From patchwork Fri Feb 28 20:18:14 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Eric W. Biederman" X-Patchwork-Id: 11413227 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6F264138D for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 20:20:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4FDA2246A8 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 20:20:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726733AbgB1UUX (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:20:23 -0500 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233]:42060 "EHLO out03.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726400AbgB1UUX (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:20:23 -0500 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]) by out03.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1j7m7S-0001W3-Bn; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:20:22 -0700 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1j7m7R-0002lL-EH; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:20:22 -0700 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Al Viro , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , Linux FS Devel , Linux Security Module , Akinobu Mita , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Daniel Micay , Djalal Harouni , "Dmitry V . Levin" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Ingo Molnar , "J . Bruce Fields" , Jeff Layton , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Oleg Nesterov , Alexey Gladkov , Linus Torvalds , Jeff Dike , Richard Weinberger , Anton Ivanov References: <20200210150519.538333-8-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> <87v9odlxbr.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200212144921.sykucj4mekcziicz@comp-core-i7-2640m-0182e6> <87tv3vkg1a.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9obipk9.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200212200335.GO23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200212203833.GQ23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200212204124.GR23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <87lfp7h422.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87pnejf6fz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871rqpaswu.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871rqk2brn.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <878skmsbyy.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 14:18:14 -0600 In-Reply-To: <878skmsbyy.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Fri, 28 Feb 2020 14:17:41 -0600") Message-ID: <8736ausby1.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1j7m7R-0002lL-EH;;;mid=<8736ausby1.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+WuHbOA66kXQc+ge/fBSMlwuwEjasAimw= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa06.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.5 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,T_TooManySym_01, T_TooManySym_02,XMNoVowels,XMSubLong,XM_Body_Dirty_Words autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.5 XM_Body_Dirty_Words Contains a dirty word * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **; X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 489 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.04 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 2.7 (0.6%), b_tie_ro: 1.89 (0.4%), parse: 1.23 (0.3%), extract_message_metadata: 22 (4.5%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.65 (0.3%), tests_pri_-1000: 37 (7.5%), tests_pri_-950: 1.26 (0.3%), tests_pri_-900: 1.05 (0.2%), tests_pri_-90: 25 (5.2%), check_bayes: 24 (4.9%), b_tokenize: 9 (1.8%), b_tok_get_all: 7 (1.5%), b_comp_prob: 2.2 (0.5%), b_tok_touch_all: 3.8 (0.8%), b_finish: 0.69 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 386 (79.0%), check_dkim_signature: 0.52 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.6 (0.5%), poll_dns_idle: 0.40 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 2.0 (0.4%), tests_pri_500: 7 (1.5%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH 1/3] uml: Don't consult current to find the proc_mnt in mconsole_proc X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Inspection of the control flow reveals that mconsole_proc is either called from mconsole_stop called from mc_work_proc or from mc_work_proc directly. The function mc_work_proc is dispatched to a kernel thread with schedule_work. All of the threads that run dispatched by schedule_work are in the init pid namespace. So make the code clearer and by using init_pid_ns instead of task_active_pid_ns(current). Cc: Jeff Dike Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Anton Ivanov Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c b/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c index b80a1d616e4e..e8f5c81c2c6c 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ void mconsole_log(struct mc_request *req) void mconsole_proc(struct mc_request *req) { - struct vfsmount *mnt = task_active_pid_ns(current)->proc_mnt; + struct vfsmount *mnt = init_pid_ns.proc_mnt; char *buf; int len; struct file *file; From patchwork Fri Feb 28 20:18:43 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Eric W. Biederman" X-Patchwork-Id: 11413235 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B560513A4 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 20:21:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9675724677 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 20:21:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726631AbgB1UU4 (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:20:56 -0500 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:58806 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725900AbgB1UU4 (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:20:56 -0500 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]) by out02.