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[71.244.252.199]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id i20sm1863119qka.17.2020.08.05.08.52.54 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 05 Aug 2020 08:52:55 -0700 (PDT) From: Stephen Smalley To: paul@paul-moore.com Cc: omosnace@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, dburgener@linux.microsoft.com, Stephen Smalley Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 1/2] selinux: encapsulate policy state, refactor policy load Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 11:52:39 -0400 Message-Id: <20200805155240.26473-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Encapsulate the policy state in its own structure (struct selinux_policy) that is separately allocated but referenced from the selinux_ss structure. The policy state includes the SID table (particularly the context structures), the policy database, and the mapping between the kernel classes/permissions and the policy values. Refactor the security server portion of the policy load logic to cleanly separate loading of the new structures from committing the new policy. Unify the initial policy load and reload code paths as much as possible, avoiding duplicated code. Make sure we are taking the policy read-lock prior to any dereferencing of the policy. Move the copying of the policy capability booleans into the state structure outside of the policy write-lock because they are separate from the policy and are read outside of any policy lock; possibly they should be using at least READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE or smp_load_acquire/store_release. Restore the load mutex that was previously removed by commit 89abd0acf033 ("SELinux: drop load_mutex in security_load_policy") to make explicit the exclusion even though it is currently redundant with the fsi->mutex held by selinuxfs; this makes clear that we do not need to take the policy read-lock across sidtab_convert() and will be useful in the future for lockdep checking. These changes simplify the policy loading logic, reduce the size of the critical section while holding the policy write-lock, and should facilitate future changes to e.g. refactor the entire policy reload logic including the selinuxfs code to make the updating of the policy and the selinuxfs directory tree atomic and/or to convert the policy read-write lock to RCU. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley --- v4 does not take the policy read-lock across sidtab_convert() and therefore does not require changing allocations by it to be atomic or dropping the cond_resched() call. To make obvious that taking the policy read-lock is not necessary in security_load_policy(), restore the load mutex to security_load_policy() that was removed back in commit 89abd0acf033 ("SELinux: drop load_mutex in security_load_policy"). However, since we have refactored security_load_policy() in this change to split out selinux_policy_commit(), we need to take the mutex in security_load_policy() and release it in selinux_policy_commit(). security/selinux/ss/services.c | 403 +++++++++++++++++---------------- security/selinux/ss/services.h | 11 +- 2 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 194 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 9e76a80db6e1..6dea93fac9e2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss; void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss) { rwlock_init(&selinux_ss.policy_rwlock); + mutex_init(&selinux_ss.load_mutex); *ss = &selinux_ss; } @@ -248,9 +249,15 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map, int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state) { - struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; + int mls_enabled; - return p->mls_enabled; + if (!selinux_initialized(state)) + return 0; + + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + mls_enabled = state->ss->policy->policydb.mls_enabled; + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + return mls_enabled; } /* @@ -726,8 +733,8 @@ static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state, struct sidtab_entry *tentry, u16 tclass) { - struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; - struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL; u32 olen, nlen, tlen; @@ -771,11 +778,11 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; if (!user) - tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass); + tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->policy->map, orig_tclass); else tclass = orig_tclass; @@ -872,8 +879,8 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; rc = -EINVAL; old_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, old_sid); @@ -1029,8 +1036,8 @@ void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state, if (!selinux_initialized(state)) goto allow; - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { @@ -1046,7 +1053,7 @@ void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state, goto out; } - tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass); + tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->policy->map, orig_tclass); if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { if (policydb->allow_unknown) goto allow; @@ -1114,8 +1121,8 @@ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state, if (!selinux_initialized(state)) goto allow; - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { @@ -1135,7 +1142,7 @@ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state, goto out; } - tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass); + tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->policy->map, orig_tclass); if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { if (policydb->allow_unknown) goto allow; @@ -1143,7 +1150,7 @@ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state, } context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms); - map_decision(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass, avd, + map_decision(&state->ss->policy->map, orig_tclass, avd, policydb->allow_unknown); out: read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); @@ -1168,8 +1175,8 @@ void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state, if (!selinux_initialized(state)) goto allow; - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { @@ -1292,7 +1299,7 @@ int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page) } read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - rc = sidtab_hash_stats(state->ss->sidtab, page); + rc = sidtab_hash_stats(&state->ss->policy->sidtab, page); read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; @@ -1340,8 +1347,8 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state, return -EINVAL; } read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; if (force) entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(sidtab, sid); @@ -1534,8 +1541,8 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state, goto out; } read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2, &context, def_sid); if (rc == -EINVAL && force) { @@ -1622,8 +1629,8 @@ static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context( u16 tclass, struct context *newcontext) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL; u32 slen, tlen, nlen; struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -1719,16 +1726,16 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (kern) { - tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass); + tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->policy->map, orig_tclass); sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass); } else { tclass = orig_tclass; - sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&state->ss->map, + sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&state->ss->policy->map, tclass)); } - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; sentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, ssid); if (!sentry) { @@ -1945,7 +1952,7 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context( struct selinux_state *state, struct context *context) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; char *s; u32 len; @@ -2098,10 +2105,14 @@ static int convert_context(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *p) static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state) { - struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; + struct policydb *p; unsigned int i; struct ebitmap_node *node; + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + p = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++) state->policycap[i] = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i); @@ -2115,11 +2126,73 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state) pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n", i); } + + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); } static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state, struct policydb *newpolicydb); +static void selinux_policy_free(struct selinux_policy *policy) +{ + if (!policy) + return; + + policydb_destroy(&policy->policydb); + sidtab_destroy(&policy->sidtab); + kfree(policy->map.mapping); + kfree(policy); +} + +static void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy) +{ + struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy; + u32 seqno; + + lockdep_assert_held(&state->ss->load_mutex); + + /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */ + oldpolicy = state->ss->policy; + if (oldpolicy) { + if (oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled) + pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n"); + else if (!oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled) + pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n"); + } + + /* Install the new policy. */ + write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + state->ss->policy = newpolicy; + seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting; + write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + /* Load the policycaps from the new policy */ + security_load_policycaps(state); + + if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { + /* + * After first policy load, the security server is + * marked as initialized and ready to handle requests and + * any objects created prior to policy load are then labeled. + */ + selinux_mark_initialized(state); + mutex_unlock(&state->ss->load_mutex); + selinux_complete_init(); + } else + mutex_unlock(&state->ss->load_mutex); + + /* Free the old policy */ + selinux_policy_free(oldpolicy); + + /* Flush external caches and notify userspace of policy load */ + avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno); + selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); + selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); + selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); + selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); +} + /** * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration. * @data: binary policy data @@ -2132,166 +2205,82 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state, */ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) { - struct policydb *policydb; - struct sidtab *oldsidtab, *newsidtab; - struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb; - struct selinux_mapping *oldmapping; - struct selinux_map newmap; + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy; struct sidtab_convert_params convert_params; struct convert_context_args args; - u32 seqno; int rc = 0; struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file; - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - - newsidtab = kmalloc(sizeof(*newsidtab), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!newsidtab) + newpolicy = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!newpolicy) return -ENOMEM; - if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { - rc = policydb_read(policydb, fp); - if (rc) { - kfree(newsidtab); - return rc; - } - - policydb->len = len; - rc = selinux_set_mapping(policydb, secclass_map, - &state->ss->map); - if (rc) { - kfree(newsidtab); - policydb_destroy(policydb); - return rc; - } - - rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, newsidtab); - if (rc) { - kfree(newsidtab); - policydb_destroy(policydb); - return rc; - } - - state->ss->sidtab = newsidtab; - security_load_policycaps(state); - selinux_mark_initialized(state); - seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting; - selinux_complete_init(); - avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno); - selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); - selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); - selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); - selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); - return 0; - } + rc = policydb_read(&newpolicy->policydb, fp); + if (rc) + goto err; - oldpolicydb = kcalloc(2, sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!oldpolicydb) { - kfree(newsidtab); - return -ENOMEM; - } - newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1; + newpolicy->policydb.len = len; + rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicy->policydb, secclass_map, + &newpolicy->map); + if (rc) + goto err; - rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp); + rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicy->policydb, &newpolicy->sidtab); if (rc) { - kfree(newsidtab); - goto out; + pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n"); + goto err; } - newpolicydb->len = len; - /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */ - if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled) - pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n"); - else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled) - pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n"); + mutex_lock(&state->ss->load_mutex); - rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, newsidtab); - if (rc) { - pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n"); - policydb_destroy(newpolicydb); - kfree(newsidtab); - goto out; + if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { + /* First policy load, so no need to preserve state from old policy */ + selinux_policy_commit(state, newpolicy); + return 0; } - rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &newmap); - if (rc) - goto err; - - rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb); + /* Preserve active