From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:12 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669399 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5191E15E9 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 389D029073 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 2CA3B29111; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:34 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C24F929184 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727592AbeKFItM (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:12 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54466 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725839AbeKFItM (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:12 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3CA7A2085B; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460422; bh=7uBKmHeSwBFlJdNMLkOBT0S9i+y9nbvxwIu3NmULkjI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hXo48jhPv8GCdfzdTd7Y2qsNawtD+HMEEHpUfgLPeMbETaW4NdWx/UVOFLtKtrh0l 0KZRCGRAtd2ocEwuGsG8Bfiig9m0KMmw4h2doj09wZgZtGKYEDhpzA8aCO9YySiPJI EBl2IElhBzqbG0GJpDI3UmgMm48dhoVCa66LHRCk= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 01/15] crypto: chacha20-generic - add HChaCha20 library function Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:12 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Refactor the unkeyed permutation part of chacha20_block() into its own function, then add hchacha20_block() which is the ChaCha equivalent of HSalsa20 and is an intermediate step towards XChaCha20 (see https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). HChaCha20 skips the final addition of the initial state, and outputs only certain words of the state. It should not be used for streaming directly. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- include/crypto/chacha20.h | 2 ++ lib/chacha20.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha20.h b/include/crypto/chacha20.h index f76302d99e2b..fbec4e6a8789 100644 --- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha20.h @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ struct chacha20_ctx { }; void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream); +void hchacha20_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out); + void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv); int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keysize); diff --git a/lib/chacha20.c b/lib/chacha20.c index d907fec6a9ed..6a484e16171d 100644 --- a/lib/chacha20.c +++ b/lib/chacha20.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * ChaCha20 256-bit cipher algorithm, RFC7539 + * The "hash function" used as the core of the ChaCha20 stream cipher (RFC7539) * * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi * @@ -16,14 +16,10 @@ #include #include -void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream) +static void chacha20_permute(u32 *x) { - u32 x[16]; int i; - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++) - x[i] = state[i]; - for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 2) { x[0] += x[4]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0], 16); x[1] += x[5]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[1], 16); @@ -65,6 +61,25 @@ void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream) x[8] += x[13]; x[7] = rol32(x[7] ^ x[8], 7); x[9] += x[14]; x[4] = rol32(x[4] ^ x[9], 7); } +} + +/** + * chacha20_block - generate one keystream block and increment block counter + * @state: input state matrix (16 32-bit words) + * @stream: output keystream block (64 bytes) + * + * This is the ChaCha20 core, a function from 64-byte strings to 64-byte + * strings. The caller has already converted the endianness of the input. This + * function also handles incrementing the block counter in the input matrix. + */ +void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream) +{ + u32 x[16]; + int i; + + memcpy(x, state, 64); + + chacha20_permute(x); for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++) put_unaligned_le32(x[i] + state[i], &stream[i * sizeof(u32)]); @@ -72,3 +87,26 @@ void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream) state[12]++; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha20_block); + +/** + * hchacha20_block - abbreviated ChaCha20 core, for XChaCha20 + * @in: input state matrix (16 32-bit words) + * @out: output (8 32-bit words) + * + * HChaCha20 is the ChaCha equivalent of HSalsa20 and is an intermediate step + * towards XChaCha20 (see https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). + * HChaCha20 skips the final addition of the initial state, and outputs only + * certain words of the state. It should not be used for streaming directly. + */ +void hchacha20_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out) +{ + u32 x[16]; + + memcpy(x, in, 64); + + chacha20_permute(x); + + memcpy(&out[0], &x[0], 16); + memcpy(&out[4], &x[12], 16); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha20_block); From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:13 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669411 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6031515E9 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:29:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5479F299BE for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:29:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 4902F29A8D; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:29:25 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E81F1299C6 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:29:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726027AbeKFItL (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:11 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54482 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725844AbeKFItL (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:11 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 67E2C20862; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460422; bh=qUwqEechARY9nZcoYFLGIbQ8l7d+5rhd8+k1jHebbtk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=sR1d/bzkrpWo/+sNBgzkK60qzEvgakTQJ86vrFD95LjeQlDt3VEpKjxabtzkMGEh1 eauwrd1ohLhiCa9rusEju8hl7LBde97t/R30kM9VFibGLphv4D2pJ6RI76b31eqccD F1//EFbNZuFUhU+NjEFnp5qFDBoWQZ+nck8dCyBs= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 02/15] crypto: chacha20-generic - don't unnecessarily use atomic walk Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:13 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-3-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers chacha20-generic doesn't use SIMD instructions or otherwise disable preemption, so passing atomic=true to skcipher_walk_virt() is unnecessary. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c index 3ae96587caf9..3529521d72a4 100644 --- a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c +++ b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) u32 state[16]; int err; - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:14 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669387 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 071D015E9 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F0BDC29FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id E49C829FF2; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07EE229FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728947AbeKFItN (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:13 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54494 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725878AbeKFItN (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:13 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9442820866; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460422; bh=loyvozjPziq8VWzPSVomt1N0VqsdVbuns+k3NBV8Ek0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fMWul0XCCmLZ/qnWKL2joi/lrsEyx6R0/4pDauRNCBbC8H8tuGRxsBBtz+EqfbtSd ZN+8JrFufO+0r1z0sgptp6L6XfiCjTdt+eHgmcjoPtU6VC9wT1CkSOAAr1Z1dXngRf /wN43uIvHJGFwJ0YyDmCwJNL5pA5Xf/wPkFHDHNA= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 03/15] crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:14 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-4-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the application of the XSalsa20 construction (https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or 96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce. We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used. Supporting both variants is straightforward. Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe. Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally. Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users to seek to any position in the stream. I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20, and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit to the added complexity of separate modules. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- crypto/Kconfig | 14 +- crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 120 +++++--- crypto/testmgr.c | 6 + crypto/testmgr.h | 577 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/chacha20.h | 14 +- 5 files changed, 689 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig index f7a235db56aa..d9acbce23d4d 100644 --- a/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/Kconfig @@ -1387,18 +1387,22 @@ config CRYPTO_SALSA20 Bernstein . See config CRYPTO_CHACHA20 - tristate "ChaCha20 cipher algorithm" + tristate "ChaCha20 stream cipher algorithms" select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER help - ChaCha20 cipher algorithm, RFC7539. + The ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 stream cipher algorithms. ChaCha20 is a 256-bit high-speed stream cipher designed by Daniel J. Bernstein and further specified in RFC7539 for use in IETF protocols. - This is the portable C implementation of ChaCha20. - - See also: + This is the portable C implementation of ChaCha20. See also: + XChaCha20 is the application of the XSalsa20 construction to ChaCha20 + rather than to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length + from 64 bits (or 96 bits using the RFC7539 convention) to 192 bits, + while provably retaining ChaCha20's security. See also: + + config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 tristate "ChaCha20 cipher algorithm (x86_64/SSSE3/AVX2)" depends on X86 && 64BIT diff --git a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c index 3529521d72a4..4305b1b62b16 100644 --- a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c +++ b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ /* - * ChaCha20 256-bit cipher algorithm, RFC7539 + * ChaCha20 (RFC7539) and XChaCha20 stream cipher algorithms * * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -36,6 +37,31 @@ static void chacha20_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, } } +static int chacha20_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, + struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) +{ + struct skcipher_walk walk; + u32 state[16]; + int err; + + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + + crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, iv); + + while (walk.nbytes > 0) { + unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; + + if (nbytes < walk.total) + nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride); + + chacha20_docrypt(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, + nbytes); + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); + } + + return err; +} + void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) { state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */ @@ -77,54 +103,74 @@ int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - struct skcipher_walk walk; - u32 state[16]; - int err; - - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); + return chacha20_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_crypt); - while (walk.nbytes > 0) { - unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; +int crypto_xchacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct chacha20_ctx subctx; + u32 state[16]; + u8 real_iv[16]; - if (nbytes < walk.total) - nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride); + /* Compute the subkey given the original key and first 128 nonce bits */ + crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, req->iv); + hchacha20_block(state, subctx.key); - chacha20_docrypt(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - nbytes); - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); - } + /* Build the real IV */ + memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8); /* stream position */ + memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8); /* remaining 64 nonce bits */ - return err; + /* Generate the stream and XOR it with the data */ + return chacha20_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_crypt); - -static struct skcipher_alg alg = { - .base.cra_name = "chacha20", - .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-generic", - .base.cra_priority = 100, - .base.cra_blocksize = 1, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), - .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - - .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = CHACHA20_IV_SIZE, - .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, - .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, - .encrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, - .decrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_xchacha20_crypt); + +static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { + { + .base.cra_name = "chacha20", + .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-generic", + .base.cra_priority = 100, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA20_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, + .decrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "xchacha20", + .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-generic", + .base.cra_priority = 100, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = XCHACHA20_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = crypto_xchacha20_crypt, + .decrypt = crypto_xchacha20_crypt, + } }; static int __init chacha20_generic_mod_init(void) { - return crypto_register_skcipher(&alg); + return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); } static void __exit chacha20_generic_mod_fini(void) { - crypto_unregister_skcipher(&alg); + crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); } module_init(chacha20_generic_mod_init); @@ -132,6 +178,8 @@ module_exit(chacha20_generic_mod_fini); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi "); -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("chacha20 cipher algorithm"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 stream ciphers (generic)"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-generic"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-generic"); diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index b1f79c6bf409..a5512e69c8f3 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -3544,6 +3544,12 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { .suite = { .hash = __VECS(aes_xcbc128_tv_template) } + }, { + .alg = "xchacha20", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(xchacha20_tv_template) + }, }, { .alg = "xts(aes)", .test = alg_test_skcipher, diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index 1fe7b97ba03f..371641c73cf8 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -30802,6 +30802,583 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec chacha20_tv_template[] = { }, }; +static const struct cipher_testvec xchacha20_tv_template[] = { + { /* from libsodium test/default/xchacha20.c */ + .key = "\x79\xc9\x97\x98\xac\x67\x30\x0b" + "\xbb\x27\x04\xc9\x5c\x34\x1e\x32" + "\x45\xf3\xdc\xb2\x17\x61\xb9\x8e" + "\x52\xff\x45\xb2\x4f\x30\x4f\xc4", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xb3\x3f\xfd\x30\x96\x47\x9b\xcf" + "\xbc\x9a\xee\x49\x41\x76\x88\xa0" + "\xa2\x55\x4f\x8d\x95\x38\x94\x19" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ctext = "\xc6\xe9\x75\x81\x60\x08\x3a\xc6" + "\x04\xef\x90\xe7\x12\xce\x6e\x75" + "\xd7\x79\x75\x90\x74\x4e\x0c\xf0" + "\x60\xf0\x13\x73\x9c", + .len = 29, + }, { /* from libsodium test/default/xchacha20.c */ + .key = "\x9d\x23\xbd\x41\x49\xcb\x97\x9c" + "\xcf\x3c\x5c\x94\xdd\x21\x7e\x98" + "\x08\xcb\x0e\x50\xcd\x0f\x67\x81" + "\x22\x35\xea\xaf\x60\x1d\x62\x32", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xc0\x47\x54\x82\x66\xb7\xc3\x70" + "\xd3\x35\x66\xa2\x42\x5c\xbf\x30" + "\xd8\x2d\x1e\xaf\x52\x94\x10\x9e" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00", + .ctext = "\xa2\x12\x09\x09\x65\x94\xde\x8c" + "\x56\x67\xb1\xd1\x3a\xd9\x3f\x74" + "\x41\x06\xd0\x54\xdf\x21\x0e\x47" + "\x82\xcd\x39\x6f\xec\x69\x2d\x35" + "\x15\xa2\x0b\xf3\x51\xee\xc0\x11" + "\xa9\x2c\x36\x78\x88\xbc\x46\x4c" + "\x32\xf0\x80\x7a\xcd\x6c\x20\x3a" + "\x24\x7e\x0d\xb8\x54\x14\x84\x68" + "\xe9\xf9\x6b\xee\x4c\xf7\x18\xd6" + "\x8d\x5f\x63\x7c\xbd\x5a\x37\x64" + "\x57\x78\x8e\x6f\xae\x90\xfc\x31" + "\x09\x7c\xfc", + .len = 91, + }, { /* Taken from the ChaCha20 test vectors, appended 16 random bytes + to nonce, and recomputed the ciphertext with libsodium */ + .key = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x67\xc6\x69\x73" + "\x51\xff\x4a\xec\x29\xcd\xba\xab" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ctext = "\x9c\x49\x2a\xe7\x8a\x2f\x93\xc7" + "\xb3\x33\x6f\x82\x17\xd8\xc4\x1e" + "\xad\x80\x11\x11\x1d\x4c\x16\x18" + "\x07\x73\x9b\x4f\xdb\x7c\xcb\x47" + "\xfd\xef\x59\x74\xfa\x3f\xe5\x4c" + "\x9b\xd0\xea\xbc\xba\x56\xad\x32" + "\x03\xdc\xf8\x2b\xc1\xe1\x75\x67" + "\x23\x7b\xe6\xfc\xd4\x03\x86\x54", + .len = 64, + }, { /* Taken from the ChaCha20 test vectors, appended 16 random bytes + to nonce, and recomputed the ciphertext with libsodium */ + .key = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x02\xf2\xfb\xe3\x46" + "\x7c\xc2\x54\xf8\x1b\xe8\xe7\x8d" + "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x41\x6e\x79\x20\x73\x75\x62\x6d" + "\x69\x73\x73\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x74" + "\x6f\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x49\x45" + "\x54\x46\x20\x69\x6e\x74\x65\x6e" + "\x64\x65\x64\x20\x62\x79\x20\x74" + "\x68\x65\x20\x43\x6f\x6e\x74\x72" + "\x69\x62\x75\x74\x6f\x72\x20\x66" + "\x6f\x72\x20\x70\x75\x62\x6c\x69" + "\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x61" + "\x73\x20\x61\x6c\x6c\x20\x6f\x72" + "\x20\x70\x61\x72\x74\x20\x6f\x66" + "\x20\x61\x6e\x20\x49\x45\x54\x46" + "\x20\x49\x6e\x74\x65\x72\x6e\x65" + "\x74\x2d\x44\x72\x61\x66\x74\x20" + "\x6f\x72\x20\x52\x46\x43\x20\x61" + "\x6e\x64\x20\x61\x6e\x79\x20\x73" + "\x74\x61\x74\x65\x6d\x65\x6e\x74" + "\x20\x6d\x61\x64\x65\x20\x77\x69" + "\x74\x68\x69\x6e\x20\x74\x68\x65" + "\x20\x63\x6f\x6e\x74\x65\x78\x74" + "\x20\x6f\x66\x20\x61\x6e\x20\x49" + "\x45\x54\x46\x20\x61\x63\x74\x69" + "\x76\x69\x74\x79\x20\x69\x73\x20" + "\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x69\x64\x65\x72" + "\x65\x64\x20\x61\x6e\x20\x22\x49" + "\x45\x54\x46\x20\x43\x6f\x6e\x74" + "\x72\x69\x62\x75\x74\x69\x6f\x6e" + "\x22\x2e\x20\x53\x75\x63\x68\x20" + "\x73\x74\x61\x74\x65\x6d\x65\x6e" + "\x74\x73\x20\x69\x6e\x63\x6c\x75" + "\x64\x65\x20\x6f\x72\x61\x6c\x20" + "\x73\x74\x61\x74\x65\x6d\x65\x6e" + "\x74\x73\x20\x69\x6e\x20\x49\x45" + "\x54\x46\x20\x73\x65\x73\x73\x69" + "\x6f\x6e\x73\x2c\x20\x61\x73\x20" + "\x77\x65\x6c\x6c\x20\x61\x73\x20" + "\x77\x72\x69\x74\x74\x65\x6e\x20" + "\x61\x6e\x64\x20\x65\x6c\x65\x63" + "\x74\x72\x6f\x6e\x69\x63\x20\x63" + "\x6f\x6d\x6d\x75\x6e\x69\x63\x61" + "\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x73\x20\x6d\x61" + "\x64\x65\x20\x61\x74\x20\x61\x6e" + "\x79\x20\x74\x69\x6d\x65\x20\x6f" + "\x72\x20\x70\x6c\x61\x63\x65\x2c" + "\x20\x77\x68\x69\x63\x68\x20\x61" + "\x72\x65\x20\x61\x64\x64\x72\x65" + "\x73\x73\x65\x64\x20\x74\x6f", + .ctext = "\xf9\xab\x7a\x4a\x60\xb8\x5f\xa0" + "\x50\xbb\x57\xce\xef\x8c\xc1\xd9" + "\x24\x15\xb3\x67\x5e\x7f\x01\xf6" + "\x1c\x22\xf6\xe5\x71\xb1\x43\x64" + "\x63\x05\xd5\xfc\x5c\x3d\xc0\x0e" + "\x23\xef\xd3\x3b\xd9\xdc\x7f\xa8" + "\x58\x26\xb3\xd0\xc2\xd5\x04\x3f" + "\x0a\x0e\x8f\x17\xe4\xcd\xf7\x2a" + "\xb4\x2c\x09\xe4\x47\xec\x8b\xfb" + "\x59\x37\x7a\xa1\xd0\x04\x7e\xaa" + "\xf1\x98\x5f\x24\x3d\x72\x9a\x43" + "\xa4\x36\x51\x92\x22\x87\xff\x26" + "\xce\x9d\xeb\x59\x78\x84\x5e\x74" + "\x97\x2e\x63\xc0\xef\x29\xf7\x8a" + "\xb9\xee\x35\x08\x77\x6a\x35\x9a" + "\x3e\xe6\x4f\x06\x03\x74\x1b\xc1" + "\x5b\xb3\x0b\x89\x11\x07\xd3\xb7" + "\x53\xd6\x25\x04\xd9\x35\xb4\x5d" + "\x4c\x33\x5a\xc2\x42\x4c\xe6\xa4" + "\x97\x6e\x0e\xd2\xb2\x8b\x2f\x7f" + "\x28\xe5\x9f\xac\x4b\x2e\x02\xab" + "\x85\xfa\xa9\x0d\x7c\x2d\x10\xe6" + "\x91\xab\x55\x63\xf0\xde\x3a\x94" + "\x25\x08\x10\x03\xc2\x68\xd1\xf4" + "\xaf\x7d\x9c\x99\xf7\x86\x96\x30" + "\x60\xfc\x0b\xe6\xa8\x80\x15\xb0" + "\x81\xb1\x0c\xbe\xb9\x12\x18\x25" + "\xe9\x0e\xb1\xe7\x23\xb2\xef\x4a" + "\x22\x8f\xc5\x61\x89\xd4\xe7\x0c" + "\x64\x36\x35\x61\xb6\x34\x60\xf7" + "\x7b\x61\x37\x37\x12\x10\xa2\xf6" + "\x7e\xdb\x7f\x39\x3f\xb6\x8e\x89" + "\x9e\xf3\xfe\x13\x98\xbb\x66\x5a" + "\xec\xea\xab\x3f\x9c\x87\xc4\x8c" + "\x8a\x04\x18\x49\xfc\x77\x11\x50" + "\x16\xe6\x71\x2b\xee\xc0\x9c\xb6" + "\x87\xfd\x80\xff\x0b\x1d\x73\x38" + "\xa4\x1d\x6f\xae\xe4\x12\xd7\x93" + "\x9d\xcd\x38\x26\x09\x40\x52\xcd" + "\x67\x01\x67\x26\xe0\x3e\x98\xa8" + "\xe8\x1a\x13\x41\xbb\x90\x4d\x87" + "\xbb\x42\x82\x39\xce\x3a\xd0\x18" + "\x6d\x7b\x71\x8f\xbb\x2c\x6a\xd1" + "\xbd\xf5\xc7\x8a\x7e\xe1\x1e\x0f" + "\x0d\x0d\x13\x7c\xd9\xd8\x3c\x91" + "\xab\xff\x1f\x12\xc3\xee\xe5\x65" + "\x12\x8d\x7b\x61\xe5\x1f\x98", + .len = 375, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 3, + .tap = { 375 - 20, 4, 16 }, + + }, { /* Taken from the ChaCha20 test vectors, appended 16 random bytes + to nonce, and recomputed the ciphertext with libsodium */ + .key = "\x1c\x92\x40\xa5\xeb\x55\xd3\x8a" + "\xf3\x33\x88\x86\x04\xf6\xb5\xf0" + "\x47\x39\x17\xc1\x40\x2b\x80\x09" + "\x9d\xca\x5c\xbc\x20\x70\x75\xc0", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x02\x76\x5a\x2e\x63" + "\x33\x9f\xc9\x9a\x66\x32\x0d\xb7" + "\x2a\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x27\x54\x77\x61\x73\x20\x62\x72" + "\x69\x6c\x6c\x69\x67\x2c\x20\x61" + "\x6e\x64\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x73" + "\x6c\x69\x74\x68\x79\x20\x74\x6f" + "\x76\x65\x73\x0a\x44\x69\x64\x20" + "\x67\x79\x72\x65\x20\x61\x6e\x64" + "\x20\x67\x69\x6d\x62\x6c\x65\x20" + "\x69\x6e\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x77" + "\x61\x62\x65\x3a\x0a\x41\x6c\x6c" + "\x20\x6d\x69\x6d\x73\x79\x20\x77" + "\x65\x72\x65\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20" + "\x62\x6f\x72\x6f\x67\x6f\x76\x65" + "\x73\x2c\x0a\x41\x6e\x64\x20\x74" + "\x68\x65\x20\x6d\x6f\x6d\x65\x20" + "\x72\x61\x74\x68\x73\x20\x6f\x75" + "\x74\x67\x72\x61\x62\x65\x2e", + .ctext = "\x95\xb9\x51\xe7\x8f\xb4\xa4\x03" + "\xca\x37\xcc\xde\x60\x1d\x8c\xe2" + "\xf1\xbb\x8a\x13\x7f\x61\x85\xcc" + "\xad\xf4\xf0\xdc\x86\xa6\x1e\x10" + "\xbc\x8e\xcb\x38\x2b\xa5\xc8\x8f" + "\xaa\x03\x3d\x53\x4a\x42\xb1\x33" + "\xfc\xd3\xef\xf0\x8e\x7e\x10\x9c" + "\x6f\x12\x5e\xd4\x96\xfe\x5b\x08" + "\xb6\x48\xf0\x14\x74\x51\x18\x7c" + "\x07\x92\xfc\xac\x9d\xf1\x94\xc0" + "\xc1\x9d\xc5\x19\x43\x1f\x1d\xbb" + "\x07\xf0\x1b\x14\x25\x45\xbb\xcb" + "\x5c\xe2\x8b\x28\xf3\xcf\x47\x29" + "\x27\x79\x67\x24\xa6\x87\xc2\x11" + "\x65\x03\xfa\x45\xf7\x9e\x53\x7a" + "\x99\xf1\x82\x25\x4f\x8d\x07", + .len = 127, + }, { /* Taken from the ChaCha20 test vectors, appended 16 random bytes + to nonce, and recomputed the ciphertext with libsodium */ + .key = "\x1c\x92\x40\xa5\xeb\x55\xd3\x8a" + "\xf3\x33\x88\x86\x04\xf6\xb5\xf0" + "\x47\x39\x17\xc1\x40\x2b\x80\x09" + "\x9d\xca\x5c\xbc\x20\x70\x75\xc0", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x01\x31\x58\xa3\x5a" + "\x25\x5d\x05\x17\x58\xe9\x5e\xd4" + "\x1c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x49\xee\xe0\xdc\x24\x90\x40\xcd" + "\xc5\x40\x8f\x47\x05\xbc\xdd\x81" + "\x47\xc6\x8d\xe6\xb1\x8f\xd7\xcb" + "\x09\x0e\x6e\x22\x48\x1f\xbf\xb8" + "\x5c\xf7\x1e\x8a\xc1\x23\xf2\xd4" + "\x19\x4b\x01\x0f\x4e\xa4\x43\xce" + "\x01\xc6\x67\xda\x03\x91\x18\x90" + "\xa5\xa4\x8e\x45\x03\xb3\x2d\xac" + "\x74\x92\xd3\x53\x47\xc8\xdd\x25" + "\x53\x6c\x02\x03\x87\x0d\x11\x0c" + "\x58\xe3\x12\x18\xfd\x2a\x5b\x40" + "\x0c\x30\xf0\xb8\x3f\x43\xce\xae" + "\x65\x3a\x7d\x7c\xf4\x54\xaa\xcc" + "\x33\x97\xc3\x77\xba\xc5\x70\xde" + "\xd7\xd5\x13\xa5\x65\xc4\x5f\x0f" + "\x46\x1a\x0d\x97\xb5\xf3\xbb\x3c" + "\x84\x0f\x2b\xc5\xaa\xea\xf2\x6c" + "\xc9\xb5\x0c\xee\x15\xf3\x7d\xbe" + "\x9f\x7b\x5a\xa6\xae\x4f\x83\xb6" + "\x79\x49\x41\xf4\x58\x18\xcb\x86" + "\x7f\x30\x0e\xf8\x7d\x44\x36\xea" + "\x75\xeb\x88\x84\x40\x3c\xad\x4f" + "\x6f\x31\x6b\xaa\x5d\xe5\xa5\xc5" + "\x21\x66\xe9\xa7\xe3\xb2\x15\x88" + "\x78\xf6\x79\xa1\x59\x47\x12\x4e" + "\x9f\x9f\x64\x1a\xa0\x22\x5b\x08" + "\xbe\x7c\x36\xc2\x2b\x66\x33\x1b" + "\xdd\x60\x71\xf7\x47\x8c\x61\xc3" + "\xda\x8a\x78\x1e\x16\xfa\x1e\x86" + "\x81\xa6\x17\x2a\xa7\xb5\xc2\xe7" + "\xa4\xc7\x42\xf1\xcf\x6a\xca\xb4" + "\x45\xcf\xf3\x93\xf0\xe7\xea\xf6" + "\xf4\xe6\x33\x43\x84\x93\xa5\x67" + "\x9b\x16\x58\x58\x80\x0f\x2b\x5c" + "\x24\x74\x75\x7f\x95\x81\xb7\x30" + "\x7a\x33\xa7\xf7\x94\x87\x32\x27" + "\x10\x5d\x14\x4c\x43\x29\xdd\x26" + "\xbd\x3e\x3c\x0e\xfe\x0e\xa5\x10" + "\xea\x6b\x64\xfd\x73\xc6\xed\xec" + "\xa8\xc9\xbf\xb3\xba\x0b\x4d\x07" + "\x70\xfc\x16\xfd\x79\x1e\xd7\xc5" + "\x49\x4e\x1c\x8b\x8d\x79\x1b\xb1" + "\xec\xca\x60\x09\x4c\x6a\xd5\x09" + "\x49\x46\x00\x88\x22\x8d\xce\xea" + "\xb1\x17\x11\xde\x42\xd2\x23\xc1" + "\x72\x11\xf5\x50\x73\x04\x40\x47" + "\xf9\x5d\xe7\xa7\x26\xb1\x7e\xb0" + "\x3f\x58\xc1\x52\xab\x12\x67\x9d" + "\x3f\x43\x4b\x68\xd4\x9c\x68\x38" + "\x07\x8a\x2d\x3e\xf3\xaf\x6a\x4b" + "\xf9\xe5\x31\x69\x22\xf9\xa6\x69" + "\xc6\x9c\x96\x9a\x12\x35\x95\x1d" + "\x95\xd5\xdd\xbe\xbf\x93\x53\x24" + "\xfd\xeb\xc2\x0a\x64\xb0\x77\x00" + "\x6f\x88\xc4\x37\x18\x69\x7c\xd7" + "\x41\x92\x55\x4c\x03\xa1\x9a\x4b" + "\x15\xe5\xdf\x7f\x37\x33\x72\xc1" + "\x8b\x10\x67\xa3\x01\x57\x94\x25" + "\x7b\x38\x71\x7e\xdd\x1e\xcc\x73" + "\x55\xd2\x8e\xeb\x07\xdd\xf1\xda" + "\x58\xb1\x47\x90\xfe\x42\x21\x72" + "\xa3\x54\x7a\xa0\x40\xec\x9f\xdd" + "\xc6\x84\x6e\xca\xae\xe3\x68\xb4" + "\x9d\xe4\x78\xff\x57\xf2\xf8\x1b" + "\x03\xa1\x31\xd9\xde\x8d\xf5\x22" + "\x9c\xdd\x20\xa4\x1e\x27\xb1\x76" + "\x4f\x44\x55\xe2\x9b\xa1\x9c\xfe" + "\x54\xf7\x27\x1b\xf4\xde\x02\xf5" + "\x1b\x55\x48\x5c\xdc\x21\x4b\x9e" + "\x4b\x6e\xed\x46\x23\xdc\x65\xb2" + "\xcf\x79\x5f\x28\xe0\x9e\x8b\xe7" + "\x4c\x9d\x8a\xff\xc1\xa6\x28\xb8" + "\x65\x69\x8a\x45\x29\xef\x74\x85" + "\xde\x79\xc7\x08\xae\x30\xb0\xf4" + "\xa3\x1d\x51\x41\xab\xce\xcb\xf6" + "\xb5\xd8\x6d\xe0\x85\xe1\x98\xb3" + "\x43\xbb\x86\x83\x0a\xa0\xf5\xb7" + "\x04\x0b\xfa\x71\x1f\xb0\xf6\xd9" + "\x13\x00\x15\xf0\xc7\xeb\x0d\x5a" + "\x9f\xd7\xb9\x6c\x65\x14\x22\x45" + "\x6e\x45\x32\x3e\x7e\x60\x1a\x12" + "\x97\x82\x14\xfb\xaa\x04\x22\xfa" + "\xa0\xe5\x7e\x8c\x78\x02\x48\x5d" + "\x78\x33\x5a\x7c\xad\xdb\x29\xce" + "\xbb\x8b\x61\xa4\xb7\x42\xe2\xac" + "\x8b\x1a\xd9\x2f\x0b\x8b\x62\x21" + "\x83\x35\x7e\xad\x73\xc2\xb5\x6c" + "\x10\x26\x38\x07\xe5\xc7\x36\x80" + "\xe2\x23\x12\x61\xf5\x48\x4b\x2b" + "\xc5\xdf\x15\xd9\x87\x01\xaa\xac" + "\x1e\x7c\xad\x73\x78\x18\x63\xe0" + "\x8b\x9f\x81\xd8\x12\x6a\x28\x10" + "\xbe\x04\x68\x8a\x09\x7c\x1b\x1c" + "\x83\x66\x80\x47\x80\xe8\xfd\x35" + "\x1c\x97\x6f\xae\x49\x10\x66\xcc" + "\xc6\xd8\xcc\x3a\x84\x91\x20\x77" + "\x72\xe4\x24\xd2\x37\x9f\xc5\xc9" + "\x25\x94\x10\x5f\x40\x00\x64\x99" + "\xdc\xae\xd7\x21\x09\x78\x50\x15" + "\xac\x5f\xc6\x2c\xa2\x0b\xa9\x39" + "\x87\x6e\x6d\xab\xde\x08\x51\x16" + "\xc7\x13\xe9\xea\xed\x06\x8e\x2c" + "\xf8\x37\x8c\xf0\xa6\x96\x8d\x43" + "\xb6\x98\x37\xb2\x43\xed\xde\xdf" + "\x89\x1a\xe7\xeb\x9d\xa1\x7b\x0b" + "\x77\xb0\xe2\x75\xc0\xf1\x98\xd9" + "\x80\x55\xc9\x34\x91\xd1\x59\xe8" + "\x4b\x0f\xc1\xa9\x4b\x7a\x84\x06" + "\x20\xa8\x5d\xfa\xd1\xde\x70\x56" + "\x2f\x9e\x91\x9c\x20\xb3\x24\xd8" + "\x84\x3d\xe1\x8c\x7e\x62\x52\xe5" + "\x44\x4b\x9f\xc2\x93\x03\xea\x2b" + "\x59\xc5\xfa\x3f\x91\x2b\xbb\x23" + "\xf5\xb2\x7b\xf5\x38\xaf\xb3\xee" + "\x63\xdc\x7b\xd1\xff\xaa\x8b\xab" + "\x82\x6b\x37\x04\xeb\x74\xbe\x79" + "\xb9\x83\x90\xef\x20\x59\x46\xff" + "\xe9\x97\x3e\x2f\xee\xb6\x64\x18" + "\x38\x4c\x7a\x4a\xf9\x61\xe8\x9a" + "\xa1\xb5\x01\xa6\x47\xd3\x11\xd4" + "\xce\xd3\x91\x49\x88\xc7\xb8\x4d" + "\xb1\xb9\x07\x6d\x16\x72\xae\x46" + "\x5e\x03\xa1\x4b\xb6\x02\x30\xa8" + "\x3d\xa9\x07\x2a\x7c\x19\xe7\x62" + "\x87\xe3\x82\x2f\x6f\xe1\x09\xd9" + "\x94\x97\xea\xdd\x58\x9e\xae\x76" + "\x7e\x35\xe5\xb4\xda\x7e\xf4\xde" + "\xf7\x32\x87\xcd\x93\xbf\x11\x56" + "\x11\xbe\x08\x74\xe1\x69\xad\xe2" + "\xd7\xf8\x86\x75\x8a\x3c\xa4\xbe" + "\x70\xa7\x1b\xfc\x0b\x44\x2a\x76" + "\x35\xea\x5d\x85\x81\xaf\x85\xeb" + "\xa0\x1c\x61\xc2\xf7\x4f\xa5\xdc" + "\x02\x7f\xf6\x95\x40\x6e\x8a\x9a" + "\xf3\x5d\x25\x6e\x14\x3a\x22\xc9" + "\x37\x1c\xeb\x46\x54\x3f\xa5\x91" + "\xc2\xb5\x8c\xfe\x53\x08\x97\x32" + "\x1b\xb2\x30\x27\xfe\x25\x5d\xdc" + "\x08\x87\xd0\xe5\x94\x1a\xd4\xf1" + "\xfe\xd6\xb4\xa3\xe6\x74\x81\x3c" + "\x1b\xb7\x31\xa7\x22\xfd\xd4\xdd" + "\x20\x4e\x7c\x51\xb0\x60\x73\xb8" + "\x9c\xac\x91\x90\x7e\x01\xb0\xe1" + "\x8a\x2f\x75\x1c\x53\x2a\x98\x2a" + "\x06\x52\x95\x52\xb2\xe9\x25\x2e" + "\x4c\xe2\x5a\x00\xb2\x13\x81\x03" + "\x77\x66\x0d\xa5\x99\xda\x4e\x8c" + "\xac\xf3\x13\x53\x27\x45\xaf\x64" + "\x46\xdc\xea\x23\xda\x97\xd1\xab" + "\x7d\x6c\x30\x96\x1f\xbc\x06\x34" + "\x18\x0b\x5e\x21\x35\x11\x8d\x4c" + "\xe0\x2d\xe9\x50\x16\x74\x81\xa8" + "\xb4\x34\xb9\x72\x42\xa6\xcc\xbc" + "\xca\x34\x83\x27\x10\x5b\x68\x45" + "\x8f\x52\x22\x0c\x55\x3d\x29\x7c" + "\xe3\xc0\x66\x05\x42\x91\x5f\x58" + "\xfe\x4a\x62\xd9\x8c\xa9\x04\x19" + "\x04\xa9\x08\x4b\x57\xfc\x67\x53" + "\x08\x7c\xbc\x66\x8a\xb0\xb6\x9f" + "\x92\xd6\x41\x7c\x5b\x2a\x00\x79" + "\x72", + .ctext = "\x3a\x92\xee\x53\x31\xaf\x2b\x60" + "\x5f\x55\x8d\x00\x5d\xfc\x74\x97" + "\x28\x54\xf4\xa5\x75\xf1\x9b\x25" + "\x62\x1c\xc0\xe0\x13\xc8\x87\x53" + "\xd0\xf3\xa7\x97\x1f\x3b\x1e\xea" + "\xe0\xe5\x2a\xd1\xdd\xa4\x3b\x50" + "\x45\xa3\x0d\x7e\x1b\xc9\xa0\xad" + "\xb9\x2c\x54\xa6\xc7\x55\x16\xd0" + "\xc5\x2e\x02\x44\x35\xd0\x7e\x67" + "\xf2\xc4\x9b\xcd\x95\x10\xcc\x29" + "\x4b\xfa\x86\x87\xbe\x40\x36\xbe" + "\xe1\xa3\x52\x89\x55\x20\x9b\xc2" + "\xab\xf2\x31\x34\x16\xad\xc8\x17" + "\x65\x24\xc0\xff\x12\x37\xfe\x5a" + "\x62\x3b\x59\x47\x6c\x5f\x3a\x8e" + "\x3b\xd9\x30\xc8\x7f\x2f\x88\xda" + "\x80\xfd\x02\xda\x7f\x9a\x7a\x73" + "\x59\xc5\x34\x09\x9a\x11\xcb\xa7" + "\xfc\xf6\xa1\xa0\x60\xfb\x43\xbb" + "\xf1\xe9\xd7\xc6\x79\x27\x4e\xff" + "\x22\xb4\x24\xbf\x76\xee\x47\xb9" + "\x6d\x3f\x8b\xb0\x9c\x3c\x43\xdd" + "\xff\x25\x2e\x6d\xa4\x2b\xfb\x5d" + "\x1b\x97\x6c\x55\x0a\x82\x7a\x7b" + "\x94\x34\xc2\xdb\x2f\x1f\xc1\xea" + "\xd4\x4d\x17\x46\x3b\x51\x69\x09" + "\xe4\x99\x32\x25\xfd\x94\xaf\xfb" + "\x10\xf7\x4f\xdd\x0b\x3c\x8b\x41" + "\xb3\x6a\xb7\xd1\x33\xa8\x0c\x2f" + "\x62\x4c\x72\x11\xd7\x74\xe1\x3b" + "\x38\x43\x66\x7b\x6c\x36\x48\xe7" + "\xe3\xe7\x9d\xb9\x42\x73\x7a\x2a" + "\x89\x20\x1a\x41\x80\x03\xf7\x8f" + "\x61\x78\x13\xbf\xfe\x50\xf5\x04" + "\x52\xf9\xac\x47\xf8\x62\x4b\xb2" + "\x24\xa9\xbf\x64\xb0\x18\x69\xd2" + "\xf5\xe4\xce\xc8\xb1\x87\x75\xd6" + "\x2c\x24\x79\x00\x7d\x26\xfb\x44" + "\xe7\x45\x7a\xee\x58\xa5\x83\xc1" + "\xb4\x24\xab\x23\x2f\x4d\xd7\x4f" + "\x1c\xc7\xaa\xa9\x50\xf4\xa3\x07" + "\x12\x13\x89\x74\xdc\x31\x6a\xb2" + "\xf5\x0f\x13\x8b\xb9\xdb\x85\x1f" + "\xf5\xbc\x88\xd9\x95\xea\x31\x6c" + "\x36\x60\xb6\x49\xdc\xc4\xf7\x55" + "\x3f\x21\xc1\xb5\x92\x18\x5e\xbc" + "\x9f\x87\x7f\xe7\x79\x25\x40\x33" + "\xd6\xb9\x33\xd5\x50\xb3\xc7\x89" + "\x1b\x12\xa0\x46\xdd\xa7\xd8\x3e" + "\x71\xeb\x6f\x66\xa1\x26\x0c\x67" + "\xab\xb2\x38\x58\x17\xd8\x44\x3b" + "\x16\xf0\x8e\x62\x8d\x16\x10\x00" + "\x32\x8b\xef\xb9\x28\xd3\xc5\xad" + "\x0a\x19\xa2\xe4\x03\x27\x7d\x94" + "\x06\x18\xcd\xd6\x27\x00\xf9\x1f" + "\xb6\xb3\xfe\x96\x35\x5f\xc4\x1c" + "\x07\x62\x10\x79\x68\x50\xf1\x7e" + "\x29\xe7\xc4\xc4\