops landlock_prog_ops = {}; + +static int __init landlock_init(void) +{ + pr_info(LANDLOCK_NAME ": Initializing (sandbox with seccomp)\n"); + landlock_add_hooks_fs(); + return 0; +} + +struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {}; + +DEFINE_LSM(LANDLOCK_NAME) = { + .name = LANDLOCK_NAME, + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, + .blobs = &landlock_blob_sizes, + .init = landlock_init, +}; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f493db0bf62a..05a23995407d 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -263,6 +263,21 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) } } + /* + * In case of an unprivileged access-control, we don't want to give the + * ability to any process to do some checks (e.g. through an eBPF + * program) on kernel objects (e.g. files) if a privileged security + * policy forbid their access. We must then load + * potentially-unprivileged security modules after all other LSMs. + * + * LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last and does not appear in the modifiable + * ordered list of enabled LSMs. + */ + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST) + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "last"); + } + /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:36 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016441 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7ACE614BB for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C3E026253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 602652859F; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:50 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B416726253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:54:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726450AbfFYVys (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:54:48 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:59517 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726572AbfFYVys (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:54:48 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrNIv019875 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:23 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrNLP038854; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:23 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 07/10] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:36 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-8-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP A landlocked process has less privileges than a non-landlocked process and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process' rules. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn --- Changes since v6: * factor out ptrace check * constify pointers * cleanup headers * use the new security_add_hooks() --- security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h | 8 ++ security/landlock/init.c | 2 + 4 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index 270ece5d93de..4500ddb0767e 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o landlock-y := init.o \ enforce.o enforce_seccomp.o \ - hooks.o hooks_fs.o + hooks.o hooks_fs.o hooks_ptrace.o diff --git a/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c b/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7f5e8b994e93 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - ptrace hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +#include +#include +#include /* ARRAY_SIZE */ +#include +#include /* struct task_struct */ +#include + +#include "common.h" /* struct landlock_prog_set */ +#include "hooks.h" /* landlocked() */ +#include "hooks_ptrace.h" + +static bool progs_are_subset(const struct landlock_prog_set *parent, + const struct landlock_prog_set *child) +{ + size_t i; + + if (!parent || !child) + return false; + if (parent == child) + return true; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(child->programs); i++) { + struct landlock_prog_list *walker; + bool found_parent = false; + + if (!parent->programs[i]) + continue; + for (walker = child->programs[i]; walker; + walker = walker->prev) { + if (walker == parent->programs[i]) { + found_parent = true; + break; + } + } + if (!found_parent) + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static bool task_has_subset_progs(const struct task_struct *parent, + const struct task_struct *child) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + if (progs_are_subset(parent->seccomp.landlock_prog_set, + child->seccomp.landlock_prog_set)) + /* must be ANDed with other providers (i.e. cgroup) */ + return true; +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ + return false; +} + +static int task_ptrace(const struct task_struct *parent, + const struct task_struct *child) +{ + if (!landlocked(parent)) + return 0; + + if (!landlocked(child)) + return -EPERM; + + if (task_has_subset_progs(parent, child)) + return 0; + + return -EPERM; +} + +/** + * hook_ptrace_access_check - determine whether the current process may access + * another + * + * @child: the process to be accessed + * @mode: the mode of attachment + * + * If the current task has Landlock programs, then the child must have at least + * the same programs. Else denied. + * + * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission + * granted, -errno if denied. + */ +static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) +{ + return task_ptrace(current, child); +} + +/** + * hook_ptrace_traceme - determine whether another process may trace the + * current one + * + * @parent: the task proposed to be the tracer + * + * If the parent has Landlock programs, then the current task must have the + * same or more programs. + * Else denied. + * + * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current + * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied. + */ +static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + return task_ptrace(parent, current); +} + +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme), +}; + +__init void landlock_add_hooks_ptrace(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), + LANDLOCK_NAME); +} diff --git a/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h b/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2c2b8a13037f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - ptrace hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +__init void landlock_add_hooks_ptrace(void); diff --git a/security/landlock/init.c b/security/landlock/init.c index 68def2a7af71..d58aa94124b0 100644 --- a/security/landlock/init.c +++ b/security/landlock/init.