From patchwork Tue Mar 17 19:41:37 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Waiman Long X-Patchwork-Id: 11443867 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4CE996CA for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:43:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0F9DB2075E for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:43:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="V9Z3Q11g" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726682AbgCQTms (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:42:48 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-74.mimecast.com ([216.205.24.74]:50416 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-74.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726754AbgCQTmr (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:42:47 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1584474166; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=ejhP8Yzko9ZDR1cGx7ufN3FHzyPQQMWf6ywcBiN0StA=; b=V9Z3Q11gPihaKWSgPQD1rTskhEJ81Dv4/9pcccrj4Hm0aNp5B8+oeQ33DCHnQNOv5Xy2kt XFgmERF9eX9uBZHqZ2fMJAT78LSQe/yZkp2YrprxnkzQVq5dGn6K9x8m0KGEvkwcMpkSpu HopR220XUzWADC3Lwt0Ss7Au5/5hR4g= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-279-7uhcbGigMAm7hYcvz3FU4Q-1; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:42:42 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 7uhcbGigMAm7hYcvz3FU4Q-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B6B918C35DE; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from llong.com (ovpn-115-15.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.115.15]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5F1A10372C2; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:36 +0000 (UTC) From: Waiman Long To: David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Mimi Zohar , "David S. Miller" , Jakub Kicinski Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, Sumit Garg , Jerry Snitselaar , Roberto Sassu , Eric Biggers , Chris von Recklinghausen , Waiman Long Subject: [PATCH v4 1/4] KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:41:37 -0400 Message-Id: <20200317194140.6031-2-longman@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20200317194140.6031-1-longman@redhat.com> References: <20200317194140.6031-1-longman@redhat.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test: [12537.027242] ====================================================== [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12537.208365] [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12537.270476] [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. [12537.270476] [12537.307209] [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [12537.340754] [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.636225] [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.908649] [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [12538.243010] [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf [12538.435535] [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: [12538.435535] [12538.472829] Chain exists of: [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class [12538.472829] [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12538.524820] [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 [12538.572654] ---- ---- [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [12538.687758] [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** [12538.687758] [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12538.770573] [12538.770573] stack backtrace: [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 [12538.881963] Call Trace: [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock. That requires taking out the __user modifier from the read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Waiman Long --- include/keys/big_key-type.h | 2 +- include/keys/user-type.h | 3 +- include/linux/key-type.h | 2 +- security/keys/big_key.c | 11 ++--- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 7 ++- security/keys/keyctl.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++---- security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +-- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 7 ++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 14 +----- security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 +- 10 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/big_key-type.h b/include/keys/big_key-type.h index f6a7ba4dccd4..3fee04f81439 100644 --- a/include/keys/big_key-type.h +++ b/include/keys/big_key-type.h @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ extern void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key); extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key); extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m); -extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); +extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen); #endif /* _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h index d5e73266a81a..be61fcddc02a 100644 --- a/include/keys/user-type.h +++ b/include/keys/user-type.h @@ -41,8 +41,7 @@ extern int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); extern void user_revoke(struct key *key); extern void user_destroy(struct key *key); extern void user_describe(const struct key *user, struct seq_file *m); -extern long user_read(const struct key *key, - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); +extern long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen); static inline const struct user_key_payload *user_key_payload_rcu(const struct key *key) { diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h index 4ded94bcf274..2ab2d6d6aeab 100644 --- a/include/linux/key-type.h +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct key_type { * much is copied into the buffer * - shouldn't do the copy if the buffer is NULL */ - long (*read)(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); + long (*read)(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen); /* handle request_key() for this type instead of invoking * /sbin/request-key (optional) diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 001abe530a0d..82008f900930 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) * read the key data * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ -long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) +long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; long