From patchwork Tue Oct 1 23:41:48 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11169943 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 360FC1709 for ; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0292D21A4C for ; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729296AbfJAXmP (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:42:15 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:22014 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729292AbfJAXmP (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:42:15 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x91NgDZi077218 for ; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:42:13 -0400 Received: from e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.99]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vccat7w6b-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 01 Oct 2019 19:42:13 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 2 Oct 2019 00:42:06 +0100 Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.160]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x91Ng5eD38142134 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:05 GMT Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1483BA4054; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:05 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 76CC3A405B; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:02 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.224.222]) by b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:02 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v4 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:41:48 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1569973311-3047-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1569973311-3047-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19100123-0012-0000-0000-000003532603 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19100123-0013-0000-0000-0000218E2708 Message-Id: <1569973311-3047-2-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-01_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910010202 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are controlled by OPAL. This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL secure variables based on the unique key. This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h | 5 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h | 8 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h | 35 +++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c | 19 +++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 6 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c | 3 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c | 5 + 11 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h index 378e3997845a..c1f25a760eb1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h @@ -211,7 +211,10 @@ #define OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE 173 #define OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG 174 #define OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG 175 -#define OPAL_LAST 175 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET 176 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT 177 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE 178 +#define OPAL_LAST 178 #define QUIESCE_HOLD 1 /* Spin all calls at entry */ #define QUIESCE_REJECT 2 /* Fail all calls with OPAL_BUSY */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h index a0cf8fba4d12..03392dc3f5e2 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h @@ -298,6 +298,13 @@ int opal_sensor_group_clear(u32 group_hndl, int token); int opal_sensor_group_enable(u32 group_hndl, int token, bool enable); int opal_nx_coproc_init(uint32_t chip_id, uint32_t ct); +int opal_secvar_get(const char *key, uint64_t key_len, u8 *data, + uint64_t *data_size); +int opal_secvar_get_next(const char *key, uint64_t *key_len, + uint64_t key_buf_size); +int opal_secvar_enqueue_update(const char *key, uint64_t key_len, u8 *data, + uint64_t data_size); + s64 opal_mpipl_update(enum opal_mpipl_ops op, u64 src, u64 dest, u64 size); s64 opal_mpipl_register_tag(enum opal_mpipl_tags tag, u64 addr); s64 opal_mpipl_query_tag(enum opal_mpipl_tags tag, u64 *addr); @@ -392,6 +399,7 @@ void opal_wake_poller(void); void opal_powercap_init(void); void opal_psr_init(void); void opal_sensor_groups_init(void); +void opal_secvar_init(void); #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h index e1a858718716..cff980a85dd2 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/powernv.h @@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ extern void powernv_set_nmmu_ptcr(unsigned long ptcr); void pnv_program_cpu_hotplug_lpcr(unsigned int cpu, u64 lpcr_val); void pnv_tm_init(void); + #else static inline void powernv_set_nmmu_ptcr(unsigned long ptcr) { } static inline void pnv_tm_init(void) { } + #endif #endif /* _ASM_POWERNV_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4cc35b58b986 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * PowerPC secure variable operations. + */ +#ifndef SECVAR_OPS_H +#define SECVAR_OPS_H + +#include +#include + +extern const struct secvar_operations *secvar_ops; + +struct secvar_operations { + int (*get)(const char *key, uint64_t key_len, u8 *data, + uint64_t *data_size); + int (*get_next)(const char *key, uint64_t *key_len, + uint64_t keybufsize); + int (*set)(const char *key, uint64_t key_len, u8 *data, + uint64_t data_size); +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT + +extern void set_secvar_ops(const struct secvar_operations *ops); + +#else + +static inline void set_secvar_ops(const struct secvar_operations *ops) { } + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index e8eb2955b7d5..3cf26427334f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),) obj-y += ucall.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4331a5b66ec0 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * This file initializes secvar operations for PowerPC Secureboot + */ + +#include +#include + +const struct secvar_operations *secvar_ops; + +void set_secvar_ops(const struct secvar_operations *ops) +{ + if (!ops) + secvar_ops = NULL; + secvar_ops = ops; +} diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig index 938803eab0ad..a1c7c8e2e683 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig @@ -50,3 +50,9 @@ config PPC_VAS config SCOM_DEBUGFS bool "Expose SCOM controllers via debugfs" depends on DEBUG_FS + +config OPAL_SECVAR + bool "OPAL Secure Variables" + depends on PPC_POWERNV + help + This enables the kernel to access OPAL secure variables. diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile index a3ac9646119d..0ae688bde9b7 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile @@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE) += memtrace.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS) += vas.o vas-window.o vas-debug.o obj-$(CONFIG_OCXL_BASE) += ocxl.o obj-$(CONFIG_SCOM_DEBUGFS) += opal-xscom.o +obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c index a2aa5e433ac8..5cd0f52d258f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c @@ -290,3 +290,6 @@ OPAL_CALL(opal_nx_coproc_init, OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT); OPAL_CALL(opal_mpipl_update, OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE); OPAL_CALL(opal_mpipl_register_tag, OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG); OPAL_CALL(opal_mpipl_query_tag, OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG); +OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_get, OPAL_SECVAR_GET); +OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_get_next, OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT); +OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_enqueue_update, OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ad5c6b8019dd --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * PowerNV code for secure variables + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Claudio Carvalho + * Nayna Jain + * + * APIs to access secure variables managed by OPAL. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secvar: "fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int opal_status_to_err(int rc) +{ + int err; + + switch (rc) { + case OPAL_SUCCESS: + err = 0; + break; + case OPAL_UNSUPPORTED: + err = -ENXIO; + break; + case OPAL_PARAMETER: + err = -EINVAL; + break; + case OPAL_RESOURCE: + err = -ENOSPC; + break; + case OPAL_HARDWARE: + err = -EIO; + break; + case OPAL_NO_MEM: + err = -ENOMEM; + break; + case OPAL_EMPTY: + err = -ENOENT; + break; + case OPAL_PARTIAL: + err = -EFBIG; + break; + default: + err = -EINVAL; + } + + return err; +} + +static bool is_opal_secvar_supported(void) +{ + static bool opal_secvar_supported; + static bool initialized; + + if (initialized) + return opal_secvar_supported; + + if (!is_powerpc_os_sb_supported()) { + opal_secvar_supported = false; + goto out; + } + + if (!opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_GET) + || !opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT) + || !opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE)) { + pr_err("OPAL doesn't support secure variables\n"); + opal_secvar_supported = false; + } else { + opal_secvar_supported = true; + } + +out: + initialized = true; + + return opal_secvar_supported; +} + +static int opal_get_variable(const char *key, uint64_t ksize, + u8 *data, uint64_t *dsize) +{ + int rc; + + if (dsize) + *dsize = cpu_to_be64(*dsize); + + rc = opal_secvar_get(key, ksize, data, dsize); + + if (dsize) + *dsize = be64_to_cpu(*dsize); + + return opal_status_to_err(rc); +} + +static int opal_get_next_variable(const char *key, uint64_t *keylen, + uint64_t keybufsize) +{ + int rc; + + if (keylen) + *keylen = cpu_to_be64(*keylen); + + rc = opal_secvar_get_next(key, keylen, keybufsize); + + if (keylen) + *keylen = be64_to_cpu(*keylen); + + return opal_status_to_err(rc); +} + +static int opal_set_variable(const char *key, uint64_t ksize, u8 *data, + uint64_t dsize) +{ + int rc; + + rc = opal_secvar_enqueue_update(key, ksize, data, dsize); + + return opal_status_to_err(rc); +} + +static const struct secvar_operations opal_secvar_ops = { + .get = opal_get_variable, + .get_next = opal_get_next_variable, + .set = opal_set_variable, +}; + +void opal_secvar_init(void) +{ + if (!is_opal_secvar_supported()) + set_secvar_ops(NULL); + + set_secvar_ops(&opal_secvar_ops); +} diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c index 38e90270280b..8e654d3735c1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include "powernv.h" @@ -1002,6 +1004,9 @@ static int __init opal_init(void) /* Initialise OPAL Power control interface */ opal_power_control_init(); + /* Initialize OPAL secure variables */ + opal_secvar_init(); + return 0; } machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, opal_init); From patchwork Tue Oct 1 23:41:49 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11169945 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC6C31709 for ; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8154921A4A for ; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729310AbfJAXmS (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:42:18 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:36428 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729309AbfJAXmS (ORCPT ); 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 2 Oct 2019 00:42:10 +0100 Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.160]) by b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x91Ng8CQ49741880 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:08 GMT Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id B22BEA405C; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:08 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 266DCA405B; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:06 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.224.222]) by b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:05 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v4 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:41:49 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1569973311-3047-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1569973311-3047-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19100123-0016-0000-0000-000002B324AD X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19100123-0017-0000-0000-000033142628 Message-Id: <1569973311-3047-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-01_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910010202 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org PowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates. This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating the keys stored in the secure variables. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 37 +++++ arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 10 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 246 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..815bd8ec4d5e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +What: /sys/firmware/secvar +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: This directory is created if the POWER firmware supports OS + secureboot, thereby secure variables. It exposes interface + for reading/writing the secure variables + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: This directory lists all the secure variables that are supported + by the firmware. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/ +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: Each secure variable is represented as a directory named as + . The variable name is unique and is in ASCII + representation. The data and size can be determined by reading + their respective attribute files. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars//size +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: An integer representation of the size of the content of the + variable. In other words, it represents the size of the data. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars//data +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: A read-only file containing the value of the variable + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars//update +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: A write-only file that is used to submit the new value for the + variable. diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index deb19ec6ba3d..89084e4e5054 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -946,6 +946,16 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT to enable OS secure boot on systems that have firmware support for it. If in doubt say N. +config SECVAR_SYSFS + tristate "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables" + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + depends on SYSFS + help + POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware. + These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable + read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have + secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace. + endmenu config ISA_DMA_API diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index 3cf26427334f..116a3a5c0557 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ obj-y += ucall.o endif obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECVAR_SYSFS) += secvar-sysfs.