From patchwork Thu Oct 24 03:47:10 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11208245 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B540314E5 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92D8D20856 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2437338AbfJXDrn (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:43 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:36880 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2437335AbfJXDrm (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:42 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098420.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3lYlI006605 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:41 -0400 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vu07uxqnc-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:41 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:39 +0100 Received: from b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.198) by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.135) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:35 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3lX4q45285438 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:34 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1ECEAE04D; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:33 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 12C32AE057; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:31 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:30 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:10 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0020-0000-0000-0000037D8109 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0021-0000-0000-000021D3C529 Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-2-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This patch defines a function to detect the secure boot state of a PowerNV system. The PPC_SECURE_BOOT config represents the base enablement of secure boot for powerpc. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 67 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 3e56c9c2f16e..56ea0019b616 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -934,6 +934,16 @@ config PPC_MEM_KEYS If unsure, say y. +config PPC_SECURE_BOOT + prompt "Enable secure boot support" + bool + depends on PPC_POWERNV + help + Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security + policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user + to enable OS secure boot on systems that have firmware support for + it. If in doubt say N. + endmenu config ISA_DMA_API diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..07d0fe0ca81f --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Secure boot definitions + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + */ +#ifndef _ASM_POWER_SECURE_BOOT_H +#define _ASM_POWER_SECURE_BOOT_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT + +bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void); + +#else + +static inline bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void) +{ + return false; +} + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index a7ca8fe62368..e2a54fa240ac 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),) obj-y += ucall.o endif +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o + # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..63dc82c50862 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + */ +#include +#include +#include + +bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void) +{ + struct device_node *node; + bool enabled = false; + + node = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "ibm,secvar-v1"); + if (!of_device_is_available(node)) { + pr_err("Cannot find secure variable node in device tree; failing to secure state\n"); + goto out; + } + + /* + * secureboot is enabled if os-secure-enforcing property exists, + * else disabled. + */ + enabled = of_property_read_bool(node, "os-secure-enforcing"); + +out: + of_node_put(node); + + pr_info("Secure boot mode %s\n", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + return enabled; +} From patchwork Thu Oct 24 03:47:11 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11208247 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF27014ED for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD0482166E for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2408353AbfJXDru (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:50 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:5614 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2406598AbfJXDru (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:50 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098417.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3lEpS003830 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:48 -0400 Received: from e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.98]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vu13h5a0u-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:48 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:46 +0100 Received: from b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.198) by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.132) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:42 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3legK42139724 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:40 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92E69AE053; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:40 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9DB9AE051; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:37 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:37 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:11 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0008-0000-0000-000003267A28 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0009-0000-0000-00004A45AB8D Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-3-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org PowerNV system use a Linux-based bootloader, which relies on the IMA subsystem to enforce different secure boot modes. Since the verification policy may differ based on the secure boot mode of the system, the policies must be defined at runtime. This patch implements arch-specific support to define IMA policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system. This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT config is enabled. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/ima.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 56ea0019b616..c795039bdc73 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -938,6 +938,7 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT prompt "Enable secure boot support" bool depends on PPC_POWERNV + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY help Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index e2a54fa240ac..e8eb2955b7d5 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),) obj-y += ucall.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d88913dc0da7 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + */ + +#include +#include + +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(); +} + +/* + * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems. + * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values. + * The "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" option allows the known good signature + * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature. + * + * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible, the IMA + * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE + * is not enabled. + */ +static const char *const secure_rules[] = { + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", +#endif + NULL +}; + +/* + * Returns the relevant IMA arch-specific policies based on the system secure + * boot state. + */ +const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) +{ + if (is_ppc_secureboot_enabled()) + return secure_rules; + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 1c37f17f7203..6d904754d858 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); #endif -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) +#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \ + || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); #else From patchwork Thu Oct 24 03:47:12 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11208249 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8B86A14ED for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6ADAD21872 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2437361AbfJXDr4 (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:56 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:62602 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2437358AbfJXDrz (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:55 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3l8ZO100347 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:54 -0400 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vu2uxafhe-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:54 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:52 +0100 Received: from