ret; @@ -391,9 +391,8 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ret = datalen; - /* copy decrypted data to user */ - if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf->virt, datalen) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + /* copy out decrypted data */ + memcpy(buffer, buf->virt, datalen); err_fput: fput(file); @@ -401,9 +400,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) big_key_free_buffer(buf); } else { ret = datalen; - if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], - datalen) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen); } return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 60720f58cbe0..f6797ba44bf7 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -902,14 +902,14 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) } /* - * encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace + * encrypted_read - format and copy out the encrypted data * * The resulting datablob format is: * * * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size. */ -static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, +static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload; @@ -957,8 +957,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, key_put(mkey); memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key)); - if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + memcpy(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len); kzfree(ascii_buf); return asciiblob_len; diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 9b898c969558..81f68e434b9f 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -797,6 +797,21 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid, return ret; } +/* + * Call the read method + */ +static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) +{ + long ret; + + down_read(&key->sem); + ret = key_validate(key); + if (ret == 0) + ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen); + up_read(&key->sem); + return ret; +} + /* * Read a key's payload. * @@ -844,16 +859,42 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */ can_read_key: - ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (key->type->read) { - /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep) + if (!key->type->read) { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto error2; + } + + if (!buffer || !buflen) { + /* Get the key length from the read method */ + ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, NULL, 0); + } else { + + /* + * Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep) * to protect against the key being updated or revoked. + * + * Allocating a temporary buffer to hold the keys before + * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential + * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_sem. + */ + char *tmpbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!tmpbuf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error2; + } + ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, tmpbuf, buflen); + + /* + * Read methods will just return the required length + * without any copying if the provided length isn't big + * enough. */ - down_read(&key->sem); - ret = key_validate(key); - if (ret == 0) - ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen); - up_read(&key->sem); + if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen)) { + if (copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, ret)) + ret = -EFAULT; + } + kzfree(tmpbuf); } error2: diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index febf36c6ddc5..5ca620d31cd3 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -459,7 +459,6 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data) { struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data; const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - int ret; kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}", key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen); @@ -467,10 +466,7 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data) if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen) return 1; - ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ctx->buffer++; + *ctx->buffer++ = key->serial; ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial); return 0; } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index ecba39c93fd9..41e9735006d0 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); -static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t); +static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t); /* * The request-key authorisation key type definition. @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) + char *buffer, size_t buflen) { struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key); size_t datalen; @@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, if (buflen > datalen) buflen = datalen; - if (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + memcpy(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen); } return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index d2c5ec1e040b..8001ab07e63b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1130,11 +1130,10 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. */ -static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { const struct trusted_key_payload *p; - char *ascii_buf; char *bufp; int i; @@ -1143,18 +1142,9 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, return -EINVAL; if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { - ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - - bufp = ascii_buf; + bufp = buffer; for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { - kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; - } - kzfree(ascii_buf); } return 2 * p->blob_len; } diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 6f12de4ce549..07d4287e9084 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe); * read the key data * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ -long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) +long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { const struct user_key_payload *upayload; long ret; @@ -181,8 +181,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) if (buflen > upayload->datalen) buflen = upayload->datalen; - if (copy_to_user(buffer, upayload->data, buflen) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + memcpy(buffer, upayload->data, buflen); } return ret; From patchwork Tue Mar 17 19:41:38 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Waiman Long X-Patchwork-Id: 11443859 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C67A21392 for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A597E20767 for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:54 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="URIDBFSA" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726735AbgCQTmx (ORCPT ); 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Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from llong.com (ovpn-115-15.