boolean values from the old policy */ + rc = security_preserve_bools(state, &newpolicy->policydb); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n"); - goto err; + goto err_unlock; } - oldsidtab = state->ss->sidtab; - /* * Convert the internal representations of contexts * in the new SID table. */ args.state = state; - args.oldp = policydb; - args.newp = newpolicydb; + args.oldp = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + args.newp = &newpolicy->policydb; convert_params.func = convert_context; convert_params.args = &args; - convert_params.target = newsidtab; + convert_params.target = &newpolicy->sidtab; - rc = sidtab_convert(oldsidtab, &convert_params); + rc = sidtab_convert(&state->ss->policy->sidtab, &convert_params); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to convert the internal" " representation of contexts in the new SID" " table\n"); - goto err; + goto err_unlock; } - /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */ - memcpy(oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof(*policydb)); - - /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */ - write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - memcpy(policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(*policydb)); - state->ss->sidtab = newsidtab; - security_load_policycaps(state); - oldmapping = state->ss->map.mapping; - state->ss->map.mapping = newmap.mapping; - state->ss->map.size = newmap.size; - seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting; - write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - - /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ - policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb); - sidtab_destroy(oldsidtab); - kfree(oldsidtab); - kfree(oldmapping); - - avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno); - selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); - selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); - selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); - selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); - - rc = 0; - goto out; - + selinux_policy_commit(state, newpolicy); + return 0; +err_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&state->ss->load_mutex); err: - kfree(newmap.mapping); - sidtab_destroy(newsidtab); - kfree(newsidtab); - policydb_destroy(newpolicydb); - -out: - kfree(oldpolicydb); + selinux_policy_free(newpolicy); return rc; } size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state) { - struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; size_t len; read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - len = p->len; + len = state->ss->policy->policydb.len; read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return len; @@ -2313,8 +2302,8 @@ int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT]; while (c) { @@ -2358,8 +2347,8 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY]; while (c) { @@ -2404,8 +2393,8 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT]; while (c) { @@ -2449,8 +2438,8 @@ int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF]; while (c) { @@ -2512,8 +2501,8 @@ int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; switch (domain) { case AF_INET: { @@ -2612,8 +2601,8 @@ int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; context_init(&usercon); @@ -2714,8 +2703,8 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; int len; u16 sclass; struct genfs *genfs; @@ -2725,7 +2714,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/') path++; - sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_sclass); + sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->policy->map, orig_sclass); *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) { @@ -2800,8 +2789,8 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb) read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; while (c) { @@ -2851,7 +2840,7 @@ int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; *names = NULL; *values = NULL; @@ -2902,7 +2891,7 @@ int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values) write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; rc = -EFAULT; lenp = policydb->p_bools.nprim; @@ -2950,7 +2939,7 @@ int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; rc = -EFAULT; len = policydb->p_bools.nprim; @@ -2998,8 +2987,8 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *context1; struct context *context2; struct context newcon; @@ -3008,7 +2997,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state, int rc; rc = 0; - if (!selinux_initialized(state) || !policydb->mls_enabled) { + if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { *new_sid = sid; goto out; } @@ -3017,6 +3006,14 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; + + if (!policydb->mls_enabled) { + *new_sid = sid; + goto out_unlock; + } + rc = -EINVAL; context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid); if (!context1) { @@ -3094,8 +3091,8 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state, u32 xfrm_sid, u32 *peer_sid) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc; struct context *nlbl_ctx; struct context *xfrm_ctx; @@ -3117,15 +3114,20 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state, return 0; } + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; + /* * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true. */ - if (!policydb->mls_enabled) - return 0; - - read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + if (!policydb->mls_enabled) { + rc = 0; + goto out; + } rc = -EINVAL; nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid); @@ -3172,7 +3174,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state, char ***classes, int *nclasses) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct policydb *policydb; int rc; if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { @@ -3183,6 +3185,8 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + rc = -ENOMEM; *nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim; *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -3219,12 +3223,14 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state, char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct policydb *policydb; int rc, i; struct class_datum *match; read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + rc = -EINVAL; match = symtab_search(&policydb->p_classes, class); if (!match) { @@ -3265,12 +3271,22 @@ int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state, int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state) { - return state->ss->policydb.reject_unknown; + int value; + + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + value = state->ss->policy->policydb.reject_unknown; + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + return value; } int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state) { - return state->ss->policydb.allow_unknown; + int value; + + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + value = state->ss->policy->policydb.allow_unknown; + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + return value; } /** @@ -3286,11 +3302,10 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state) int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, unsigned int