From patchwork Sun Mar 29 00:43:49 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11463839 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 520AD1667 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 30F8720732 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:07 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="AjJRdfkQ" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727718AbgC2AoE (ORCPT ); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 20:44:04 -0400 Received: from mail-wm1-f65.google.com ([209.85.128.65]:36855 "EHLO mail-wm1-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727725AbgC2AoE (ORCPT ); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 20:44:04 -0400 Received: by mail-wm1-f65.google.com with SMTP id g62so17181407wme.1 for ; Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:02 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=7blgUyFIIrVXU7X0EuWXVRLnZG5tDffRat1rkTfOq9s=; b=AjJRdfkQK8V4rv3MT1CVxj4JrgZcIhoGpKGyfWFmCWrjLPX/2nygmTAyrJentmQgwl wOVz5/ddR+u5hODxWWjJvvqNinCFomAtxS0qnh083h29aQVL2b6LJZD6hYslnqEcFODf AmWI/Vf8nLLSjwP5QAzxfjFhuADPBlOo+ZOQU= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=7blgUyFIIrVXU7X0EuWXVRLnZG5tDffRat1rkTfOq9s=; b=VrlmN9/JBFDOfGa4u0KEL8v9yFW3AD4F/Qf+xA5/WkLKCRVhG8/drjuOLWMLr4qN5K 4vcaer9+dDwbxTFiJhIz5VIOjkvUm3PFGrcrlJH5SzRQmilKMNqTLS2H3xeeUdReQsi/ vtO4byALDUXHqq3hYSsdOnFhz0uob3ezu1pox0SXZRnAE9K9HlBxPyC9NknM9FZEkEfZ LWWr+BQ/Q/06VqMpjz7lLe6kcpfdNGbZAU4CcZ2p+70q9RTvddH4vbDc9BPhfcIQ30pC 4n5qFER+oI1sVkcuJimp7KJAIw0KZN3UZ7T9hzsdH9TQxSwfRetWFK23oKK4Kh25iL+c 0xww== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ3ic/peZFoLkElQbTQ/9n3AfKCZnPMfZv4AgNhAbxaOBJb/A7n1 3qQ58lqK5fXSN12UUVETMIqL+A== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vsL+qLjVbG8SMz9ihKx6LI3nR88tJEyib4a8xe5jE1xDVwCLBnUeZwN6Bnvnv/Sq15klHmMYA== X-Received: by 2002:a05:600c:224d:: with SMTP id a13mr5897964wmm.53.1585442641569; Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kpsingh-kernel.localdomain (77-56-209-237.dclient.hispeed.ch. [77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm14577647wru.92.2020.03.28.17.44.00 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:01 -0700 (PDT) From: KP Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Brendan Jackman , Florent Revest , Thomas Garnier , Yonghong Song , Andrii Nakryiko , James Morris , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 1/8] bpf: Introduce BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:43:49 +0100 Message-Id: <20200329004356.27286-2-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh Introduce types and configs for bpf programs that can be attached to LSM hooks. The programs can be enabled by the config option CONFIG_BPF_LSM. Signed-off-by: KP Singh Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest Reviewed-by: Thomas Garnier Acked-by: Yonghong Song Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Acked-by: James Morris --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + include/linux/bpf.h | 3 +++ include/linux/bpf_types.h | 4 ++++ include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++ init/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/Makefile | 1 + kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 12 ++++++------ tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++ tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c | 1 + 10 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 5dbee41045bc..3197fe9256b2 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -3147,6 +3147,7 @@ R: Martin KaFai Lau R: Song Liu R: Yonghong Song R: Andrii Nakryiko +R: KP Singh L: netdev@vger.kernel.org L: bpf@vger.kernel.org T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 372708eeaecd..3bde59a8453b 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -1515,6 +1515,9 @@ extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tcp_sock_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto; extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_ns_current_pid_tgid_proto; +const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_tracing_func_proto( + enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog); + /* Shared helpers among cBPF and eBPF. */ void bpf_user_rnd_init_once(void); u64 bpf_user_rnd_u32(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5); diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_types.h b/include/linux/bpf_types.h index c81d4ece79a4..ba0c2d56f8a3 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_types.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_types.h @@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS, bpf_struct_ops, void *, void *) BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT, bpf_extension, void *, void *) +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM +BPF_PROG_TYPE(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, lsm, + void *, void *) +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */ #endif BPF_MAP_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY, array_map_ops) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 222ba11966e3..f1fbc36f58d3 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ enum bpf_prog_type { BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS, BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT, + BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, }; enum bpf_attach_type { @@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ enum bpf_attach_type { BPF_TRACE_FENTRY, BPF_TRACE_FEXIT, BPF_MODIFY_RETURN, + BPF_LSM_MAC, __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE }; diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 20a6ac33761c..deae572d1927 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1616,6 +1616,18 @@ config KALLSYMS_BASE_RELATIVE # end of the "standard kernel features (expert users)" menu # syscall, maps, verifier + +config BPF_LSM + bool "LSM Instrumentation with BPF" + depends on BPF_SYSCALL + depends on SECURITY + depends on BPF_JIT + help + Enables instrumentation of the security hooks with eBPF programs for + implementing dynamic MAC and Audit Policies. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config BPF_SYSCALL bool "Enable bpf() system call" select BPF diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/Makefile index 046ce5d98033..f2d7be596966 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/Makefile +++ b/kernel/bpf/Makefile @@ -29,4 +29,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF) += sysfs_btf.o endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_BPF_JIT),y) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_struct_ops.o +obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_lsm.o endif diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82875039ca90 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +const struct bpf_prog_ops lsm_prog_ops = { +}; + +const struct bpf_verifier_ops lsm_verifier_ops = { + .get_func_proto = bpf_tracing_func_proto, + .is_valid_access = btf_ctx_access, +}; diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index e619eedb5919..37ffceab608f 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -779,8 +779,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_send_signal_thread_proto = { .arg1_type = ARG_ANYTHING, }; -static const struct bpf_func_proto * -tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) +const struct bpf_func_proto * +bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) { switch (func_id) { case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ kprobe_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return &bpf_override_return_proto; #endif default: - return tracing_func_proto(func_id, prog); + return bpf_tracing_func_proto(func_id, prog); } } @@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ tp_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_get_stack: return &bpf_get_stack_proto_tp; default: - return tracing_func_proto(func_id, prog); + return bpf_tracing_func_proto(func_id, prog); } } @@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ pe_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_read_branch_records: return &bpf_read_branch_records_proto; default: - return tracing_func_proto(func_id, prog); + return bpf_tracing_func_proto(func_id, prog); } } @@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ raw_tp_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) case BPF_FUNC_get_stack: return &bpf_get_stack_proto_raw_tp; default: - return tracing_func_proto(func_id, prog); + return bpf_tracing_func_proto(func_id, prog); } } diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 222ba11966e3..f1fbc36f58d3 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ enum bpf_prog_type { BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS, BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT, + BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, }; enum bpf_attach_type { @@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ enum bpf_attach_type { BPF_TRACE_FENTRY, BPF_TRACE_FEXIT, BPF_MODIFY_RETURN, + BPF_LSM_MAC, __MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE }; diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c index b782ebef6ac9..2c92059c0c90 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_probes.c @@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ probe_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type, const struct bpf_insn *insns, case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: default: break; } From patchwork Sun Mar 29 00:43:50 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11463845 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4F0C17EF for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F93A20732 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; 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[77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm14577647wru.92.2020.03.28.17.44.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:02 -0700 (PDT) From: KP Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris , Brendan Jackman , Florent Revest , Kees Cook , Casey Schaufler , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , James Morris , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 2/8] security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:43:50 +0100 Message-Id: <20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(, , , args...) with acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT() Signed-off-by: KP Singh Acked-by: James Morris Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 381 +++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 628 +--------------------------------- security/security.c | 41 ++- 3 files changed, 423 insertions(+), 627 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9cd4455528e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +/* + * Linux Security Module Hook declarations. + * + * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc + * Copyright (C) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman + * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc + * Copyright (C) 2001 James Morris + * Copyright (C) 2001 Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Trust Technology Group) + * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corporation. + * Copyright (C) 2015 Casey Schaufler + * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + */ + +/* + * The macro LSM_HOOK is used to define the data structures required by the + * the LSM framework using the pattern: + * + * LSM_HOOK(, , , args...) + * + * struct security_hook_heads { + * #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) struct hlist_head NAME; + * #include + * #undef LSM_HOOK + * }; + */ +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_set_context_mgr, struct task_struct *mgr) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transaction, struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transfer_binder, struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transfer_file, struct task_struct *from, + struct task_struct *to, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_access_check, struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_traceme, struct task_struct *parent) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capget, struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capset, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + const kernel_cap_t *permitted) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capable, const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, unsigned int