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.115.15]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABECF1036B44; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:40 +0000 (UTC) From: Waiman Long To: David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Mimi Zohar , "David S. Miller" , Jakub Kicinski Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, Sumit Garg , Jerry Snitselaar , Roberto Sassu , Eric Biggers , Chris von Recklinghausen , Waiman Long Subject: [PATCH v4 2/4] KEYS: Remove __user annotation from rxrpc_read() Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:41:38 -0400 Message-Id: <20200317194140.6031-3-longman@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20200317194140.6031-1-longman@redhat.com> References: <20200317194140.6031-1-longman@redhat.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: As the keyctl_read_key() has been modified to use a temporary kernel buffer to read out the key data instead of passing in the user-supplied buffer directly, there is no need to use the __user annotation for rxrpc_read(). In addition, 1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). 3) All the fault handling code is removed. Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long --- net/rxrpc/key.c | 27 +++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/key.c b/net/rxrpc/key.c index 6c3f35fac42d..0c98313dd7a8 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/key.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *); static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *); static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *); static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); -static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t); +static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t); /* * rxrpc defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an @@ -1042,12 +1042,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rxrpc_get_null_key); * - this returns the result in XDR form */ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) + char *buffer, size_t buflen) { const struct rxrpc_key_token *token; const struct krb5_principal *princ; size_t size; - __be32 __user *xdr, *oldxdr; + __be32 *xdr, *oldxdr; u32 cnlen, toksize, ntoks, tok, zero; u16 toksizes[AFSTOKEN_MAX]; int loop; @@ -1124,30 +1124,25 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, if (!buffer || buflen < size) return size; - xdr = (__be32 __user *) buffer; + xdr = (__be32 *)buffer; zero = 0; #define ENCODE(x) \ do { \ - __be32 y = htonl(x); \ - if (put_user(y, xdr++) < 0) \ - goto fault; \ + *xdr++ = htonl(x); \ } while(0) #define ENCODE_DATA(l, s) \ do { \ u32 _l = (l); \ ENCODE(l); \ - if (copy_to_user(xdr, (s), _l) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ - if (_l & 3 && \ - copy_to_user((u8 __user *)xdr + _l, &zero, 4 - (_l & 3)) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ + memcpy(xdr, (s), _l); \ + if (_l & 3) \ + memcpy((u8 *)xdr + _l, &zero, 4 - (_l & 3)); \ xdr += (_l + 3) >> 2; \ } while(0) #define ENCODE64(x) \ do { \ __be64 y = cpu_to_be64(x); \ - if (copy_to_user(xdr, &y, 8) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ + memcpy(xdr, &y, 8); \ xdr += 8 >> 2; \ } while(0) #define ENCODE_STR(s) \ @@ -1238,8 +1233,4 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, ASSERTCMP((char __user *) xdr - buffer, ==, size); _leave(" = %zu", size); return size; - -fault: - _leave(" = -EFAULT"); - return -EFAULT; } From patchwork Tue Mar 17 19:41:39 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Waiman Long X-Patchwork-Id: 11443861 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B8026CA for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB01720753 for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="NjufUV8w" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726741AbgCQTm4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:42:56 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-74.mimecast.com ([216.205.24.74]:43873 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-74.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726836AbgCQTmz (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:42:55 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1584474174; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=TLh7fxXRQ0dpTKGNzTwR3rofoc+DNuOkh1kniQaCX2c=; b=NjufUV8w+clc+XUBZpc1f6wIg5yih5df0cR4hfldXRJZqbLGCeak6kLjlhtT3njXBMn6mA bpB0AdT+fB7zeqYMA2PfzGZaNqAQ7Qqewu+/Lo+Vn9q29X04nvVMx/OaTAOwjFz2bfg84d FxlpH86NwPV6fOWhrdp77V5EOIEja8Q= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-411-2XksrESOO-SPPeqVQnymNg-1; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:42:52 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 2XksrESOO-SPPeqVQnymNg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 22C14107B7D9; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from llong.com (ovpn-115-15.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.115.15]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF55910016EB; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:43 +0000 (UTC) From: Waiman Long To: David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Mimi Zohar , "David S. Miller" , Jakub Kicinski Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, Sumit Garg , Jerry Snitselaar , Roberto Sassu , Eric Biggers , Chris von Recklinghausen , Waiman Long Subject: [PATCH v4 3/4] KEYS: Remove __user annotation from dns_resolver_read() Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:41:39 -0400 Message-Id: <20200317194140.6031-4-longman@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20200317194140.6031-1-longman@redhat.com> References: <20200317194140.6031-1-longman@redhat.