From patchwork Fri May 29 16:46:40 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Eric W. Biederman" X-Patchwork-Id: 11579353 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAE3C1667 for ; Fri, 29 May 2020 16:50:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA5532075A for ; Fri, 29 May 2020 16:50:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726944AbgE2Qug (ORCPT ); Fri, 29 May 2020 12:50:36 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:53838 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725601AbgE2Quf (ORCPT ); Fri, 29 May 2020 12:50:35 -0400 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]) by out01.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jeiDK-0002HE-5T; Fri, 29 May 2020 10:50:34 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1jeiDJ-0003BZ-3L; Fri, 29 May 2020 10:50:34 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Linus Torvalds , Oleg Nesterov , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Greg Ungerer , Rob Landley , Bernd Edlinger , , Al Viro , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Casey Schaufler , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andy Lutomirski References: <87h7wujhmz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87sgga6ze4.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9l4zyla.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <877dx822er.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87k10wysqz.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87d06mr8ps.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:46:40 -0500 In-Reply-To: <87d06mr8ps.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Fri, 29 May 2020 11:45:19 -0500") Message-ID: <877dwur8nj.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1jeiDJ-0003BZ-3L;;;mid=<877dwur8nj.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19wzHLdNs+aLSYbLN06mIAw8Mq8RcEUPeg= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.5 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,LotsOfNums_01,T_TooManySym_01,T_TooManySym_02, T_TooManySym_03,XMNoVowels autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 1.2 LotsOfNums_01 BODY: Lots of long strings of numbers * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 0; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_03 6+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: ; sa07 0; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **; X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 675 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.08 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 11 (1.6%), b_tie_ro: 10 (1.4%), parse: 1.88 (0.3%), extract_message_metadata: 20 (3.0%), get_uri_detail_list: 4.6 (0.7%), tests_pri_-1000: 16 (2.4%), tests_pri_-950: 1.28 (0.2%), tests_pri_-900: 1.05 (0.2%), tests_pri_-90: 138 (20.5%), check_bayes: 137 (20.3%), b_tokenize: 12 (1.8%), b_tok_get_all: 36 (5.3%), b_comp_prob: 3.4 (0.5%), b_tok_touch_all: 81 (12.0%), b_finish: 0.87 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 471 (69.8%), check_dkim_signature: 0.60 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.3 (0.3%), poll_dns_idle: 0.67 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 2.2 (0.3%), tests_pri_500: 7 (1.1%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH 1/2] exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: There is a small bug in the code that recomputes parts of bprm->cred for every bprm->file. The code never recomputes the part of clear_dangerous_personality_flags it is responsible for. Which means that in practice if someone creates a sgid script the interpreter will not be able to use any of: READ_IMPLIES_EXEC ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT MMAP_PAGE_ZERO. This accentially clearing of personality flags probably does not matter in practice because no one has complained but it does make the code more difficult to understand. Further remaining bug compatible prevents the recomputation from being removed and replaced by simply computing bprm->cred once from the final bprm->file. Making this change removes the last behavior difference between computing bprm->creds from the final file and recomputing bprm->cred several times. Which allows this behavior change to be justified for it's own reasons, and for any but hunts looking into why the behavior changed to wind up here instead of in the code that will follow that computes bprm->cred from the final bprm->file. This small logic bug appears to have existed since the code started clearing dangerous personality bits. History Tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git Fixes: 1bb0fa189c6a ("[PATCH] NX: clean up legacy binary support") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- fs/exec.c | 6 ++++-- include/linux/binfmts.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++ security/commoncap.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index c3c879a55d65..0f793536e393 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1354,6 +1354,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD | PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY); flush_thread(); + bprm->per_clear |= bprm->pf_per_clear; me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; /* @@ -1628,12 +1629,12 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return; if (mode & S_ISUID) { - bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->euid = uid; } if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { - bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->egid = gid; } } @@ -1654,6 +1655,7 @@ static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* Recompute parts of bprm->cred based on bprm->file */ bprm->active_secureexec = 0; + bprm->pf_per_clear = 0; bprm_fill_uid(bprm); retval = security_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm); if (retval) diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h index 7fc05929c967..50025ead0b72 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h @@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ struct linux_binprm { struct file * file; struct cred *cred; /* new credentials */ int unsafe; /* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */ + /* + * bits to clear in current->personality + * recalculated for each bprm->file. + */ + unsigned int pf_per_clear; unsigned int per_clear; /* bits to clear in current->personality */ int argc, envc; const char * filename; /* Name of binary as seen by procps */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index d618ecc4d660..cd3dd0afceb5 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ * transitions between security domains). * The hook must set @bprm->active_secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to * request libc enable secure mode. + * The hook must set @bprm->pf_per_clear to the personality flags that + * should be cleared from current->personality. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. * @bprm_check_security: diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 77b04cb6feac..6de72d22dc6c 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) - bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. From patchwork Fri May 29 16:47:29 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Eric W. Biederman" X-Patchwork-Id: 11579357 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0D340139A for ; Fri, 29 May 2020 16:51:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E421C20C09 for ; Fri, 29 May 2020 16:51:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727112AbgE2Qvb (ORCPT ); Fri, 29 May 2020 12:51:31 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:60806 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725601AbgE2QvZ (ORCPT ); Fri, 29 May 2020 12:51:25 -0400 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]) by out02.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jeiE7-0002O4-Ci; Fri, 29 May 2020 10:51:23 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1jeiE5-0003HU-Nf; Fri, 29 May 2020 10:51:23 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Linus Torvalds , Oleg Nesterov , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Greg Ungerer , Rob Landley , Bernd Edlinger , , Al Viro , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Casey Schaufler , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andy Lutomirski References: <87h7wujhmz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87sgga6ze4.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9l4zyla.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <877dx822er.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87k10wysqz.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87d06mr8ps.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:47:29 -0500 In-Reply-To: <87d06mr8ps.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Fri, 29 May 2020 11:45:19 -0500") Message-ID: <871rn2r8m6.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-XM-SPF: eid=1jeiE5-0003HU-Nf;;;mid=<871rn2r8m6.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX181wX+NRhhP4m1CiH+i9ON3W6pa6AHjXFY= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa07.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: * X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.3 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,XMNoVowels autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa07 0; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] X-Spam-DCC: ; sa07 0; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: *; X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 1128 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.05 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 9 (0.8%), b_tie_ro: 7 (0.6%), parse: 1.58 (0.1%), extract_message_metadata: 18 (1.6%), get_uri_detail_list: 8 (0.7%), tests_pri_-1000: 14 (1.2%), tests_pri_-950: 1.26 (0.1%), tests_pri_-900: 1.05 (0.1%), tests_pri_-90: 149 (13.2%), check_bayes: 147 (13.0%), b_tokenize: 28 (2.5%), b_tok_get_all: 18 (1.6%), b_comp_prob: 4.6 (0.4%), b_tok_touch_all: 91 (8.1%), b_finish: 0.90 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 916 (81.3%), check_dkim_signature: 0.81 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.3 (0.2%), poll_dns_idle: 0.60 (0.1%), tests_pri_10: 2.7 (0.2%), tests_pri_500: 12 (1.1%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [PATCH 2/2] exec: Compute file based creds only once X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made. Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred. A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds will be computed from. The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid. A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already heandled by prepare_exec_creds. The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been removed. A small comment to document that the work of cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the user had uid 0 has been added. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- fs/binfmt_misc.c | 2 +- fs/exec.c | 63 +++++++++++++++-------------------- include/linux/binfmts.h | 14 ++------ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 22 ++++++------ include/linux/security.h | 9 ++--- security/commoncap.c | 24 +++++++------ security/security.c | 4 +-- 8 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c index 53968ea07b57..bc5506619b7e 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->interpreter = interp_file; if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS) - bprm->preserve_creds = 1; + bprm->execfd_creds = 1; retval = 0; ret: diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 0f793536e393..e8599236290d 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ #include +static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm); + int suid_dumpable = 0; static LIST_HEAD(formats); @@ -1304,6 +1306,11 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) struct task_struct *me = current; int retval; + /* Once we are committed compute the creds */ + retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm); + if (retval) + return retval; + /* * Ensure all future errors are fatal. */ @@ -1354,7 +1361,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD | PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY); flush_thread(); - bprm->per_clear |= bprm->pf_per_clear; me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; /* @@ -1365,13 +1371,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) */ do_close_on_exec(me->files); - /* - * Once here, prepare_binrpm() will not be called any more, so - * the final state of setuid/setgid/fscaps can be merged into the - * secureexec flag. - */ - bprm->secureexec |= bprm->active_secureexec; - if (bprm->secureexec) { /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */ me->pdeath_signal = 0; @@ -1587,29 +1586,21 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock); } -static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { + /* Handle suid and sgid on files */ struct inode *inode; unsigned int mode; kuid_t uid; kgid_t gid; - /* - * Since this can be called multiple times (via prepare_binprm), - * we must clear any previous work done when setting set[ug]id - * bits from any earlier bprm->file uses (for example when run - * first for a setuid script then again for its interpreter). - */ - bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); - bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); - - if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt)) + if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt)) return; if (task_no_new_privs(current)) return; - inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode); if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID))) return; @@ -1629,19 +1620,31 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return; if (mode & S_ISUID) { - bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->euid = uid; } if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { - bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->egid = gid; } } +/* + * Compute brpm->cred based upon the final binary. + */ +static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + /* Compute creds based on which file? */ + struct file *file = bprm->execfd_creds ? bprm->executable : bprm->file; + + bprm_fill_uid(bprm, file); + return security_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file); +} + /* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. - * Check permissions, then read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes + * Read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes * * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example). */ @@ -1649,20 +1652,6 @@ static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { loff_t pos = 0; - /* Can the interpreter get to the executable without races? */ - if (!bprm->preserve_creds) { - int retval; - - /* Recompute parts of bprm->cred based on bprm->file */ - bprm->active_secureexec = 0; - bprm->pf_per_clear = 0; - bprm_fill_uid(bprm); - retval = security_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm); - if (retval) - return retval; - } - bprm->preserve_creds = 0; - memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); return kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, &pos); } diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h index 50025ead0b72..aece1b340e7d 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h @@ -29,13 +29,8 @@ struct linux_binprm { /* Should an execfd be passed to userspace? */ have_execfd:1, - /* It is safe to use the creds of a script (see binfmt_misc) */ - preserve_creds:1, - /* - * True if most recent call to security_bprm_set_creds - * resulted in elevated privileges. - */ - active_secureexec:1, + /* Use the creds of a script (see binfmt_misc) */ + execfd_creds:1, /* * Set by bprm_creds_for_exec hook to indicate a * privilege-gaining exec has happened. Used to set @@ -55,11 +50,6 @@ struct linux_binprm { struct file * file; struct cred *cred; /* new credentials */ int unsafe; /* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */ - /* - * bits to clear in current->personality - * recalculated for each bprm->file. - */ - unsigned int pf_per_clear; unsigned int per_clear; /* bits to clear in current->personality */ int argc, envc; const char * filename; /* Name of binary as seen by procps */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 1e295ba12c0d..adbc6603abba 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, settime, const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, vm_enough_memory, struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_for_exec, struct linux_binprm *bprm) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_repopulate_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committing_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committed_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index cd3dd0afceb5..37bb3df751c6 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -44,18 +44,18 @@ * request libc enable secure mode. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. - * @bprm_repopulate_creds: - * Assuming that the relevant bits of @bprm->cred->security have been - * previously set, examine @bprm->file and regenerate them. This is - * so that the credentials derived from the interpreter the code is - * actually going to run are used rather than credentials derived - * from a script. This done because the interpreter binary needs to - * reopen script, and may end up opening something completely different. - * This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for - * transitions between security domains). - * The hook must set @bprm->active_secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to + * @bprm_creds_from_file: + * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change + * privilege upon exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. + * This is called after finding the binary that will be executed. + * without an interpreter. This ensures that the credentials will not + * be derived from a script that the binary will need to reopen, which + * when reopend may end up being a completely different file. This + * hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for transitions + * between security domains). + * The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to * request libc enable secure mode. - * The hook must set @bprm->pf_per_clear to the personality flags that + * The hook must set @bprm->per_clear to the personality flags that * should be cleared from current->personality. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 6dcec9375e8f..8444fae7c5b9 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -extern int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file); extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int security_syslog(int type); int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz); int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -int security_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file); int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); @@ -575,9 +575,10 @@ static inline int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return 0; } -static inline int security_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, + struct file *file) { - return cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm); + return cap_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file); } static inline int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 6de72d22dc6c..59bf3c1674c8 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -647,7 +647,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being * constructed by execve(). */ -static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap) +static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file, + bool *effective, bool *has_fcap) { int rc = 0; struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; @@ -657,7 +658,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f if (!file_caps_enabled) return 0; - if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt)) + if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt)) return 0; /* @@ -665,10 +666,10 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f * explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its * descendants. */ - if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns)) + if (!current_in_userns(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns)) return 0; - rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); + rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); if (rc < 0) { if (rc == -EINVAL) printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n", @@ -797,26 +798,27 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, } /** - * cap_bprm_repopulate_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). + * cap_bprm_creds_from_file - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds + * @file: The file to pull the credentials from * * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered, * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. */ -int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { + /* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */ const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid; int ret; kuid_t root_uid; - new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient; if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old))) return -EPERM; - ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap); + ret = get_file_caps(bprm, file, &effective, &has_fcap); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -826,7 +828,7 @@ int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) - bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. @@ -889,7 +891,7 @@ int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) (!__is_real(root_uid, new) && (effective || __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new)))) - bprm->active_secureexec = 1; + bprm->secureexec = 1; return 0; } @@ -1346,7 +1348,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_repopulate_creds, cap_bprm_repopulate_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, cap_bprm_creds_from_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity), diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b890b7e2a765..259b8e750aa2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -828,9 +828,9 @@ int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); } -int security_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { - return call_int_hook(bprm_repopulate_creds, 0, bprm); + return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); } int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)