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "common.h" /* LANDLOCK_* */ #include "hooks_fs.h" +#include "hooks_ptrace.h" static bool bpf_landlock_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, const struct bpf_prog *prog, @@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ const struct bpf_prog_ops landlock_prog_ops = {}; static int __init landlock_init(void) { pr_info(LANDLOCK_NAME ": Initializing (sandbox with seccomp)\n"); + landlock_add_hooks_ptrace(); landlock_add_hooks_fs(); return 0; } From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:37 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016453 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 55CC614E5 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 439C826253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 374F32675C; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 041DB284AF for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726432AbfFYVzF (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:05 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:54876 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726037AbfFYVzF (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:05 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrPqj019890 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:25 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrO5b038876; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:24 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 08/10] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:37 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-9-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Add a basic sandbox tool to launch a command which is denied access to a list of files and directories. Add to the bpf_load library the ability to handle a BPF program subtype. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn --- Changes since v8: * rewrite the landlock1 sample which deny access to a set of files or directories (i.e. simple blacklist) to fit with the previous patches * add "landlock1" to .gitignore * in bpf_load.c, pass the subtype with a call to bpf_load_program_xattr() Changes since v7: * rewrite the example using an inode map * add to bpf_load the ability to handle subtypes per program type Changes since v6: * check return value of load_and_attach() * allow to write on pipes * rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK to BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULE * rename Landlock version to ABI to better reflect its purpose * use const variable (suggested by Kees Cook) * remove useless definitions (suggested by Kees Cook) * add detailed explanations (suggested by Kees Cook) Changes since v5: * cosmetic fixes * rebase Changes since v4: * write Landlock rule in C and compiled it with LLVM * remove cgroup handling * remove path handling: only handle a read-only environment * remove errno return codes Changes since v3: * remove seccomp and origin field: completely free from seccomp programs * handle more FS-related hooks * handle inode hooks and directory traversal * add faked but consistent view thanks to ENOENT * add /lib64 in the example * fix spelling * rename some types and definitions (e.g. SECCOMP_ADD_LANDLOCK_RULE) Changes since v2: * use BPF_PROG_ATTACH for cgroup handling --- samples/bpf/.gitignore | 1 + samples/bpf/Makefile | 3 + samples/bpf/bpf_load.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++- samples/bpf/bpf_load.h | 7 ++ samples/bpf/landlock1.h | 8 ++ samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++ samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 samples/bpf/landlock1.h create mode 100644 samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c create mode 100644 samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c diff --git a/samples/bpf/.gitignore b/samples/bpf/.gitignore index 74d31fd3c99c..a4c9c806f739 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/.gitignore +++ b/samples/bpf/.gitignore @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ cpustat fds_example hbm ibumad +landlock1 lathist lwt_len_hist map_perf_test diff --git a/samples/bpf/Makefile b/samples/bpf/Makefile index 0917f8cf4fab..da246eaa8bf8 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/Makefile +++ b/samples/bpf/Makefile @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ hostprogs-y += task_fd_query hostprogs-y += xdp_sample_pkts hostprogs-y += ibumad hostprogs-y += hbm +hostprogs-y += landlock1 # Libbpf dependencies LIBBPF = $(TOOLS_PATH)/lib/bpf/libbpf.a @@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ task_fd_query-objs := bpf_load.o task_fd_query_user.o $(TRACE_HELPERS) xdp_sample_pkts-objs := xdp_sample_pkts_user.o $(TRACE_HELPERS) ibumad-objs := bpf_load.o ibumad_user.o $(TRACE_HELPERS) hbm-objs := bpf_load.o hbm.o $(CGROUP_HELPERS) +landlock1-objs := bpf_load.o landlock1_user.o # Tell kbuild to always build the programs always := $(hostprogs-y) @@ -168,6 +170,7 @@ always += task_fd_query_kern.o always += xdp_sample_pkts_kern.o always += ibumad_kern.o always += hbm_out_kern.o +always += landlock1_kern.o KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS += -I$(objtree)/usr/include KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS += -I$(srctree)/tools/lib/bpf/ diff --git a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c index 4574b1939e49..bf62d965f606 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c +++ b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -42,6 +43,9 @@ int prog_array_fd = -1; struct bpf_map_data map_data[MAX_MAPS]; int map_data_count; +struct bpf_subtype_data subtype_data[MAX_PROGS]; +int subtype_data_count; + static int populate_prog_array(const char *event, int prog_fd) { int ind = atoi(event), err; @@ -87,11 +91,15 @@ static int load_and_attach(const char *event, struct bpf_insn *prog, int size) bool is_sockops = strncmp(event, "sockops", 7) == 0; bool is_sk_skb = strncmp(event, "sk_skb", 6) == 0; bool is_sk_msg = strncmp(event, "sk_msg", 6) == 0; + bool is_landlock = strncmp(event, "landlock", 8) == 0; size_t insns_cnt = size / sizeof(struct bpf_insn); enum bpf_prog_type prog_type; char buf[256]; int fd, efd, err, id; struct perf_event_attr attr = {}; + union bpf_prog_subtype *st = NULL; + struct bpf_subtype_data *sd = NULL; + struct bpf_load_program_attr load_attr; attr.type = PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT; attr.sample_type = PERF_SAMPLE_RAW; @@ -120,6 +128,32 @@ static int load_and_attach(const char *event, struct bpf_insn *prog, int size) prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB; } else if (is_sk_msg) { prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG; + } else if (is_landlock) { + int i, prog_id; + const char *event_id = (event + 8); + + if (!isdigit(*event_id)) { + printf("invalid prog number\n"); + return -1; + } + prog_id = atoi(event_id); + for (i = 0; i < subtype_data_count; i++) { + if (subtype_data[i].name && strcmp(event, + subtype_data[i].name) == 0) { + /* save the prog_id for a next program */ + sd = &subtype_data[i]; + sd->prog_id = prog_id; + st = &sd->subtype; + free(sd->name); + sd->name = NULL; + break; + } + } + if (!st) { + printf("missing subtype\n"); + return -1; + } + prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK; } else { printf("Unknown event '%s'\n", event); return -1; @@ -128,16 +162,25 @@ static int load_and_attach(const char *event, struct bpf_insn *prog, int size) if (prog_cnt == MAX_PROGS) return -1; - fd = bpf_load_program(prog_type, prog, insns_cnt, license, kern_version, - bpf_log_buf, BPF_LOG_BUF_SIZE); + memset(&load_attr, 0, sizeof(struct bpf_load_program_attr)); + load_attr.prog_type = prog_type; + load_attr.prog_subtype = st; + load_attr.insns = prog; + load_attr.insns_cnt = insns_cnt; + load_attr.license = license; + load_attr.kern_version = kern_version; + fd = bpf_load_program_xattr(&load_attr, bpf_log_buf, BPF_LOG_BUF_SIZE); if (fd < 0) { printf("bpf_load_program() err=%d\n%s", errno, bpf_log_buf); return -1; } + if (sd) + sd->prog_fd = fd; prog_fd[prog_cnt++] = fd; - if (is_xdp || is_perf_event || is_cgroup_skb || is_cgroup_sk) + if (is_xdp || is_perf_event || is_cgroup_skb || is_cgroup_sk || + is_landlock) return 0; if (is_socket || is_sockops || is_sk_skb || is_sk_msg) { @@ -519,6 +562,7 @@ static int do_load_bpf_file(const char *path, fixup_map_cb fixup_map) kern_version = 0; memset(license, 0, sizeof(license)); memset(processed_sec, 0, sizeof(processed_sec)); + subtype_data_count = 0; if (elf_version(EV_CURRENT) == EV_NONE) return 1; @@ -567,6 +611,29 @@ static int do_load_bpf_file(const char *path, fixup_map_cb fixup_map) data_maps = data; for (j = 0; j < MAX_MAPS; j++) map_data[j].fd = -1; + } else if (strncmp(shname, "subtype", 7) == 0) { + processed_sec[i] = true; + if (*(shname + 7) != '/') { + printf("invalid name of subtype section"); + return 1; + } + if (data->d_size != sizeof(union bpf_prog_subtype)) { + printf("invalid size of subtype section: %zd\n", + data->d_size); + printf("ref: %zd\n", + sizeof(union bpf_prog_subtype)); + return 1; + } + if (subtype_data_count >= MAX_PROGS) { + printf("too many subtype sections"); + return 1; + } + memcpy(&subtype_data[subtype_data_count].subtype, + data->d_buf, + sizeof(union bpf_prog_subtype)); + subtype_data[subtype_data_count].name = + strdup((shname + 8)); + subtype_data_count++; } else if (shdr.sh_type == SHT_SYMTAB) { strtabidx = shdr.sh_link; symbols = data; @@ -643,7 +710,8 @@ static int do_load_bpf_file(const char *path, fixup_map_cb fixup_map) memcmp(shname, "cgroup/", 7) == 0 || memcmp(shname, "sockops", 7) == 0 || memcmp(shname, "sk_skb", 6) == 0 || - memcmp(shname, "sk_msg", 6) == 0) { + memcmp(shname, "sk_msg", 6) == 0 || + memcmp(shname, "landlock", 8) == 0) { ret = load_and_attach(shname, data->d_buf, data->d_size); if (ret != 0) diff --git a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.h b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.h index 814894a12974..e210b5fdf8ee 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.h +++ b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.h @@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ struct bpf_map_data { struct bpf_load_map_def def; }; +struct bpf_subtype_data { + char *name; + int prog_id; + int prog_fd; + union bpf_prog_subtype subtype; +}; + typedef void (*fixup_map_cb)(struct bpf_map_data *map, int idx); extern int prog_fd[MAX_PROGS]; diff --git a/samples/bpf/landlock1.h b/samples/bpf/landlock1.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..53b0a9447855 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/landlock1.h @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock sample 1 - common header + * + * Copyright © 2018-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +#define MAP_FLAG_DENY (1ULL << 0) diff --git a/samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c b/samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0298d98dd06a --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock sample 1 - whitelist of read only or read-write file hierarchy + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +/* + * This file contains a function that will be compiled to eBPF bytecode thanks + * to LLVM/Clang. + * + * Each SEC() means that the following function or variable will be part of a + * custom ELF section. This sections are then processed by the userspace part + * (see landlock1_user.c) to extract eBPF bytecode and take into account + * variables describing the eBPF program subtype or its license. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "bpf_helpers.h" +#include "landlock1.h" /* MAP_FLAG_DENY */ + +#define MAP_MAX_ENTRIES 20 + +SEC("maps") +struct bpf_map_def inode_map = { + .type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE, + .key_size = sizeof(u32), + .value_size = sizeof(u64), + .max_entries = MAP_MAX_ENTRIES, +}; + +static __always_inline __u64 get_access(void *inode) +{ + if (bpf_inode_map_lookup(&inode_map, inode) & MAP_FLAG_DENY) + return LANDLOCK_RET_DENY; + return LANDLOCK_RET_ALLOW; +} + +SEC("subtype/landlock1") +static union bpf_prog_subtype _subtype1 = { + .landlock_hook = { + .type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK, + } +}; + +/* + * The function fs_walk() is a simple Landlock program enforced on a set of + * processes. This program will be run for each walk through a file path. + * + * The argument ctx contains the context of the program when it is run, which + * enable to evaluate the file path. This context can change for each run of + * the program. + */ +SEC("landlock1") +int fs_walk(struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk *ctx) +{ + return get_access((void *)ctx->inode); +} + +SEC("subtype/landlock2") +static union bpf_prog_subtype _subtype2 = { + .landlock_hook = { + .type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK, + /* + * allowed: + * - LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINK + * - LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LINKTO + * - LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RECEIVE + * - LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MOUNTON + */ + .triggers = + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_APPEND | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHDIR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CHROOT | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_CREATE | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_FCNTL | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_IOCTL | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_LOCK | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_MAP | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAME | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RENAMETO | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_RMDIR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_SETATTR | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_TRANSFER | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_UNLINK | + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_WRITE, + } +}; + +SEC("landlock2") +int fs_pick_ro(struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick *ctx) +{ + return get_access((void *)ctx->inode); +} + +SEC("license") +static const char _license[] = "GPL"; diff --git a/samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c b/samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aa45932d36a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/landlock1_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock sample 1 - deny access to a set of directories (blacklisting) + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +#include "bpf/libbpf.h" +#include "bpf_load.h" +#include "landlock1.h" /* MAP_FLAG_DENY */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include /* open() */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef seccomp +static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args) +{ + errno = 0; + return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args); +} +#endif + +static int apply_sandbox(int prog_fd) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* set up the test sandbox */ + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { + perror("prctl(no_new_priv)"); + return 1; + } + if (seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &prog_fd)) { + perror("seccomp(set_hook)"); + ret = 1; + } + close(prog_fd); + + return ret; +} + +#define ENV_FS_PATH_DENY_NAME "LL_PATH_DENY" +#define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":" + +static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***path_list) +{ + int i, path_nb = 0; + + if (env_path) { + path_nb++; + for (i = 0; env_path[i]; i++) { + if (env_path[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0]) + path_nb++; + } + } + *path_list = malloc(path_nb * sizeof(**path_list)); + for (i = 0; i < path_nb; i++) + (*path_list)[i] = strsep(&env_path, ENV_PATH_TOKEN); + + return path_nb; +} + +static int populate_map(const char *env_var, unsigned long long value, + int map_fd) +{ + int path_nb, ref_fd, i; + char *env_path_name; + const char **path_list = NULL; + + env_path_name = getenv(env_var); + if (!env_path_name) + return 0; + env_path_name = strdup(env_path_name); + path_nb = parse_path(env_path_name, &path_list); + + for (i = 0; i < path_nb; i++) { + ref_fd = open(path_list[i], O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + if (ref_fd < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n", + path_list[i], + strerror(errno)); + return 1; + } + if (bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd, &ref_fd, &value, BPF_ANY)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to update the map with" + " \"%s\": %s\n", path_list[i], + strerror(errno)); + return 1; + } + close(ref_fd); + } + free(env_path_name); + return 0; +} + +int main(int argc, char * const argv[], char * const *envp) +{ + char filename[256]; + char *cmd_path; + char * const *cmd_argv; + int ll_prog_walk, ll_prog_pick; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [args]...\n\n", argv[0]); + fprintf(stderr, "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, each separated by a colon:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of files and directories which are denied\n", + ENV_FS_PATH_DENY_NAME); + fprintf(stderr, "\nexample:\n" + "%s=\"${HOME}/.ssh:${HOME}/Images\" " + "%s /bin/sh -i\n", + ENV_FS_PATH_DENY_NAME, argv[0]); + return 1; + } + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s_kern.o", argv[0]); + if (load_bpf_file(filename)) { + printf("%s", bpf_log_buf); + return 1; + } + ll_prog_walk = prog_fd[0]; /* fs_walk */ + ll_prog_pick = prog_fd[1]; /* fs_pick */ + if (!ll_prog_walk || !ll_prog_pick) { + if (errno) + printf("load_bpf_file: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + else + printf("load_bpf_file: Error\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (populate_map(ENV_FS_PATH_DENY_NAME, MAP_FLAG_DENY, map_fd[0])) + return 1; + close(map_fd[0]); + + fprintf(stderr, "Launching a new sandboxed process\n"); + if (apply_sandbox(ll_prog_walk)) + return 1; + if (apply_sandbox(ll_prog_pick)) + return 1; + cmd_path = argv[1]; + cmd_argv = argv + 1; + execve(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp); + perror("Failed to call execve"); + return 1; +} From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:38 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016465 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E32C514E5 for ; 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Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:35 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrQV7019903 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:26 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrP22038950; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:26 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 09/10] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:38 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-10-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Test basic context access, ptrace protection and filesystem hooks. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Will Drewry --- Changes since v8: * update eBPF include path for macros * use TEST_GEN_PROGS and use the generic "clean" target * add more verbose errors * update the bpf/verifier files * remove chain tests (from landlock and bpf/verifier) * replace the whitelist tests with blacklist tests (because of stateless Landlock programs): remove "dotdot" tests and other depth tests * sync the landlock Makefile with its bpf sibling directory and use bpf_load_program_xattr() Changes since v7: * update tests and add new ones for filesystem hierarchy and Landlock chains. Changes since v6: * use the new kselftest_harness.h * use const variables * replace ASSERT_STEP with ASSERT_* * rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK to BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULE * force sample library rebuild * fix install target Changes since v5: * add subtype test * add ptrace tests * split and rename files * cleanup and rebase --- tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 1 + .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c | 35 +++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c | 10 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore | 4 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile | 39 +++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h | 48 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c | 24 ++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c | 257 ++++++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c | 154 +++++++++++ 11 files changed, 575 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile index 9781ca79794a..342a7d714fb9 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ TARGETS += ir TARGETS += kcmp TARGETS += kexec TARGETS += kvm +TARGETS += landlock TARGETS += lib TARGETS += livepatch TARGETS += membarrier diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h index 1a5b1accf091..0b15c49fac3f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h @@ -225,6 +225,8 @@ static void *(*bpf_sk_storage_get)(void *map, struct bpf_sock *sk, static int (*bpf_sk_storage_delete)(void *map, struct bpf_sock *sk) = (void *)BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_delete; static int (*bpf_send_signal)(unsigned sig) = (void *)BPF_FUNC_send_signal; +static unsigned long long (*bpf_inode_map_lookup)(void *map, void *key) = + (void *) BPF_FUNC_inode_map_lookup; /* llvm builtin functions that eBPF C program may use to * emit BPF_LD_ABS and BPF_LD_IND instructions diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c index 93faffd31fc3..c67218ffebf9 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7ed4e24c0a88 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/landlock.c @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +{ + "landlock/fs_pick: always accept", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, + .has_prog_subtype = true, + .prog_subtype = { + .landlock_hook = { + .type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK, + .triggers = LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ, + } + }, +}, +{ + "landlock/fs_pick: read context", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_6, + offsetof(struct landlock_ctx_fs_pick, inode)), + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, + .has_prog_subtype = true, + .prog_subtype = { + .landlock_hook = { + .type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK, + .triggers = LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READ, + } + }, +}, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c index cf614223d53f..6bb7ef4b39b5 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/subtype.c @@ -8,3 +8,13 @@ .result = REJECT, .has_prog_subtype = true, }, +{ + "missing subtype", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .errstr = "", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, +}, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..25b9cd834c3c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +/test_base +/test_fs +/test_ptrace +/tmp_* diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7a253bf6d580 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +LIBDIR := ../../../lib +BPFDIR := $(LIBDIR)/bpf +APIDIR := ../../../include/uapi +GENDIR := ../../../../include/generated +GENHDR := $(GENDIR)/autoconf.h + +ifneq ($(wildcard $(GENHDR)),) + GENFLAGS := -DHAVE_GENHDR +endif + +BPFOBJS := $(BPFDIR)/bpf.o $(BPFDIR)/nlattr.o +LOADOBJ := ../../../../samples/bpf/bpf_load.o + +CFLAGS += -Wl,-no-as-needed -Wall -O2 -I$(APIDIR) -I$(LIBDIR) -I$(BPFDIR) -I$(GENDIR) $(GENFLAGS) -I../../../include +LDFLAGS += -lelf + +test_src = $(wildcard test_*.c) + +test_objs := $(test_src:.c=) + +TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(test_objs) + +.PHONY: all clean force + +all: $(test_objs) + +# force a rebuild of BPFOBJS when its dependencies are updated +force: + +# rebuild bpf.o as a workaround for the samples/bpf bug +$(BPFOBJS): $(LOADOBJ) force + $(MAKE) -C $(BPFDIR) + +$(LOADOBJ): force + $(MAKE) -C $(dir $(LOADOBJ)) + +$(test_objs): $(BPFOBJS) $(LOADOBJ) ../kselftest_harness.h + +include ../lib.mk diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7d412d94148c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Landlock helpers + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "../kselftest_harness.h" +#include "../../../../samples/bpf/bpf_load.h" + +#ifndef SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG +#define SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG 4 +#endif + +#ifndef seccomp +static int __attribute__((unused)) seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, + void *args) +{ + errno = 0; + return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args); +} +#endif + +/* bpf_load_program() with subtype */ +static int __attribute__((unused)) ll_bpf_load_program( + const struct bpf_insn *insns, size_t insns_cnt, char *log_buf, + size_t log_buf_sz, const union bpf_prog_subtype *subtype) +{ + struct bpf_load_program_attr load_attr; + + memset(&load_attr, 0, sizeof(struct bpf_load_program_attr)); + load_attr.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK; + load_attr.prog_subtype = subtype; + load_attr.insns = insns; + load_attr.insns_cnt = insns_cnt; + load_attr.license = "GPL"; + + return bpf_load_program_xattr(&load_attr, log_buf, log_buf_sz); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..db46f39048cb --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_base.c @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock tests - base + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include + +#include "test.h" + +TEST(seccomp_landlock) +{ + int ret; + + ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, NULL); + EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) { + TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK"); + } +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dba726ea4994 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_fs.c @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock tests - file system + * + * Copyright © 2018-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +#include /* O_DIRECTORY */ +#include /* statbuf */ +#include /* faccessat() */ + +#include "test.h" + +#define TEST_PATH_TRIGGERS ( \ + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN | \ + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_READDIR | \ + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_EXECUTE | \ + LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_GETATTR) + +static void test_path_rel(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int dirfd, + const char *path, int ret) +{ + int fd; + struct stat statbuf; + + ASSERT_EQ(ret, faccessat(dirfd, path, R_OK | X_OK, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(ret, fstatat(dirfd, path, &statbuf, 0)); + fd = openat(dirfd, path, O_DIRECTORY); + if (ret) { + ASSERT_EQ(-1, fd); + } else { + ASSERT_NE(-1, fd); + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd)); + } +} + +static void test_path(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const char *path, + int ret) +{ + return test_path_rel(_metadata, AT_FDCWD, path, ret); +} + +static const char d1[] = "/usr"; +static const char d2[] = "/usr/share"; +static const char d3[] = "/usr/share/doc"; + +TEST(fs_base) +{ + test_path(_metadata, d1, 0); + test_path(_metadata, d2, 0); + test_path(_metadata, d3, 0); +} + +#define MAP_VALUE_DENY 1 + +static int create_denied_inode_map(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, + const char *const dirs[]) +{ + int map, key, dirs_len, i; + __u64 value = MAP_VALUE_DENY; + + ASSERT_NE(NULL, dirs) { + TH_LOG("No directory list\n"); + } + ASSERT_NE(NULL, dirs[0]) { + TH_LOG("Empty directory list\n"); + } + + /* get the number of dir entries */ + for (dirs_len = 0; dirs[dirs_len]; dirs_len++); + map = bpf_create_map(BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE, sizeof(key), sizeof(value), + dirs_len, 0); + ASSERT_NE(-1, map) { + TH_LOG("Failed to create a map of %d elements: %s\n", dirs_len, + strerror(errno)); + } + + for (i = 0; dirs[i]; i++) { + key = open(dirs[i], O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_DIRECTORY); + ASSERT_NE(-1, key) { + TH_LOG("Failed to open directory \"%s\": %s\n", dirs[i], + strerror(errno)); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, bpf_map_update_elem(map, &key, &value, BPF_ANY)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to update the map with \"%s\": %s\n", + dirs[i], strerror(errno)); + } + close(key); + } + return map; +} + +static void enforce_map(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int map, + bool subpath) +{ + const struct bpf_insn prog_deny[] = { + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1), + /* look for the requested inode in the map */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6, + offsetof(struct landlock_ctx_fs_walk, inode)), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map), /* 2 instructions */ + BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, + BPF_FUNC_inode_map_lookup), + /* if it is there, then deny access to the inode, otherwise + * allow it */ + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, MAP_VALUE_DENY, 2), + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, LANDLOCK_RET_ALLOW), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, LANDLOCK_RET_DENY), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }; + union bpf_prog_subtype subtype = {}; + int fd_walk = -1, fd_pick; + char log[1024] = ""; + + if (subpath) { + subtype.landlock_hook.type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK; + fd_walk = ll_bpf_load_program((const struct bpf_insn *)&prog_deny, + sizeof(prog_deny) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn), + log, sizeof(log), &subtype); + ASSERT_NE(-1, fd_walk) { + TH_LOG("Failed to load fs_walk program: %s\n%s", + strerror(errno), log); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &fd_walk)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to