opts) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, quotactl, int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, quota_on, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, syslog, int type) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, settime, const struct timespec64 *ts, + const struct timezone *tz) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, vm_enough_memory, struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_set_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committing_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committed_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_dup, struct fs_context *fc, + struct fs_context *src_sc) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_parse_param, struct fs_context *fc, + struct fs_parameter *param) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_alloc_security, struct super_block *sb) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sb_free_security, struct super_block *sb) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sb_free_mnt_opts, void *mnt_opts) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_eat_lsm_opts, char *orig, void **mnt_opts) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_remount, struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_kern_mount, struct super_block *sb) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_show_options, struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_statfs, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_mount, const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_umount, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_pivotroot, const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_set_mnt_opts, struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_clone_mnt_opts, const struct super_block *oldsb, + struct super_block *newsb, unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_add_mnt_opt, const char *option, const char *val, + int len, void **mnt_opts) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, move_mount, const struct path *from_path, + const struct path *to_path) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry, + int mode, const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_create_files_as, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_unlink, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mkdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_rmdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mknod, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_truncate, const struct path *path) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_symlink, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, + const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_rename, const struct path *old_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_chmod, const struct path *path, umode_t mode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_chown, const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_chroot, const struct path *path) +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ + +/* Needed for inode based security check */ +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask, + unsigned int obj_type) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode, + struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, + void **value, size_t *len) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_symlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_mkdir, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_rmdir, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_mknod, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode, dev_t dev) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_rename, struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_readlink, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, + bool rcu) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setxattr, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listxattr, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_need_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry) +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_getsecurity, struct inode *inode, + const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_setsecurity, struct inode *inode, + const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listsecurity, struct inode *inode, char *buffer, + size_t buffer_size) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_getsecid, struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_copy_up, struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_copy_up_xattr, const char *name) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernfs_init_security, struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, + struct kernfs_node *kn) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_mprotect, struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_lock, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_fcntl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_set_fowner, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk, + struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long clone_flags) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_free, struct task_struct *task) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_alloc_blank, struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_free, struct cred *cred) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_prepare, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + gfp_t gfp) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_transfer, struct cred *new, + const struct cred *old) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getsecid, const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_act_as, struct cred *new, u32 secid) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_create_files_as, struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_request, char *kmod_name) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_read_file, struct file *file, + enum kernel_read_file_id id) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_read_file, struct file *file, char *buf, + loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setuid, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + int flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid, struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_prlimit, const struct cred *cred, + const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setrlimit, struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setscheduler, struct task_struct *p) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getscheduler, struct task_struct *p) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_movememory, struct task_struct *p) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_kill, struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, + int sig, const struct cred *cred) +LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOSYS, task_prctl, int option, unsigned long arg2, + unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p, + struct inode *inode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getsecid, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, + u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_msg_alloc_security, struct msg_msg *msg) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, msg_msg_free_security, struct msg_msg *msg) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_queue_alloc_security, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, msg_queue_free_security, + struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_queue_associate, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int msqflg) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_queue_msgctl, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_queue_msgsnd, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, + struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_queue_msgrcv, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, + struct msg_msg *msg, struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, shm_alloc_security, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, shm_free_security, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, shm_associate, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int shmflg) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, shm_shmctl, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, shm_shmat, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, char __user *shmaddr, + int shmflg) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sem_alloc_security, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sem_free_security, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sem_associate, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int semflg) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sem_semctl, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sem_semop, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, struct sembuf *sops, + unsigned nsops, int alter) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, netlink_send, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, d_instantiate, struct dentry *dentry, + struct inode *inode) +LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, getprocattr, struct task_struct *p, char *name, + char **value) +LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, setprocattr, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ismaclabel, const char *name) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata, + u32 *seclen) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, char *secdata, u32 seclen) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_invalidate_secctx, struct inode *inode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_notifysecctx, struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setsecctx, struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getsecctx, struct inode *inode, void **ctx, + u32 *ctxlen) + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, + struct sock *newsk) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_may_send, struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_create, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type, + int protocol, int kern) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_socketpair, struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_bind, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_connect, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_listen, struct socket *sock, int backlog) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_accept, struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_sendmsg, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + int size) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_recvmsg, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + int size, int flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_getsockname, struct socket *sock) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_getpeername, struct socket *sock) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_getsockopt, struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_setsockopt, struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_shutdown, struct socket *sock, int how) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_sock_rcv_skb, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_getpeersec_stream, struct socket *sock, + char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_getpeersec_dgram, struct socket *sock, + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sk_alloc_security, struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sk_free_security, struct sock *sk) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sk_clone_security, const struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sk_getsecid, struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sock_graft, struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inet_conn_request, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct request_sock *req) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inet_csk_clone, struct sock *newsk, + const struct request_sock *req) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inet_conn_established, struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secmark_relabel_packet, u32 secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, secmark_refcount_inc, void) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, secmark_refcount_dec, void) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, req_classify_flow, const struct request_sock *req, + struct flowi *fl) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, tun_dev_alloc_security, void **security) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, tun_dev_free_security, void *security) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, tun_dev_create, void) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, tun_dev_attach_queue, void *security) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, tun_dev_attach, struct sock *sk, void *security) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, tun_dev_open, void *security) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sctp_assoc_request, struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + struct sk_buff *skb) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sctp_bind_connect, struct sock *sk, int optname, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sctp_sk_clone, struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ib_pkey_access, void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ib_endport_manage_subnet, void *sec, const char *dev_name, + u8 port_num) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ib_alloc_security, void **sec) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ib_free_security, void *sec) +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, xfrm_policy_alloc_security, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, gfp_t gfp) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, xfrm_policy_clone_security, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, xfrm_policy_free_security, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, xfrm_policy_delete_security, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, xfrm_state_alloc, struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, xfrm_state_free_security, struct xfrm_state *x) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, xfrm_state_delete_security, struct xfrm_state *x) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, xfrm_policy_lookup, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, + u8 dir) +LSM_HOOK(int, 1, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, xfrm_decode_session, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, + int ckall) +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ + +/* key management security hooks */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_alloc, struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, + unsigned long flags) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_free, struct key *key) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_permission, key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, + unsigned perm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_getsecurity, struct key *key, char **_buffer) +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_map, struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_prog, struct bpf_prog *prog) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_map_alloc_security, struct bpf_map *map) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_map_free_security, struct bpf_map *map) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_prog_alloc_security, struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_prog_free_security, struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_alloc, struct perf_event *event) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, perf_event_free, struct perf_event *event) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_read, struct perf_event *event) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event) +#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 20d8cf194fb7..c09623b32489 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1456,625 +1456,15 @@ * @what: kernel feature being accessed */ union security_list_options { - int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr); - int (*binder_transaction)(struct task_struct *from, - struct task_struct *to); - int (*binder_transfer_binder)(struct task_struct *from, - struct task_struct *to); - int (*binder_transfer_file)(struct task_struct *from, - struct task_struct *to, - struct file *file); - - int (*ptrace_access_check)(struct task_struct *child, - unsigned int mode); - int (*ptrace_traceme)(struct task_struct *parent); - int (*capget)(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, - kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); - int (*capset)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, - const kernel_cap_t *effective, - const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, - const kernel_cap_t *permitted); - int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, - unsigned int opts); - int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); - int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry); - int (*syslog)(int type); - int (*settime)(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz); - int (*vm_enough_memory)(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); - - int (*bprm_set_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm); - int (*bprm_check_security)(struct linux_binprm *bprm); - void (*bprm_committing_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm); - void (*bprm_committed_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm); - - int (*fs_context_dup)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_sc); - int (*fs_context_parse_param)(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param); - - int (*sb_alloc_security)(struct super_block *sb); - void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb); - void (*sb_free_mnt_opts)(void *mnt_opts); - int (*sb_eat_lsm_opts)(char *orig, void **mnt_opts); - int (*sb_remount)(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts); - int (*sb_kern_mount)(struct super_block *sb); - int (*sb_show_options)(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb); - int (*sb_statfs)(struct dentry *dentry); - int (*sb_mount)(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, - const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data); - int (*sb_umount)(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); - int (*sb_pivotroot)(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path); - int (*sb_set_mnt_opts)(struct super_block *sb, - void *mnt_opts, - unsigned long kern_flags, - unsigned long *set_kern_flags); - int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(const struct super_block *oldsb, - struct super_block *newsb, - unsigned long kern_flags, - unsigned long *set_kern_flags); - int (*sb_add_mnt_opt)(const char *option, const char *val, int len, - void **mnt_opts); - int (*move_mount)(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path); - int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, - const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, - u32 *ctxlen); - int (*dentry_create_files_as)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, - struct qstr *name, - const struct cred *old, - struct cred *new); - - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH - int (*path_unlink)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); - int (*path_mkdir)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - umode_t mode); - int (*path_rmdir)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); - int (*path_mknod)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - umode_t mode, unsigned int dev); - int (*path_truncate)(const struct path *path); - int (*path_symlink)(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *old_name); - int (*path_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, - struct dentry *new_dentry); - int (*path_rename)(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, - const struct path *new_dir, - struct dentry *new_dentry); - int (*path_chmod)(const struct path *path, umode_t mode); - int (*path_chown)(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid); - int (*path_chroot)(const struct path *path); -#endif - /* Needed for inode based security check */ - int (*path_notify)(const struct path *path, u64 mask, - unsigned int obj_type); - int (*inode_alloc_security)(struct inode *inode); - void (*inode_free_security)(struct inode *inode); - int (*inode_init_security)(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - const struct qstr *qstr, - const char **name, void **value, - size_t *len); - int (*inode_create)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - umode_t mode); - int (*inode_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, - struct dentry *new_dentry); - int (*inode_unlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); - int (*inode_symlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *old_name); - int (*inode_mkdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - umode_t mode); - int (*inode_rmdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); - int (*inode_mknod)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - umode_t mode, dev_t dev); - int (*inode_rename)(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, - struct inode *new_dir, - struct dentry *new_dentry); - int (*inode_readlink)(struct dentry *dentry); - int (*inode_follow_link)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, - bool rcu); - int (*inode_permission)(struct inode *inode, int mask); - int (*inode_setattr)(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); - int (*inode_getattr)(const struct path *path); - int (*inode_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags); - void (*inode_post_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, - int flags); - int (*inode_getxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); - int (*inode_listxattr)(struct dentry *dentry); - int (*inode_removexattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); - int (*inode_need_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry); - int (*inode_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry); - int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, - void **buffer, bool alloc); - int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, - int flags); - int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, - size_t buffer_size); - void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); - int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); - int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name); - - int (*kernfs_init_security)(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, - struct kernfs_node *kn); - - int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask); - int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file); - void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file); - int (*file_ioctl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg); - int (*mmap_addr)(unsigned long addr); - int (*mmap_file)(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); - int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot); - int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd); - int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg); - void (*file_set_fowner)(struct file *file); - int (*file_send_sigiotask)(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); - int (*file_receive)(struct file *file); - int (*file_open)(struct file *file); - - int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); - void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task); - int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); - void (*cred_free)(struct cred *cred); - int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, - gfp_t gfp); - void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); - void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); - int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid); - int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); - int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name); - int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id); - int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); - int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_read_file_id id); - int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, - int flags); - int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); - int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p); - int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p); - void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); - int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice); - int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); - int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p); - int (*task_prlimit)(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, - unsigned int flags); - int (*task_setrlimit)(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, - struct rlimit *new_rlim); - int (*task_setscheduler)(struct task_struct *p); - int (*task_getscheduler)(struct task_struct *p); - int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p); - int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, - int sig, const struct cred *cred); - int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); - void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); - - int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); - void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); - - int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg); - void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg); - - int (*msg_queue_alloc_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); - void (*msg_queue_free_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); - int (*msg_queue_associate)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int msqflg); - int (*msg_queue_msgctl)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd); - int (*msg_queue_msgsnd)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, struct msg_msg *msg, - int msqflg); - int (*msg_queue_msgrcv)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, struct msg_msg *msg, - struct task_struct *target, long type, - int mode); - - int (*shm_alloc_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); - void (*shm_free_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); - int (*shm_associate)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int shmflg); - int (*shm_shmctl)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd); - int (*shm_shmat)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, char __user *shmaddr, - int shmflg); - - int (*sem_alloc_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); - void (*sem_free_security)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm); - int (*sem_associate)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int semflg); - int (*sem_semctl)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, int cmd); - int (*sem_semop)(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, struct sembuf *sops, - unsigned nsops, int alter); - - int (*netlink_send)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); - - void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); - - int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); - int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size); - int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name); - int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); - int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); - void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen); - - void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode); - int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); - int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); - int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK - int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, - struct sock *newsk); - int (*unix_may_send)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other); - - int (*socket_create)(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern); - int (*socket_post_create)(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, - int protocol, int kern); - int (*socket_socketpair)(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb); - int (*socket_bind)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, - int addrlen); - int (*socket_connect)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, - int addrlen); - int (*socket_listen)(struct socket *sock, int backlog); - int (*socket_accept)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock); - int (*socket_sendmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, - int size); - int (*socket_recvmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, - int size, int flags); - int (*socket_getsockname)(struct socket *sock); - int (*socket_getpeername)(struct socket *sock); - int (*socket_getsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); - int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname); - int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how); - int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); - int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock, - char __user *optval, - int __user *optlen, unsigned len); - int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock, - struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid); - int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority); - void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk); - void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk); - void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid); - void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent); - int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct request_sock *req); - void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk, - const struct request_sock *req); - void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); - int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(u32 secid); - void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(void); - void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(void); - void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req, - struct flowi *fl); - int (*tun_dev_alloc_security)(void **security); - void (*tun_dev_free_security)(void *security); - int (*tun_dev_create)(void); - int (*tun_dev_attach_queue)(void *security); - int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk, void *security); - int (*tun_dev_open)(void *security); - int (*sctp_assoc_request)(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, - struct sk_buff *skb); - int (*sctp_bind_connect)(struct sock *sk, int optname, - struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); - void (*sctp_sk_clone)(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, - struct sock *newsk); -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND - int (*ib_pkey_access)(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey); - int (*ib_endport_manage_subnet)(void *sec, const char *dev_name, - u8 port_num); - int (*ib_alloc_security)(void **sec); - void (*ib_free_security)(void *sec); -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM - int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, - gfp_t gfp); - int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, - struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx); - void (*xfrm_policy_free_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); - int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx); - int (*xfrm_state_alloc)(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); - int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire)(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, - u32 secid); - void (*xfrm_state_free_security)(struct xfrm_state *x); - int (*xfrm_state_delete_security)(struct xfrm_state *x); - int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, - u8 dir); - int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x, - struct xfrm_policy *xp, - const struct flowi *fl); - int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall); -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ - - /* key management security hooks */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - int (*key_alloc)(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, - unsigned long flags); - void (*key_free)(struct key *key); - int (*key_permission)(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, - unsigned perm); - int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer); -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule); - int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule); - int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); - void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule); -#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL - int (*bpf)(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, - unsigned int size); - int (*bpf_map)(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode); - int (*bpf_prog)(struct bpf_prog *prog); - int (*bpf_map_alloc_security)(struct bpf_map *map); - void (*bpf_map_free_security)(struct bpf_map *map); - int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux); - void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux); -#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ - int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what); -#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS - int (*perf_event_open)(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type); - int (*perf_event_alloc)(struct perf_event *event); - void (*perf_event_free)(struct perf_event *event); - int (*perf_event_read)(struct perf_event *event); - int (*perf_event_write)(struct perf_event *event); - -#endif + #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) RET (*NAME)(__VA_ARGS__); + #include "lsm_hook_defs.h" + #undef LSM_HOOK }; struct security_hook_heads { - struct hlist_head binder_set_context_mgr; - struct hlist_head binder_transaction; - struct hlist_head binder_transfer_binder; - struct hlist_head binder_transfer_file; - struct hlist_head ptrace_access_check; - struct hlist_head ptrace_traceme; - struct hlist_head capget; - struct hlist_head capset; - struct hlist_head capable; - struct hlist_head quotactl; - struct hlist_head quota_on; - struct hlist_head syslog; - struct hlist_head settime; - struct hlist_head vm_enough_memory; - struct hlist_head bprm_set_creds; - struct hlist_head bprm_check_security; - struct hlist_head bprm_committing_creds; - struct hlist_head bprm_committed_creds; - struct hlist_head fs_context_dup; - struct hlist_head fs_context_parse_param; - struct hlist_head sb_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head sb_free_security; - struct hlist_head sb_free_mnt_opts; - struct hlist_head sb_eat_lsm_opts; - struct hlist_head sb_remount; - struct hlist_head sb_kern_mount; - struct hlist_head sb_show_options; - struct hlist_head sb_statfs; - struct hlist_head sb_mount; - struct hlist_head sb_umount; - struct hlist_head sb_pivotroot; - struct hlist_head sb_set_mnt_opts; - struct hlist_head sb_clone_mnt_opts; - struct hlist_head sb_add_mnt_opt; - struct hlist_head move_mount; - struct hlist_head dentry_init_security; - struct hlist_head dentry_create_files_as; -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH - struct hlist_head path_unlink; - struct hlist_head path_mkdir; - struct hlist_head path_rmdir; - struct hlist_head path_mknod; - struct hlist_head path_truncate; - struct hlist_head path_symlink; - struct hlist_head path_link; - struct hlist_head path_rename; - struct hlist_head path_chmod; - struct hlist_head path_chown; - struct hlist_head path_chroot; -#endif - /* Needed for inode based modules as well */ - struct hlist_head path_notify; - struct hlist_head inode_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head inode_free_security; - struct hlist_head inode_init_security; - struct hlist_head inode_create; - struct hlist_head inode_link; - struct hlist_head inode_unlink; - struct hlist_head inode_symlink; - struct hlist_head inode_mkdir; - struct hlist_head inode_rmdir; - struct hlist_head inode_mknod; - struct hlist_head inode_rename; - struct hlist_head inode_readlink; - struct hlist_head inode_follow_link; - struct hlist_head inode_permission; - struct hlist_head inode_setattr; - struct hlist_head inode_getattr; - struct hlist_head inode_setxattr; - struct hlist_head inode_post_setxattr; - struct hlist_head inode_getxattr; - struct hlist_head inode_listxattr; - struct hlist_head inode_removexattr; - struct hlist_head inode_need_killpriv; - struct hlist_head inode_killpriv; - struct hlist_head inode_getsecurity; - struct hlist_head inode_setsecurity; - struct hlist_head inode_listsecurity; - struct hlist_head inode_getsecid; - struct hlist_head inode_copy_up; - struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr; - struct hlist_head kernfs_init_security; - struct hlist_head file_permission; - struct hlist_head file_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head file_free_security; - struct hlist_head file_ioctl; - struct hlist_head mmap_addr; - struct hlist_head mmap_file; - struct hlist_head file_mprotect; - struct hlist_head file_lock; - struct hlist_head file_fcntl; - struct hlist_head file_set_fowner; - struct hlist_head file_send_sigiotask; - struct hlist_head