xe7\xee\x54\xd6" + "\x58\x76\x84\x6d\x8d\xe4\x59\x31" + "\xe9\xf4\xdc\xa1\x1f\xe5\x1a\xd6" + "\xe6\x64\x46\xf5\x77\x9c\x60\x7a" + "\x5e\x62\xe3\x0a\xd4\x9f\x7a\x2d" + "\x7a\xa5\x0a\x7b\x29\x86\x7a\x74" + "\x74\x71\x6b\xca\x7d\x1d\xaa\xba" + "\x39\x84\x43\x76\x35\xfe\x4f\x9b" + "\xbb\xbb\xb5\x6a\x32\xb5\x5d\x41" + "\x51\xf0\x5b\x68\x03\x47\x4b\x8a" + "\xca\x88\xf6\x37\xbd\x73\x51\x70" + "\x66\xfe\x9e\x5f\x21\x9c\xf3\xdd" + "\xc3\xea\x27\xf9\x64\x94\xe1\x19" + "\xa0\xa9\xab\x60\xe0\x0e\xf7\x78" + "\x70\x86\xeb\xe0\xd1\x5c\x05\xd3" + "\xd7\xca\xe0\xc0\x47\x47\x34\xee" + "\x11\xa3\xa3\x54\x98\xb7\x49\x8e" + "\x84\x28\x70\x2c\x9e\xfb\x55\x54" + "\x4d\xf8\x86\xf7\x85\x7c\xbd\xf3" + "\x17\xd8\x47\xcb\xac\xf4\x20\x85" + "\x34\x66\xad\x37\x2d\x5e\x52\xda" + "\x8a\xfe\x98\x55\x30\xe7\x2d\x2b" + "\x19\x10\x8e\x7b\x66\x5e\xdc\xe0" + "\x45\x1f\x7b\xb4\x08\xfb\x8f\xf6" + "\x8c\x89\x21\x34\x55\x27\xb2\x76" + "\xb2\x07\xd9\xd6\x68\x9b\xea\x6b" + "\x2d\xb4\xc4\x35\xdd\xd2\x79\xae" + "\xc7\xd6\x26\x7f\x12\x01\x8c\xa7" + "\xe3\xdb\xa8\xf4\xf7\x2b\xec\x99" + "\x11\x00\xf1\x35\x8c\xcf\xd5\xc9" + "\xbd\x91\x36\x39\x70\xcf\x7d\x70" + "\x47\x1a\xfc\x6b\x56\xe0\x3f\x9c" + "\x60\x49\x01\x72\xa9\xaf\x2c\x9c" + "\xe8\xab\xda\x8c\x14\x19\xf3\x75" + "\x07\x17\x9d\x44\x67\x7a\x2e\xef" + "\xb7\x83\x35\x4a\xd1\x3d\x1c\x84" + "\x32\xdd\xaa\xea\xca\x1d\xdc\x72" + "\x2c\xcc\x43\xcd\x5d\xe3\x21\xa4" + "\xd0\x8a\x4b\x20\x12\xa3\xd5\x86" + "\x76\x96\xff\x5f\x04\x57\x0f\xe6" + "\xba\xe8\x76\x50\x0c\x64\x1d\x83" + "\x9c\x9b\x9a\x9a\x58\x97\x9c\x5c" + "\xb4\xa4\xa6\x3e\x19\xeb\x8f\x5a" + "\x61\xb2\x03\x7b\x35\x19\xbe\xa7" + "\x63\x0c\xfd\xdd\xf9\x90\x6c\x08" + "\x19\x11\xd3\x65\x4a\xf5\x96\x92" + "\x59\xaa\x9c\x61\x0c\x29\xa7\xf8" + "\x14\x39\x37\xbf\x3c\xf2\x16\x72" + "\x02\xfa\xa2\xf3\x18\x67\x5d\xcb" + "\xdc\x4d\xbb\x96\xff\x70\x08\x2d" + "\xc2\xa8\x52\xe1\x34\x5f\x72\xfe" + "\x64\xbf\xca\xa7\x74\x38\xfb\x74" + "\x55\x9c\xfa\x8a\xed\xfb\x98\xeb" + "\x58\x2e\x6c\xe1\x52\x76\x86\xd7" + "\xcf\xa1\xa4\xfc\xb2\x47\x41\x28" + "\xa3\xc1\xe5\xfd\x53\x19\x28\x2b" + "\x37\x04\x65\x96\x99\x7a\x28\x0f" + "\x07\x68\x4b\xc7\x52\x0a\x55\x35" + "\x40\x19\x95\x61\xe8\x59\x40\x1f" + "\x9d\xbf\x78\x7d\x8f\x84\xff\x6f" + "\xd0\xd5\x63\xd2\x22\xbd\xc8\x4e" + "\xfb\xe7\x9f\x06\xe6\xe7\x39\x6d" + "\x6a\x96\x9f\xf0\x74\x7e\xc9\x35" + "\xb7\x26\xb8\x1c\x0a\xa6\x27\x2c" + "\xa2\x2b\xfe\xbe\x0f\x07\x73\xae" + "\x7f\x7f\x54\xf5\x7c\x6a\x0a\x56" + "\x49\xd4\x81\xe5\x85\x53\x99\x1f" + "\x95\x05\x13\x58\x8d\x0e\x1b\x90" + "\xc3\x75\x48\x64\x58\x98\x67\x84" + "\xae\xe2\x21\xa2\x8a\x04\x0a\x0b" + "\x61\xaa\xb0\xd4\x28\x60\x7a\xf8" + "\xbc\x52\xfb\x24\x7f\xed\x0d\x2a" + "\x0a\xb2\xf9\xc6\x95\xb5\x11\xc9" + "\xf4\x0f\x26\x11\xcf\x2a\x57\x87" + "\x7a\xf3\xe7\x94\x65\xc2\xb5\xb3" + "\xab\x98\xe3\xc1\x2b\x59\x19\x7c" + "\xd6\xf3\xf9\xbf\xff\x6d\xc6\x82" + "\x13\x2f\x4a\x2e\xcd\x26\xfe\x2d" + "\x01\x70\xf4\xc2\x7f\x1f\x4c\xcb" + "\x47\x77\x0c\xa0\xa3\x03\xec\xda" + "\xa9\xbf\x0d\x2d\xae\xe4\xb8\x7b" + "\xa9\xbc\x08\xb4\x68\x2e\xc5\x60" + "\x8d\x87\x41\x2b\x0f\x69\xf0\xaf" + "\x5f\xba\x72\x20\x0f\x33\xcd\x6d" + "\x36\x7d\x7b\xd5\x05\xf1\x4b\x05" + "\xc4\xfc\x7f\x80\xb9\x4d\xbd\xf7" + "\x7c\x84\x07\x01\xc2\x40\x66\x5b" + "\x98\xc7\x2c\xe3\x97\xfa\xdf\x87" + "\xa0\x1f\xe9\x21\x42\x0f\x3b\xeb" + "\x89\x1c\x3b\xca\x83\x61\x77\x68" + "\x84\xbb\x60\x87\x38\x2e\x25\xd5" + "\x9e\x04\x41\x70\xac\xda\xc0\x9c" + "\x9c\x69\xea\x8d\x4e\x55\x2a\x29" + "\xed\x05\x4b\x7b\x73\x71\x90\x59" + "\x4d\xc8\xd8\x44\xf0\x4c\xe1\x5e" + "\x84\x47\x55\xcc\x32\x3f\xe7\x97" + "\x42\xc6\x32\xac\x40\xe5\xa5\xc7" + "\x8b\xed\xdb\xf7\x83\xd6\xb1\xc2" + "\x52\x5e\x34\xb7\xeb\x6e\xd9\xfc" + "\xe5\x93\x9a\x97\x3e\xb0\xdc\xd9" + "\xd7\x06\x10\xb6\x1d\x80\x59\xdd" + "\x0d\xfe\x64\x35\xcd\x5d\xec\xf0" + "\xba\xd0\x34\xc9\x2d\x91\xc5\x17" + "\x11", + .len = 1281, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 3, + .tap = { 1200, 1, 80 }, + }, +}; + /* * CTS (Cipher Text Stealing) mode tests */ diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha20.h b/include/crypto/chacha20.h index fbec4e6a8789..6290d997060e 100644 --- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha20.h @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* - * Common values for the ChaCha20 algorithm + * Common values and helper functions for the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 algorithms. + * + * XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce to 192 bits, while provably retaining + * ChaCha20's security. Here they share the same key size, tfm context, and + * setkey function; only their IV size and encrypt/decrypt function differ. */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_CHACHA20_H @@ -10,10 +14,15 @@ #include #include +/* 32-bit stream position, then 96-bit nonce (RFC7539 convention) */ #define CHACHA20_IV_SIZE 16 + #define CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE 32 #define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */ +#define XCHACHA20_IV_SIZE 32 + struct chacha20_ctx { u32 key[8]; }; @@ -22,8 +31,11 @@ void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream); void hchacha20_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out); void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv); + int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keysize); + int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); +int crypto_xchacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); #endif From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:15 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669395 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB6E8175A for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 474F229073 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 3B5E629151; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70A0229073 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726932AbeKFIuZ (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:50:25 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54506 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725906AbeKFItN (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:13 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C2EDB20869; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460422; bh=2/sAhJyi/LD9iBcyHToJN7nd0bgYH+9lF/IqkFpixFQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=eocJE9jMG2X//oar3nhn47fRRQmTeh05fZ9zPnldK/SglDig2ob7d3FMDQBHihgDH k+fXvSuWtybiaPesCRVEruWI0DmZNUvUCkY4LDxkUDGN4whib4LmyxRQSQBfz9MYVY j7zUu4iLEoKjhlgNnrBaN4kAIGBEIoVT7/NEqCAg= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 04/15] crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:15 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers In preparation for adding XChaCha12 support, rename/refactor chacha20-generic to support different numbers of rounds. The justification for needing XChaCha12 support is explained in more detail in the patch "crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support". The only difference between ChaCha{8,12,20} are the number of rounds itself; all other parts of the algorithm are the same. Therefore, remove the "20" from all definitions, structures, functions, files, etc. that will be shared by all ChaCha versions. Also make ->setkey() store the round count in the chacha_ctx (previously chacha20_ctx). The generic code then passes the round count through to chacha_block(). There will be a ->setkey() function for each explicitly allowed round count; the encrypt/decrypt functions will be the same. I decided not to do it the opposite way (same ->setkey() function for all round counts, with different encrypt/decrypt functions) because that would have required more boilerplate code in architecture-specific implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c | 40 +++---- arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c | 40 +++---- arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c | 52 ++++----- crypto/Makefile | 2 +- crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 10 +- .../{chacha20_generic.c => chacha_generic.c} | 110 ++++++++++-------- drivers/char/random.c | 51 ++++---- include/crypto/chacha.h | 46 ++++++++ include/crypto/chacha20.h | 41 ------- lib/Makefile | 2 +- lib/{chacha20.c => chacha.c} | 43 ++++--- 11 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 210 deletions(-) rename crypto/{chacha20_generic.c => chacha_generic.c} (57%) create mode 100644 include/crypto/chacha.h delete mode 100644 include/crypto/chacha20.h rename lib/{chacha20.c => chacha.c} (67%) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c index 59a7be08e80c..7386eb1c1889 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ */ #include -#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -34,20 +34,20 @@ asmlinkage void chacha20_4block_xor_neon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes) { - u8 buf[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { chacha20_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; state[12] += 4; } - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { chacha20_block_xor_neon(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; state[12]++; } if (bytes) { @@ -60,17 +60,17 @@ static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); struct skcipher_walk walk; u32 state[16]; int err; - if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) - return crypto_chacha20_crypt(req); + if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) + return crypto_chacha_crypt(req); err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); kernel_neon_begin(); while (walk.nbytes > 0) { @@ -93,14 +93,14 @@ static struct skcipher_alg alg = { .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-neon", .base.cra_priority = 300, .base.cra_blocksize = 1, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = CHACHA20_IV_SIZE, - .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, - .walksize = 4 * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, .encrypt = chacha20_neon, .decrypt = chacha20_neon, diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c index 727579c93ded..96e0cfb8c3f5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ */ #include -#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ asmlinkage void chacha20_4block_xor_neon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes) { - u8 buf[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { kernel_neon_begin(); chacha20_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src); kernel_neon_end(); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; state[12] += 4; } @@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, return; kernel_neon_begin(); - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { chacha20_block_xor_neon(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; state[12]++; } if (bytes) { @@ -68,17 +68,17 @@ static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); struct skcipher_walk walk; u32 state[16]; int err; - if (!may_use_simd() || req->cryptlen <= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) - return crypto_chacha20_crypt(req); + if (!may_use_simd() || req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) + return crypto_chacha_crypt(req); err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); while (walk.nbytes > 0) { unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; @@ -99,14 +99,14 @@ static struct skcipher_alg alg = { .