From patchwork Wed Sep 23 19:33:22 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lokesh Gidra X-Patchwork-Id: 11795593 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E18F8618 for ; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 19:33:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A7732221EF for ; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 19:33:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="PyfoVlUb" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726680AbgIWTdh (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Sep 2020 15:33:37 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52254 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726596AbgIWTdc (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Sep 2020 15:33:32 -0400 Received: from mail-pf1-x44a.google.com (mail-pf1-x44a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::44a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 283B0C0613D1 for ; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 12:33:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x44a.google.com with SMTP id 135so312817pfu.9 for ; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 12:33:32 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=sender:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject :from:to:cc; bh=PsgjBekQvcZUp7FDgX2EiweKVibxKh+wEaqxE15I4Qs=; b=PyfoVlUbI9koWc5nOeXNtYd5pWlhM5+/vgNpdbVU7D1PKEopQgyDO3dypPi/gc4WZf AG8L4Ix94fdHYqx0BxZIdvYSPNRzGdHassTWR07tnF+ImfRLqRx3uzDA13vz47bHFufc aFm1BAjlaINqbLlEBdTkk+Dfbxqj3gKu024gPNHcID4PQBlrd/OIxWGuHEDGg9ilzLDb WXDJzSw0JAqUjM9aFDqvm+9EVCB1u3yqvYr8KymURVgKF7A4pA+hCDvKGiZzPmvKvBZb DARSKP44/jPSymagilOH/PJhy6yf7w6Kmc8M3nrVXhDHWEQwGaQtmRYucUbs1QDjgfqY bULA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:sender:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=PsgjBekQvcZUp7FDgX2EiweKVibxKh+wEaqxE15I4Qs=; b=iuCSgjyvMAuBgTvQ3bVzw9O9QR6EJrm7EMfuUn4H7OYbZcrHpWqrNS1/kJHCvIN12B N+lzg6ZFpE3tHobFj+pDHbEPDV4LQaEorvQkpWuCbsaFVhM+1wwk6YGH5B6tAvjrpW3H 1syPed2mN/t99fRutYa1x50cVirOEMLRDPxFz8htU8NWEk9t++PapBh9YQNP6zRoxIx2 3pXOGYE9hIJy3i2IpuDTMOVl9Al/BPxlHeBaDVSZjgA13LaZ2hTt+AlEfMD1cnfnbnJl PgMnhgyRzM5hwcF9Z4lvf9ZrFGECbO4jfLg58D3KOy0Xpza3zyfGzACYoasBsmAt/IhU teCg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532FFDlAekykIsRNseknP0/5UODM4XrSD56OFcUO3e9Z9hqafcT+ +UGFdu1B1Dsi8nBRF7efQV3RCdzgM3uxliE9Pw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJy9wKOHWd1rFunlK/HuM/MWjpEYCCxbWrJpKo1tIbCyb2y0vBoQVKXrppOOq4ermZkJ7DuDadWO+KXH+DdATg== Sender: "lokeshgidra via sendgmr" X-Received: from lg.mtv.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:211:202:f693:9fff:fef4:29dd]) (user=lokeshgidra job=sendgmr) by 2002:a62:1542:0:b029:150:e3f5:d8fc with SMTP id 63-20020a6215420000b0290150e3f5d8fcmr1206315pfv.66.1600889611206; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 12:33:31 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 12:33:22 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20200923193324.3090160-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> Message-Id: <20200923193324.3090160-2-lokeshgidra@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20200923193324.3090160-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0.681.g6f77f65b4e-goog Subject: [PATCH v9 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface From: Lokesh Gidra To: Alexander Viro , James Morris , Stephen Smalley , Casey Schaufler , Eric Biggers Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Paul Moore , Eric Paris , Lokesh Gidra , Daniel Colascione , Kees Cook , "Eric W. Biederman" , KP Singh , David Howells , Thomas Cedeno , Anders Roxell , Sami Tolvanen , Matthew Garrett , Aaron Goidel , Randy Dunlap , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , YueHaibing , Christian Brauner , Alexei Starovoitov , Alexey Budankov , Adrian Reber , Aleksa Sarai , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, kaleshsingh@google.com, calin@google.com, surenb@google.com, nnk@google.com, jeffv@google.com, kernel-team@android.com, Daniel Colascione Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org From: Daniel Colascione This change adds a new function, anon_inode_getfd_secure, that creates anonymous-node file with individual non-S_PRIVATE inode to which security modules can apply policy. Existing callers continue using the original singleton-inode kind of anonymous-inode file. We can transition anonymous inode users to the new kind of anonymous inode in individual patches for the sake of bisection and review. The new function accepts an optional context_inode parameter that callers can use to provide additional contextual information to security modules for granting/denying permission to create an anon inode of the same type. For example, in case of userfaultfd, the created inode is a 'logical child' of the context_inode (userfaultfd inode of the parent process) in the sense that it provides the security context required during creation of the child process' userfaultfd inode. Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione [Fix comment documenting return values of inode_init_security_anon()] [Add context_inode description in comments to anon_inode_getfd_secure()] [Remove definition of anon_inode_getfile_secure() as there are no callers] [Make _anon_inode_getfile() static] [Use correct error cast in _anon_inode_getfile()] [Fix error handling in _anon_inode_getfile()] Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra --- fs/anon_inodes.c | 147 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- include/linux/anon_inodes.h | 8 ++ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 9 +++ include/linux/security.h | 10 +++ security/security.c | 8 ++ 6 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/anon_inodes.c b/fs/anon_inodes.c index 89714308c25b..c3f16deda211 100644 --- a/fs/anon_inodes.c +++ b/fs/anon_inodes.c @@ -55,61 +55,79 @@ static struct file_system_type anon_inode_fs_type = { .kill_sb = kill_anon_super, }; -/** - * anon_inode_getfile - creates a new file instance by hooking it up to an - * anonymous inode, and a dentry that describe the "class" - * of the file - * - * @name: [in] name of the "class" of the new file - * @fops: [in] file operations for the new file - * @priv: [in] private data for the new file (will be file's private_data) - * @flags: [in] flags - * - * Creates a new file by hooking it on a single inode. This is useful for files - * that do not need to have a full-fledged inode in order to operate correctly. - * All the files created with anon_inode_getfile() will share a single inode, - * hence saving memory and avoiding code duplication for the file/inode/dentry - * setup. Returns the newly created file* or an error pointer. - */ -struct file *anon_inode_getfile(const char *name, - const struct file_operations *fops, - void *priv, int flags) +static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode( + const char *name, + const struct inode *context_inode) { - struct file *file; + struct inode *inode; + const struct qstr qname = QSTR_INIT(name, strlen(name)); + int error; + + inode = alloc_anon_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) + return inode; + inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE; + error = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &qname, context_inode); + if (error) { + iput(inode); + return ERR_PTR(error); + } + return inode; +} - if (IS_ERR(anon_inode_inode)) - return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); +static struct file *_anon_inode_getfile(const char *name, + const struct file_operations *fops, + void *priv, int flags, + const struct inode *context_inode, + bool secure) +{ + struct inode *inode; + struct file *file; if (fops->owner && !try_module_get(fops->owner)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); - /* - * We know the anon_inode inode count is always greater than zero, - * so ihold() is safe. - */ - ihold(anon_inode_inode); - file = alloc_file_pseudo(anon_inode_inode, anon_inode_mnt, name, + if (secure) { + inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(name, context_inode); + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { + file = ERR_CAST(inode); + goto err; + } + } else { + inode = anon_inode_inode; + if (IS_ERR(inode)) { + file = ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); + goto err; + } + /* + * We know the anon_inode inode count is always + * greater than zero, so ihold() is safe. + */ + ihold(inode); + } + + file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, anon_inode_mnt, name, flags & (O_ACCMODE | O_NONBLOCK), fops); if (IS_ERR(file)) - goto err; + goto err_iput; - file->f_mapping = anon_inode_inode->i_mapping; + file->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping; file->private_data = priv; return file; +err_iput: + iput(inode); err: - iput(anon_inode_inode); module_put(fops->owner); return file; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfile); /** - * anon_inode_getfd - creates a new file instance by hooking it up to an - * anonymous inode, and a dentry that describe the "class" - * of the file + * anon_inode_getfile - creates a new file instance by hooking it up to an + * anonymous inode, and a dentry that describe the "class" + * of the file * * @name: [in] name of the "class" of the new file * @fops: [in] file operations for the new file @@ -118,12 +136,23 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfile); * * Creates a new file by hooking it on a single inode. This is useful for files * that do not need to have a full-fledged inode in order to operate correctly. - * All the files created with anon_inode_getfd() will share a single inode, + * All the files created with anon_inode_getfile() will share a single inode, * hence saving memory and avoiding code duplication for the file/inode/dentry - * setup. Returns new descriptor or an error code. + * setup. Returns the newly created file* or an error pointer. */ -int anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, - void *priv, int flags) +struct file *anon_inode_getfile(const char *name, + const struct file_operations *fops, + void *priv, int flags) +{ + return _anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags, NULL, false); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfile); + +static int _anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, + const struct file_operations *fops, + void *priv, int flags, + const struct inode *context_inode, + bool secure) { int error, fd; struct file *file; @@ -133,7 +162,8 @@ int anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, return error; fd = error; - file = anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags); + file = _anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags, context_inode, + secure); if (IS_ERR(file)) { error = PTR_ERR(file); goto err_put_unused_fd; @@ -146,8 +176,45 @@ int anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, put_unused_fd(fd); return error; } + +/** + * anon_inode_getfd - creates a new file instance by hooking it up to + * an anonymous inode and a dentry that describe + * the "class" of the file + * + * @name: [in] name of the "class" of the new file + * @fops: [in] file operations for the new file + * @priv: [in] private data for the new file (will be file's private_data) + * @flags: [in] flags + * + * Creates a new file by hooking it on a single inode. This is + * useful for files that do not need to have a full-fledged inode in + * order to operate correctly. All the files created with + * anon_inode_getfd() will use the same singleton inode, reducing + * memory use and avoiding code duplication for the file/inode/dentry + * setup. Returns a newly created file descriptor or an error code. + */ +int anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, + void *priv, int flags) +{ + return _anon_inode_getfd(name, fops, priv, flags, NULL, false); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfd); +/** + * Like anon_inode_getfd(), but adds the @context_inode argument to + * allow security modules to control creation of the new file. Once the + * security module makes the decision, this inode is no longer needed + * and hence reference to it is not held. + */ +int anon_inode_getfd_secure(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, + void *priv, int flags, + const struct inode *context_inode) +{ + return _anon_inode_getfd(name, fops, priv, flags, context_inode, true); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfd_secure); + static int __init anon_inode_init(void) { anon_inode_mnt = kern_mount(&anon_inode_fs_type); diff --git a/include/linux/anon_inodes.h b/include/linux/anon_inodes.h index d0d7d96261ad..6ab840ee93bc 100644 --- a/include/linux/anon_inodes.h +++ b/include/linux/anon_inodes.h @@ -10,12 +10,20 @@ #define _LINUX_ANON_INODES_H struct file_operations; +struct inode; struct file *anon_inode_getfile(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags); + +int anon_inode_getfd_secure(const char *name, + const struct file_operations *fops, + void *priv, int flags, + const struct inode *context_inode); + int anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags); + #endif /* _LINUX_ANON_INODES_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 2a8c74d99015..35ff75c43de4 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode, + const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 9e2e3e63719d..586186f1184b 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -233,6 +233,15 @@ * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set, * -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or * -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. + * @inode_init_security_anon: + * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode + * and return whether the inode creation is permitted by the security + * module or not. + * @inode contains the inode structure + * @name name of the anonymous inode class + * @context_inode optional related inode + * Returns 0 on success, -EACCESS if the security module denies the + * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. * @inode_create: * Check permission to create a regular file. * @dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file. diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 0a0a03b36a3b..7c6b3dcf4721 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -322,6 +322,9 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode); int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data); +int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + const struct qstr *name, + const struct inode *context_inode); int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len); @@ -732,6 +735,13 @@ static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, return 0; } +static inline int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + const struct qstr *name, + const struct inode *context_inode) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 70a7ad357bc6..2c4b121a01b9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1057,6 +1057,14 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); +int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + const struct qstr *name, + const struct inode *context_inode) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, + context_inode); +} + int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) From patchwork Wed Sep 23 19:33:23 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Lokesh Gidra X-Patchwork-Id: 11795589 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC94E6CA for ; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 19:33:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A140621D92 for ; Wed, 23 Sep 2020 19:33:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="TIdpodC0" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726662AbgIWTdi (ORCPT ); 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Wed, 23 Sep 2020 12:33:34 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 12:33:23 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20200923193324.3090160-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> Message-Id: <20200923193324.3090160-3-lokeshgidra@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20200923193324.3090160-1-lokeshgidra@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0.681.g6f77f65b4e-goog Subject: [PATCH v9 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes From: Lokesh Gidra To: Alexander Viro , James Morris , Stephen Smalley , Casey Schaufler , Eric Biggers Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Paul Moore , Eric Paris , Lokesh Gidra , Daniel Colascione , Kees Cook , "Eric W. Biederman" , KP Singh , David Howells , Thomas Cedeno , Anders Roxell , Sami Tolvanen , Matthew Garrett , Aaron Goidel , Randy Dunlap , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , YueHaibing , Christian Brauner , Alexei Starovoitov , Alexey Budankov , Adrian Reber , Aleksa Sarai , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, kaleshsingh@google.com, calin@google.com, surenb@google.com, nnk@google.com, jeffv@google.com, kernel-team@android.com, Daniel Colascione , Andrew Morton Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org From: Daniel Colascione This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in the previous patch to give SELinux the ability to control anonymous-inode files that are created using the new anon_inode_getfd_secure() function. A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used for the name-based transition is the name associated with the anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or "[perf_event]". Example: type uffd_t; type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]"; allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create }; (The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd support this new interface. The example above is just for exposition.) Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra Cc: Al Viro Cc: Andrew Morton --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a340986aa92e..7b22c3112583 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2926,6 +2926,58 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, return 0; } +static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + const struct qstr *name, + const struct inode *context_inode) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + struct common_audit_data ad; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; + int rc; + + if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))) + return 0; + + isec = selinux_inode(inode); + + /* + * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has + * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise + * untouched. + */ + + if (context_inode) { + struct inode_security_struct *context_isec = + selinux_inode(context_inode); + isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass; + isec->sid = context_isec->sid; + } else { + isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE; + rc = security_transition_sid( + &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; + + /* + * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're + * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode. + */ + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; + ad.u.inode = inode; + + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + tsec->sid, + isec->sid, + isec->sclass, + FILE__CREATE, + &ad); +} + static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); @@ -6987,6 +7039,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink), diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 40cebde62856..ba2e01a6955c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { {"open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write"} }, { "lockdown", { "integrity", "confidentiality", NULL } }, + { "anon_inode", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { NULL } }; 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Hallyn" , Paul Moore , Eric Paris , Lokesh Gidra , Daniel Colascione , Kees Cook , "Eric W. Biederman" , KP Singh , David Howells , Thomas Cedeno , Anders Roxell , Sami Tolvanen , Matthew Garrett , Aaron Goidel , Randy Dunlap , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , YueHaibing , Christian Brauner , Alexei Starovoitov , Alexey Budankov , Adrian Reber , Aleksa Sarai , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, kaleshsingh@google.com, calin@google.com, surenb@google.com, nnk@google.com, jeffv@google.com, kernel-team@android.com, Daniel Colascione Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org From: Daniel Colascione This change gives userfaultfd file descriptors a real security context, allowing policy to act on them. Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione [Remove owner inode from userfaultfd_ctx] [Use anon_inode_getfd_secure() instead of anon_inode_getfile_secure() in userfaultfd syscall] [Use inode of file in userfaultfd_read() in resolve_userfault_fork()] Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index 0e4a3837da52..918535b49475 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -978,14 +978,14 @@ static __poll_t userfaultfd_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_fops; -static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, - struct userfaultfd_ctx *new, +static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *new, + struct inode *inode, struct uffd_msg *msg) { int fd; - fd = anon_inode_getfd("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new, - O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)); + fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new, + O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode); if (fd < 0) return fd; @@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, } static ssize_t userfaultfd_ctx_read(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, int no_wait, - struct uffd_msg *msg) + struct uffd_msg *msg, struct inode *inode) { ssize_t ret; DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static ssize_t userfaultfd_ctx_read(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, int no_wait, spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock); if (!ret && msg->event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) { - ret = resolve_userfault_fork(ctx, fork_nctx, msg); + ret = resolve_userfault_fork(fork_nctx, inode, msg); spin_lock_irq(&ctx->event_wqh.lock); if (!list_empty(&fork_event)) { /* @@ -1166,6 +1166,7 @@ static ssize_t userfaultfd_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, ssize_t _ret, ret = 0; struct uffd_msg msg; int no_wait = file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); if (ctx->state == UFFD_STATE_WAIT_API) return -EINVAL; @@ -1173,7 +1174,7 @@ static ssize_t userfaultfd_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, for (;;) { if (count < sizeof(msg)) return ret ? ret : -EINVAL; - _ret = userfaultfd_ctx_read(ctx, no_wait, &msg); + _ret = userfaultfd_ctx_read(ctx, no_wait, &msg, inode); if (_ret < 0) return ret ? ret : _ret; if (copy_to_user((__u64 __user *) buf, &msg, sizeof(msg))) @@ -1995,8 +1996,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags) /* prevent the mm struct to be freed */ mmgrab(ctx->mm); - fd = anon_inode_getfd("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx, - O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)); + fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx, + O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL); if (fd < 0) { mmdrop(ctx->mm); kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);