From patchwork Tue Oct 13 01:15:09 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Paul Moore X-Patchwork-Id: 11834855 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9082109B for ; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 02:45:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC91820678 for ; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 02:45:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="FEFVCX/+" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728055AbgJMBPY (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Oct 2020 21:15:24 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54454 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727950AbgJMBPX (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Oct 2020 21:15:23 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x642.google.com (mail-ej1-x642.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::642]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7C383C0613D2 for ; Mon, 12 Oct 2020 18:15:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x642.google.com with SMTP id u8so25939863ejg.1 for ; Mon, 12 Oct 2020 18:15:21 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc :content-transfer-encoding; bh=sriivWtFoi5P+y8iWJ5C09llKR2ed5ZfEWA0LWNTcX0=; b=FEFVCX/+dW0jLiNqAckex96To29CxPbhIc7UTFOe0z+RQV99pfU/Af/e5mVJzEMMZc yZV2KTN4Or/psTLBPFoNUIV+h+2wW9m/JeVTeXuDaf6qQWYyDnZm/aPp88kNHzneG0W+ hzKWDEg8HoQukkKfcdtaTKALIeBTBU8cgB0aUSQ/ZxfaBf/rxyOASCe2xAOAc+GT/uKm 2aL1gyUZyZI3HyiSk7ypyGMzclmztpl2lsQ3BrTWvjfqUtkZv3yF7WPYSoRLau9qklwB 9OxEirsQTJLkm4oIeOHhhGgel7FkdW0uatT3lLfnI80iLjLBDUZRjxfqtZTSEH8OXxGN Y3KA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc :content-transfer-encoding; bh=sriivWtFoi5P+y8iWJ5C09llKR2ed5ZfEWA0LWNTcX0=; b=Pnse1SAx/Eb5VoX41KE9v5eOmOMhJbCBBNcBsrYyVMrVbCtWT5ItG04Ygq7JVv0iZM Fqlkz4qSEWzIBX4cRF2Mrt8/rq0HpmRi5VV7sIr+yNZudVQJH2rQVDN8f49cjHevZcg5 lVlomeT0X3WtDMmDSIMBZlHjv73VIKeOqti931UYdFuVlNbLuply9hVvTR1kBcCgYnQa 0V02OswnHgm1AaQkeIWpSKqLkrWU+OKVMvWrTLTcUeO8hWhqNuhQED/MT5OytI6JraXg KHvTZJSg0vLU8ZExAww78k3Y/ajIhaa5D/PlslgbBLVIqjPailBXY0RId1OoEQukPWon GVOQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533xNnjvAD4QUzmOmcZ3RIU7QK4GKYhL/VNoo62qwO37FhsZzzYQ +TncaYEP7OzbouE30lGlUA2dhFOmX5Sx/jj+r3aLj9UvMwhR X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyw/aW8jICPx6dj38zdbA20PH/TsVqvNiFW5OZM0kDyyH+4I1k5Dt3wS6ximU1UKip6HnGt+bXeausBm+/2rEE= X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:c444:: with SMTP id ck4mr29111638ejb.398.1602551719875; Mon, 12 Oct 2020 18:15:19 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Paul Moore Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 21:15:09 -0400 Message-ID: Subject: [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.10 To: Linus Torvalds Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Hi Linus, A decent number of SELinux patches for v5.10, twenty two in total. The highlights are listed below, but all of the patches pass our test suite and merge cleanly against your tree. Please merge for v5.10. - A number of changes to how the SELinux policy is loaded and managed inside the kernel with the goal of improving the atomicity of a SELinux policy load operation. These changes account for the bulk of the diffstat as well as the patch count. A special thanks to everyone who contributed patches and fixes for this work. - Convert the SELinux policy read-write lock to RCU. - A tracepoint was added for audited SELinux access control events; this should help provide a more unified backtrace across kernel and userspace. - Allow the removal of security.selinux xattrs when a SELinux policy is not loaded. - Enable policy capabilities in SELinux policies created with the scripts/selinux/mdp tool. - Provide some "no sooner than" dates for the SELinux checkreqprot sysfs deprecation. Thanks, -Paul --- The following changes since commit 9123e3a74ec7b934a4a099e98af6a61c2f80bbf5: Linux 5.9-rc1 (2020-08-16 13:04:57 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git tags/selinux-pr-20201012 for you to fetch changes up to 0d50f059c4cdc9e436f6f4db8779ac0795bfdadf: selinux: provide a "no sooner than" date for the checkreqprot removal (2020-09-29 16:50:57 -0400) ---------------------------------------------------------------- selinux/stable-5.10 PR 20201012 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Colin Ian King (1): selinux: fix allocation failure check on newpolicy->sidtab Dan Carpenter (1): selinux: fix error handling bugs in security_load_policy() Daniel Burgener (4): selinux: Create function for selinuxfs directory cleanup selinux: Refactor selinuxfs directory populating functions selinux: Standardize string literal usage for selinuxfs directory names selinux: Create new booleans and class dirs out of tree Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (1): selinux: Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot Ondrej Mosnacek (1): selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len() Paul Moore (1): selinux: provide a "no sooner than" date for the checkreqprot removal Peter Enderborg (1): selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events Randy Dunlap (1): selinux: delete repeated words in comments Stephen Smalley (9): scripts/selinux,selinux: update mdp to enable policy capabilities selinux: encapsulate policy state, refactor policy load selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs selinux: refactor changing booleans selinux: avoid dereferencing the policy prior to initialization selinux: permit removing security.selinux xattr before policy load selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU selinux: move policy mutex to selinux_state, use in lockdep checks selinux: access policycaps with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE Thiébaud Weksteen (1): selinux: add tracepoint on audited events kernel test robot (1): selinux: fix memdup.cocci warnings .../ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-checkreqprot | 2 +- MAINTAINERS | 1 + include/trace/events/avc.h | 53 ++ scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c | 7 + security/selinux/avc.c | 29 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 +- security/selinux/include/conditional.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 20 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 18 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 63 +- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 259 ++++-- security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 49 +- security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 1 + security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 155 ++++ security/selinux/ss/conditional.h | 2 + security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 53 ++ security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h | 6 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 875 ++++++++++------- security/selinux/ss/services.h | 5 +- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 10 + security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h | 2 + 21 files changed, 1130 insertions(+), 499 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/trace/events/avc.h create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/policycap.h create mode 100644 security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h