b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.195) by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.134) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:46 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3lipj54591500 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:44 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F1F2AE045; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:44 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id D42F8AE051; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:41 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:41 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 3/8] powerpc: detect the trusted boot state of the system Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:12 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0016-0000-0000-000002BC7C2F X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0017-0000-0000-0000331DBEC2 Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-4-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=657 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org While secure boot permits only properly verified signed kernels to be booted, trusted boot calculates the file hash of the kernel image and stores the measurement prior to boot, that can be subsequently compared against good known values via attestation services. This patch reads the trusted boot state of a PowerNV system. The state is used to conditionally enable additional measurement rules in the IMA arch-specific policies. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h | 6 ++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h index 07d0fe0ca81f..a2ff556916c6 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void); +bool is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled(void); #else @@ -19,5 +20,10 @@ static inline bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void) return false; } +static inline bool is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled(void) +{ + return false; +} + #endif #endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c index 63dc82c50862..a6a5f17ede03 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c @@ -7,6 +7,17 @@ #include #include +static struct device_node *get_ppc_fw_sb_node(void) +{ + static const struct of_device_id ids[] = { + { .compatible = "ibm,secureboot-v1", }, + { .compatible = "ibm,secureboot-v2", }, + {}, + }; + + return of_find_matching_node(NULL, ids); +} + bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void) { struct device_node *node; @@ -30,3 +41,18 @@ bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void) pr_info("Secure boot mode %s\n", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); return enabled; } + +bool is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled(void) +{ + struct device_node *node; + bool enabled = false; + + node = get_ppc_fw_sb_node(); + enabled = of_property_read_bool(node, "trusted-enabled"); + + of_node_put(node); + + pr_info("Trusted boot mode %s\n", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + + return enabled; +} From patchwork Thu Oct 24 03:47:13 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11208251 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3CC714E5 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8B2652166E for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2437359AbfJXDr7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:59 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:44174 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2390786AbfJXDr6 (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:58 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098421.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3lBoq092198 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:57 -0400 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vu1nfmgk4-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:57 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:55 +0100 Received: from b06avi18878370.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.26.194) by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.135) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:50 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06avi18878370.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3lmYn43712986 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:49 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id E054CAE04D; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:48 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 203A2AE045; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:46 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:45 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 4/8] powerpc/ima: define trusted boot policy Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:13 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0020-0000-0000-0000037D810B X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0021-0000-0000-000021D3C52A Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-5-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=928 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This patch defines an arch-specific trusted boot only policy and a combined secure and trusted boot policy. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c index d88913dc0da7..0ef5956c9753 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -30,6 +30,32 @@ static const char *const secure_rules[] = { NULL }; +/* + * The "trusted_rules" are enabled only on "trustedboot" enabled systems. + * These rules add the kexec kernel image and kernel modules file hashes to + * the IMA measurement list. + */ +static const char *const trusted_rules[] = { + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", + NULL +}; + +/* + * The "secure_and_trusted_rules" contains rules for both the secure boot and + * trusted boot. The "template=ima-modsig" option includes the appended + * signature, when available, in the IMA measurement list. + */ +static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = { + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", +#endif + NULL +}; + /* * Returns the relevant IMA arch-specific policies based on the system secure * boot state. @@ -37,7 +63,12 @@ static const char *const secure_rules[] = { const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) { if (is_ppc_secureboot_enabled()) - return secure_rules; + if (is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled()) + return secure_and_trusted_rules; + else + return secure_rules; + else if (is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled()) + return trusted_rules; return NULL; } From patchwork Thu Oct 24 03:47:14 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11208255 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9CFCC14ED for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B6CE2173B for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2437405AbfJXDsP (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:15 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:60410 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2437402AbfJXDsO (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:14 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0187473.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3lrMg002931 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:13 -0400 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vt2943h3d-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:12 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:59 +0100 Received: from b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.197) by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.135) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:55 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3ls3l59506718 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:54 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA365AE058; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:53 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 144A4AE055; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:51 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:50 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 5/8] ima: make process_buffer_measurement() generic Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:14 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0020-0000-0000-0000037D810D X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0021-0000-0000-000021D3C52C Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-6-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=996 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org process_buffer_measurement() is limited to measuring the kexec boot command line. This patch makes process_buffer_measurement() more generic, allowing it to measure other types of buffer data (e.g. blacklisted binary hashes or key hashes). process_buffer_measurement() may be called directly from an IMA hook or as an auxiliary measurement record. In both cases the buffer measurement is based on policy. This patch modifies the function to conditionally retrieve the policy defined PCR and template for the IMA hook case. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3689081aaf38..a65772ffa427 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, + const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, + int pcr); void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 60027c643ecd..fe0b704ffdeb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -626,14 +626,14 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. - * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation. - * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated. + * @func: IMA hook + * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ -static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, - const char *eventname, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid) +void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, + const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, + int pcr) { int ret = 0; struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; @@ -642,19 +642,38 @@ static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, .filename = eventname, .buf = buf, .buf_len = size}; - struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL; + struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; struct { struct ima_digest_data hdr; char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } hash = {}; int violation = 0; - int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; int action = 0; + u32 secid; - action = ima_get_action(NULL, cred, secid, 0, KEXEC_CMDLINE, &pcr, - &template_desc); - if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) - return; + if (func) { + security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, + &pcr, &template); + if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) + return; + } + + if (!pcr) + pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; + + if (!template) { + template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf"); + ret = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt, + &(template->fields), + &(template->num_fields)); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n", + (strlen(template->name) ? + template->name : template->fmt), ret); + return; + } + } iint.ima_hash = &hash.hdr; iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo; @@ -664,7 +683,7 @@ static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, if (ret < 0) goto out; - ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); + ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template); if (ret < 0) goto out; @@ -686,13 +705,9 @@ static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, */ void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) { - u32 secid; - - if (buf && size != 0) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + if (buf && size != 0) process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", - current_cred(), secid); - } + KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0); } static int __init init_ima(void) From patchwork Thu Oct 24 03:47:15 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11208253 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8013C14E5 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68C5721655 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2437391AbfJXDsN (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:13 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:18708 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2392939AbfJXDsM (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:12 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3l8Eu111767 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:11 -0400 Received: from e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.103]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vtyjgyq6e-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:11 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:48:09 +0100 Received: from b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.198) by e06smtp07.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.137) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:48:03 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3m1pk38469726 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:01 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8226AE053; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:01 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF66BAE04D; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:58 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:58 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 6/8] certs: add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:15 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0028-0000-0000-000003AE77C9 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0029-0000-0000-00002470A830 Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-7-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The -EKEYREJECTED error returned by existing is_hash_blacklisted() is misleading when called for checking against blacklisted hash of a binary. This patch adds a wrapper function is_binary_blacklisted() to return -EPERM error if binary is blacklisted. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- certs/blacklist.c | 9 +++++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c index ec00bf337eb6..6514f9ebc943 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.c +++ b/certs/blacklist.c @@ -135,6 +135,15 @@ int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted); +int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) +{ + if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, "bin") == -EKEYREJECTED) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_binary_blacklisted); + /* * Initialise the blacklist */ diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h index c1a96fdf598b..fb8b07daa9d1 100644 --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h @@ -35,12 +35,18 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash); extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type); +extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len); #else static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type) { return 0; } + +static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) +{ + return 0; +} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING From patchwork Thu Oct 24 03:47:16 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11208257 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D16714ED for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7071621925 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2437404AbfJXDsU (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:20 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:17144 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2437402AbfJXDsQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:16 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098399.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3l6MA135709 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:16 -0400 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vu42xrf4a-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:15 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:48:11 +0100 Received: from b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.195) by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.134) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:48:07 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3m5e537552304 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:05 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1722AE056; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:05 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id E01B3AE053; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:02 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:02 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 7/8] ima: check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:16 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0016-0000-0000-000002BC7C33 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0017-0000-0000-0000331DBEC5 Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-8-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Asymmetric private keys are used to sign multiple files. The kernel currently support checking against blacklisted keys. However, if the public key is blacklisted, any file signed by the blacklisted key will automatically fail signature verification. We might not want to blacklist all the files signed by a particular key, but just a single file. Blacklisting the public key is not fine enough granularity. This patch adds support for checking against the blacklisted hash of the file based on the IMA policy. The blacklisted hash is the file hash without the appended signature. Defined is a new policy option "appraise_flag=check_blacklist". In addition to the blacklisted binary hashes stored in the firmware "dbx" variable, the Linux kernel may be configured to load blacklisted binary hashes onto the .blacklist keyring as well. The following example shows how to blacklist a kernel module. $ sha256sum kernel/kheaders.ko 77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 kern el/kheaders.ko $ grep BLACKLIST .config # CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING is not set CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="blacklist-hash-list" $ cat certs/blacklist-hash-list "bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3" Update the IMA custom measurement and appraisal policy rules (/etc/ima-policy): measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig After building, installing, and rebooting the kernel: # keyctl show %keyring:.blacklist | grep 77fa889b35a05 545660333 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 # cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy | grep MODULE_CHECK measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig # modprobe kheaders modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kheaders': Permission denied # cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements 10 0c9834db5a0182c1fb0cdc5d3adcf11a11fd83dd ima-sig sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40 2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko 10 82aad2bcc3fa8ed94762356b5c14838f3bcfa6a0 ima-modsig sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40 2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko sha256:77fa889b3 5a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 3082029a06092a864886f70d010702a082028b30820287020101310d300b0609608648 016503040201300b06092a864886f70d01070131820264.... 