file_receive; - struct hlist_head file_open; - struct hlist_head task_alloc; - struct hlist_head task_free; - struct hlist_head cred_alloc_blank; - struct hlist_head cred_free; - struct hlist_head cred_prepare; - struct hlist_head cred_transfer; - struct hlist_head cred_getsecid; - struct hlist_head kernel_act_as; - struct hlist_head kernel_create_files_as; - struct hlist_head kernel_load_data; - struct hlist_head kernel_read_file; - struct hlist_head kernel_post_read_file; - struct hlist_head kernel_module_request; - struct hlist_head task_fix_setuid; - struct hlist_head task_setpgid; - struct hlist_head task_getpgid; - struct hlist_head task_getsid; - struct hlist_head task_getsecid; - struct hlist_head task_setnice; - struct hlist_head task_setioprio; - struct hlist_head task_getioprio; - struct hlist_head task_prlimit; - struct hlist_head task_setrlimit; - struct hlist_head task_setscheduler; - struct hlist_head task_getscheduler; - struct hlist_head task_movememory; - struct hlist_head task_kill; - struct hlist_head task_prctl; - struct hlist_head task_to_inode; - struct hlist_head ipc_permission; - struct hlist_head ipc_getsecid; - struct hlist_head msg_msg_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head msg_msg_free_security; - struct hlist_head msg_queue_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head msg_queue_free_security; - struct hlist_head msg_queue_associate; - struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgctl; - struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgsnd; - struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgrcv; - struct hlist_head shm_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head shm_free_security; - struct hlist_head shm_associate; - struct hlist_head shm_shmctl; - struct hlist_head shm_shmat; - struct hlist_head sem_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head sem_free_security; - struct hlist_head sem_associate; - struct hlist_head sem_semctl; - struct hlist_head sem_semop; - struct hlist_head netlink_send; - struct hlist_head d_instantiate; - struct hlist_head getprocattr; - struct hlist_head setprocattr; - struct hlist_head ismaclabel; - struct hlist_head secid_to_secctx; - struct hlist_head secctx_to_secid; - struct hlist_head release_secctx; - struct hlist_head inode_invalidate_secctx; - struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx; - struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx; - struct hlist_head inode_getsecctx; -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK - struct hlist_head unix_stream_connect; - struct hlist_head unix_may_send; - struct hlist_head socket_create; - struct hlist_head socket_post_create; - struct hlist_head socket_socketpair; - struct hlist_head socket_bind; - struct hlist_head socket_connect; - struct hlist_head socket_listen; - struct hlist_head socket_accept; - struct hlist_head socket_sendmsg; - struct hlist_head socket_recvmsg; - struct hlist_head socket_getsockname; - struct hlist_head socket_getpeername; - struct hlist_head socket_getsockopt; - struct hlist_head socket_setsockopt; - struct hlist_head socket_shutdown; - struct hlist_head socket_sock_rcv_skb; - struct hlist_head socket_getpeersec_stream; - struct hlist_head socket_getpeersec_dgram; - struct hlist_head sk_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head sk_free_security; - struct hlist_head sk_clone_security; - struct hlist_head sk_getsecid; - struct hlist_head sock_graft; - struct hlist_head inet_conn_request; - struct hlist_head inet_csk_clone; - struct hlist_head inet_conn_established; - struct hlist_head secmark_relabel_packet; - struct hlist_head secmark_refcount_inc; - struct hlist_head secmark_refcount_dec; - struct hlist_head req_classify_flow; - struct hlist_head tun_dev_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head tun_dev_free_security; - struct hlist_head tun_dev_create; - struct hlist_head tun_dev_attach_queue; - struct hlist_head tun_dev_attach; - struct hlist_head tun_dev_open; - struct hlist_head sctp_assoc_request; - struct hlist_head sctp_bind_connect; - struct hlist_head sctp_sk_clone; -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND - struct hlist_head ib_pkey_access; - struct hlist_head ib_endport_manage_subnet; - struct hlist_head ib_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head ib_free_security; -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM - struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_clone_security; - struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_free_security; - struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_delete_security; - struct hlist_head xfrm_state_alloc; - struct hlist_head xfrm_state_alloc_acquire; - struct hlist_head xfrm_state_free_security; - struct hlist_head xfrm_state_delete_security; - struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_lookup; - struct hlist_head xfrm_state_pol_flow_match; - struct hlist_head xfrm_decode_session; -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - struct hlist_head key_alloc; - struct hlist_head key_free; - struct hlist_head key_permission; - struct hlist_head key_getsecurity; -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - struct hlist_head audit_rule_init; - struct hlist_head audit_rule_known; - struct hlist_head audit_rule_match; - struct hlist_head audit_rule_free; -#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ -#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL - struct hlist_head bpf; - struct hlist_head bpf_map; - struct hlist_head bpf_prog; - struct hlist_head bpf_map_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head bpf_map_free_security; - struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security; - struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security; -#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ - struct hlist_head locked_down; -#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS - struct hlist_head perf_event_open; - struct hlist_head perf_event_alloc; - struct hlist_head perf_event_free; - struct hlist_head perf_event_read; - struct hlist_head perf_event_write; -#endif + #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) struct hlist_head NAME; + #include "lsm_hook_defs.h" + #undef LSM_HOOK } __randomize_layout; /* @@ -2100,6 +1490,12 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes { int lbs_task; }; +/* + * LSM_RET_VOID is used as the default value in LSM_HOOK definitions for void + * LSM hooks (in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h). + */ +#define LSM_RET_VOID ((void) 0) + /* * Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes * up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 565bc9b67276..7fed24b9d57e 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -668,6 +668,25 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); } +/* + * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and + * can be accessed with: + * + * LSM_RET_DEFAULT() + * + * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each + * LSM hook. + */ +#define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) +#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) +#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ + static const int LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ + DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) + +#include +#undef LSM_HOOK + /* * Hook list operation macros. * @@ -1338,16 +1357,16 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buf int rc; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); /* * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. */ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); - if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) + if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) return rc; } - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); } int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) @@ -1356,17 +1375,17 @@ int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void int rc; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); /* * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. */ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags); - if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) + if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) return rc; } - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); } int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) @@ -1740,12 +1759,12 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { int thisrc; - int rc = -ENOSYS; + int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); struct security_hook_list *hp; hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); - if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) { + if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { rc = thisrc; if (thisrc != 0) break; @@ -1917,7 +1936,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, continue; return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); } - return -EINVAL; + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); } int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, @@ -1930,7 +1949,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, continue; return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); } - return -EINVAL; + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); } int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -2315,7 +2334,7 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct flowi *fl) { struct security_hook_list *hp; - int rc = 1; + int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); /* * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment From patchwork Sun Mar 29 00:43:51 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11463853 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04A0292C for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D7C3E20732 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:38 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; 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[77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm14577647wru.92.2020.03.28.17.44.02 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:03 -0700 (PDT) From: KP Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yonghong Song , James Morris , Brendan Jackman , Florent Revest , Kees Cook , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , James Morris , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 3/8] bpf: lsm: provide attachment points for BPF LSM programs Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:43:51 +0100 Message-Id: <20200329004356.27286-4-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh When CONFIG_BPF_LSM is enabled, nop functions, bpf_lsm_, are generated for each LSM hook. These functions are initialized as LSM hooks in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: KP Singh Acked-by: Yonghong Song Acked-by: James Morris Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/bpf_lsm.h diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..83b96895829f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H +#define _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H + +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM + +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ + RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__); +#include +#undef LSM_HOOK + +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index 82875039ca90..3b3bbb28603e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -7,6 +7,20 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include + +/* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a nop + * function where a BPF program can be attached. + */ +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ +noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) \ +{ \ + return DEFAULT; \ +} + +#include +#undef LSM_HOOK const struct bpf_prog_ops lsm_prog_ops = { }; From patchwork Sun Mar 29 00:43:52 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11463841 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F0CE92C for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16C1B20732 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="ecjt+t8U" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727841AbgC2AoH (ORCPT ); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 20:44:07 -0400 Received: from mail-wr1-f65.google.com ([209.85.221.65]:45537 "EHLO mail-wr1-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727733AbgC2AoG (ORCPT ); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 20:44:06 -0400 Received: by