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1j7m7y-0006J6-Sk; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:20:54 -0700 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1j7m7x-0002pK-QT; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:20:54 -0700 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Al Viro , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , Linux FS Devel , Linux Security Module , Akinobu Mita , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Daniel Micay , Djalal Harouni , "Dmitry V . Levin" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Ingo Molnar , "J . Bruce Fields" , Jeff Layton , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Oleg Nesterov , Alexey Gladkov , Linus Torvalds , Jeff Dike , Richard Weinberger , Anton Ivanov References: <20200210150519.538333-8-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> <87v9odlxbr.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200212144921.sykucj4mekcziicz@comp-core-i7-2640m-0182e6> <87tv3vkg1a.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9obipk9.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200212200335.GO23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200212203833.GQ23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200212204124.GR23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <87lfp7h422.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87pnejf6fz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871rqpaswu.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871rqk2brn.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <878skmsbyy.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 14:18:43 -0600 In-Reply-To: <878skmsbyy.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Fri, 28 Feb 2020 14:17:41 -0600") Message-ID: <87wo86qxcs.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1j7m7x-0002pK-QT;;;mid=<87wo86qxcs.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19/GoFUi05+QdGnxptjvdL+9xjBop5u87I= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.5 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,XMNoVowels,XMSubLong, XM_Body_Dirty_Words autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.5 XM_Body_Dirty_Words Contains a dirty word X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **; X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 576 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.07 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 3.0 (0.5%), b_tie_ro: 2.0 (0.4%), parse: 1.15 (0.2%), extract_message_metadata: 21 (3.7%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.81 (0.3%), tests_pri_-1000: 41 (7.1%), tests_pri_-950: 1.33 (0.2%), tests_pri_-900: 1.11 (0.2%), tests_pri_-90: 32 (5.5%), check_bayes: 30 (5.2%), b_tokenize: 11 (1.9%), b_tok_get_all: 9 (1.6%), b_comp_prob: 2.7 (0.5%), b_tok_touch_all: 4.6 (0.8%), b_finish: 0.73 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 459 (79.8%), check_dkim_signature: 0.71 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.3 (0.4%), poll_dns_idle: 0.58 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 3.0 (0.5%), tests_pri_500: 9 (1.6%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH 2/3] uml: Create a private mount of proc for mconsole X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: The mconsole code only ever accesses proc for the initial pid namespace. Instead of depending upon the proc_mnt which is for proc_flush_task have uml create it's own mount of proc instead. This allows proc_flush_task to evolve and remove the need for having a proc_mnt to do it's job. Cc: Jeff Dike Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Anton Ivanov Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c b/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c index e8f5c81c2c6c..30575bd92975 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/mconsole_kern.c @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ #include "mconsole_kern.h" #include +static struct vfsmount *proc_mnt = NULL; + static int do_unlink_socket(struct notifier_block *notifier, unsigned long what, void *data) { @@ -123,7 +125,7 @@ void mconsole_log(struct mc_request *req) void mconsole_proc(struct mc_request *req) { - struct vfsmount *mnt = init_pid_ns.proc_mnt; + struct vfsmount *mnt = proc_mnt; char *buf; int len; struct file *file; @@ -134,6 +136,10 @@ void mconsole_proc(struct mc_request *req) ptr += strlen("proc"); ptr = skip_spaces(ptr); + if (!mnt) { + mconsole_reply(req, "Proc not available", 1, 0); + goto out; + } file = file_open_root(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, ptr, O_RDONLY, 0); if (IS_ERR(file)) { mconsole_reply(req, "Failed to open file", 1, 0); @@ -683,6 +689,24 @@ void mconsole_stack(struct mc_request *req) with_console(req, stack_proc, to); } +static int __init mount_proc(void) +{ + struct file_system_type *proc_fs_type; + struct vfsmount *mnt; + + proc_fs_type = get_fs_type("proc"); + if (!proc_fs_type) + return -ENODEV; + + mnt = kern_mount(proc_fs_type); + put_filesystem(proc_fs_type); + if (IS_ERR(mnt)) + return PTR_ERR(mnt); + + proc_mnt = mnt; + return 0; +} + /* * Changed by mconsole_setup, which is __setup, and called before SMP is * active. @@ -696,6 +720,8 @@ static int __init mconsole_init(void) int err; char file[UNIX_PATH_MAX]; + mount_proc(); + if (umid_file_name("mconsole", file, sizeof(file))) return -1; snprintf(mconsole_socket_name, sizeof(file), "%s", file); From patchwork Fri Feb 28 20:19:22 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Eric W. Biederman" X-Patchwork-Id: 11413241 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1FBE61580 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 20:21:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA3BE246A8 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 20:21:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726673AbgB1UVc (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:21:32 -0500 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:48570 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725900AbgB1UVc (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:21:32 -0500 Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1j7m8Y-0008CC-TQ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:21:30 -0700 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1j7m8X-0002B5-4f; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 13:21:30 -0700 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Al Viro , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , Linux FS Devel , Linux Security Module , Akinobu Mita , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Daniel Micay , Djalal Harouni , "Dmitry V . Levin" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Ingo Molnar , "J . Bruce Fields" , Jeff Layton , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Oleg Nesterov , Alexey Gladkov , Linus Torvalds , Jeff Dike , Richard Weinberger , Anton Ivanov References: <20200210150519.538333-8-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> <87v9odlxbr.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200212144921.sykucj4mekcziicz@comp-core-i7-2640m-0182e6> <87tv3vkg1a.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9obipk9.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200212200335.GO23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200212203833.GQ23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200212204124.GR23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <87lfp7h422.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87pnejf6fz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871rqpaswu.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871rqk2brn.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <878skmsbyy.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 14:19:22 -0600 In-Reply-To: <878skmsbyy.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Fri, 28 Feb 2020 14:17:41 -0600") Message-ID: <87r1yeqxbp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1j7m8X-0002B5-4f;;;mid=<87r1yeqxbp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19VfyN/lsDbEeYKOAeN0gaGhdR50pzHuEY= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa06.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: *** X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.2 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,LotsOfNums_01,XMNoVowels,XMSubLong autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.4413] * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 1.2 LotsOfNums_01 BODY: Lots of long strings of numbers * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ***; X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 680 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.04 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 3.7 (0.6%), b_tie_ro: 2.8 (0.4%), parse: 1.59 (0.2%), extract_message_metadata: 15 (2.2%), get_uri_detail_list: 3.4 (0.5%), tests_pri_-1000: 15 (2.2%), tests_pri_-950: 1.28 (0.2%), tests_pri_-900: 1.06 (0.2%), tests_pri_-90: 38 (5.5%), check_bayes: 36 (5.3%), b_tokenize: 14 (2.1%), b_tok_get_all: 11 (1.7%), b_comp_prob: 3.1 (0.5%), b_tok_touch_all: 3.4 (0.5%), b_finish: 0.64 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 592 (87.1%), check_dkim_signature: 0.61 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.3 (0.3%), poll_dns_idle: 0.74 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 2.2 (0.3%), tests_pri_500: 8 (1.1%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH 3/3] proc: Remove the now unnecessary internal mount of proc X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: There remains no more code in the kernel using pids_ns->proc_mnt, therefore remove it from the kernel. The big benefit of this change is that one of the most error prone and tricky parts of the pid namespace implementation, maintaining kernel mounts of proc is removed. In addition removing the unnecessary complexity of the kernel mount fixes a regression that caused the proc mount options to be ignored. Now that the initial mount of proc comes from userspace, those mount options are again honored. This fixes Android's usage of the proc hidepid option. Reported-by: Alistair Strachan Fixes: e94591d0d90c ("proc: Convert proc_mount to use mount_ns.") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- fs/proc/root.c | 36 ----------------------------------- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 2 -- include/linux/proc_ns.h | 5 ----- kernel/pid.c | 8 -------- kernel/pid_namespace.c | 7 ------- 5 files changed, 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index 608233dfd29c..2633f10446c3 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -292,39 +292,3 @@ struct proc_dir_entry proc_root = { .subdir = RB_ROOT, .name = "/proc", }; - -int pid_ns_prepare_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns) -{ - struct proc_fs_context *ctx; - struct fs_context *fc; - struct vfsmount *mnt; - - fc = fs_context_for_mount(&proc_fs_type, SB_KERNMOUNT); - if (IS_ERR(fc)) - return PTR_ERR(fc); - - if (fc->user_ns != ns->user_ns) { - put_user_ns(fc->user_ns); - fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(ns->user_ns); - } - - ctx = fc->fs_private; - if (ctx->pid_ns != ns) { - put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns); - get_pid_ns(ns); - ctx->pid_ns = ns; - } - - mnt = fc_mount(fc); - put_fs_context(fc); - if (IS_ERR(mnt)) - return PTR_ERR(mnt); - - ns->proc_mnt = mnt; - return 0; -} - -void pid_ns_release_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns) -{ - kern_unmount(ns->proc_mnt); -} diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h index 2ed6af88794b..4956e362e55e 100644 --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct pid_namespace { unsigned int level; struct pid_namespace *parent; #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS - struct vfsmount *proc_mnt; struct dentry *proc_self; struct dentry *proc_thread_self; #endif @@ -42,7 +41,6 @@ struct pid_namespace { #endif struct user_namespace *user_ns; struct ucounts *ucounts; - struct work_struct proc_work; kgid_t pid_gid; int hide_pid; int reboot; /* group exit code if this pidns was rebooted */ diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h index 4626b1ac3b6c..e1106a077c1a 100644 --- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h +++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h @@ -50,16 +50,11 @@ enum { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS -extern int pid_ns_prepare_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns); -extern void pid_ns_release_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns); extern int proc_alloc_inum(unsigned int *pino); extern void proc_free_inum(unsigned int inum); #else /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ -static inline int pid_ns_prepare_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns) { return 0; } -static inline void pid_ns_release_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns) {} - static inline int proc_alloc_inum(unsigned int *inum) { *inum = 1; diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c index ca08d6a3aa77..60820e72634c 100644 --- a/kernel/pid.c +++ b/kernel/pid.c @@ -144,9 +144,6 @@ void free_pid(struct pid *pid) /* Handle a fork failure of the first process */ WARN_ON(ns->child_reaper); ns->pid_allocated = 0; - /* fall through */ - case 0: - schedule_work(&ns->proc_work); break; } @@ -247,11 +244,6 @@ struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns, pid_t *set_tid, tmp = tmp->parent; } - if (unlikely(is_child_reaper(pid))) { - if (pid_ns_prepare_proc(ns)) - goto out_free; - } - get_pid_ns(ns); refcount_set(&pid->count, 1); for (type = 0; type < PIDTYPE_MAX; ++type) diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c index d40017e79ebe..318fcc6ba301 100644 --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c @@ -57,12 +57,6 @@ static struct kmem_cache *create_pid_cachep(unsigned int level) return READ_ONCE(*pkc); } -static void proc_cleanup_work(struct work_struct *work) -{ - struct pid_namespace *ns = container_of(work, struct pid_namespace, proc_work); - pid_ns_release_proc(ns); -} - static struct ucounts *inc_pid_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns) { return inc_ucount(ns, current_euid(), UCOUNT_PID_NAMESPACES); @@ -114,7 +108,6 @@ static struct pid_namespace *create_pid_namespace(struct user_namespace *user_ns ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); ns->ucounts = ucounts; ns->pid_allocated = PIDNS_ADDING; - INIT_WORK(&ns->proc_work, proc_cleanup_work); return ns; From patchwork Fri Feb 28 22:34:20 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Eric W. Biederman" X-Patchwork-Id: 11413311 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 111A414B4 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 22:36:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E59C6246B6 for ; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 22:36:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726809AbgB1Wgc (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 17:36:32 -0500 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:41006 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726785AbgB1Wgb (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Feb 2020 17:36:31 -0500 Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]) by out02.