apply Landlock program: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd_walk)); + } + + subtype.landlock_hook.type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK; + subtype.landlock_hook.triggers = TEST_PATH_TRIGGERS; + fd_pick = ll_bpf_load_program((const struct bpf_insn *)&prog_deny, + sizeof(prog_deny) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn), log, + sizeof(log), &subtype); + ASSERT_NE(-1, fd_pick) { + TH_LOG("Failed to load fs_pick program: %s\n%s", + strerror(errno), log); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &fd_pick)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to apply Landlock program: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd_pick)); +} + +static void check_map_blacklist(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, + bool subpath) +{ + int map = create_denied_inode_map(_metadata, (const char *const []) + { d2, NULL }); + ASSERT_NE(-1, map); + enforce_map(_metadata, map, subpath); + test_path(_metadata, d1, 0); + test_path(_metadata, d2, -1); + test_path(_metadata, d3, subpath ? -1 : 0); + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(map)); +} + +TEST(fs_map_blacklist_literal) +{ + check_map_blacklist(_metadata, false); +} + +TEST(fs_map_blacklist_subpath) +{ + check_map_blacklist(_metadata, true); +} + +static const char r2[] = "."; +static const char r3[] = "./doc"; + +enum relative_access { + REL_OPEN, + REL_CHDIR, + REL_CHROOT, +}; + +static void check_access(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, + bool enforce, enum relative_access rel) +{ + int dirfd; + int map = -1; + + if (rel == REL_CHROOT) + ASSERT_NE(-1, chdir(d2)); + if (enforce) { + map = create_denied_inode_map(_metadata, (const char *const []) + { d3, NULL }); + ASSERT_NE(-1, map); + enforce_map(_metadata, map, true); + } + switch (rel) { + case REL_OPEN: + dirfd = open(d2, O_DIRECTORY); + ASSERT_NE(-1, dirfd); + break; + case REL_CHDIR: + ASSERT_NE(-1, chdir(d2)); + dirfd = AT_FDCWD; + break; + case REL_CHROOT: + ASSERT_NE(-1, chroot(d2)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to chroot: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + } + dirfd = AT_FDCWD; + break; + default: + ASSERT_TRUE(false); + return; + } + + test_path_rel(_metadata, dirfd, r2, 0); + test_path_rel(_metadata, dirfd, r3, enforce ? -1 : 0); + + if (rel == REL_OPEN) + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(dirfd)); + if (enforce) + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(map)); +} + +TEST(fs_allow_open) +{ + /* no enforcement, via open */ + check_access(_metadata, false, REL_OPEN); +} + +TEST(fs_allow_chdir) +{ + /* no enforcement, via chdir */ + check_access(_metadata, false, REL_CHDIR); +} + +TEST(fs_allow_chroot) +{ + /* no enforcement, via chroot */ + check_access(_metadata, false, REL_CHROOT); +} + +TEST(fs_deny_open) +{ + /* enforcement without tag, via open */ + check_access(_metadata, true, REL_OPEN); +} + +TEST(fs_deny_chdir) +{ + /* enforcement without tag, via chdir */ + check_access(_metadata, true, REL_CHDIR); +} + +TEST(fs_deny_chroot) +{ + /* enforcement without tag, via chroot */ + check_access(_metadata, true, REL_CHROOT); +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2f3e346288bc --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/test_ptrace.c @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock tests - ptrace + * + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include /* raise */ +#include +#include /* waitpid */ +#include /* waitpid */ +#include /* fork, pipe */ + +#include "test.h" + +static void apply_null_sandbox(struct __test_metadata *_metadata) +{ + const struct bpf_insn prog_accept[] = { + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }; + const union bpf_prog_subtype subtype = { + .landlock_hook = { + .type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK, + .triggers = LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN, + } + }; + int prog; + char log[256] = ""; + + prog = ll_bpf_load_program((const struct bpf_insn *)&prog_accept, + sizeof(prog_accept) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn), log, + sizeof(log), &subtype); + ASSERT_NE(-1, prog) { + TH_LOG("Failed to load minimal rule: %s\n%s", + strerror(errno), log); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &prog)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to apply minimal rule: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(prog)); +} + +/* PTRACE_TRACEME and PTRACE_ATTACH without Landlock rules effect */ +static void check_ptrace(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, + int sandbox_both, int sandbox_parent, int sandbox_child, + int expect_ptrace) +{ + pid_t child; + int status; + int pipefd[2]; + + ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd)); + if (sandbox_both) + apply_null_sandbox(_metadata); + + child = fork(); + ASSERT_LE(0, child); + if (child == 0) { + char buf; + + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1])); + if (sandbox_child) + apply_null_sandbox(_metadata); + + /* test traceme */ + ASSERT_EQ(expect_ptrace, ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME)); + if (expect_ptrace) { + ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + } else { + ASSERT_EQ(0, raise(SIGSTOP)); + } + + /* sync */ + ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to read() sync from parent"); + } + ASSERT_EQ('.', buf); + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE); + } + + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[0])); + if (sandbox_parent) + apply_null_sandbox(_metadata); + + /* test traceme */ + if (!expect_ptrace) { + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFSTOPPED(status)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child, NULL, 0)); + } + /* test attach */ + ASSERT_EQ(expect_ptrace, ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, child, NULL, 0)); + if (expect_ptrace) { + ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + } else { + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFSTOPPED(status)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child, NULL, 0)); + } + + /* sync */ + ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], ".", 1)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to write() sync to child"); + } + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)) + _metadata->passed = 0; +} + +TEST(ptrace_allow_without_sandbox) +{ + /* no sandbox */ + check_ptrace(_metadata, 0, 0, 0, 0); +} + +TEST(ptrace_allow_with_one_sandbox) +{ + /* child sandbox */ + check_ptrace(_metadata, 0, 0, 1, 0); +} + +TEST(ptrace_allow_with_nested_sandbox) +{ + /* inherited and child sandbox */ + check_ptrace(_metadata, 1, 0, 1, 0); +} + +TEST(ptrace_deny_with_parent_sandbox) +{ + /* parent sandbox */ + check_ptrace(_metadata, 0, 1, 0, -1); +} + +TEST(ptrace_deny_with_nested_and_parent_sandbox) +{ + /* inherited and parent sandbox */ + check_ptrace(_metadata, 1, 1, 0, -1); +} + +TEST(ptrace_deny_with_forked_sandbox) +{ + /* inherited, parent and child sandbox */ + check_ptrace(_metadata, 1, 1, 1, -1); +} + +TEST(ptrace_deny_with_sibling_sandbox) +{ + /* parent and child sandbox */ + check_ptrace(_metadata, 0, 1, 1, -1); +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN From patchwork Tue Jun 25 21:52:39 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 11016455 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15B4114BB for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0566326253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id ED299284AF; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2D7226253 for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 21:55:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726037AbfFYVzK (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:10 -0400 Received: from smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch ([128.65.195.4]:44236 "EHLO smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726574AbfFYVzK (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 17:55:10 -0400 Received: from smtp5.infomaniak.ch (smtp5.infomaniak.ch [83.166.132.18]) by smtp-sh.