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..87a7cea41523 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * + * This code exposes secure variables to user via sysfs + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Since firmware checks the maximum allowed size, currently, it is default to + * 0. In future, it will be read from the device tree. + */ +#define VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE 0 +/* Approximate value */ +#define NAME_MAX_SIZE 1024 + +static struct kobject *secvar_kobj; +static struct kset *secvar_kset; + +static ssize_t size_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + uint64_t dsize; + int rc; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL, &dsize); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Error retrieving variable size %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + + rc = sprintf(buf, "%llu\n", dsize); + + return rc; +} + +static ssize_t data_read(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + uint64_t dsize; + int rc; + char *data; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL, &dsize); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Error getting variable size %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } + pr_debug("dsize is %llu\n", dsize); + + data = kzalloc(dsize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, data, &dsize); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Error getting variable %d\n", rc); + goto data_fail; + } + + rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &off, data, dsize); + +data_fail: + kfree(data); + return rc; +} + +static ssize_t update_write(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + int rc; + + pr_debug("count is %ld\n", count); + rc = secvar_ops->set(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, buf, count); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Error setting the variable %s\n", kobj->name); + return rc; + } + + return count; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute size_attr = __ATTR_RO(size); + +static struct bin_attribute data_attr = __BIN_ATTR_RO(data, VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE); + +static struct bin_attribute update_attr = __BIN_ATTR_WO(update, + VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE); + +static struct bin_attribute *secvar_bin_attrs[] = { + &data_attr, + &update_attr, + NULL, +}; + +static struct attribute *secvar_attrs[] = { + &size_attr.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group secvar_attr_group = { + .attrs = secvar_attrs, + .bin_attrs = secvar_bin_attrs, +}; +__ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(secvar_attr); + +static struct kobj_type secvar_ktype = { + .sysfs_ops = &kobj_sysfs_ops, + .default_groups = secvar_attr_groups, +}; + +static int secvar_sysfs_load(void) +{ + char *name; + uint64_t namesize = 0; + struct kobject *kobj; + int rc; + + name = kzalloc(NAME_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + + do { + rc = secvar_ops->get_next(name, &namesize, NAME_MAX_SIZE); + if (rc) { + if (rc != -ENOENT) + pr_err("error getting secvar from firmware %d\n", + rc); + break; + } + + kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*kobj), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kobj) + return -ENOMEM; + + kobject_init(kobj, &secvar_ktype); + + rc = kobject_add(kobj, &secvar_kset->kobj, "%s", name); + if (rc) { + pr_warn("kobject_add error %d for attribute: %s\n", rc, + name); + kobject_put(kobj); + kobj = NULL; + } + + if (kobj) + kobject_uevent(kobj, KOBJ_ADD); + + } while (!rc); + + kfree(name); + return rc; +} + +static int secvar_sysfs_init(void) +{ + if (!secvar_ops) { + pr_warn("secvar: failed to retrieve secvar operations.\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } + + secvar_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("secvar", firmware_kobj); + if (!secvar_kobj) { + pr_err("secvar: Failed to create firmware kobj\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + secvar_kset = kset_create_and_add("vars", NULL, secvar_kobj); + if (!secvar_kset) { + pr_err("secvar: sysfs kobject registration failed.\n"); + kobject_put(secvar_kobj); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + secvar_sysfs_load(); + + return 0; +} + +static void secvar_sysfs_exit(void) +{ + kset_unregister(secvar_kset); + kobject_put(secvar_kobj); +} + +module_init(secvar_sysfs_init); +module_exit(secvar_sysfs_exit); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Nayna Jain "); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("sysfs interface to POWER secure variables"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); From patchwork Tue Oct 1 23:41:50 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11169951 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF8F117EE for ; 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 2 Oct 2019 00:42:14 +0100 Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.160]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x91NgCF631850678 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:12 GMT Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 722C5A4062; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:12 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id D63A6A4054; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:09 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.224.222]) by b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:09 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:41:50 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1569973311-3047-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1569973311-3047-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19100123-4275-0000-0000-0000036D236C X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19100123-4276-0000-0000-000038802451 Message-Id: <1569973311-3047-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-01_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910010202 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware. This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 ++++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +--------------- 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 19faace69644..525bf1d6e0db 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ - platform_certs/load_uefi.o + platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c5ba695c10e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "../integrity.h" + +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata = + EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; + +/* + * Blacklist a hash. + */ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data, + size_t len, const char *type, + size_t type_len) +{ + char *hash, *p; + + hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hash) + return; + p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len); + p += type_len; + bin2hex(p, data, len); + p += len * 2; + *p = 0; + + mark_hash_blacklisted(hash); + kfree(hash); +} + +/* + * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. + */ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, + const void *data, size_t len) +{ + uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4); +} + +/* + * Blacklist the hash of an executable. + */ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source, + const void *data, size_t len) +{ + uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4); +} + +/* + * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in + * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. + */ +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) + return add_to_platform_keyring; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in + * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. + */ +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0) + return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0) + return uefi_blacklist_binary; + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2462bfa08fe3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H +#define PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H + +#include + +void blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data, + size_t len, const char *type, + size_t type_len); + +/* + * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. + */ +void blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len); + +/* + * Blacklist the hash of an executable. + */ +void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len); + +/* + * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the db. + */ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +/* + * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. + */ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index 81b19c52832b..4369204a19cd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include "../integrity.h" +#include "keyring_handler.h" static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata = @@ -67,72 +68,6 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, return db; } -/* - * Blacklist a hash. - */ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data, - size_t len, const char *type, - size_t type_len) -{ - char *hash, *p; - - hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!hash) - return; - p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len); - p += type_len; - bin2hex(p, data, len); - p += len * 2; - *p = 0; - - mark_hash_blacklisted(hash); - kfree(hash); -} - -/* - * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. - */ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, - const void *data, size_t len) -{ - uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4); -} - -/* - * Blacklist the hash of an executable. - */ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source, - const void *data, size_t len) -{ - uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4); -} - -/* - * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in - * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. - */ -static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t * - sig_type) -{ - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) - return add_to_platform_keyring; - return 0; -} - -/* - * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in - * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. - */ -static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t * - sig_type) -{ - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0) - return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0) - return uefi_blacklist_binary; - return 0; -} - /* * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist From patchwork Tue Oct 1 23:41:51 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11169949 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A49B976 for ; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 825A721D81 for ; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728981AbfJAXma (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:42:30 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:37666 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726960AbfJAXmX (ORCPT ); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:42:23 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x91Ng7D1069956 for ; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:42:22 -0400 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vcc4eywga-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 01 Oct 2019 19:42:22 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 2 Oct 2019 00:42:17 +0100 Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.160]) by b06avi18878370.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x91NgGKP37683644 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:16 GMT Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1014BA4054; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:16 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75EDCA405B; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:13 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.224.222]) by b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 1 Oct 2019 23:42:13 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v4 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:41:51 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1569973311-3047-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1569973311-3047-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19100123-0016-0000-0000-000002B324B2 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19100123-0017-0000-0000-00003314262D Message-Id: <1569973311-3047-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-01_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910010202 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/Kconfig | 8 ++ security/integrity/Makefile | 3 + .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 97 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 0bae6adb63a9..26abee23e4e3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -72,6 +72,14 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS depends on S390 def_bool y +config LOAD_PPC_KEYS + bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER" + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + help + Enable loading of keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted + hashes to the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms. + config INTEGRITY_AUDIT bool "Enables integrity auditing support " depends on AUDIT diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 525bf1d6e0db..9eeb6b053de3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o +integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ + platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..83d99cde5376 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * - loads keys and hashes stored and controlled by the firmware. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "keyring_handler.h" + +/* + * Get a certificate list blob from the named secure variable. + */ +static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, uint64_t *size) +{ + int rc; + void *db; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, NULL, size); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Couldn't get size: %d\n", rc); + return NULL; + } + + db = kmalloc(*size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!db) + return NULL; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, db, size); + if (rc) { + kfree(db); + pr_err("Error reading db var: %d\n", rc); + return NULL; + } + + return db; +} + +/* + * Load the certs contained in the keys databases into the platform trusted + * keyring and the blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist + * keyring. + */ +static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) +{ + void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; + uint64_t dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0; + int rc = 0; + + if (!secvar_ops) + return -ENODEV; + + /* Get db, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't + * an error if we can't get them. + */ + db = get_cert_list("db", 3, &dbsize); + if (!db) { + pr_err("Couldn't get db list from firmware\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:db", db, dbsize, + get_handler_for_db); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(db); + } + + dbx = get_cert_list("dbx", 3, &dbxsize); + if (!dbx) { + pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list from firmware\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:dbx", dbx, dbxsize, + get_handler_for_dbx); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(dbx); + } + + return rc; +} +late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);