mail-wr1-f65.google.com with SMTP id t7so16549452wrw.12 for ; Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:05 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=NClpa9OTqjXVYb4HzHQR31vWEe/lthorA38otzIJk8s=; b=ecjt+t8UulVsPa5iDcxiiKFq1IxDGmY+H4r3qyzT1KsJzgxLDLHHoeLukJqCgajvdO ltnhbOZL5E3SC/CF/qdvJG4jT1Wy0wgoeqxlK9C0p5xOvBAzWECBbpu3AfNOwlEKC37E cDcLDJDFFXiYo3pypLAdkTm8+2w3t+oXnBOag= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=NClpa9OTqjXVYb4HzHQR31vWEe/lthorA38otzIJk8s=; b=qWJI+JRpuFSN1mX1k83vl3v+jrle5NmaST6TFUF4K6qpdwC6RQokqiYm58/DPrRxu9 wtmlEsNo17H9tnz0hPlmZr8Ai8JI5N3f4fxhaQ8EYTC8RQHM71zDJMIz1KR+UBSVMF6Z Abq59ulA8jN1xCkd4cu9Mpq2w3llklKVK4mmX3t3Vm7iFYL/sirIchfY2qDTl/vEMZci coZhNr+84qcnGtiLF/UQ86KoFQmyvN9qb8snyt3TBYXOlIPfARHm97p9GGJWZjfU23jn 0AF7NRTj3EhUF4Dp730Qc/DH4hiKHxMNviyDdAbDC6DoAil8zzI75HNG/tZoyoLPjpJ3 K3sw== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ0hTk2WKl8P/66NMxtnHstwhINZC0/nnlZjylNtcFjGCdOJybcT EuY6GmI1g2OFP2ZncZ5bzVxnYA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vvN7BVf+UWF8bVpHeSjk39UXyS/PYf5mk7IKvTGywyQ/sOP0kMExkEw+crzEnv66HPUrDCzhQ== X-Received: by 2002:adf:f38e:: with SMTP id m14mr7324444wro.54.1585442645060; Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kpsingh-kernel.localdomain (77-56-209-237.dclient.hispeed.ch. [77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm14577647wru.92.2020.03.28.17.44.04 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:04 -0700 (PDT) From: KP Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrii Nakryiko , James Morris , Brendan Jackman , Florent Revest , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 4/8] bpf: lsm: Implement attach, detach and execution Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:43:52 +0100 Message-Id: <20200329004356.27286-5-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh JITed BPF programs are dynamically attached to the LSM hooks using BPF trampolines. The trampoline prologue generates code to handle conversion of the signature of the hook to the appropriate BPF context. The allocated trampoline programs are attached to the nop functions initialized as LSM hooks. BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM programs must have a GPL compatible license and and need CAP_SYS_ADMIN (required for loading eBPF programs). Upon attachment: * A BPF fexit trampoline is used for LSM hooks with a void return type. * A BPF fmod_ret trampoline is used for LSM hooks which return an int. The attached programs can override the return value of the bpf LSM hook to indicate a MAC Policy decision. Signed-off-by: KP Singh Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Acked-by: James Morris Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest --- include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 11 ++++++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/btf.c | 16 +++++++++++- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 17 +++++++++--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 +++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h index 83b96895829f..af74712af585 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h @@ -17,6 +17,17 @@ #include #undef LSM_HOOK +int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog, + const struct bpf_prog *prog); + +#else /* !CONFIG_BPF_LSM */ + +static inline int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog, + const struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */ #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index 3b3bbb28603e..19636703b24e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a nop * function where a BPF program can be attached. @@ -22,6 +24,27 @@ noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) \ #include #undef LSM_HOOK +#define BPF_LSM_SYM_PREFX "bpf_lsm_" + +int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog, + const struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + if (!prog->gpl_compatible) { + bpf_log(vlog, + "LSM programs must have a GPL compatible license\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (strncmp(BPF_LSM_SYM_PREFX, prog->aux->attach_func_name, + sizeof(BPF_LSM_SYM_PREFX) - 1)) { + bpf_log(vlog, "attach_btf_id %u points to wrong type name %s\n", + prog->aux->attach_btf_id, prog->aux->attach_func_name); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + const struct bpf_prog_ops lsm_prog_ops = { }; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 6f397c4da05e..de335cd386f0 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -3710,7 +3710,21 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, } if (arg == nr_args) { - if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT) { + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || + prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_MAC) { + /* When LSM programs are attached to void LSM hooks + * they use FEXIT trampolines and when attached to + * int LSM hooks, they use MODIFY_RETURN trampolines. + * + * While the LSM programs are BPF_MODIFY_RETURN-like + * the check: + * + * if (ret_type != 'int') + * return -EINVAL; + * + * is _not_ done here. This is still safe as LSM hooks + * have only void and int return types. + */ if (!t) return true; t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index b2584b25748c..a616b63f23b4 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define IS_FD_ARRAY(map) ((map)->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY || \ (map)->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY || \ @@ -1935,6 +1936,7 @@ bpf_prog_load_check_attach(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type, switch (prog_type) { case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: break; @@ -2366,10 +2368,28 @@ static int bpf_tracing_prog_attach(struct bpf_prog *prog) struct file *link_file; int link_fd, err; - if (prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_FENTRY && - prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_FEXIT && - prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_MODIFY_RETURN && - prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { + switch (prog->type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: + if (prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_FENTRY && + prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_FEXIT && + prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_prog; + } + break; + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: + if (prog->expected_attach_type != 0) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_prog; + } + break; + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: + if (prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_MAC) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_prog; + } + break; + default: err = -EINVAL; goto out_put_prog; } @@ -2448,16 +2468,10 @@ static int bpf_raw_tracepoint_open(const union bpf_attr *attr) if (IS_ERR(prog)) return PTR_ERR(prog); - if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT && - prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && - prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT && - prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE) { - err = -EINVAL; - goto out_put_prog; - } - - if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING || - prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { + switch (prog->type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: if (attr->raw_tracepoint.name) { /* The attach point for this category of programs * should be specified via btf_id during program load. @@ -2465,11 +2479,14 @@ static int bpf_raw_tracepoint_open(const union bpf_attr *attr) err = -EINVAL; goto out_put_prog; } - if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) + if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && + prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) { tp_name = prog->aux->attach_func_name; - else - return bpf_tracing_prog_attach(prog); - } else { + break; + } + return bpf_tracing_prog_attach(prog); + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: if (strncpy_from_user(buf, u64_to_user_ptr(attr->raw_tracepoint.name), sizeof(buf) - 1) < 0) { @@ -2478,6 +2495,10 @@ static int bpf_raw_tracepoint_open(const union bpf_attr *attr) } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; tp_name = buf; + break; + default: + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_put_prog; } btp = bpf_get_raw_tracepoint(tp_name); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c index f30bca2a4d01..9be85aa4ec5f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* dummy _ops. The verifier will operate on target program's ops. */ const struct bpf_verifier_ops bpf_extension_verifier_ops = { @@ -233,15 +234,23 @@ static int bpf_trampoline_update(struct bpf_trampoline *tr) return err; } -static enum bpf_tramp_prog_type bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(enum bpf_attach_type t) +static enum bpf_tramp_prog_type bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(struct bpf_prog *prog) { - switch (t) { + switch (prog->expected_attach_type) { case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: return BPF_TRAMP_FENTRY; case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: return BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN; case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: return BPF_TRAMP_FEXIT; + case BPF_LSM_MAC: + if (!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) + /* The function returns void, we cannot modify its + * return value. + */ + return BPF_TRAMP_FEXIT; + else + return BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN; default: return BPF_TRAMP_REPLACE; } @@ -255,7 +264,7 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) int cnt; tr = prog->aux->trampoline; - kind = bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(prog->expected_attach_type); + kind = bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(prog); mutex_lock(&tr->mutex); if (tr->extension_prog) { /* cannot attach fentry/fexit if extension prog is attached. @@ -305,7 +314,7 @@ int bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) int err; tr = prog->aux->trampoline; - kind = bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(prog->expected_attach_type); + kind = bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(prog); mutex_lock(&tr->mutex); if (kind == BPF_TRAMP_REPLACE) { WARN_ON_ONCE(!tr->extension_prog); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 46ba86c540e2..047b2e876399 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "disasm.h" @@ -6492,8 +6493,9 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1); int err; - /* The struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ - if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS && + /* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */ + if ((env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || + env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) && !prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type) return 0; @@ -9923,7 +9925,9 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) return check_struct_ops_btf_id(env); - if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && !prog_extension) + if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && + prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && + !prog_extension) return 0; if (!btf_id) { @@ -10054,8 +10058,16 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return -EINVAL; /* fallthrough */ case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: + case BPF_LSM_MAC: case BPF_TRACE_FENTRY: case BPF_TRACE_FEXIT: + prog->aux->attach_func_name = tname; + if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { + ret = bpf_lsm_verify_prog(&env->log, prog); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + if (!btf_type_is_func(t)) { verbose(env, "attach_btf_id %u is not a function\n", btf_id); @@ -10070,7 +10082,6 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) tr = bpf_trampoline_lookup(key); if (!tr) return -ENOMEM; - prog->aux->attach_func_name = tname; /* t is either vmlinux type or another program's type */ prog->aux->attach_func_proto = t; mutex_lock(&tr->mutex); From patchwork Sun Mar 29 00:43:53 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11463851 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 91ED792C for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6756E20732 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="RTFgQI0H" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727620AbgC2Ao2 (ORCPT ); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 20:44:28 -0400 Received: from mail-wr1-f68.google.com ([209.85.221.68]:43223 "EHLO mail-wr1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727833AbgC2AoI (ORCPT ); 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[77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm14577647wru.92.2020.03.28.17.44.05 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:05 -0700 (PDT) From: KP Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook , James Morris , Brendan Jackman , Florent Revest , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , James Morris , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 5/8] bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:43:53 +0100 Message-Id: <20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh * The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h. * The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM. Signed-off-by: KP Singh Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: James Morris Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest --- security/Kconfig | 10 +++++----- security/Makefile | 2 ++ security/bpf/Makefile | 5 +++++ security/bpf/hooks.