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrSKW019918 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:28 +0200 Received: from localhost (ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu [94.23.54.103]) (authenticated bits=0) by smtp5.infomaniak.ch (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id x5PLrRJX038974; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:53:27 +0200 From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Viro , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BC?= =?utf-8?q?n?= , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Stephen Smalley , Tejun Heo , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Graf , Tycho Andersen , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation for Landlock Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:52:39 +0200 Message-Id: <20190625215239.11136-11-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20190625215239.11136-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David S. Miller Cc: James Morris Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn --- Changes since v8: * remove documentation related to chaining and tagging according to this patch series Changes since v7: * update documentation according to the Landlock revamp Changes since v6: * add a check for ctx->event * rename BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK to BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_RULE * rename Landlock version to ABI to better reflect its purpose and add a dedicated changelog section * update tables * relax no_new_privs recommendations * remove ABILITY_WRITE related functions * reword rule "appending" to "prepending" and explain it * cosmetic fixes Changes since v5: * update the rule hierarchy inheritance explanation * briefly explain ctx->arg2 * add ptrace restrictions * explain EPERM * update example (subtype) * use ":manpage:" --- Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst | 20 +++ Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst | 99 ++++++++++++++ Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 268 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst index aad6d92ffe31..32b4c1db2325 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst @@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ Security Documentation SCTP self-protection tpm/index + landlock/index diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d0af868d1582 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +========================================= +Landlock LSM: programmatic access control +========================================= + +Landlock is a stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) that makes it possible to +create security sandboxes, programmable access-controls or safe endpoint +security agents. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the +security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space +applications. The current version allows only a process with the global +CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability to create such sandboxes but the ultimate goal of +Landlock is to empower any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely +restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of +filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can inspect the use +of kernel objects like files and hence make a decision according to the kernel +semantic. + +.. toctree:: + + user + kernel diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7d1e06d544bf --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock/kernel.rst @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +============================== +Landlock: kernel documentation +============================== + +eBPF properties +=============== + +To get an expressive language while still being safe and small, Landlock is +based on eBPF. Landlock should be usable by untrusted processes and must +therefore expose a minimal attack surface. The eBPF bytecode is minimal, +powerful, widely used and designed to be used by untrusted applications. Thus, +reusing the eBPF support in the kernel enables a generic approach while +minimizing new code. + +An eBPF program has access to an eBPF context containing some fields used to +inspect the current object. These arguments can be used directly (e.g. cookie) +or passed to helper functions according to their types (e.g. inode pointer). It +is then possible to do complex access checks without race conditions or +inconsistent evaluation (i.e. `incorrect mirroring of the OS code and state +`_). + +A Landlock hook describes a particular access type. For now, there is two +hooks dedicated to filesystem related operations: LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK and +LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_WALK. A Landlock program is tied to one hook. This makes it +possible to statically check context accesses, potentially performed by such +program, and hence prevents kernel address leaks and ensure the right use of +hook arguments with eBPF functions. Any user can add multiple Landlock +programs per Landlock hook. They are stacked and evaluated one after the +other, starting from the most recent program, as seccomp-bpf does with its +filters. Underneath, a hook is an abstraction over a set of LSM hooks. + + +Guiding principles +================== + +Unprivileged use +---------------- + +* Landlock helpers and context should be usable by any unprivileged and + untrusted program while following the system security policy enforced by + other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC, LSM). + + +Landlock hook and context +------------------------- + +* A Landlock hook shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead + of syscall filtering (i.e. syscall arguments), which is the purpose of + seccomp-bpf. +* A Landlock context provided by a hook shall express the minimal and more + generic interface to control an access for a kernel object. +* A hook shall guaranty that all the BPF function calls from a program are + safe. Thus, the related Landlock context arguments shall always be of the + same type for a particular hook. For example, a network hook could share + helpers with a file hook because of UNIX socket. However, the same helpers + may not be compatible for a file system handle and a net handle. +* Multiple hooks may use the same context interface. + + +Landlock helpers +---------------- + +* Landlock helpers shall be as generic as possible while at the same time being + as simple as possible and following the