10 25b72217cc1152b44b134ce2cd68f12dfb71acb3 ima-buf sha256:8b58427fedcf8f4b20bc8dc007f2e232bf7285d7b93a66476321f9c2a3aa132 b blacklisted-hash 77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3 Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 4 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 ++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++-- security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 29ebe9afdac4..29aaedf33246 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ Description: lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio] + [appraise_flag=] base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] @@ -38,6 +39,9 @@ Description: fowner:= decimal value lsm: are LSM specific option: appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig] + appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist] + Currently, blacklist check is only for files signed with appended + signature. template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index a65772ffa427..df4ca482fb53 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE +int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr); int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, @@ -271,6 +273,12 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); #else +static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 136ae4e0ee92..300c8d2943c5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "ima.h" @@ -303,6 +304,38 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig, return rc; } +/* + * ima_check_blacklist - determine if the binary is blacklisted. + * + * Add the hash of the blacklisted binary to the measurement list, based + * on policy. + * + * Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted. + */ +int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) +{ + enum hash_algo hash_algo; + const u8 *digest = NULL; + u32 digestsize = 0; + int rc = 0; + + if (!(iint->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) + return 0; + + if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig) { + ima_get_modsig_digest(modsig, &hash_algo, &digest, &digestsize); + + rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize); + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) + process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize, + "blacklisted-hash", NONE, + pcr); + } + + return rc; +} + /* * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index fe0b704ffdeb..13a0d64580ef 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -335,10 +335,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, template_desc); if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { - inode_lock(inode); - rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, - xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig); - inode_unlock(inode); + rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); + if (rc != -EPERM) { + inode_lock(inode); + rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, + pathname, xattr_value, + xattr_len, modsig); + inode_unlock(inode); + } if (!rc) rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf, &pathname, filename); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 5380aca2b351..f19a895ad7cd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -765,8 +765,8 @@ enum { Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq, Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt, Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, - Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio, - Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_err + Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, + Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -798,6 +798,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_euid_lt, "euid<%s"}, {Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"}, {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, + {Opt_appraise_flag, "appraise_flag=%s"}, {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, @@ -1172,6 +1173,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) else result = -EINVAL; break; + case Opt_appraise_flag: + ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from); + if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist")) + entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST; + break; case Opt_permit_directio: entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO; break; @@ -1500,6 +1506,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) else seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig "); } + if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST) + seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist "); if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index d9323d31a3a8..73fc286834d7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000 #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 #define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 +#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000 #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) From patchwork Thu Oct 24 03:47:17 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11208259 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F180E14E5 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D95782173B for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2437417AbfJXDsY (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:24 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:9064 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2437418AbfJXDsU (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:20 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098414.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3lC1i052938 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:19 -0400 Received: from e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.98]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vu21bknj7-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:48:18 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:48:17 +0100 Received: from b06avi18878370.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.26.194) by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.132) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:48:11 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06avi18878370.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3m9L840042988 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:09 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A420AE04D; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:09 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id B17B9AE053; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:06 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:48:06 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 8/8] powerpc/ima: update ima arch policy to check for blacklist Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:17 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0008-0000-0000-000003267A2E X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0009-0000-0000-00004A45AB93 Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-9-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This patch updates the arch-specific policies for PowerNV system to make sure that the binary hash is not blacklisted. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c index 0ef5956c9753..b9de0fb45bb9 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) * is not enabled. */ static const char *const secure_rules[] = { - "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #endif NULL }; @@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ static const char *const trusted_rules[] = { static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = { "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", - "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #endif NULL };