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-neon", .base.cra_priority = 300, .base.cra_blocksize = 1, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = CHACHA20_IV_SIZE, - .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, - .walksize = 4 * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, .encrypt = chacha20_neon, .decrypt = chacha20_neon, diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c index dce7c5d39c2f..bd249f0b29dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha20_glue.c @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ */ #include -#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -29,31 +29,31 @@ static bool chacha20_use_avx2; static void chacha20_dosimd(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes) { - u8 buf[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; #ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2 if (chacha20_use_avx2) { - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8) { chacha20_8block_xor_avx2(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; state[12] += 8; } } #endif - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { chacha20_4block_xor_ssse3(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; state[12] += 4; } - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { chacha20_block_xor_ssse3(state, dst, src); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - src += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; state[12]++; } if (bytes) { @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static void chacha20_dosimd(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, static int chacha20_simd(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8); struct skcipher_walk walk; int err; @@ -74,20 +74,20 @@ static int chacha20_simd(struct skcipher_request *req) BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN != 16); state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA20_STATE_ALIGN); - if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) - return crypto_chacha20_crypt(req); + if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) + return crypto_chacha_crypt(req); err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); kernel_fpu_begin(); - while (walk.nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + while (walk.nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { chacha20_dosimd(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - rounddown(walk.nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE)); + rounddown(walk.nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, - walk.nbytes % CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); + walk.nbytes % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); } if (walk.nbytes) { @@ -106,13 +106,13 @@ static struct skcipher_alg alg = { .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-simd", .base.cra_priority = 300, .base.cra_blocksize = 1, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = CHACHA20_IV_SIZE, - .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, .encrypt = chacha20_simd, .decrypt = chacha20_simd, diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile index 5c207c76abf7..7e673f7c7110 100644 --- a/crypto/Makefile +++ b/crypto/Makefile @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KHAZAD) += khazad.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANUBIS) += anubis.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED) += seed.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20) += salsa20_generic.o -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20) += chacha20_generic.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20) += chacha_generic.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLY1305) += poly1305_generic.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE) += deflate.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC) += michael_mic.o diff --git a/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c index 600afa99941f..573c07e6f189 100644 --- a/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c +++ b/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct poly_req { }; struct chacha_req { - u8 iv[CHACHA20_IV_SIZE]; + u8 iv[CHACHA_IV_SIZE]; struct scatterlist src[1]; struct skcipher_request req; /* must be last member */ }; @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static void chacha_iv(u8 *iv, struct aead_request *req, u32 icb) memcpy(iv, &leicb, sizeof(leicb)); memcpy(iv + sizeof(leicb), ctx->salt, ctx->saltlen); memcpy(iv + sizeof(leicb) + ctx->saltlen, req->iv, - CHACHA20_IV_SIZE - sizeof(leicb) - ctx->saltlen); + CHACHA_IV_SIZE - sizeof(leicb) - ctx->saltlen); } static int poly_verify_tag(struct aead_request *req) @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static int chachapoly_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); int err; - if (keylen != ctx->saltlen + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) + if (keylen != ctx->saltlen + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; keylen -= ctx->saltlen; @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ static int chachapoly_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb, err = -EINVAL; /* Need 16-byte IV size, including Initial Block Counter value */ - if (crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(chacha) != CHACHA20_IV_SIZE) + if (crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(chacha) != CHACHA_IV_SIZE) goto out_drop_chacha; /* Not a stream cipher? */ if (chacha->base.cra_blocksize != 1) diff --git a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c b/crypto/chacha_generic.c similarity index 57% rename from crypto/chacha20_generic.c rename to crypto/chacha_generic.c index 4305b1b62b16..438f15a14054 100644 --- a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c +++ b/crypto/chacha_generic.c @@ -12,33 +12,33 @@ #include #include -#include +#include #include #include -static void chacha20_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, - unsigned int bytes) +static void chacha_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int bytes, int nrounds) { /* aligned to potentially speed up crypto_xor() */ - u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(sizeof(long)); + u8 stream[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(sizeof(long)); if (dst != src) memcpy(dst, src, bytes); - while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { - chacha20_block(state, stream); - crypto_xor(dst, stream, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); - bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { + chacha_block(state, stream, nrounds); + crypto_xor(dst, stream, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); + bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; } if (bytes) { - chacha20_block(state, stream); + chacha_block(state, stream, nrounds); crypto_xor(dst, stream, bytes); } } -static int chacha20_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, - struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) +static int chacha_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, + struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) { struct skcipher_walk walk; u32 state[16]; @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int chacha20_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, iv); + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, iv); while (walk.nbytes > 0) { unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; @@ -54,15 +54,15 @@ static int chacha20_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, if (nbytes < walk.total) nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride); - chacha20_docrypt(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - nbytes); + chacha_docrypt(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, + nbytes, ctx->nrounds); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); } return err; } -void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) +void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) { state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */ state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */ @@ -81,53 +81,61 @@ void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) state[14] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 8); state[15] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 12); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_init); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha_init); -int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keysize) +static int chacha_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize, int nrounds) { - struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); int i; - if (keysize != CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) + if (keysize != CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->key); i++) ctx->key[i] = get_unaligned_le32(key + i * sizeof(u32)); + ctx->nrounds = nrounds; return 0; } + +int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize) +{ + return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 20); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_setkey); -int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - return chacha20_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv); + return chacha_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_crypt); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha_crypt); -int crypto_xchacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - struct chacha20_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); - struct chacha20_ctx subctx; + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct chacha_ctx subctx; u32 state[16]; u8 real_iv[16]; /* Compute the subkey given the original key and first 128 nonce bits */ - crypto_chacha20_init(state, ctx, req->iv); - hchacha20_block(state, subctx.key); + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv); + hchacha_block(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds); + subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds; /* Build the real IV */ memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8); /* stream position */ memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8); /* remaining 64 nonce bits */ /* Generate the stream and XOR it with the data */ - return chacha20_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv); + return chacha_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_xchacha20_crypt); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_xchacha_crypt); static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { { @@ -135,50 +143,50 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-generic", .base.cra_priority = 100, .base.cra_blocksize = 1, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = CHACHA20_IV_SIZE, - .