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: As the keyctl_read_key() has been modified to use a temporary kernel buffer to read out the key data instead of passing in the user-supplied buffer directly, there is no need to use the __user annotation for dns_resolver_read(). Signed-off-by: Waiman Long --- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index 3e1a90669006..ad53eb31d40f 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key, - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) + char *buffer, size_t buflen) { int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]); From patchwork Tue Mar 17 19:41:40 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Waiman Long X-Patchwork-Id: 11443871 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7E7DB6CA for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:43:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 53B0A20738 for ; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:43:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="S2yFmBHB" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726756AbgCQTnY (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:43:24 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-74.mimecast.com ([63.128.21.74]:35862 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-74.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726692AbgCQTnY (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:43:24 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1584474203; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=VP/33sULw/Y4pBnAwwPfa1aLW7Jli8KU3auzMsRKrNI=; b=S2yFmBHBJ57BHjDW4MzJQjKuV8JgxZYhe2pEAS3dbfQunL1E7bhnZr2BAKqQUD0VYY1stM beNWEMY5YKxofzbkpYDSrh9RCW/wK5i2q6xDOfIc1a1zxy3KQfc1tdhxllOiK7jV1qQ53e y2U4hV9L9W3NOkiZW5B+58Db1ajeMg4= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-454-3j8DzbXzMg2ZwixPszIWXg-1; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:43:07 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 3j8DzbXzMg2ZwixPszIWXg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B2B9B80259A; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from llong.com (ovpn-115-15.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.115.15]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17FFD10027A3; Tue, 17 Mar 2020 19:42:48 +0000 (UTC) From: Waiman Long To: David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Mimi Zohar , "David S. Miller" , Jakub Kicinski Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, Sumit Garg , Jerry Snitselaar , Roberto Sassu , Eric Biggers , Chris von Recklinghausen , Waiman Long Subject: [PATCH v4 4/4] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:41:40 -0400 Message-Id: <20200317194140.6031-5-longman@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20200317194140.6031-1-longman@redhat.com> References: <20200317194140.6031-1-longman@redhat.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: By allocating a kernel buffer with a user-supplied buffer length, it is possible that a false positive ENOMEM error may be returned because the user-supplied length is just too large even if the system do have enough memory to hold the actual key data. Moreover, if the buffer length is larger than the maximum amount of memory that can be returned by kmalloc() (2^(MAX_ORDER-1) number of pages), a warning message will also be printed. To reduce this possibility, we set a threshold (PAGE_SIZE) over which we do check the actual key length first before allocating a buffer of the right size to hold it. The threshold is arbitrary, it is just used to trigger a buffer length check. It does not limit the actual key length as long as there is enough memory to satisfy the memory request. To further avoid large buffer allocation failure due to page fragmentation, kvmalloc() is used to allocate the buffer so that vmapped pages can be used when there is not a large enough contiguous set of pages available for allocation. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long --- security/keys/internal.h | 12 ++++++++++++ security/keys/keyctl.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index ba3e2da14cef..6d0ca48ae9a5 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include struct iovec; @@ -349,4 +351,14 @@ static inline void key_check(const struct key *key) #endif +/* + * Helper function to clear and free a kvmalloc'ed memory object. + */ +static inline void __kvzfree(const void *addr, size_t len) +{ + if (addr) { + memset((void *)addr, 0, len); + kvfree(addr); + } +} #endif /* _INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 81f68e434b9f..07eaa46d344c 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id, payload = NULL; if (plen) { ret = -ENOMEM; - payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); + payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!payload) goto error; @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id, key_ref_put(key_ref); error2: - kzfree(payload); + __kvzfree(payload, plen); error: return ret; } @@ -877,13 +877,24 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_sem. */ - char *tmpbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); + char *tmpbuf = NULL; + size_t tmpbuflen = buflen; - if (!tmpbuf) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error2; + /* + * To prevent memory allocation failure with an arbitrary + * large user-supplied buflen, we do a key length check + * before allocating a buffer of the right size to hold + * key data if it exceeds a threshold (PAGE_SIZE). + */ + if (buflen <= PAGE_SIZE) { +allocbuf: + tmpbuf = kvmalloc(tmpbuflen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tmpbuf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error2; + } } - ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, tmpbuf, buflen); + ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, tmpbuf, tmpbuflen); /* * Read methods will just return the required length @@ -891,10 +902,24 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) * enough. */ if ((ret > 0) && (ret <= buflen)) { + /* + * It is possible, though unlikely, that the key + * changes in between the up_read->down_read period. + * If the key becomes longer, we will have to + * allocate a larger buffer and redo the key read + * again. + */ + if (!tmpbuf || unlikely(ret > tmpbuflen)) { + if (unlikely(tmpbuf)) + __kvzfree(tmpbuf, tmpbuflen); + tmpbuflen = ret; + goto allocbuf; + } + if (copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, ret)) ret = -EFAULT; } - kzfree(tmpbuf); + __kvzfree(tmpbuf, tmpbuflen); } error2: