From patchwork Wed Aug 5 00:43:28 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian X-Patchwork-Id: 11701095 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DA28913 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 00:43:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 593D220792 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 00:43:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="SwPdfQBv" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726166AbgHEAnj (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:43:39 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:38366 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726197AbgHEAnh (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:43:37 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain (c-73-42-176-67.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [73.42.176.67]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id ED0F120B490A; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 17:43:35 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com ED0F120B490A DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1596588216; bh=SF9nLu7J2HUvWV7Tl+ZwVBSS+d5Qa91rslKFBRAWfq0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SwPdfQBvdVK2gPdIEwEvbF0H4ed7PrBGla5VF04p65M5fa0kMmJozKIJy+EBsm4ED IoSdqWDBoALJYHcJ6hvC2/wdNxRGXfVPt7hz8sGMGtppNduc8lPxSpMBISIjFkhIv2 XDlpO2YBoYk8MMgQ1tz4Fmm2OiglfUiHd95jSzLs= From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 1/4] IMA: Add func to measure LSM state and policy Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 17:43:28 -0700 Message-Id: <20200805004331.20652-2-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Critical data structures of security modules need to be measured to enable an attestation service to verify if the configuration and policies for the security modules have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. A new IMA policy is required for handling this measurement. Define two new IMA policy func namely LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY to measure the state and the policy provided by the security modules. Update ima_match_rules() and ima_validate_rule() to check for the new func and ima_parse_rule() to handle the new func. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index cd572912c593..b7c7fb548c0c 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Description: [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [LSM_STATE] [LSM_POLICY] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value @@ -125,3 +126,11 @@ Description: keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring: measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima + + Example of measure rule using LSM_STATE to measure LSM state: + + measure func=LSM_STATE template=ima-buf + + Example of measure rule using LSM_POLICY to measure LSM policy: + + measure func=LSM_POLICY template=ima-ng diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 38043074ce5e..1b5f4b2f17d0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(LSM_STATE, lsm_state) \ + hook(LSM_POLICY, lsm_policy) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none) #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 4f39fb93f278..8c8b4e4a6493 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK - * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | LSM_STATE | LSM_POLICY * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 07f033634b27..e4de581442d5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -442,13 +442,21 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, { int i; - if (func == KEY_CHECK) { - return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && - ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred); - } if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; + + switch (func) { + case KEY_CHECK: + return ((rule->func == func) && + ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred)); + case LSM_STATE: + case LSM_POLICY: + return (rule->func == func); + default: + break; + } + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; @@ -1044,6 +1052,18 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) return false; + break; + case LSM_STATE: + case LSM_POLICY: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR)) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + break; default: return false; @@ -1176,6 +1196,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) && + strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_STATE") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_STATE; + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) && + strcmp(args[0].from, "LSM_POLICY") == 0) + entry->func = LSM_POLICY; else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) From patchwork Wed Aug 5 00:43:29 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian X-Patchwork-Id: 11701105 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD94814DD for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 00:43:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A544920842 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 00:43:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="gkoWPIfv" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726862AbgHEAnt (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:43:49 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:38378 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726210AbgHEAnh (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:43:37 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain (c-73-42-176-67.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [73.42.176.67]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3F4BF20B490D; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 17:43:36 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 3F4BF20B490D DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1596588216; bh=rlps7OqHhVGVD16ISs6BovnL28JviBxRVRibNHIIlhY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gkoWPIfviFKFKawhpIfi3Z0VTFwBIeRTLMjgHwOPbQOk9cGhVQbZVV50rddIvqkTF uPPMe/vuKYHv63XDDif27JgryMYYxrW/z1rPqbO3E8Ma4kCh50wTKXYPtfRv0nIlUu ZCJwQiGJN8qTBRIBKXUYX2zROhTAUpMPEnXuzEys= From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 2/4] IMA: Define IMA hooks to measure LSM state and policy Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 17:43:29 -0700 Message-Id: <20200805004331.20652-3-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org IMA subsystem needs to define IMA hooks that the security modules can call to measure state and policy data. Define two new IMA hooks, namely ima_lsm_state() and ima_lsm_policy(), that the security modules can call to measure LSM state and LSM policy respectively. Return the status of the measurement operation from these two IMA hooks. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks --- include/linux/ima.h | 14 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index d15100de6cdd..442ca0dce3c8 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); +extern int ima_measure_lsm_state(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf, + int size); +extern int ima_measure_lsm_policy(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf, + int size); #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); @@ -104,6 +108,16 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) } static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} +static inline int ima_measure_lsm_state(const char *lsm_event_name, + const void *buf, int size) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +static inline int ima_measure_lsm_policy(const char *lsm_event_name, + const void *buf, int size) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 1b5f4b2f17d0..8ed9f5e1dd40 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -267,9 +267,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); -void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, - const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, - int pcr, const char *keyring); +int process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, + const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, + int pcr, const char *keyring); void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 8a91711ca79b..74d421e40c8f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -736,9 +736,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) * * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ -void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, - const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, - int pcr, const char *keyring) +int process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, + const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, + int pcr, const char *keyring) { int ret = 0; const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, u32 secid; if (!ima_policy_flag) - return; + return 0; /* * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are @@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, keyring); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) - return; + return 0; } if (!pcr) @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, pr_err("template %s init failed, result: %d\n", (strlen(template->name) ? template->name : template->fmt), ret); - return; + return ret; } } @@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, func_measure_str(func), audit_cause, ret, 0, ret); - return; + return ret; } /** @@ -846,6 +846,42 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) fdput(f); } +/** + * ima_measure_lsm_state - measure LSM specific state + * @lsm_event_name: LSM event + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing LSM specific state + * @size: Number of bytes in buf + * + * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. + */ +int ima_measure_lsm_state(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf, + int size) +{ + if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size) + return -EINVAL; + + return process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, size, lsm_event_name, + LSM_STATE, 0, NULL); +} + +/** + * ima_measure_lsm_policy - measure LSM specific policy + * @lsm_event_name: LSM event + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing LSM specific policy + * @size: Number of bytes in buf + * + * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. + */ +int ima_measure_lsm_policy(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf, + int size) +{ + if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size) + return -EINVAL; + + return process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, size, lsm_event_name, + LSM_POLICY, 0, NULL); +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; From patchwork Wed Aug 5 00:43:30 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian X-Patchwork-Id: 11701109 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9D36913 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 00:43:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D771B20842 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 00:43:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="UmRZHMMU" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726841AbgHEAns (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:43:48 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:38390 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726230AbgHEAnh (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:43:37 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain (c-73-42-176-67.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [73.42.176.67]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 84A5820B490F; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 17:43:36 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 84A5820B490F DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1596588216; bh=CfiFqfbw/Bv6iAx0xQEtB6LbwfXGxWUXCDGWnsMT+jk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=UmRZHMMU9UPT4Vb3NAS2KufjimJiee65VX4cjlQap+IqbO82eZK8Ibp+ujf44Blut NRN8CcfHGg8EPpC7TIx0AmOB5CYFcRc3uMeJK6dkWsXZ3BPPJSvHsjqDEZUutDn4QY 7CLlzzZamZ4Kj3vWVBS8+tpTl89nozBvCtaBWVxI= From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 3/4] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure state and policy Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 17:43:30 -0700 Message-Id: <20200805004331.20652-4-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the loaded policy by calling the IMA hooks ima_measure_lsm_state() and ima_measure_lsm_policy() respectively. Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy: 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271 To verify the measurement check the following: Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state). grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example, initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state: => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists, 0 otherwise For other entries, compare the integer value in the files => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot And, each of the policy capabilities files under => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry. To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match. sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 4 Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley Reported-by: kernel test robot # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' Reported-by: kernel test robot # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash' Reported-by: kernel test robot # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? --- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 +++ security/selinux/measure.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index efa6108b1ce9..5521dfc1900b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7394,6 +7394,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) } selinux_mark_disabled(state); + selinux_measure_state(state); pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index b0e02cfe3ce1..77f42d9b544b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -222,16 +222,31 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]; } +static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot(const struct selinux_state *state) +{ + return READ_ONCE(state->checkreqprot); +} + int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state); int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len); int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len); +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len); size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state); int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, unsigned int req_cap); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif + #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32 struct av_decision { u32 allowed; diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1583628d09d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include "security.h" + +/* + * This function creates an unique name by appending the timestamp to + * the given string. This string is passed as "event name" to the IMA + * hook to measure the given SELinux data. + * + * The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have + * already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). + * But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence + * needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass an unique "Event Name" + * to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. + * + * For example, + * At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. + * At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. + * At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it + * (since it was already measured) unless the event name, for instance, + * is different in this call. + */ +static char *selinux_event_name(const char *name_prefix) +{ + char *event_name = NULL; + struct timespec64 curr_time; + int count; + + ktime_get_real_ts64(&curr_time); + count = snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s-%lld:%09ld", name_prefix, + curr_time.tv_sec, curr_time.tv_nsec); + count++; + event_name = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!event_name) { + pr_warn("%s: event name not allocated.\n", __func__); + return NULL; + } + + snprintf(event_name, count, "%s-%lld:%09ld", name_prefix, + curr_time.tv_sec, curr_time.tv_nsec); + + return event_name; +} + +static int read_selinux_state(char **state_str, int *state_str_len, + struct selinux_state *state) +{ + char *buf, *str_fmt = "%s=%d;"; + int i, buf_len, curr; + + buf_len = snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "initialized", 0); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "enabled", 0); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "enforcing", 0); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "checkreqprot", 0); + + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, + selinux_policycap_names[i], 0); + } + ++buf_len; + + buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + curr = snprintf(buf, buf_len, str_fmt, + "initialized", selinux_initialized(state)); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "enabled", !selinux_disabled(state)); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "enforcing", enforcing_enabled(state)); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "checkreqprot", selinux_checkreqprot(state)); + + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + selinux_policycap_names[i], + state->policycap[i]); + } + + *state_str = buf; + *state_str_len = curr; + + return 0; +} + +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state) +{ + void *policy = NULL; + char *event_name = NULL; + char *state_str = NULL; + size_t policy_len; + int state_str_len, rc = 0; + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state); + + rc = read_selinux_state(&state_str, &state_str_len, state); + if (rc) { + pr_warn("%s: Failed to read selinux state.\n", __func__); + return; + } + + /* + * Get an unique string for measuring the current SELinux state. + */ + event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-state"); + if (!event_name) { + pr_warn("%s: Event name for state not allocated.\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = ima_measure_lsm_state(event_name, state_str, state_str_len); + + kfree(event_name); + event_name = NULL; + + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* + * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. + */ + if (!initialized) + goto out; + + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); + if (rc) + goto out; + + event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-policy-hash"); + if (!event_name) { + pr_warn("%s: Event name for policy not allocated.