From patchwork Sat Nov 9 19:00:29 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11236095 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C46E4139A for ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:01:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B32621882 for ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:01:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726537AbfKITAx (ORCPT ); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 14:00:53 -0500 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:17874 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726292AbfKITAx (ORCPT ); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 14:00:53 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098414.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id xA9Iv1wK023613 for ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 14:00:51 -0500 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2w5tg0cvtj-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Sat, 09 Nov 2019 14:00:51 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:44 -0000 Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.232]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id xA9J0grD3604676 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:43 GMT Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98A3A5204F; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:42 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 204C45204E; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:40 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v8 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable Date: Sat, 9 Nov 2019 13:00:29 -0600 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19110919-0016-0000-0000-000002C23D07 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19110919-0017-0000-0000-00003323C7B4 Message-Id: <20191109190032.96259-2-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-11-09_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1910280000 definitions=main-1911090193 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are controlled by OPAL. This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL secure variables based on the unique key. This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR. Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Signed-off-by: Eric Richter --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h | 5 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h | 7 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h | 35 +++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c | 16 +++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c | 3 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 140 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c | 3 + 9 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h index 378e3997845a..c1f25a760eb1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h @@ -211,7 +211,10 @@ #define OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE 173 #define OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG 174 #define OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG 175 -#define OPAL_LAST 175 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET 176 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT 177 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE 178 +#define OPAL_LAST 178 #define QUIESCE_HOLD 1 /* Spin all calls at entry */ #define QUIESCE_REJECT 2 /* Fail all calls with OPAL_BUSY */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h index a0cf8fba4d12..9986ac34b8e2 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h @@ -298,6 +298,13 @@ int opal_sensor_group_clear(u32 group_hndl, int token); int opal_sensor_group_enable(u32 group_hndl, int token, bool enable); int opal_nx_coproc_init(uint32_t chip_id, uint32_t ct); +int opal_secvar_get(const char *key, uint64_t key_len, u8 *data, + uint64_t *data_size); +int opal_secvar_get_next(const char *key, uint64_t *key_len, + uint64_t key_buf_size); +int opal_secvar_enqueue_update(const char *key, uint64_t key_len, u8 *data, + uint64_t data_size); + s64 opal_mpipl_update(enum opal_mpipl_ops op, u64 src, u64 dest, u64 size); s64 opal_mpipl_register_tag(enum opal_mpipl_tags tag, u64 addr); s64 opal_mpipl_query_tag(enum opal_mpipl_tags tag, u64 *addr); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4cc35b58b986 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * PowerPC secure variable operations. + */ +#ifndef SECVAR_OPS_H +#define SECVAR_OPS_H + +#include +#include + +extern const struct secvar_operations *secvar_ops; + +struct secvar_operations { + int (*get)(const char *key, uint64_t key_len, u8 *data, + uint64_t *data_size); + int (*get_next)(const char *key, uint64_t *key_len, + uint64_t keybufsize); + int (*set)(const char *key, uint64_t key_len, u8 *data, + uint64_t data_size); +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT + +extern void set_secvar_ops(const struct secvar_operations *ops); + +#else + +static inline void set_secvar_ops(const struct secvar_operations *ops) { } + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index e8eb2955b7d5..3cf26427334f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),) obj-y += ucall.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4cfa7dbd8850 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * This file initializes secvar operations for PowerPC Secureboot + */ + +#include + +const struct secvar_operations *secvar_ops; + +void set_secvar_ops(const struct secvar_operations *ops) +{ + secvar_ops = ops; +} diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile index a3ac9646119d..f9c4fa99e8b9 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-y += idle.o opal-rtc.o opal-nvram.o opal-lpc.o opal-flash.o obj-y += rng.o opal-elog.o opal-dump.o opal-sysparam.o opal-sensor.o obj-y += opal-msglog.o opal-hmi.o opal-power.o opal-irqchip.o obj-y += opal-kmsg.o opal-powercap.o opal-psr.o opal-sensor-groups.o -obj-y += ultravisor.o +obj-y += ultravisor.o opal-secvar.o obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += smp.o subcore.o subcore-asm.o obj-$(CONFIG_FA_DUMP) += opal-fadump.o diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c index a2aa5e433ac8..5cd0f52d258f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c @@ -290,3 +290,6 @@ OPAL_CALL(opal_nx_coproc_init, OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT); OPAL_CALL(opal_mpipl_update, OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE); OPAL_CALL(opal_mpipl_register_tag, OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG); OPAL_CALL(opal_mpipl_query_tag, OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG); +OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_get, OPAL_SECVAR_GET); +OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_get_next, OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT); +OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_enqueue_update, OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..889ae5ed048b --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * PowerNV code for secure variables + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Claudio Carvalho + * Nayna Jain + * + * APIs to access secure variables managed by OPAL. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secvar: "fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int opal_status_to_err(int rc) +{ + int err; + + switch (rc) { + case OPAL_SUCCESS: + err = 0; + break; + case OPAL_UNSUPPORTED: + err = -ENXIO; + break; + case OPAL_PARAMETER: + err = -EINVAL; + break; + case OPAL_RESOURCE: + err = -ENOSPC; + break; + case OPAL_HARDWARE: + err = -EIO; + break; + case OPAL_NO_MEM: + err = -ENOMEM; + break; + case OPAL_EMPTY: + err = -ENOENT; + break; + case OPAL_PARTIAL: + err = -EFBIG; + break; + default: + err = -EINVAL; + } + + return err; +} + +static int opal_get_variable(const char *key, uint64_t ksize, + u8 *data, uint64_t *dsize) +{ + int rc; + + if (!key || !dsize) + return -EINVAL; + + *dsize = cpu_to_be64(*dsize); + + rc = opal_secvar_get(key, ksize, data, dsize); + + *dsize = be64_to_cpu(*dsize); + + return opal_status_to_err(rc); +} + +static int opal_get_next_variable(const char *key, uint64_t *keylen, + uint64_t keybufsize) +{ + int rc; + + if (!key || !keylen) + return -EINVAL; + + *keylen = cpu_to_be64(*keylen); + + rc = opal_secvar_get_next(key, keylen, keybufsize); + + *keylen = be64_to_cpu(*keylen); + + return opal_status_to_err(rc); +} + +static int opal_set_variable(const char *key, uint64_t ksize, u8 *data, + uint64_t dsize) +{ + int rc; + + if (!key || !data) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = opal_secvar_enqueue_update(key, ksize, data, dsize); + + return opal_status_to_err(rc); +} + +static const struct secvar_operations opal_secvar_ops = { + .get = opal_get_variable, + .get_next = opal_get_next_variable, + .set = opal_set_variable, +}; + +static int opal_secvar_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + if (!opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_GET) + || !opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT) + || !opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE)) { + pr_err("OPAL doesn't support secure variables\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } + + set_secvar_ops(&opal_secvar_ops); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct of_device_id opal_secvar_match[] = { + { .compatible = "ibm,edk2-compat-v1",}, + {}, +}; + +static struct platform_driver opal_secvar_driver = { + .driver = { + .name = "secvar", + .of_match_table = opal_secvar_match, + }, +}; + +static int __init opal_secvar_init(void) +{ + return platform_driver_probe(&opal_secvar_driver, opal_secvar_probe); +} +device_initcall(opal_secvar_init); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c index 38e90270280b..c1678a3ea5c1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c @@ -1002,6 +1002,9 @@ static int __init opal_init(void) /* Initialise OPAL Power control interface */ opal_power_control_init(); + /* Initialize OPAL secure variables */ + opal_pdev_init("ibm,edk2-compat-v1"); + return 0; } machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, opal_init); From patchwork Sat Nov 9 19:00:30 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11236097 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E5C911986 for ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:01:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CF93921882 for ; 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:47 -0000 Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.232]) by b06avi18878370.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id xA9J0kpb30540204 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:46 GMT Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3B35A52052; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:46 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6C305204F; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:43 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v8 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Date: Sat, 9 Nov 2019 13:00:30 -0600 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19110919-0028-0000-0000-000003B478CC X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19110919-0029-0000-0000-000024777CC3 Message-Id: <20191109190032.96259-3-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-11-09_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1910280000 definitions=main-1911090193 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org PowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates. This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating the keys stored in the secure variables. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Eric Richter --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 46 +++++ arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 11 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c | 248 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 306 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..911b89cc6957 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +What: /sys/firmware/secvar +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: This directory is created if the POWER firmware supports OS + secureboot, thereby secure variables. It exposes interface + for reading/writing the secure variables + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: This directory lists all the secure variables that are supported + by the firmware. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/backend +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: A string indicating which backend is in use by the firmware. + This determines the format of the variable and the accepted + format of variable updates. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/ +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: Each secure variable is represented as a directory named as + . The variable name is unique and is in ASCII + representation. The data and size can be determined by reading + their respective attribute files. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars//size +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: An integer representation of the size of the content of the + variable. In other words, it represents the size of the data. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars//data +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain h +Description: A read-only file containing the value of the variable. The size + of the file represents the maximum size of the variable data. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars//update +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain +Description: A write-only file that is used to submit the new value for the + variable. The size of the file represents the maximum size of + the variable data that can be written. diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index c795039bdc73..cabc091f3fe1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -945,6 +945,17 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT to enable OS secure boot on systems that have firmware support for it. If in doubt say N. +config PPC_SECVAR_SYSFS + bool "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables" + default y + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + depends on SYSFS + help + POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware. + These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable + read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have + secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace. + endmenu config ISA_DMA_API diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index 3cf26427334f..b216e9f316ee 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ obj-y += ucall.o endif obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECVAR_SYSFS) += secvar-sysfs.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..39345edbdecc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * + * This code exposes secure variables to user via sysfs + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secvar-sysfs: "fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define NAME_MAX_SIZE 1024 + +static struct kobject *secvar_kobj; +static struct kset *secvar_kset; + +static ssize_t backend_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + ssize_t rc = 0; + struct device_node *node; + const char *compatible; + + node = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "secvar"); + if (!of_device_is_available(node)) + return -ENODEV; + + rc = of_property_read_string(node, "compatible", &compatible); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = sprintf(buf, "%s\n", compatible); + + of_node_put(node); + + return rc; +} + + +static ssize_t size_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + uint64_t dsize; + int rc; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL, &dsize); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Error retrieving %s variable size %d\n", kobj->name, + rc); + return rc; + } + + return sprintf(buf, "%llu\n", dsize); +} + +static ssize_t data_read(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + uint64_t dsize; + char *data; + int rc; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL, &dsize); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Error getting %s variable size %d\n", kobj->name, rc); + return rc; + } + pr_debug("dsize is %llu\n", dsize); + + data = kzalloc(dsize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, data, &dsize); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Error getting %s variable %d\n", kobj->name, rc); + goto data_fail; + } + + rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &off, data, dsize); + +data_fail: + kfree(data); + return rc; +} + +static ssize_t update_write(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + int rc; + + pr_debug("count is %ld\n", count); + rc = secvar_ops->set(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, buf, count); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Error setting the %s variable %d\n", kobj->name, rc); + return rc; + } + + return count; +} + +static struct kobj_attribute backend_attr = __ATTR_RO(backend); + +static struct kobj_attribute size_attr = __ATTR_RO(size); + +static struct bin_attribute data_attr = __BIN_ATTR_RO(data, 0); + +static struct bin_attribute update_attr = __BIN_ATTR_WO(update, 0); + +static struct bin_attribute *secvar_bin_attrs[] = { + &data_attr, + &update_attr, + NULL, +}; + +static struct attribute *secvar_attrs[] = { + &size_attr.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group secvar_attr_group = { + .attrs = secvar_attrs, + .bin_attrs = secvar_bin_attrs, +}; +__ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(secvar_attr); + +static struct kobj_type secvar_ktype = { + .sysfs_ops = &kobj_sysfs_ops, + .default_groups = secvar_attr_groups, +}; + +static int update_kobj_size(void) +{ + + struct device_node *node; + u64 varsize; + int rc = 0; + + node = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "ibm,edk2-compat-v1"); + if (!of_device_is_available(node)) { + rc = -ENODEV; + goto out; + } + + rc = of_property_read_u64(node, "max-var-size", &varsize); + if (rc) + goto out; + + data_attr.size = varsize; + update_attr.size = varsize; + +out: + of_node_put(node); + + return rc; +} + +static int secvar_sysfs_load(void) +{ + char *name; + uint64_t namesize = 0; + struct kobject *kobj; + int rc; + + name = kzalloc(NAME_MAX_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + + do { + rc = secvar_ops->get_next(name, &namesize, NAME_MAX_SIZE); + if (rc) { + if (rc != -ENOENT) + pr_err("error getting secvar from firmware %d\n", + rc); + break; + } + + kobj = kzalloc(sizeof(*kobj), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kobj) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + break; + } + + kobject_init(kobj, &secvar_ktype); + + rc = kobject_add(kobj, &secvar_kset->kobj, "%s", name); + if (rc) { + pr_warn("kobject_add error %d for attribute: %s\n", rc, + name); + kobject_put(kobj); + kobj = NULL; + } + + if (kobj) + kobject_uevent(kobj, KOBJ_ADD); + + } while (!rc); + + kfree(name); + return rc; +} + +static int secvar_sysfs_init(void) +{ + int rc; + + if (!secvar_ops) { + pr_warn("secvar: failed to retrieve secvar operations.\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } + + secvar_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("secvar", firmware_kobj); + if (!secvar_kobj) { + pr_err("secvar: Failed to create firmware kobj\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + rc = sysfs_create_file(secvar_kobj, &backend_attr.attr); + if (rc) { + kobject_put(secvar_kobj); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + secvar_kset = kset_create_and_add("vars", NULL, secvar_kobj); + if (!secvar_kset) { + pr_err("secvar: sysfs kobject registration failed.\n"); + kobject_put(secvar_kobj); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + rc = update_kobj_size(); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Cannot read the size of the attribute\n"); + return rc; + } + + secvar_sysfs_load(); + + return 0; +} + +late_initcall(secvar_sysfs_init); From patchwork Sat Nov 9 19:00:31 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11236099 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E1B41709 for ; 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Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:55 -0000 Received: from b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.196) by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.132) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:51 -0000 Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.232]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id xA9J0njU53280788 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:50 GMT Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id D638452051; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:49 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E0B352059; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:47 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v8 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file Date: Sat, 9 Nov 2019 13:00:31 -0600 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19110919-0008-0000-0000-0000032D0F16 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19110919-0009-0000-0000-00004A4C1A42 Message-Id: <20191109190032.96259-4-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-11-09_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1910280000 definitions=main-1911090193 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware. This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Eric Richter --- security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 ++++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +--------------- 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 35e6ca773734..351c9662994b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ - platform_certs/load_uefi.o + platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/ diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c5ba695c10e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "../integrity.h" + +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata = + EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; +static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; + +/* + * Blacklist a hash. + */ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data, + size_t len, const char *type, + size_t type_len) +{ + char *hash, *p; + + hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hash) + return; + p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len); + p += type_len; + bin2hex(p, data, len); + p += len * 2; + *p = 0; + + mark_hash_blacklisted(hash); + kfree(hash); +} + +/* + * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. + */ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, + const void *data, size_t len) +{ + uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4); +} + +/* + * Blacklist the hash of an executable. + */ +static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source, + const void *data, size_t len) +{ + uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4); +} + +/* + * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in + * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. + */ +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) + return add_to_platform_keyring; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in + * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. + */ +__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) +{ + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0) + return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0) + return uefi_blacklist_binary; + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2462bfa08fe3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H +#define PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H + +#include + +void blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data, + size_t len, const char *type, + size_t type_len); + +/* + * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. + */ +void blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len); + +/* + * Blacklist the hash of an executable. + */ +void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len); + +/* + * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the db. + */ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +/* + * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. + */ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index 81b19c52832b..4369204a19cd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include "../integrity.h" +#include "keyring_handler.h" static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata = @@ -67,72 +68,6 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, return db; } -/* - * Blacklist a