syscall creation principles (cf. + *Documentation/adding-syscalls.txt*). +* The only behavior change allowed on a helper is to fix a (logical) bug to + match the initial semantic. +* Helpers shall be reentrant, i.e. only take inputs from arguments (e.g. from + the BPF context), to enable a hook to use a cache. Future program options + might change this cache behavior. +* It is quite easy to add new helpers to extend Landlock. The main concern + should be about the possibility to leak information from the kernel that may + not be accessible otherwise (i.e. side-channel attack). + + +Questions and answers +===================== + +Why not create a custom hook for each kind of action? +----------------------------------------------------- + +Landlock programs can handle these checks. Adding more exceptions to the +kernel code would lead to more code complexity. A decision to ignore a kind of +action can and should be done at the beginning of a Landlock program. + + +Why a program does not return an errno or a kill code? +------------------------------------------------------ + +seccomp filters can return multiple kind of code, including an errno value or a +kill signal, which may be convenient for access control. Those return codes +are hardwired in the userland ABI. Instead, Landlock's approach is to return a +boolean to allow or deny an action, which is much simpler and more generic. +Moreover, we do not really have a choice because, unlike to seccomp, Landlock +programs are not enforced at the syscall entry point but may be executed at any +point in the kernel (through LSM hooks) where an errno return code may not make +sense. However, with this simple ABI and with the ability to call helpers, +Landlock may gain features similar to seccomp-bpf in the future while being +compatible with previous programs. diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e4bb7dba4aa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock/user.rst @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +================================ +Landlock: userland documentation +================================ + +Landlock programs +================= + +eBPF programs are used to create security programs. They are contained and can +call only a whitelist of dedicated functions. Moreover, they can only loop +under strict conditions, which protects from denial of service. More +information on BPF can be found in *Documentation/networking/filter.txt*. + + +Writing a program +----------------- + +To enforce a security policy, a thread first needs to create a Landlock program. +The easiest way to write an eBPF program depicting a security program is to write +it in the C language. As described in *samples/bpf/README.rst*, LLVM can +compile such programs. Files *samples/bpf/landlock1_kern.c* and those in +*tools/testing/selftests/landlock/* can be used as examples. + +Once the eBPF program is created, the next step is to create the metadata +describing the Landlock program. This metadata includes a subtype which +contains the hook type to which the program is tied and some options. + +.. code-block:: c + + union bpf_prog_subtype subtype = { + .landlock_hook = { + .type = LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK, + .triggers = LANDLOCK_TRIGGER_FS_PICK_OPEN, + } + }; + +A Landlock hook describes the kind of kernel object for which a program will be +triggered to allow or deny an action. For example, the hook +LANDLOCK_HOOK_FS_PICK can be triggered every time a landlocked thread performs +a set of action related to the filesystem (e.g. open, read, write, mount...). +This actions are identified by the `triggers` bitfield. + +The next step is to fill a :c:type:`union bpf_attr ` with +BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, the previously created subtype and other BPF +program metadata. This bpf_attr must then be passed to the :manpage:`bpf(2)` +syscall alongside the BPF_PROG_LOAD command. If everything is deemed correct +by the kernel, the thread gets a file descriptor referring to this program. + +In the following code, the *insn* variable is an array of BPF instructions +which can be extracted from an ELF file as is done in bpf_load_file() from +*samples/bpf/bpf_load.c*. + +.. code-block:: c + + union bpf_attr attr = { + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK, + .insn_cnt = sizeof(insn) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn), + .insns = (__u64) (unsigned long) insn, + .license = (__u64) (unsigned long) "GPL", + .prog_subtype = &subtype, + .prog_subtype_size = sizeof(subtype), + }; + int fd = bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, &attr, sizeof(attr)); + if (fd == -1) + exit(1); + + +Enforcing a program +------------------- + +Once the Landlock program has been created or received (e.g. through a UNIX +socket), the thread willing to sandbox itself (and its future children) should +perform the following two steps. + +The thread should first request to never be allowed to get new privileges with a +call to :manpage:`prctl(2)` and the PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS option. More +information can be found in *Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt*. + +.. code-block:: c + + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0)) + exit(1); + +A thread can apply a program to itself by using the :manpage:`seccomp(2)` syscall. +The operation is SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, the flags must be empty and the +*args* argument must point to a valid Landlock program file descriptor. + +.. code-block:: c + + if (seccomp(SECCOMP_PREPEND_LANDLOCK_PROG, 0, &fd)) + exit(1); + +If the syscall succeeds, the program is now enforced on the calling thread and +will be enforced on all its subsequently created children of the thread as +well. Once a thread is landlocked, there is no way to remove this security +policy, only stacking more restrictions is allowed. The program evaluation is +performed from the newest to the oldest. + +When a syscall ask for an action on a kernel object, if this action is denied, +then an EACCES errno code is returned through the syscall. + + +.. _inherited_programs: + +Inherited programs +------------------ + +Every new thread resulting from a :manpage:`clone(2)` inherits Landlock program +restrictions from its parent. This is similar to the seccomp inheritance as +described in *Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt*. + + +Ptrace restrictions +------------------- + +A landlocked process has less privileges than a non-landlocked process and must +then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating another process. +To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target +process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process programs. + + +Landlock structures and constants +================================= + +Hook types +---------- + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h + :functions: landlock_hook_type + + +Contexts +-------- + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h + :functions: landlock_ctx_fs_pick landlock_ctx_fs_walk landlock_ctx_fs_get + + +Triggers for fs_pick +-------------------- + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h + :functions: landlock_triggers + + +Additional documentation +======================== + +See https://landlock.io