\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = ima_measure_lsm_policy(event_name, policy, policy_len); + +out: + kfree(event_name); + kfree(state_str); + vfree(policy); +} diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 4781314c2510..6d46eaef5c92 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); enforcing_set(state, new_value); + selinux_measure_state(state); if (new_value) avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0); selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value); @@ -678,6 +679,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; length = count; + + selinux_measure_state(fsi->state); out: kfree(page); return length; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index ef0afd878bfc..3978c804c361 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2182,6 +2182,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); + selinux_measure_state(state); return 0; } @@ -2270,6 +2271,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); + selinux_measure_state(state); rc = 0; goto out; @@ -2941,6 +2943,7 @@ int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values) selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); + selinux_measure_state(state); } return rc; } @@ -3720,14 +3723,23 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, } #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ +static int security_read_policy_len(struct selinux_state *state, size_t *len) +{ + if (!selinux_initialized(state)) + return -EINVAL; + + *len = security_policydb_len(state); + return 0; +} + /** - * security_read_policy - read the policy. + * security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. * @data: binary policy data * @len: length of data in bytes * */ -int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, - void **data, size_t *len) +static int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) { struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc; @@ -3736,12 +3748,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return -EINVAL; - *len = security_policydb_len(state); - - *data = vmalloc_user(*len); - if (!*data) - return -ENOMEM; - fp.data = *data; fp.len = *len; @@ -3754,5 +3760,52 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; return 0; +} + +/** + * security_read_policy - read the policy. + * @data: binary policy data + * @len: length of data in bytes + * + */ +int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) +{ + int rc; + + rc = security_read_policy_len(state, len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + *data = vmalloc_user(*len); + if (!*data) + return -ENOMEM; + + return security_read_selinux_policy(state, data, len); +} + +/** + * security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy. + * @data: binary policy data + * @len: length of data in bytes + * + * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy. + * This function is for internal use only and should not + * be used for returning data to user space + * + */ +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) +{ + int rc; + + rc = security_read_policy_len(state, len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + *data = vmalloc(*len); + if (!*data) + return -ENOMEM; + return security_read_selinux_policy(state, data, len); } From patchwork Wed Aug 5 00:43:31 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian X-Patchwork-Id: 11701091 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF97D913 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 00:43:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97BD92073E for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 00:43:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="JLthUTDE" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726197AbgHEAnn (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:43:43 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:38396 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726233AbgHEAnj (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Aug 2020 20:43:39 -0400 Received: from localhost.localdomain (c-73-42-176-67.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [73.42.176.67]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CA44320B4913; Tue, 4 Aug 2020 17:43:36 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com CA44320B4913 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1596588217; bh=e9qb3yiuuplBvrGVBCdozGy4KXNH45mvKhd+aCdT3q0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=JLthUTDEWJF1nwYpSoJUDL/edI+721m0Q2hjCWzZjiyElqYl1XK25EITPzwi9gAlN N9gk65trF7Qmvp9zCo1diHNwr5CNmpSLLvNSLFX1K5LMkVghwxdyXw8pfzma3hnpCD uvPg0zLCpVK3SGKPJKeRc9YEraR4ysrUbvAEinIc= From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 4/4] IMA: Handle early boot data measurement Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 17:43:31 -0700 Message-Id: <20200805004331.20652-5-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org The current implementation of early boot measurement in the IMA subsystem is very specific to asymmetric keys. It does not handle measurement of other data such as Linux Security Module (LSM) data. Since most security modules are initialized very early in the boot cycle, data provided by those modules are not measured by IMA. Any other subsystem that initializes early in the boot cycle and needs IMA to measure their data would suffer from the same issue. Update the early boot key measurement to handle any early boot data. Change the kernel configuration CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS to CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA so it can be used for enabling early boot data measurement. Change this new configuration to support SECURITY_SELINUX subsystem in addition to KEYS subsystem, which is currently supported. This can be extended to include more subsystems in the future by updating this kernel configuration. Update LSM hooks namely ima_measure_lsm_state() and ima_measure_lsm_policy to utilize early boot measurement support. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 5 +- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 37 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 174 ----------------- 9 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 080c53545ff0..e4fb1761d64a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -322,10 +322,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y default y -config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS +config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX || (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) default y config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 67dabca670e2..cbbbc9848d2f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o -ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA) += ima_queue_data.