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1j7oFA-00048z-A9; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:36:28 -0700 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1j7oF9-0002E6-6T; Fri, 28 Feb 2020 15:36:28 -0700 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Al Viro , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , Linux FS Devel , Linux Security Module , Akinobu Mita , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Daniel Micay , Djalal Harouni , "Dmitry V . Levin" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Ingo Molnar , "J . Bruce Fields" , Jeff Layton , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Oleg Nesterov , Alexey Gladkov , Linus Torvalds , Jeff Dike , Richard Weinberger , Anton Ivanov References: <20200210150519.538333-8-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> <87v9odlxbr.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200212144921.sykucj4mekcziicz@comp-core-i7-2640m-0182e6> <87tv3vkg1a.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9obipk9.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200212200335.GO23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200212203833.GQ23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200212204124.GR23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <87lfp7h422.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87pnejf6fz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871rqpaswu.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <871rqk2brn.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <878skmsbyy.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 16:34:20 -0600 In-Reply-To: <878skmsbyy.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Fri, 28 Feb 2020 14:17:41 -0600") Message-ID: <878skmpcib.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1j7oF9-0002E6-6T;;;mid=<878skmpcib.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+NbByb1lQfJAk+7olBYMa3XlQf2trYP+A= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.5 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_TooManySym_01,XMGappySubj_01,XMNoVowels,XMSubLong autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.4999] * 0.5 XMGappySubj_01 Very gappy subject * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa07 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **; X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 439 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.06 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 6 (1.5%), b_tie_ro: 2.0 (0.5%), parse: 1.21 (0.3%), extract_message_metadata: 14 (3.1%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.80 (0.4%), tests_pri_-1000: 18 (4.1%), tests_pri_-950: 1.78 (0.4%), tests_pri_-900: 1.15 (0.3%), tests_pri_-90: 31 (7.0%), check_bayes: 29 (6.6%), b_tokenize: 10 (2.4%), b_tok_get_all: 9 (2.0%), b_comp_prob: 3.4 (0.8%), b_tok_touch_all: 3.9 (0.9%), b_finish: 0.68 (0.2%), tests_pri_0: 315 (71.7%), check_dkim_signature: 0.91 (0.2%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.7 (0.6%), poll_dns_idle: 0.54 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 2.3 (0.5%), tests_pri_500: 45 (10.3%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH 4/3] pid: Improve the comment about waiting in zap_pid_ns_processes X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Oleg wrote a very informative comment, but with the removal of proc_cleanup_work it is no longer accurate. Rewrite the comment so that it only talks about the details that are still relevant, and hopefully is a little clearer. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Acked-by: Christian Brauner --- kernel/pid_namespace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c index 318fcc6ba301..01f8ba32cc0c 100644 --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c @@ -224,20 +224,27 @@ void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns) } while (rc != -ECHILD); /* - * kernel_wait4() above can't reap the EXIT_DEAD children but we do not - * really care, we could reparent them to the global init. We could - * exit and reap ->child_reaper even if it is not the last thread in - * this pid_ns, free_pid(pid_allocated == 0) calls proc_cleanup_work(), - * pid_ns can not go away until proc_kill_sb() drops the reference. + * kernel_wait4() misses EXIT_DEAD children, and EXIT_ZOMBIE + * process whose parents processes are outside of the pid + * namespace. Such processes are created with setns()+fork(). * - * But this ns can also have other tasks injected by setns()+fork(). - * Again, ignoring the user visible semantics we do not really need - * to wait until they are all reaped, but they can be reparented to - * us and thus we need to ensure that pid->child_reaper stays valid - * until they all go away. See free_pid()->wake_up_process(). + * If those EXIT_ZOMBIE processes are not reaped by their + * parents before their parents exit, they will be reparented + * to pid_ns->child_reaper. Thus pidns->child_reaper needs to + * stay valid until they all go away. * - * We rely on ignored SIGCHLD, an injected zombie must be autoreaped - * if reparented. + * The code relies on the the pid_ns->child_reaper ignoring + * SIGCHILD to cause those EXIT_ZOMBIE processes to be + * autoreaped if reparented. + * + * Semantically it is also desirable to wait for EXIT_ZOMBIE + * processes before allowing the child_reaper to be reaped, as + * that gives the invariant that when the init process of a + * pid namespace is reaped all of the processes in the pid + * namespace are gone. + * + * Once all of the other tasks are gone from the pid_namespace + * free_pid() will awaken this task. */ for (;;) { set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);