hash. - */ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data, - size_t len, const char *type, - size_t type_len) -{ - char *hash, *p; - - hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!hash) - return; - p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len); - p += type_len; - bin2hex(p, data, len); - p += len * 2; - *p = 0; - - mark_hash_blacklisted(hash); - kfree(hash); -} - -/* - * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. - */ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, - const void *data, size_t len) -{ - uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4); -} - -/* - * Blacklist the hash of an executable. - */ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source, - const void *data, size_t len) -{ - uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4); -} - -/* - * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in - * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. - */ -static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t * - sig_type) -{ - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) - return add_to_platform_keyring; - return 0; -} - -/* - * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in - * the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables. - */ -static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t * - sig_type) -{ - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid) == 0) - return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; - if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0) - return uefi_blacklist_binary; - return 0; -} - /* * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist From patchwork Sat Nov 9 19:00:32 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna Jain X-Patchwork-Id: 11236101 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A74CF14E5 for ; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:01:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8816521924 for ; 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:56 -0000 Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.232]) by b06avi18626390.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id xA9J0JwL38207828 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:19 GMT Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98FC552050; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:54 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20AA85204E; Sat, 9 Nov 2019 19:00:52 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v8 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring Date: Sat, 9 Nov 2019 13:00:32 -0600 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191109190032.96259-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19110919-0016-0000-0000-000002C23D10 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19110919-0017-0000-0000-00003323C7BD Message-Id: <20191109190032.96259-5-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-11-09_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1910280000 definitions=main-1911090193 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Eric Richter --- security/integrity/Kconfig | 9 ++ security/integrity/Makefile | 4 +- .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 0bae6adb63a9..71f0177e8716 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS depends on S390 def_bool y +config LOAD_PPC_KEYS + bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER" + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + default y + help + Enable loading of keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted + hashes to the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms. + config INTEGRITY_AUDIT bool "Enables integrity auditing support " depends on AUDIT diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 351c9662994b..7ee39d66cf16 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o - +integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ + platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/ obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/ diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..99ddc2ed59e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * - loads keys and hashes stored and controlled by the firmware. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "keyring_handler.h" + +/* + * Get a certificate list blob from the named secure variable. + */ +static __init void *get_cert_list(u8 *key, unsigned long keylen, uint64_t *size) +{ + int rc; + void *db; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, NULL, size); + if (rc) { + pr_err("Couldn't get size: %d\n", rc); + return NULL; + } + + db = kmalloc(*size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!db) + return NULL; + + rc = secvar_ops->get(key, keylen, db, size); + if (rc) { + kfree(db); + pr_err("Error reading %s var: %d\n", key, rc); + return NULL; + } + + return db; +} + +/* + * Load the certs contained in the keys databases into the platform trusted + * keyring and the blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist + * keyring. + */ +static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) +{ + void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; + uint64_t dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0; + int rc = 0; + struct device_node *node; + + if (!secvar_ops) + return -ENODEV; + + /* The following only applies for the edk2-compat backend. + * Return early if it is not set. + */ + + node = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "ibm,edk2-compat-v1"); + if (!node) + return -ENODEV; + + /* Get db, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't + * an error if we can't get them. + */ + db = get_cert_list("db", 3, &dbsize); + if (!db) { + pr_err("Couldn't get db list from firmware\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:db", db, dbsize, + get_handler_for_db); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(db); + } + + dbx = get_cert_list("dbx", 4, &dbxsize); + if (!dbx) { + pr_info("Couldn't get dbx list from firmware\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("powerpc:dbx", dbx, dbxsize, + get_handler_for_dbx); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse dbx signatures: %d\n", rc); + kfree(dbx); + } + + of_node_put(node); + + return rc; +} +late_initcall(load_powerpc_certs);