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 8ed9f5e1dd40..ebe4d9bb2f2b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -229,29 +229,34 @@ extern const char *const func_tokens[]; struct modsig; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA /* - * To track keys that need to be measured. + * To track data that needs to be measured. */ -struct ima_key_entry { +struct ima_data_entry { struct list_head list; void *payload; size_t payload_len; - char *keyring_name; + const char *event_name; + const char *event_data; + enum ima_hooks func; }; -void ima_init_key_queue(void); -bool ima_should_queue_key(void); -bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload, - size_t payload_len); -void ima_process_queued_keys(void); +void ima_init_data_queue(void); +bool ima_should_queue_data(void); +bool ima_queue_data(const char *event_name, const void *payload, + size_t payload_len, const char *event_data, + enum ima_hooks func); +void ima_process_queued_data(void); #else -static inline void ima_init_key_queue(void) {} -static inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void) { return false; } -static inline bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, - const void *payload, - size_t payload_len) { return false; } -static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ +static inline void ima_init_data_queue(void) {} +static inline bool ima_should_queue_data(void) { return false; } +static inline bool ima_queue_data(const char *event_name, + const void *payload, + size_t payload_len, + const char *event_data, + enum ima_hooks func) { return false; } +static inline void ima_process_queued_data(void) {} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA */ /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c index 1c68c500c26f..8f8431f8b096 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c @@ -37,8 +37,10 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, if (!payload || (payload_len == 0)) return; - if (ima_should_queue_key()) - queued = ima_queue_key(keyring, payload, payload_len); + if (ima_should_queue_data()) + queued = ima_queue_data(keyring->description, payload, + payload_len, keyring->description, + KEY_CHECK); if (queued) return; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 4902fe7bd570..892894bf4af3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) if (rc != 0) return rc; - ima_init_key_queue(); + ima_init_data_queue(); return rc; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 74d421e40c8f..1c4e140964df 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -846,6 +846,22 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) fdput(f); } +static int ima_measure_lsm_data(const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int size, + enum ima_hooks func) +{ + bool queued = false; + + if (ima_should_queue_data()) + queued = ima_queue_data(event_name, buf, size, NULL, func); + + if (queued) + return 0; + + return process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, size, event_name, func, + 0, NULL); +} + /** * ima_measure_lsm_state - measure LSM specific state * @lsm_event_name: LSM event @@ -860,8 +876,7 @@ int ima_measure_lsm_state(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf, if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size) return -EINVAL; - return process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, size, lsm_event_name, - LSM_STATE, 0, NULL); + return ima_measure_lsm_data(lsm_event_name, buf, size, LSM_STATE); } /** @@ -878,8 +893,7 @@ int ima_measure_lsm_policy(const char *lsm_event_name, const void *buf, if (!lsm_event_name || !buf || !size) return -EINVAL; - return process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, size, lsm_event_name, - LSM_POLICY, 0, NULL); + return ima_measure_lsm_data(lsm_event_name, buf, size, LSM_POLICY); } static int __init init_ima(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e4de581442d5..196c427a79d1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) ima_update_policy_flag(); /* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */ - ima_process_queued_keys(); + ima_process_queued_data(); } /* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..93420e7670b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_data.c @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation + * + * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com) + * + * File: ima_queue_data.c + * Enables deferred processing of data to be measured + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include "ima.h" + +/* + * Flag to indicate whether data can be processed + * right away or should be queued for processing later. + */ +static bool ima_process_data; + +/* + * To synchronize access to the list of data that need to be measured + */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_data_lock); +static LIST_HEAD(ima_queued_data); + +/* + * If custom IMA policy is not loaded then data queued up + * for measurement should be freed. This worker is used + * for handling this scenario. + */ +static long ima_data_queue_timeout = 300000; /* 5 Minutes */ +static void ima_data_handler(struct work_struct *work); +static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(ima_data_delayed_work, ima_data_handler); +static bool timer_expired; + +/* + * This worker function frees data that may still be + * queued up in case custom IMA policy was not loaded. + */ +static void ima_data_handler(struct work_struct *work) +{ + timer_expired = true; + ima_process_queued_data(); +} + +/* + * This function sets up a worker to free queued data in case + * custom IMA policy was never loaded. + */ +void ima_init_data_queue(void) +{ + schedule_delayed_work(&ima_data_delayed_work, + msecs_to_jiffies(ima_data_queue_timeout)); +} + +static void ima_free_data_entry(struct ima_data_entry *entry) +{ + if (!entry) + return; + + kvfree(entry->payload); + kfree(entry->event_name); + kfree(entry->event_data); + kfree(entry); +} + +static void *ima_kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len) +{ + void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (p) + memcpy(p, src, len); + return p; +} + +static struct ima_data_entry *ima_alloc_data_entry(const char *event_name, + const void *payload, + size_t payload_len, + const char *event_data, + enum ima_hooks func) +{ + struct ima_data_entry *entry; + + entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!entry) + goto out; + + /* + * Payload size may exceed the limit supported by kmalloc. + * So use kvmalloc instead. + */ + entry->payload = ima_kvmemdup(payload, payload_len); + entry->event_name = kstrdup(event_name, GFP_KERNEL); + if (event_data) + entry->event_data = kstrdup(event_data, GFP_KERNEL); + + entry->payload_len = payload_len; + entry->func = func; + + if (!entry->payload || !entry->event_name || + (event_data && !entry->event_data)) + goto out; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); + return entry; + +out: + integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, + event_name, func_measure_str(func), + "ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, 0, -ENOMEM); + ima_free_data_entry(entry); + return NULL; +} + +bool ima_queue_data(const char *event_name, const void *payload, + size_t payload_len, const char *event_data, + enum ima_hooks func) +{ + bool queued = false; + struct ima_data_entry *entry; + + entry = ima_alloc_data_entry(event_name, payload, payload_len, + event_data, func); + if (!entry) + return false; + + mutex_lock(&ima_data_lock); + if (!ima_process_data) { + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_queued_data); + queued = true; + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_data_lock); + + if (!queued) + ima_free_data_entry(entry); + + return queued; +} + +/* + * ima_process_queued_data() - process data queued for measurement + * + * This function sets ima_process_data to true and processes queued data. + * From here on data will be processed right away (not queued). + */ +void ima_process_queued_data(void) +{ + struct ima_data_entry *entry, *tmp; + bool process = false; + + if (ima_process_data) + return; + + /* + * Since ima_process_data is set to true, any new data will be + * processed immediately and not be queued to ima_queued_data list. + * First one setting the ima_process_data flag to true will + * process the queued data. + */ + mutex_lock(&ima_data_lock); + if (!ima_process_data) { + ima_process_data = true; + process = true; + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_data_lock); + + if (!process) + return; + + if (!timer_expired) + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ima_data_delayed_work); + + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_queued_data, list) { + if (!timer_expired) + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload, + entry->payload_len, + entry->event_name, + entry->func, 0, + entry->event_data); + list_del(&entry->list); + ima_free_data_entry(entry); + } +} + +inline bool ima_should_queue_data(void) +{ + return !ima_process_data; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c deleted file mode 100644 index 69a8626a35c0..000000000000 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,174 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ -/* - * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation - * - * Author: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (nramas@linux.microsoft.com) - * - * File: ima_queue_keys.c - * Enables deferred processing of keys - */ - -#include -#include -#include "ima.h" - -/* - * Flag to indicate whether a key can be processed - * right away or should be queued for processing later. - */ -static bool ima_process_keys; - -/* - * To synchronize access to the list of keys that need to be measured - */ -static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_keys_lock); -static LIST_HEAD(ima_keys); - -/* - * If custom IMA policy is not loaded then keys queued up - * for measurement should be freed. This worker is used - * for handling this scenario. - */ -static long ima_key_queue_timeout = 300000; /* 5 Minutes */ -static void ima_keys_handler(struct work_struct *work); -static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(ima_keys_delayed_work, ima_keys_handler); -static bool timer_expired; - -/* - * This worker function frees keys that may still be - * queued up in case custom IMA policy was not loaded. - */ -static void ima_keys_handler(struct work_struct *work) -{ - timer_expired = true; - ima_process_queued_keys(); -} - -/* - * This function sets up a worker to free queued keys in case - * custom IMA policy was never loaded. - */ -void ima_init_key_queue(void) -{ - schedule_delayed_work(&ima_keys_delayed_work, - msecs_to_jiffies(ima_key_queue_timeout)); -} - -static void ima_free_key_entry(struct ima_key_entry *entry) -{ - if (entry) { - kfree(entry->payload); - kfree(entry->keyring_name); - kfree(entry); - } -} - -static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring, - const void *payload, - size_t payload_len) -{ - int rc = 0; - const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; - struct ima_key_entry *entry; - - entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); - if (entry) { - entry->payload = kmemdup(payload, payload_len, GFP_KERNEL); - entry->keyring_name = kstrdup(keyring->description, - GFP_KERNEL); - entry->payload_len = payload_len; - } - - if ((entry == NULL) || (entry->payload == NULL) || - (entry->keyring_name == NULL)) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); - -out: - if (rc) { - integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, - keyring->description, - func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK), - audit_cause, rc, 0, rc); - ima_free_key_entry(entry); - entry = NULL; - } - - return entry; -} - -bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload, - size_t payload_len) -{ - bool queued = false; - struct ima_key_entry *entry; - - entry = ima_alloc_key_entry(keyring, payload, payload_len); - if (!entry) - return false; - - mutex_lock(&ima_keys_lock); - if (!ima_process_keys) { - list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_keys); - queued = true; - } - mutex_unlock(&ima_keys_lock); - - if (!queued) - ima_free_key_entry(entry); - - return queued; -} - -/* - * ima_process_queued_keys() - process keys queued for measurement - * - * This function sets ima_process_keys to true and processes queued keys. - * From here on keys will be processed right away (not queued). - */ -void ima_process_queued_keys(void) -{ - struct ima_key_entry *entry, *tmp; - bool process = false; - - if (ima_process_keys) - return; - - /* - * Since ima_process_keys is set to true, any new key will be - * processed immediately and not be queued to ima_keys list. - * First one setting the ima_process_keys flag to true will - * process the queued keys. - */ - mutex_lock(&ima_keys_lock); - if (!ima_process_keys) { - ima_process_keys = true; - process = true; - } - mutex_unlock(&ima_keys_lock); - - if (!process) - return; - - if (!timer_expired) - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ima_keys_delayed_work); - - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) { - if (!timer_expired) - process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload, - entry->payload_len, - entry->keyring_name, - KEY_CHECK, 0, - entry->keyring_name); - list_del(&entry->list); - ima_free_key_entry(entry); - } -} - -inline bool ima_should_queue_key(void) -{ - return !ima_process_keys; -}