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/bpf/Makefile create mode 100644 security/bpf/hooks.c diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 2a1a2d396228..cd3cc7da3a55 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -277,11 +277,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 746438499029..22e73a3482bd 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown +subdir-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o +obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ # Object integrity file lists subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity diff --git a/security/bpf/Makefile b/security/bpf/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c7a89a962084 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/bpf/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + +obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) := hooks.o diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..32d32d485451 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + */ +#include +#include + +static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ + LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME), + #include + #undef LSM_HOOK +}; + +static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf"); + pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n"); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = { + .name = "bpf", + .init = bpf_lsm_init, +}; From patchwork Sun Mar 29 00:43:54 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11463843 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 759AA1667 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54D0C20732 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="gxGbNbvM" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727774AbgC2AoK (ORCPT ); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 20:44:10 -0400 Received: from mail-wr1-f65.google.com ([209.85.221.65]:34328 "EHLO mail-wr1-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727846AbgC2AoI (ORCPT ); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 20:44:08 -0400 Received: by mail-wr1-f65.google.com with SMTP id 65so16628925wrl.1 for ; Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:08 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=K7NWWRCLHlz1fRBineQjYSS2SnhtkA6+50AaveKK5cs=; b=gxGbNbvMI2136h1TFGopTcDIre/RoedC/p7uXS9onOdfgusD2Bfn/Aw82l7TGPL2TX O7OBN1oXNmg40E8YDfG5KJtpjqU9qvIlu7Hy49473LNWyXKkFixZZ4ETQWBL65alpx4d dv1p8WRPhnDzszUNDfpYd3+BPBIVCgMn5rv0M= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=K7NWWRCLHlz1fRBineQjYSS2SnhtkA6+50AaveKK5cs=; b=V6SegwLMo56/7alAqcPRKYo1vEiJNGy7C6C6yNR0C+CYsHxhcouWg3jNCOWLjq7GV2 IYWyCrTB4n592D3ceKlaNT1N9bq7KAj7aqsdSHQ+P5qsXSt0YnlWwGIFj4xBag88/Inj m7yGNJePWgBb2NwxyfCbZFi0wrohnlkpmnw7YvGnXxsHhv+B+GGpYQDHrAhjvTgdRTpq g4VVod5CBHyvWHQy5mKEDrvwD0dI2kHn5uRUyffUgOHDfCWPUB1P7RLSCXX4aM/gqPej 0MuFvHyvPTR9UWRq1TdKT4a4Qz7gNmk7uy7aNX/tybkB6Aodn4zv2U7RxXsohsXdP6UF pacQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ2Ct3rEkatJ1WBBt17Ne/8JoByWKaSqjAxvr2NU4cs/k7VT4TdF 6DQiE7gOrZB4Wp7cULJkhC9LAg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vurgM617aVILOCWHrj00lj/KKIv7lGga8p8iDyCwQnENOdJ7uKe/aex184yCuM7XRRxcsTyBg== X-Received: by 2002:adf:ea84:: with SMTP id s4mr7603775wrm.392.1585442647373; Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kpsingh-kernel.localdomain (77-56-209-237.dclient.hispeed.ch. [77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm14577647wru.92.2020.03.28.17.44.06 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:06 -0700 (PDT) From: KP Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yonghong Song , Andrii Nakryiko , Brendan Jackman , Florent Revest , James Morris , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 6/8] tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:43:54 +0100 Message-Id: <20200329004356.27286-7-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh Since BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM uses the same attaching mechanism as BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, the common logic is refactored into a static function bpf_program__attach_btf_id. A new API call bpf_program__attach_lsm is still added to avoid userspace conflicts if this ever changes in the future. Signed-off-by: KP Singh Acked-by: Yonghong Song Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest Reviewed-by: James Morris --- tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c | 3 ++- tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.h | 4 ++++ tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c index c6dafe563176..73220176728d 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c @@ -235,7 +235,8 @@ int bpf_load_program_xattr(const struct bpf_load_program_attr *load_attr, memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr)); attr.prog_type = load_attr->prog_type; attr.expected_attach_type = load_attr->expected_attach_type; - if (attr.prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { + if (attr.prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || + attr.prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { attr.attach_btf_id = load_attr->attach_btf_id; } else if (attr.prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING || attr.prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c index 62903302935e..4059717a6470 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c @@ -2358,7 +2358,8 @@ static int bpf_object__finalize_btf(struct bpf_object *obj) static inline bool libbpf_prog_needs_vmlinux_btf(struct bpf_program *prog) { - if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) + if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || + prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) return true; /* BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING programs which do not attach to other programs @@ -4866,7 +4867,8 @@ load_program(struct bpf_program *prog, struct bpf_insn *insns, int insns_cnt, load_attr.insns = insns; load_attr.insns_cnt = insns_cnt; load_attr.license = license; - if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) { + if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS || + prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) { load_attr.attach_btf_id = prog->attach_btf_id; } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING || prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) { @@ -4957,6 +4959,7 @@ int bpf_program__load(struct bpf_program *prog, char *license, __u32 kern_ver) int err = 0, fd, i, btf_id; if ((prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING || + prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM || prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) && !prog->attach_btf_id) { btf_id = libbpf_find_attach_btf_id(prog); if (btf_id <= 0) @@ -6196,6 +6199,7 @@ bool bpf_program__is_##NAME(const struct bpf_program *prog) \ } \ BPF_PROG_TYPE_FNS(socket_filter, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER); +BPF_PROG_TYPE_FNS(lsm, BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM); BPF_PROG_TYPE_FNS(kprobe, BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE); BPF_PROG_TYPE_FNS(sched_cls, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS); BPF_PROG_TYPE_FNS(sched_act, BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT); @@ -6262,6 +6266,8 @@ static struct bpf_link *attach_raw_tp(const struct bpf_sec_def *sec, struct bpf_program *prog); static struct bpf_link *attach_trace(const struct bpf_sec_def *sec, struct bpf_program *prog); +static struct bpf_link *attach_lsm(const struct bpf_sec_def *sec, + struct bpf_program *prog); struct bpf_sec_def { const char *sec; @@ -6312,6 +6318,10 @@ static const struct bpf_sec_def section_defs[] = { SEC_DEF("freplace/", EXT, .is_attach_btf = true, .attach_fn = attach_trace), + SEC_DEF("lsm/", LSM, + .is_attach_btf = true, + .expected_attach_type = BPF_LSM_MAC, + .attach_fn = attach_lsm), BPF_PROG_SEC("xdp", BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP), BPF_PROG_SEC("perf_event", BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT), BPF_PROG_SEC("lwt_in", BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN), @@ -6574,6 +6584,7 @@ static int bpf_object__collect_struct_ops_map_reloc(struct bpf_object *obj, } #define BTF_TRACE_PREFIX "btf_trace_" +#define BTF_LSM_PREFIX "bpf_lsm_" #define BTF_MAX_NAME_SIZE 128 static int find_btf_by_prefix_kind(const struct btf *btf, const char *prefix, @@ -6601,6 +6612,9 @@ static inline int __find_vmlinux_btf_id(struct btf *btf, const char *name, if (attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) err = find_btf_by_prefix_kind(btf, BTF_TRACE_PREFIX, name, BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF); + else if (attach_type == BPF_LSM_MAC) + err = find_btf_by_prefix_kind(btf, BTF_LSM_PREFIX, name, + BTF_KIND_FUNC); else err = btf__find_by_name_kind(btf, name, BTF_KIND_FUNC); @@ -7454,7 +7468,8 @@ static struct bpf_link *attach_raw_tp(const struct bpf_sec_def *sec, return bpf_program__attach_raw_tracepoint(prog, tp_name); } -struct bpf_link *bpf_program__attach_trace(struct bpf_program *prog) +/* Common logic for all BPF program types that attach to a btf_id */ +static struct bpf_link *bpf_program__attach_btf_id(struct bpf_program *prog) { char errmsg[STRERR_BUFSIZE]; struct bpf_link *link; @@ -7476,7 +7491,7 @@ struct bpf_link *bpf_program__attach_trace(struct bpf_program *prog) if (pfd < 0) { pfd = -errno; free(link); - pr_warn("program '%s': failed to attach to trace: %s\n", + pr_warn("program '%s': failed to attach: %s\n", bpf_program__title(prog, false), libbpf_strerror_r(pfd, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg))); return ERR_PTR(pfd); @@ -7485,12 +7500,28 @@ struct bpf_link *bpf_program__attach_trace(struct bpf_program *prog) return (struct bpf_link *)link; } +struct bpf_link *bpf_program__attach_trace(struct bpf_program *prog) +{ + return bpf_program__attach_btf_id(prog); +} + +struct bpf_link *bpf_program__attach_lsm(struct bpf_program *prog) +{ + return bpf_program__attach_btf_id(prog); +} + static struct bpf_link *attach_trace(const struct bpf_sec_def *sec, struct bpf_program *prog) { return bpf_program__attach_trace(prog); } +static struct bpf_link *attach_lsm(const struct bpf_sec_def *sec, + struct bpf_program *prog) +{ + return bpf_program__attach_lsm(prog); +} + struct bpf_link *bpf_program__attach(struct bpf_program *prog) { const struct bpf_sec_def *sec_def; diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.h b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.h index bf7a35a9556d..f6d66d09d94b 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.h +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.h @@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ bpf_program__attach_raw_tracepoint(struct bpf_program *prog, LIBBPF_API struct bpf_link * bpf_program__attach_trace(struct bpf_program *prog); +LIBBPF_API struct bpf_link * +bpf_program__attach_lsm(struct bpf_program *prog); struct bpf_map; LIBBPF_API struct bpf_link *bpf_map__attach_struct_ops(struct bpf_map *map); struct bpf_insn; @@ -321,6 +323,7 @@ LIBBPF_API int bpf_program__set_socket_filter(struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API int bpf_program__set_tracepoint(struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API int bpf_program__set_raw_tracepoint(struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API int bpf_program__set_kprobe(struct bpf_program *prog); +LIBBPF_API int bpf_program__set_lsm(struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API