req_cap) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc; read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, req_cap); + rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&state->ss->policy->policydb.policycaps, req_cap); read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; @@ -3314,7 +3329,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct policydb *policydb; struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule; struct role_datum *roledatum; struct type_datum *typedatum; @@ -3359,6 +3374,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + tmprule->au_seqno = state->ss->latest_granting; switch (field) { @@ -3455,7 +3472,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule) goto out; } - ctxt = sidtab_search(state->ss->sidtab, sid); + ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->policy->sidtab, sid); if (unlikely(!ctxt)) { WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n", sid); @@ -3617,8 +3634,8 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 *sid) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; - struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab; + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc; struct context *ctx; struct context ctx_new; @@ -3630,6 +3647,9 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; + if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data; else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) @@ -3686,7 +3706,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct policydb *policydb; int rc; struct context *ctx; @@ -3695,8 +3715,10 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + rc = -ENOENT; - ctx = sidtab_search(state->ss->sidtab, sid); + ctx = sidtab_search(&state->ss->policy->sidtab, sid); if (ctx == NULL) goto out; @@ -3725,7 +3747,6 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc; struct policy_file fp; @@ -3742,7 +3763,7 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, fp.len = *len; read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - rc = policydb_write(policydb, &fp); + rc = policydb_write(&state->ss->policy->policydb, &fp); read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (rc) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h index a06f3d835216..da673fa38900 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h @@ -22,12 +22,17 @@ struct selinux_map { u16 size; /* array size of mapping */ }; -struct selinux_ss { - struct sidtab *sidtab; +struct selinux_policy { + struct sidtab sidtab; struct policydb policydb; + struct selinux_map map; +}; + +struct selinux_ss { rwlock_t policy_rwlock; + struct mutex load_mutex; u32 latest_granting; - struct selinux_map map; + struct selinux_policy *policy; } __randomize_layout; void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms, From patchwork Wed Aug 5 15:52:41 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Stephen Smalley X-Patchwork-Id: 11702507 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DBEF14DD for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 20:12:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2284D22B42 for ; 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[71.244.252.199]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id i20sm1863119qka.17.2020.08.05.08.55.06 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 05 Aug 2020 08:55:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Stephen Smalley To: paul@paul-moore.com Cc: omosnace@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, dburgener@linux.microsoft.com, Stephen Smalley Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 11:52:41 -0400 Message-Id: <20200805155240.26473-2-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200805155240.26473-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> References: <20200805155240.26473-1-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org With the refactoring of the policy load logic in the security server from the previous change, it is now possible to split out the committing of the new policy from security_load_policy() and perform it only after successful updating of selinuxfs. Change security_load_policy() to return the newly populated policy data structures to the caller, export selinux_policy_commit() for external callers, and introduce selinux_policy_cancel() to provide a way to cancel the policy load in the event of an error during updating of the selinuxfs directory tree. Further, rework the interfaces used by selinuxfs to get information from the policy when creating the new directory tree to take and act upon the new policy data structure rather than the current/active policy. Update selinuxfs to use these updated and new interfaces. While we are here, stop re-creating the policy_capabilities directory on each policy load since it does not depend on the policy, and stop trying to create the booleans and classes directories during the initial creation of selinuxfs since no information is available until first policy load. After this change, a failure while updating the booleans and class directories will cause the entire policy load to be canceled, leaving the original policy intact, and policy load notifications to userspace will only happen after a successful completion of updating those directories. This does not (yet) provide full atomicity with respect to the updating of the directory trees themselves. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Tested-by: Daniel Burgener --- v2 of this patch updates it based on the changes in v4 of the previous patch to use the re-introduced load_mutex. security/selinux/include/conditional.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 16 ++++- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 69 ++++++++++---------- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 87 +++++++++++++------------- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 10 +++ security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 2 + 6 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h index 539ab357707d..b09343346e3f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include "security.h" -int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state, +int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy, u32 *len, char ***names, int **values); int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index b0e02cfe3ce1..7fa67bfb2f9f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ extern const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX]; struct selinux_avc; struct selinux_ss; +struct selinux_policy; struct selinux_state { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE @@ -224,7 +225,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state); int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, - void *data, size_t len); + void *data, size_t len, + struct selinux_policy **newpolicyp); +void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy); +void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, + struct selinux_policy *policy); int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len); size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state); @@ -358,9 +364,9 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state, u32 xfrm_sid, u32 *peer_sid); -int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state, +int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, char ***classes, int *nclasses); -int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state, +int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy, char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms); int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state); int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state); @@ -380,6 +386,10 @@ int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, u32 *sid); +int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, + const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, + u32 *sid); + #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 4781314c2510..131816878e50 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -346,9 +346,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = { }; /* declaration for sel_write_load */ -static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi); -static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi); -static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi); +static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi, + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy); +static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi, + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy); /* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name, @@ -508,28 +509,23 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; -static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) +static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi, + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy) { int ret; - ret = sel_make_bools(fsi); + ret = sel_make_bools(fsi, newpolicy); if (ret) { pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy booleans\n"); return ret; } - ret = sel_make_classes(fsi); + ret = sel_make_classes(fsi, newpolicy); if (ret) { pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy classes\n"); return ret; } - ret = sel_make_policycap(fsi); - if (ret) { - pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n"); - return ret; - } - return 0; } @@ -538,6 +534,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, { struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info; + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy; ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; @@ -563,15 +560,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) goto out; - length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count); + length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count, &newpolicy); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; } - length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi); - if (length) + length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, newpolicy); + if (length) { + selinux_policy_cancel(fsi->state, newpolicy); goto out1; + } + + selinux_policy_commit(fsi->state, newpolicy); length = count; @@ -1333,7 +1334,8 @@ static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de) #define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans" -static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) +static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi, + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy) { int ret; ssize_t len; @@ -1362,7 +1364,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) if (!page) goto out; - ret = security_get_bools(fsi->state, &num, &names, &values); + ret = security_get_bools(newpolicy, &num, &names, &values); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1388,7 +1390,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) } isec = selinux_inode(inode); - ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page, + ret = selinux_policy_genfs_sid(newpolicy, "selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid); if (ret) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n", @@ -1791,14 +1793,14 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; -static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue, - struct dentry *dir) +static int sel_make_perm_files(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, + char *objclass, int classvalue, + struct dentry *dir) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = dir->d_sb->s_fs_info; int i, rc, nperms; char **perms; - rc = security_get_permissions(fsi->state, objclass, &perms, &nperms); + rc = security_get_permissions(newpolicy, objclass, &perms, &nperms); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1831,8 +1833,9 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue, return rc; } -static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index, - struct dentry *dir) +static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, + char *classname, int index, + struct dentry *dir) { struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb; struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info; @@ -1858,12 +1861,13 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index, if (IS_ERR(dentry)) return PTR_ERR(dentry); - rc = sel_make_perm_files(classname, index, dentry); + rc = sel_make_perm_files(newpolicy, classname, index, dentry); return rc; } -static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) +static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi, + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy) { int rc, nclasses, i; @@ -1872,7 +1876,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) /* delete any existing entries */ sel_remove_entries(fsi->class_dir); - rc = security_get_classes(fsi->state, &classes, &nclasses); + rc = security_get_classes(newpolicy, &classes, &nclasses); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1890,7 +1894,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) } /* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */ - rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1, + rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(newpolicy, classes[i], i + 1, class_name_dir); if (rc) goto out; @@ -1909,8 +1913,6 @@ static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) struct dentry *dentry = NULL; struct inode *inode = NULL; - sel_remove_entries(fsi->policycap_dir); - for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) { if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names)) dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir, @@ -2075,9 +2077,12 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) goto err; } - ret = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi); - if (ret) + ret = sel_make_policycap(fsi); + if (ret) { + pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n"); goto err; + } + return 0; err: pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n", diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 6dea93fac9e2..937cb0805dc6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2144,8 +2144,18 @@ static void selinux_policy_free(struct selinux_policy *policy) kfree(policy); } -static void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, - struct selinux_policy *newpolicy) +void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, + struct selinux_policy *policy) +{ + + lockdep_assert_held(&state->ss->load_mutex); + sidtab_cancel_convert(&state->ss->policy->sidtab); + mutex_unlock(&state->ss->load_mutex); + selinux_policy_free(policy); +} + +void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, + struct selinux_policy *newpolicy) { struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy; u32 seqno; @@ -2203,7 +2213,8 @@ static void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, * This function will flush the access vector cache after * loading the new policy. */ -int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) +int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len, + struct selinux_policy **newpolicyp) { struct selinux_policy *newpolicy; struct sidtab_convert_params convert_params; @@ -2235,7 +2246,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { /* First policy load, so no need to preserve state from old policy */ - selinux_policy_commit(state, newpolicy); + *newpolicyp = newpolicy; return 0; } @@ -2266,7 +2277,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) goto err_unlock; } - selinux_policy_commit(state, newpolicy); + *newpolicyp = newpolicy; return 0; err_unlock: mutex_unlock(&state->ss->load_mutex); @@ -2694,17 +2705,15 @@ int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state, * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like * transition SIDs or task SIDs. - * - * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function. */ -static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, +static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, const char *fstype, char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { - struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; - struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->policy->sidtab; + struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab = &policy->sidtab; int len; u16 sclass; struct genfs *genfs; @@ -2714,7 +2723,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/') path++; - sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->policy->map, orig_sclass); + sclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_sclass); *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) { @@ -2769,11 +2778,22 @@ int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, int retval; read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - retval = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid); + retval = __security_genfs_sid(state->ss->policy, + fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid); read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return retval; } +int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, + const char *fstype, + char *path, + u16 orig_sclass, + u32 *sid) +{ + /* no lock required, policy is not yet accessible by other threads */ + return __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid); +} + /** * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem. * @sb: superblock in question @@ -2809,8 +2829,8 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb) } sbsec->sid = c->sid[0]; } else { - rc = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, - &sbsec->sid); + rc = __security_genfs_sid(state->ss->policy, fstype, "/", + SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid); if (rc) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; rc = 0; @@ -2824,23 +2844,14 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb) return rc; } -int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state, +int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy, u32 *len, char ***names, int **values) { struct policydb *policydb; u32 i; int rc; - if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { - *len = 0; - *names = NULL; - *values = NULL; - return 0; - } - - read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - - policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + policydb = &policy->policydb; *names = NULL; *values = NULL; @@ -2871,7 +2882,6 @@ int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state, } rc = 0; out: - read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; err: if (*names) { @@ -2960,7 +2970,9 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state, struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum; u32 i, nbools = 0; - rc = security_get_bools(state, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + rc = security_get_bools(state->ss->policy, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (rc) goto out; for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) { @@ -3171,21 +3183,13 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) return 0; } -int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state, +int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy, char ***classes, int *nclasses) { struct policydb *policydb; int rc; - if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { - *nclasses = 0; - *classes = NULL; - return 0; - } - - read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - - policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + policydb = &policy->policydb; rc = -ENOMEM; *nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim; @@ -3203,7 +3207,6 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state, } out: - read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -3220,16 +3223,14 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) return 0; } -int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state, +int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy, char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) { struct policydb *policydb; int rc, i; struct class_datum *match; - read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - - policydb = &state->ss->policy->policydb; + policydb = &policy->policydb; rc = -EINVAL; match = symtab_search(&policydb->p_classes, class); @@ -3258,11 +3259,9 @@ int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state, goto err; out: - read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; err: - read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++) kfree((*perms)[i]); kfree(*perms); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index eb6d27b5aeb4..5ee190bd30f5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -464,6 +464,16 @@ int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params) return 0; } +void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + /* cancelling policy load - disable live convert of sidtab */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags); + s->convert = NULL; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags); +} + static void sidtab_destroy_entry(struct sidtab_entry *entry) { context_destroy(&entry->context); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h index f2a84560b8b3..80c744d07ad6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h @@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ static inline struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid) int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params); +void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s); + int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid); void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);