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, - .encrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, - .decrypt = crypto_chacha20_crypt, + .encrypt = crypto_chacha_crypt, + .decrypt = crypto_chacha_crypt, }, { .base.cra_name = "xchacha20", .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-generic", .base.cra_priority = 100, .base.cra_blocksize = 1, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha20_ctx), + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .min_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = XCHACHA20_IV_SIZE, - .chunksize = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE, + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, - .encrypt = crypto_xchacha20_crypt, - .decrypt = crypto_xchacha20_crypt, + .encrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt, + .decrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt, } }; -static int __init chacha20_generic_mod_init(void) +static int __init chacha_generic_mod_init(void) { return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); } -static void __exit chacha20_generic_mod_fini(void) +static void __exit chacha_generic_mod_fini(void) { crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); } -module_init(chacha20_generic_mod_init); -module_exit(chacha20_generic_mod_fini); +module_init(chacha_generic_mod_init); +module_exit(chacha_generic_mod_fini); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Willi "); -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 stream ciphers (generic)"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers (generic)"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-generic"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20"); diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 2eb70e76ed35..38c6d1af6d1c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include #include @@ -431,11 +431,10 @@ static int crng_init = 0; #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1)) static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; -#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) -static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]); +#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) +static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]); static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); + __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); static void process_random_ready_list(void); static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); @@ -863,7 +862,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) } p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; + p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); @@ -895,7 +894,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len) unsigned long flags; static unsigned char lfsr = 1; unsigned char tmp; - unsigned i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE; + unsigned i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE; const char * src_buf = cp; char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4]; @@ -913,8 +912,8 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len) lfsr >>= 1; if (tmp & 1) lfsr ^= 0xE1; - tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE]; - dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; + tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE]; + dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5); } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); @@ -926,7 +925,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) unsigned long flags; int i, num; union { - __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; + __u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; __u32 key[8]; } buf; @@ -937,7 +936,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) } else { _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block); _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block, - CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE); + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE); } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { @@ -973,7 +972,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) } static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) + __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { unsigned long v, flags; @@ -990,7 +989,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } -static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) +static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) { struct crng_state *crng = NULL; @@ -1008,14 +1007,14 @@ static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) + __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { unsigned long flags; __u32 *s, *d; int i; used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32)); - if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { extract_crng(tmp); used = 0; } @@ -1027,7 +1026,7 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } -static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { struct crng_state *crng = NULL; @@ -1042,8 +1041,8 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { - ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); + ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); int large_request = (nbytes > 256); while (nbytes) { @@ -1057,7 +1056,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) } extract_crng(tmp); - i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); + i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) { ret = -EFAULT; break; @@ -1622,14 +1621,14 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, */ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { - __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); + __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); - while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { + while (nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { extract_crng(buf); - buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; + buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; + nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; } if (nbytes > 0) { @@ -1637,7 +1636,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes); crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes); } else - crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); + crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); } @@ -2208,8 +2207,8 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { struct batched_entropy { union { - u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)]; - u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; + u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)]; + u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; }; unsigned int position; }; diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ae79e9983c72 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Common values and helper functions for the ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers. + * + * XChaCha extends ChaCha's nonce to 192 bits, while provably retaining ChaCha's + * security. Here they share the same key size, tfm context, and setkey + * function; only their IV size and encrypt/decrypt function differ. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H +#define _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/* 32-bit stream position, then 96-bit nonce (RFC7539 convention) */ +#define CHACHA_IV_SIZE 16 + +#define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE 32 +#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64 + +/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */ +#define XCHACHA_IV_SIZE 32 + +struct chacha_ctx { + u32 key[8]; + int nrounds; +}; + +void chacha_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds); +static inline void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream) +{ + chacha_block(state, stream, 20); +} +void hchacha_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out, int nrounds); + +void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv); + +int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize); + +int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); +int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); + +#endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */ diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha20.h b/include/crypto/chacha20.h deleted file mode 100644 index 6290d997060e..000000000000 --- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* - * Common values and helper functions for the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 algorithms. - * - * XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce to 192 bits, while provably retaining - * ChaCha20's security. Here they share the same key size, tfm context, and - * setkey function; only their IV size and encrypt/decrypt function differ. - */ - -#ifndef _CRYPTO_CHACHA20_H -#define _CRYPTO_CHACHA20_H - -#include -#include -#include - -/* 32-bit stream position, then 96-bit nonce (RFC7539 convention) */ -#define CHACHA20_IV_SIZE 16 - -#define CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE 32 -#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE 64 - -/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */ -#define XCHACHA20_IV_SIZE 32 - -struct chacha20_ctx { - u32 key[8]; -}; - -void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream); -void hchacha20_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out); - -void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv); - -int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, - unsigned int keysize); - -int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); -int crypto_xchacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); - -#endif diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index db06d1237898..4c2b6fc5cde9 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dynamic_debug.o := n lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \ rbtree.o radix-tree.o timerqueue.o xarray.o \ idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o \ - sha1.o chacha20.