int bpf_program__set_sched_cls(struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API int bpf_program__set_sched_act(struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API int bpf_program__set_xdp(struct bpf_program *prog); @@ -347,6 +350,7 @@ LIBBPF_API bool bpf_program__is_socket_filter(const struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API bool bpf_program__is_tracepoint(const struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API bool bpf_program__is_raw_tracepoint(const struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API bool bpf_program__is_kprobe(const struct bpf_program *prog); +LIBBPF_API bool bpf_program__is_lsm(const struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API bool bpf_program__is_sched_cls(const struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API bool bpf_program__is_sched_act(const struct bpf_program *prog); LIBBPF_API bool bpf_program__is_xdp(const struct bpf_program *prog); diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map index dcc87db3ca8a..754e59c9fb12 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.map @@ -243,6 +243,9 @@ LIBBPF_0.0.8 { bpf_link__pin; bpf_link__pin_path; bpf_link__unpin; + bpf_program__attach_lsm; + bpf_program__is_lsm; bpf_program__set_attach_target; + bpf_program__set_lsm; bpf_set_link_xdp_fd_opts; } LIBBPF_0.0.7; From patchwork Sun Mar 29 00:43:55 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11463847 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF38C161F for ; 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[77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm14577647wru.92.2020.03.28.17.44.07 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:08 -0700 (PDT) From: KP Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrii Nakryiko , Brendan Jackman , Florent Revest , Thomas Garnier , James Morris , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 7/8] bpf: lsm: Add selftests for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:43:55 +0100 Message-Id: <20200329004356.27286-8-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh * Load/attach a BPF program that hooks to file_mprotect (int) and bprm_committed_creds (void). * Perform an action that triggers the hook. * Verify if the audit event was received using the shared global variables for the process executed. * Verify if the mprotect returns a -EPERM. Signed-off-by: KP Singh Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest Reviewed-by: Thomas Garnier Reviewed-by: James Morris --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 2 + .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c | 48 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 136 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config index 5dc109f4c097..60e3ae5d4e48 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config @@ -35,3 +35,5 @@ CONFIG_MPLS_ROUTING=m CONFIG_MPLS_IPTUNNEL=m CONFIG_IPV6_SIT=m CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y +CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y +CONFIG_SECURITY=y diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1e4c258de09d --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "lsm.skel.h" + +char *CMD_ARGS[] = {"true", NULL}; + +int heap_mprotect(void) +{ + void *buf; + long sz; + int ret; + + sz = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); + if (sz < 0) + return sz; + + buf = memalign(sz, 2 * sz); + if (buf == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = mprotect(buf, sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC); + free(buf); + return ret; +} + +int exec_cmd(int *monitored_pid) +{ + int child_pid, child_status; + + child_pid = fork(); + if (child_pid == 0) { + *monitored_pid = getpid(); + execvp(CMD_ARGS[0], CMD_ARGS); + return -EINVAL; + } else if (child_pid > 0) { + waitpid(child_pid, &child_status, 0); + return child_status; + } + + return -EINVAL; +} + +void test_test_lsm(void) +{ + struct lsm *skel = NULL; + int err, duration = 0; + + skel = lsm__open_and_load(); + if (CHECK(!skel, "skel_load", "lsm skeleton failed\n")) + goto close_prog; + + err = lsm__attach(skel); + if (CHECK(err, "attach", "lsm attach failed: %d\n", err)) + goto close_prog; + + err = exec_cmd(&skel->bss->monitored_pid); + if (CHECK(err < 0, "exec_cmd", "err %d errno %d\n", err, errno)) + goto close_prog; + + CHECK(skel->bss->bprm_count != 1, "bprm_count", "bprm_count = %d\n", + skel->bss->bprm_count); + + skel->bss->monitored_pid = getpid(); + + err = heap_mprotect(); + if (CHECK(errno != EPERM, "heap_mprotect", "want errno=EPERM, got %d\n", + errno)) + goto close_prog; + + CHECK(skel->bss->mprotect_count != 1, "mprotect_count", + "mprotect_count = %d\n", skel->bss->mprotect_count); + +close_prog: + lsm__destroy(skel); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a4e3c223028d --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright 2020 Google LLC. + */ + +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include +#include +#include + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; + +int monitored_pid = 0; +int mprotect_count = 0; +int bprm_count = 0; + +SEC("lsm/file_mprotect") +int BPF_PROG(test_int_hook, struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, int ret) +{ + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + __u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; + int is_heap = 0; + + is_heap = (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && + vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk); + + if (is_heap && monitored_pid == pid) { + mprotect_count++; + ret = -EPERM; + } + + return ret; +} + +SEC("lsm/bprm_committed_creds") +int BPF_PROG(test_void_hook, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + __u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; + + if (monitored_pid == pid) + bprm_count++; + + return 0; +} From patchwork Sun Mar 29 00:43:56 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11463849 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 152D21893 for ; Sun, 29 Mar 2020 00:44:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8EA920578 for ; 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[77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id e5sm14577647wru.92.2020.03.28.17.44.08 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sat, 28 Mar 2020 17:44:09 -0700 (PDT) From: KP Singh To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Brendan Jackman , Florent Revest , Thomas Garnier , James Morris , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v9 8/8] bpf: lsm: Add Documentation Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 01:43:56 +0100 Message-Id: <20200329004356.27286-9-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200329004356.27286-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh Document how eBPF programs (BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) can be loaded and attached (BPF_LSM_MAC) to the LSM hooks. Signed-off-by: KP Singh Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman Reviewed-by: Florent Revest Reviewed-by: Thomas Garnier Reviewed-by: James Morris --- Documentation/bpf/bpf_lsm.rst | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/bpf/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 143 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/bpf/bpf_lsm.rst diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/bpf_lsm.rst b/Documentation/bpf/bpf_lsm.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1c0a75a51d79 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/bpf/bpf_lsm.rst @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +.. Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + +================ +LSM BPF Programs +================ + +These BPF programs allow runtime instrumentation of the LSM hooks by privileged +users to implement system-wide MAC (Mandatory Access Control) and Audit +policies using eBPF. + +Structure +--------- + +The example shows an eBPF program that can be attached to the ``file_mprotect`` +LSM hook: + +.. c:function:: int file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot); + +Other LSM hooks which can be instrumented can be found in +``include/linux/lsm_hooks.h``. + +eBPF programs that use :doc:`/bpf/btf` do not need to include kernel headers +for accessing information from the attached eBPF program's context. They can +simply declare the structures in the eBPF program and only specify the fields +that need to be accessed. + +.. code-block:: c + + struct mm_struct { + unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack; + } __attribute__((preserve_access_index)); + + struct vm_area_struct { + unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack; + unsigned long vm_start, vm_end; + struct mm_struct *vm_mm; + } __attribute__((preserve_access_index)); + + +.. note:: The order of the fields is irrelevant. + +This can be further simplified (if one has access to the BTF information at +build time) by generating the ``vmlinux.h`` with: + +.. code-block:: console + + # bpftool btf dump file format c > vmlinux.h + +.. note:: ``path-to-btf-vmlinux`` can be ``/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux`` if the + build environment matches the environment the BPF programs are + deployed in. + +The ``vmlinux.h`` can then simply be included in the BPF programs without +requiring the definition of the types. + +The eBPF programs can be declared using the``BPF_PROG`` +macros defined in `tools/lib/bpf/bpf_tracing.h`_. In this +example: + + * ``"lsm/file_mprotect"`` indicates the LSM hook that the program must + be attached to + * ``mprotect_audit`` is the name of the eBPF program + +.. code-block:: c + + SEC("lsm/file_mprotect") + int BPF_PROG(mprotect_audit, struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, int ret) + { + /* ret is the return value from the previous BPF program + * or 0 if it's the first hook. + */ + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + int is_heap; + + is_heap = (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && + vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk); + + /* Return an -EPERM or write information to the perf events buffer + * for auditing + */ + if (is_heap) + return -EPERM; + } + +The ``__attribute__((preserve_access_index))`` is a clang feature that allows +the BPF verifier to update the offsets for the access at runtime using the +:doc:`/bpf/btf` information. Since the BPF verifier is aware of the types, it +also validates all the accesses made to the various types in the eBPF program. + +Loading +------- + +eBPF programs can be loaded with the :manpage:`bpf(2)` syscall's +``BPF_PROG_LOAD`` operation: + +.. code-block:: c + + struct bpf_object *obj; + + obj = bpf_object__open("./my_prog.o"); + bpf_object__load(obj); + +This can be simplified by using a skeleton header generated by ``bpftool``: + +.. code-block:: console + + # bpftool gen skeleton my_prog.o > my_prog.skel.h + +and the program can be loaded by including ``my_prog.skel.h`` and using +the generated helper, ``my_prog__open_and_load``. + +Attachment to LSM Hooks +----------------------- + +The LSM allows attachment of eBPF programs as LSM hooks using :manpage:`bpf(2)` +syscall's ``BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN`` operation or more simply by +using the libbpf helper ``bpf_program__attach_lsm``. + +The program can be detached from the LSM hook by *destroying* the ``link`` +link returned by ``bpf_program__attach_lsm`` using ``bpf_link__destroy``. + +One can also use the helpers generated in ``my_prog.skel.h`` i.e. +``my_prog__attach`` for attachment and ``my_prog__destroy`` for cleaning up. + +Examples +-------- + +An example eBPF program can be found in +`tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c`_ and the corresponding +userspace code in `tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c`_ + +.. Links +.. _tools/lib/bpf/bpf_tracing.h: + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/lib/bpf/bpf_tracing.h +.. _tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c: + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c +.. _tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c: + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c diff --git a/Documentation/bpf/index.rst b/Documentation/bpf/index.rst index 7be43c5f2dcf..f99677f3572f 100644 --- a/Documentation/bpf/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/bpf/index.rst @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ Program types prog_cgroup_sockopt prog_cgroup_sysctl prog_flow_dissector + bpf_lsm Testing and debugging BPF