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \ + sha1.o chacha.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \ flex_proportions.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \ is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \ earlycpio.o seq_buf.o siphash.o dec_and_lock.o \ diff --git a/lib/chacha20.c b/lib/chacha.c similarity index 67% rename from lib/chacha20.c rename to lib/chacha.c index 6a484e16171d..1bdc688c18df 100644 --- a/lib/chacha20.c +++ b/lib/chacha.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * The "hash function" used as the core of the ChaCha20 stream cipher (RFC7539) + * The "hash function" used as the core of the ChaCha stream cipher (RFC7539) * * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi * @@ -14,13 +14,16 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include -static void chacha20_permute(u32 *x) +static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 2) { + /* whitelist the allowed round counts */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(nrounds != 20); + + for (i = 0; i < nrounds; i += 2) { x[0] += x[4]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0], 16); x[1] += x[5]; x[13] = rol32(x[13] ^ x[1], 16); x[2] += x[6]; x[14] = rol32(x[14] ^ x[2], 16); @@ -64,49 +67,51 @@ static void chacha20_permute(u32 *x) } /** - * chacha20_block - generate one keystream block and increment block counter + * chacha_block - generate one keystream block and increment block counter * @state: input state matrix (16 32-bit words) * @stream: output keystream block (64 bytes) + * @nrounds: number of rounds (currently must be 20) * - * This is the ChaCha20 core, a function from 64-byte strings to 64-byte - * strings. The caller has already converted the endianness of the input. This - * function also handles incrementing the block counter in the input matrix. + * This is the ChaCha core, a function from 64-byte strings to 64-byte strings. + * The caller has already converted the endianness of the input. This function + * also handles incrementing the block counter in the input matrix. */ -void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream) +void chacha_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds) { u32 x[16]; int i; memcpy(x, state, 64); - chacha20_permute(x); + chacha_permute(x, nrounds); for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++) put_unaligned_le32(x[i] + state[i], &stream[i * sizeof(u32)]); state[12]++; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha20_block); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_block); /** - * hchacha20_block - abbreviated ChaCha20 core, for XChaCha20 + * hchacha_block - abbreviated ChaCha core, for XChaCha * @in: input state matrix (16 32-bit words) * @out: output (8 32-bit words) + * @nrounds: number of rounds (currently must be 20) * - * HChaCha20 is the ChaCha equivalent of HSalsa20 and is an intermediate step - * towards XChaCha20 (see https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). - * HChaCha20 skips the final addition of the initial state, and outputs only - * certain words of the state. It should not be used for streaming directly. + * HChaCha is the ChaCha equivalent of HSalsa and is an intermediate step + * towards XChaCha (see https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). HChaCha + * skips the final addition of the initial state, and outputs only certain words + * of the state. It should not be used for streaming directly. */ -void hchacha20_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out) +void hchacha_block(const u32 *in, u32 *out, int nrounds) { u32 x[16]; memcpy(x, in, 64); - chacha20_permute(x); + chacha_permute(x, nrounds); memcpy(&out[0], &x[0], 16); memcpy(&out[4], &x[12], 16); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha20_block); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block); From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:16 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669379 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C4B615E9 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3FDB829FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 3466629FF4; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37A7229FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729607AbeKFItz (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:55 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54532 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725844AbeKFItN (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:13 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EF5742086A; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460423; bh=EtBg1xiVonkav4l3885uQcUMeVa89aycdCTXT6MbdqQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=CRUyo6bJzjjeaKLj8fJjoLfpmtJPFao0dp5Pcv3wWRxqLJj9Q9qRFzXCKYVUvhnhq XIgb//qsL9UEsa0mnADY9E4CNM/Y2Rdu8BtpdTB14ReHL6AAiu1aEuZimI7V6m1Mmp ADiqMyIpduV7dyMt0RTHqwoWMZRihWduFZSdIs0g= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 05/15] crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:16 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-6-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper (https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin. We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions. We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants: combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security". Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted. As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20, xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit to the added complexity. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- crypto/Kconfig | 8 +- crypto/chacha_generic.c | 26 +- crypto/testmgr.c | 6 + crypto/testmgr.h | 578 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/chacha.h | 7 + lib/chacha.c | 6 +- 6 files changed, 625 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig index d9acbce23d4d..4fa0a4a0e861 100644 --- a/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/Kconfig @@ -1387,10 +1387,10 @@ config CRYPTO_SALSA20 Bernstein . See config CRYPTO_CHACHA20 - tristate "ChaCha20 stream cipher algorithms" + tristate "ChaCha stream cipher algorithms" select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER help - The ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 stream cipher algorithms. + The ChaCha20, XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream cipher algorithms. ChaCha20 is a 256-bit high-speed stream cipher designed by Daniel J. Bernstein and further specified in RFC7539 for use in IETF protocols. @@ -1403,6 +1403,10 @@ config CRYPTO_CHACHA20 while provably retaining ChaCha20's security. See also: + XChaCha12 is XChaCha20 reduced to 12 rounds, with correspondingly + reduced security margin but increased performance. It can be needed + in some performance-sensitive scenarios. + config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 tristate "ChaCha20 cipher algorithm (x86_64/SSSE3/AVX2)" depends on X86 && 64BIT diff --git a/crypto/chacha_generic.c b/crypto/chacha_generic.c index 438f15a14054..35b583101f4f 100644 --- a/crypto/chacha_generic.c +++ b/crypto/chacha_generic.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * ChaCha20 (RFC7539) and XChaCha20 stream cipher algorithms + * ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers, including ChaCha20 (RFC7539) * * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC @@ -106,6 +106,13 @@ int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha20_setkey); +int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize) +{ + return chacha_setkey(tfm, key, keysize, 12); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_chacha12_setkey); + int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); @@ -168,6 +175,21 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, .encrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt, .decrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "xchacha12", + .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha12-generic", + .base.cra_priority = 100, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha12_setkey, + .encrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt, + .decrypt = crypto_xchacha_crypt, } }; @@ -191,3 +213,5 @@ MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-generic"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-generic"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12-generic"); diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index a5512e69c8f3..3ff70ebc745c 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -3544,6 +3544,12 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { .suite = { .hash = __VECS(aes_xcbc128_tv_template) } + }, { + .alg = "xchacha12", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(xchacha12_tv_template) + }, }, { .alg = "xchacha20", .test = alg_test_skcipher, diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index 371641c73cf8..3b57b2701fcb 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -31379,6 +31379,584 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec xchacha20_tv_template[] = { }, }; +/* + * Same as XChaCha20 test vectors above, but recomputed the ciphertext with + * XChaCha12, using a modified libsodium. + */ +static const struct cipher_testvec xchacha12_tv_template[] = { + { + .key = "\x79\xc9\x97\x98\xac\x67\x30\x0b" + "\xbb\x27\x04\xc9\x5c\x34\x1e\x32" + "\x45\xf3\xdc\xb2\x17\x61\xb9\x8e" + "\x52\xff\x45\xb2\x4f\x30\x4f\xc4", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xb3\x3f\xfd\x30\x96\x47\x9b\xcf" + "\xbc\x9a\xee\x49\x41\x76\x88\xa0" + "\xa2\x55\x4f\x8d\x95\x38\x94\x19" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ctext = "\x1b\x78\x7f\xd7\xa1\x41\x68\xab" + "\x3d\x3f\xd1\x7b\x69\x56\xb2\xd5" + "\x43\xce\xeb\xaf\x36\xf0\x29\x9d" + "\x3a\xfb\x18\xae\x1b", + .len = 29, + }, { + .key = "\x9d\x23\xbd\x41\x49\xcb\x97\x9c" + "\xcf\x3c\x5c\x94\xdd\x21\x7e\x98" + "\x08\xcb\x0e\x50\xcd\x0f\x67\x81" + "\x22\x35\xea\xaf\x60\x1d\x62\x32", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xc0\x47\x54\x82\x66\xb7\xc3\x70" + "\xd3\x35\x66\xa2\x42\x5c\xbf\x30" + "\xd8\x2d\x1e\xaf\x52\x94\x10\x9e" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00", + .ctext = "\xfb\x32\x09\x1d\x83\x05\xae\x4c" + "\x13\x1f\x12\x71\xf2\xca\xb2\xeb" + "\x5b\x83\x14\x7d\x83\xf6\x57\x77" + "\x2e\x40\x1f\x92\x2c\xf9\xec\x35" + "\x34\x1f\x93\xdf\xfb\x30\xd7\x35" + "\x03\x05\x78\xc1\x20\x3b\x7a\xe3" + "\x62\xa3\x89\xdc\x11\x11\x45\xa8" + "\x82\x89\xa0\xf1\x4e\xc7\x0f\x11" + "\x69\xdd\x0c\x84\x2b\x89\x5c\xdc" + "\xf0\xde\x01\xef\xc5\x65\x79\x23" + "\x87\x67\xd6\x50\xd9\x8d\xd9\x92" + "\x54\x5b\x0e", + .len = 91, + }, { + .key = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x67\xc6\x69\x73" + "\x51\xff\x4a\xec\x29\xcd\xba\xab" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ctext = "\xdf\x2d\xc6\x21\x2a\x9d\xa1\xbb" + "\xc2\x77\x66\x0c\x5c\x46\xef\xa7" + "\x79\x1b\xb9\xdf\x55\xe2\xf9\x61" + "\x4c\x7b\xa4\x52\x24\xaf\xa2\xda" + "\xd1\x8f\x8f\xa2\x9e\x53\x4d\xc4" + "\xb8\x55\x98\x08\x7c\x08\xd4\x18" + "\x67\x8f\xef\x50\xb1\x5f\xa5\x77" + "\x4c\x25\xe7\x86\x26\x42\xca\x44", + .len = 64, + }, { + .key = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x02\xf2\xfb\xe3\x46" + "\x7c\xc2\x54\xf8\x1b\xe8\xe7\x8d" + "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x41\x6e\x79\x20\x73\x75\x62\x6d" + "\x69\x73\x73\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x74" + "\x6f\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x49\x45" + "\x54\x46\x20\x69\x6e\x74\x65\x6e" + "\x64\x65\x64\x20\x62\x79\x20\x74" + "\x68\x65\x20\x43\x6f\x6e\x74\x72" + "\x69\x62\x75\x74\x6f\x72\x20\x66" + "\x6f\x72\x20\x70\x75\x62\x6c\x69" + "\x63\x61\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x20\x61" + "\x73\x20\x61\x6c\x6c\x20\x6f\x72" + "\x20\x70\x61\x72\x74\x20\x6f\x66" + "\x20\x61\x6e\x20\x49\x45\x54\x46" + "\x20\x49\x6e\x74\x65\x72\x6e\x65" + "\x74\x2d\x44\x72\x61\x66\x74\x20" + "\x6f\x72\x20\x52\x46\x43\x20\x61" + "\x6e\x64\x20\x61\x6e\x79\x20\x73" + "\x74\x61\x74\x65\x6d\x65\x6e\x74" + "\x20\x6d\x61\x64\x65\x20\x77\x69" + "\x74\x68\x69\x6e\x20\x74\x68\x65" + "\x20\x63\x6f\x6e\x74\x65\x78\x74" + "\x20\x6f\x66\x20\x61\x6e\x20\x49" + "\x45\x54\x46\x20\x61\x63\x74\x69" + "\x76\x69\x74\x79\x20\x69\x73\x20" + "\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x69\x64\x65\x72" + "\x65\x64\x20\x61\x6e\x20\x22\x49" + "\x45\x54\x46\x20\x43\x6f\x6e\x74" + "\x72\x69\x62\x75\x74\x69\x6f\x6e" + "\x22\x2e\x20\x53\x75\x63\x68\x20" + "\x73\x74\x61\x74\x65\x6d\x65\x6e" + "\x74\x73\x20\x69\x6e\x63\x6c\x75" + "\x64\x65\x20\x6f\x72\x61\x6c\x20" + "\x73\x74\x61\x74\x65\x6d\x65\x6e" + "\x74\x73\x20\x69\x6e\x20\x49\x45" + "\x54\x46\x20\x73\x65\x73\x73\x69" + "\x6f\x6e\x73\x2c\x20\x61\x73\x20" + "\x77\x65\x6c\x6c\x20\x61\x73\x20" + "\x77\x72\x69\x74\x74\x65\x6e\x20" + "\x61\x6e\x64\x20\x65\x6c\x65\x63" + "\x74\x72\x6f\x6e\x69\x63\x20\x63" + "\x6f\x6d\x6d\x75\x6e\x69\x63\x61" + "\x74\x69\x6f\x6e\x73\x20\x6d\x61" + "\x64\x65\x20\x61\x74\x20\x61\x6e" + "\x79\x20\x74\x69\x6d\x65\x20\x6f" + "\x72\x20\x70\x6c\x61\x63\x65\x2c" + "\x20\x77\x68\x69\x63\x68\x20\x61" + "\x72\x65\x20\x61\x64\x64\x72\x65" + "\x73\x73\x65\x64\x20\x74\x6f", + .ctext = "\xe4\xa6\xc8\x30\xc4\x23\x13\xd6" + "\x08\x4d\xc9\xb7\xa5\x64\x7c\xb9" + "\x71\xe2\xab\x3e\xa8\x30\x8a\x1c" + "\x4a\x94\x6d\x9b\xe0\xb3\x6f\xf1" + "\xdc\xe3\x1b\xb3\xa9\x6d\x0d\xd6" + "\xd0\xca\x12\xef\xe7\x5f\xd8\x61" + "\x3c\x82\xd3\x99\x86\x3c\x6f\x66" + "\x02\x06\xdc\x55\xf9\xed\xdf\x38" + "\xb4\xa6\x17\x00\x7f\xef\xbf\x4f" + "\xf8\x36\xf1\x60\x7e\x47\xaf\xdb" + "\x55\x9b\x12\xcb\x56\x44\xa7\x1f" + "\xd3\x1a\x07\x3b\x00\xec\xe6\x4c" + "\xa2\x43\x27\xdf\x86\x19\x4f\x16" + "\xed\xf9\x4a\xf3\x63\x6f\xfa\x7f" + "\x78\x11\xf6\x7d\x97\x6f\xec\x6f" + "\x85\x0f\x5c\x36\x13\x8d\x87\xe0" + "\x80\xb1\x69\x0b\x98\x89\x9c\x4e" + "\xf8\xdd\xee\x5c\x0a\x85\xce\xd4" + "\xea\x1b\x48\xbe\x08\xf8\xe2\xa8" + "\xa5\xb0\x3c\x79\xb1\x15\xb4\xb9" + "\x75\x10\x95\x35\x81\x7e\x26\xe6" + "\x78\xa4\x88\xcf\xdb\x91\x34\x18" + "\xad\xd7\x8e\x07\x7d\xab\x39\xf9" + "\xa3\x9e\xa5\x1d\xbb\xed\x61\xfd" + "\xdc\xb7\x5a\x27\xfc\xb5\xc9\x10" + "\xa8\xcc\x52\x7f\x14\x76\x90\xe7" + "\x1b\x29\x60\x74\xc0\x98\x77\xbb" + "\xe0\x54\xbb\x27\x49\x59\x1e\x62" + "\x3d\xaf\x74\x06\xa4\x42\x6f\xc6" + "\x52\x97\xc4\x1d\xc4\x9f\xe2\xe5" + "\x38\x57\x91\xd1\xa2\x28\xcc\x40" + "\xcc\x70\x59\x37\xfc\x9f\x4b\xda" + "\xa0\xeb\x97\x9a\x7d\xed\x14\x5c" + "\x9c\xb7\x93\x26\x41\xa8\x66\xdd" + "\x87\x6a\xc0\xd3\xc2\xa9\x3e\xae" + "\xe9\x72\xfe\xd1\xb3\xac\x38\xea" + "\x4d\x15\xa9\xd5\x36\x61\xe9\x96" + "\x6c\x23\xf8\x43\xe4\x92\x29\xd9" + "\x8b\x78\xf7\x0a\x52\xe0\x19\x5b" + "\x59\x69\x5b\x5d\xa1\x53\xc4\x68" + "\xe1\xbb\xac\x89\x14\xe2\xe2\x85" + "\x41\x18\xf5\xb3\xd1\xfa\x68\x19" + "\x44\x78\xdc\xcf\xe7\x88\x2d\x52" + "\x5f\x40\xb5\x7e\xf8\x88\xa2\xae" + "\x4a\xb2\x07\x35\x9d\x9b\x07\x88" + "\xb7\x00\xd0\x0c\xb6\xa0\x47\x59" + "\xda\x4e\xc9\xab\x9b\x8a\x7b", + + .len = 375, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 3, + .tap = { 375 - 20, 4, 16 }, + + }, { + .key = "\x1c\x92\x40\xa5\xeb\x55\xd3\x8a" + "\xf3\x33\x88\x86\x04\xf6\xb5\xf0" + "\x47\x39\x17\xc1\x40\x2b\x80\x09" + "\x9d\xca\x5c\xbc\x20\x70\x75\xc0", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x02\x76\x5a\x2e\x63" + "\x33\x9f\xc9\x9a\x66\x32\x0d\xb7" + "\x2a\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x27\x54\x77\x61\x73\x20\x62\x72" + "\x69\x6c\x6c\x69\x67\x2c\x20\x61" + "\x6e\x64\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x73" + "\x6c\x69\x74\x68\x79\x20\x74\x6f" + "\x76\x65\x73\x0a\x44\x69\x64\x20" + "\x67\x79\x72\x65\x20\x61\x6e\x64" + "\x20\x67\x69\x6d\x62\x6c\x65\x20" + "\x69\x6e\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x77" + "\x61\x62\x65\x3a\x0a\x41\x6c\x6c" + "\x20\x6d\x69\x6d\x73\x79\x20\x77" + "\x65\x72\x65\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20" + "\x62\x6f\x72\x6f\x67\x6f\x76\x65" + "\x73\x2c\x0a\x41\x6e\x64\x20\x74" + "\x68\x65\x20\x6d\x6f\x6d\x65\x20" + "\x72\x61\x74\x68\x73\x20\x6f\x75" + "\x74\x67\x72\x61\x62\x65\x2e", + .ctext = "\xb9\x68\xbc\x6a\x24\xbc\xcc\xd8" + "\x9b\x2a\x8d\x5b\x96\xaf\x56\xe3" + "\x11\x61\xe7\xa7\x9b\xce\x4e\x7d" + "\x60\x02\x48\xac\xeb\xd5\x3a\x26" + "\x9d\x77\x3b\xb5\x32\x13\x86\x8e" + "\x20\x82\x26\x72\xae\x64\x1b\x7e" + "\x2e\x01\x68\xb4\x87\x45\xa1\x24" + "\xe4\x48\x40\xf0\xaa\xac\xee\xa9" + "\xfc\x31\xad\x9d\x89\xa3\xbb\xd2" + "\xe4\x25\x13\xad\x0f\x5e\xdf\x3c" + "\x27\xab\xb8\x62\x46\x22\x30\x48" + "\x55\x2c\x4e\x84\x78\x1d\x0d\x34" + "\x8d\x3c\x91\x0a\x7f\x5b\x19\x9f" + "\x97\x05\x4c\xa7\x62\x47\x8b\xc5" + "\x44\x2e\x20\x33\xdd\xa0\x82\xa9" + "\x25\x76\x37\xe6\x3c\x67\x5b", + .len = 127, + }, { + .key = "\x1c\x92\x40\xa5\xeb\x55\xd3\x8a" + "\xf3\x33\x88\x86\x04\xf6\xb5\xf0" + "\x47\x39\x17\xc1\x40\x2b\x80\x09" + "\x9d\xca\x5c\xbc\x20\x70\x75\xc0", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x01\x31\x58\xa3\x5a" + "\x25\x5d\x05\x17\x58\xe9\x5e\xd4" + "\x1c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + .ptext = "\x49\xee\xe0\xdc\x24\x90\x40\xcd" + "\xc5\x40\x8f\x47\x05\xbc\xdd\x81" + "\x47\xc6\x8d\xe6\xb1\x8f\xd7\xcb" + "\x09\x0e\x6e\x22\x48\x1f\xbf\xb8" + "\x5c\xf7\x1e\x8a\xc1\x23\xf2\xd4" + "\x19\x4b\x01\x0f\x4e\xa4\x43\xce" + "\x01\xc6\x67\xda\x03\x91\x18\x90" + "\xa5\xa4\x8e\x45\x03\xb3\x2d\xac" + "\x74\x92\xd3\x53\x47\xc8\xdd\x25" + "\x53\x6c\x02\x03\x87\x0d\x11\x0c" + "\x58\xe3\x12\x18\xfd\x2a\x5b\x40" + "\x0c\x30\xf0\xb8\x3f\x43\xce\xae" + "\x65\x3a\x7d\x7c\xf4\x54\xaa\xcc" + "\x33\x97\xc3\x77\xba\xc5\x70\xde" + "\xd7\xd5\x13\xa5\x65\xc4\x5f\x0f" + "\x46\x1a\x0d\x97\xb5\xf3\xbb\x3c" + "\x84\x0f\x2b\xc5\xaa\xea\xf2\x6c" + "\xc9\xb5\x0c\xee\x15\xf3\x7d\xbe" + "\x9f\x7b\x5a\xa6\xae\x4f\x83\xb6" + "\x79\x49\x41\xf4\x58\x18\xcb\x86" + "\x7f\x30\x0e\xf8\x7d\x44\x36\xea" + "\x75\xeb\x88\x84\x40\x3c\xad\x4f" + "\x6f\x31\x6b\xaa\x5d\xe5\xa5\xc5" + "\x21\x66\xe9\xa7\xe3\xb2\x15\x88" + "\x78\xf6\x79\xa1\x59\x47\x12\x4e" + "\x9f\x9f\x64\x1a\xa0\x22\x5b\x08" + "\xbe\x7c\x36\xc2\x2b\x66\x33\x1b" + "\xdd\x60\x71\xf7\x47\x8c\x61\xc3" + "\xda\x8a\x78\x1e\x16\xfa\x1e\x86" + "\x81\xa6\x17\x2a\xa7\xb5\xc2\xe7" + "\xa4\xc7\x42\xf1\xcf\x6a\xca\xb4" + "\x45\xcf\xf3\x93\xf0\xe7\xea\xf6" + "\xf4\xe6\x33\x43\x84\x93\xa5\x67" + "\x9b\x16\x58\x58\x80\x0f\x2b\x5c" + "\x24\x74\x75\x7f\x95\x81\xb7\x30" + "\x7a\x33\xa7\xf7\x94\x87\x32\x27" + "\x10\x5d\x14\x4c\x43\x29\xdd\x26" + "\xbd\x3e\x3c\x0e\xfe\x0e\xa5\x10" + "\xea\x6b\x64\xfd\x73\xc6\xed\xec" + "\xa8\xc9\xbf\xb3\xba\x0b\x4d\x07" + "\x70\xfc\x16\xfd\x79\x1e\xd7\xc5" + "\x49\x4e\x1c\x8b\x8d\x79\x1b\xb1" + "\xec\xca\x60\x09\x4c\x6a\xd5\x09" + "\x49\x46\x00\x88\x22\x8d\xce\xea" + "\xb1\x17\x11\xde\x42\xd2\x23\xc1" + "\x72\x11\xf5\x50\x73\x04\x40\x47" + "\xf9\x5d\xe7\xa7\x26\xb1\x7e\xb0" + "\x3f\x58\xc1\x52\xab\x12\x67\x9d" + "\x3f\x43\x4b\x68\xd4\x9c\x68\x38" + "\x07\x8a\x2d\x3e\xf3\xaf\x6a\x4b" + "\xf9\xe5\x31\x69\x22\xf9\xa6\x69" + "\xc6\x9c\x96\x9a\x12\x35\x95\x1d" + "\x95\xd5\xdd\xbe\xbf\x93\x53\x24" + "\xfd\xeb\xc2\x0a\x64\xb0\x77\x00" + "\x6f\x88\xc4\x37\x18\x69\x7c\xd7" + "\x41\x92\x55\x4c\x03\xa1\x9a\x4b" + "\x15\xe5\xdf\x7f\x37\x33\x72\xc1" + "\x8b\x10\x67\xa3\x01\x57\x94\x25" + "\x7b\x38\x71\x7e\xdd\x1e\xcc\x73" + "\x55\xd2\x8e\xeb\x07\xdd\xf1\xda" + "\x58\xb1\x47\x90\xfe\x42\x21\x72" + "\xa3\x54\x7a\xa0\x40\xec\x9f\xdd" + "\xc6\x84\x6e\xca\xae\xe3\x68\xb4" + "\x9d\xe4\x78\xff\x57\xf2\xf8\x1b" + "\x03\xa1\x31\xd9\xde\x8d\xf5\x22" + "\x9c\xdd\x20\xa4\x1e\x27\xb1\x76" + "\x4f\x44\x55\xe2\x9b\xa1\x9c\xfe" + "\x54\xf7\x27\x1b\xf4\xde\x02\xf5" + "\x1b\x55\x48\x5c\xdc\x21\x4b\x9e" + "\x4b\x6e\xed\x46\x23\xdc\x65\xb2" + "\xcf\x79\x5f\x28\xe0\x9e\x8b\xe7" + "\x4c\x9d\x8a\xff\xc1\xa6\x28\xb8" + "\x65\x69\x8a\x45\x29\xef\x74\x85" + "\xde\x79\xc7\x08\xae\x30\xb0\xf4" + "\xa3\x1d\x51\x41\xab\xce\xcb\xf6" + "\xb5\xd8\x6d\xe0\x85\xe1\x98\xb3" + "\x43\xbb\x86\x83\x0a\xa0\xf5\xb7" + "\x04\x0b\xfa\x71\x1f\xb0\xf6\xd9" + "\x13\x00\x15\xf0\xc7\xeb\x0d\x5a" + "\x9f\xd7\xb9\x6c\x65\x14\x22\x45" + "\x6e\x45\x32\x3e\x7e\x60\x1a\x12" + "\x97\x82\x14\xfb\xaa\x04\x22\xfa" + "\xa0\xe5\x7e\x8c\x78\x02\x48\x5d" + "\x78\x33\x5a\x7c\xad\xdb\x29\xce" + "\xbb\x8b\x61\xa4\xb7\x42\xe2\xac" + "\x8b\x1a\xd9\x2f\x0b\x8b\x62\x21" + "\x83\x35\x7e\xad\x73\xc2\xb5\x6c" + "\x10\x26\x38\x07\xe5\xc7\x36\x80" + "\xe2\x23\x12\x61\xf5\x48\x4b\x2b" + "\xc5\xdf\x15\xd9\x87\x01\xaa\xac" + "\x1e\x7c\xad\x73\x78\x18\x63\xe0" + "\x8b\x9f\x81\xd8\x12\x6a\x28\x10" + "\xbe\x04\x68\x8a\x09\x7c\x1b\x1c" + "\x83\x66\x80\x47\x80\xe8\xfd\x35" + "\x1c\x97\x6f\xae\x49\x10\x66\xcc" + "\xc6\xd8\xcc\x3a\x84\x91\x20\x77" + "\x72\xe4\x24\xd2\x37\x9f\xc5\xc9" + "\x25\x94\x10\x5f\x40\x00\x64\x99" + "\xdc\xae\xd7\x21\x09\x78\x50\x15" + "\xac\x5f\xc6\x2c\xa2\x0b\xa9\x39" + "\x87\x6e\x6d\xab\xde\x08\x51\x16" + "\xc7\x13\xe9\xea\xed\x06\x8e\x2c" + "\xf8\x37\x8c\xf0\xa6\x96\x8d\x43" + "\xb6\x98\x37\xb2\x43\xed\xde\xdf" + "\x89\x1a\xe7\xeb\x9d\xa1\x7b\x0b" + "\x77\xb0\xe2\x75\xc0\xf1\x98\xd9" + "\x80\x55\xc9\x34\x91\xd1\x59\xe8" + "\x4b\x0f\xc1\xa9\x4b\x7a\x84\x06" + "\x20\xa8\x5d\xfa\xd1\xde\x70\x56" + "\x2f\x9e\x91\x9c\x20\xb3\x24\xd8" + "\x84\x3d\xe1\x8c\x7e\x62\x52\xe5" + "\x44\x4b\x9f\xc2\x93\x03\xea\x2b" + "\x59\xc5\xfa\x3f\x91\x2b\xbb\x23" + "\xf5\xb2\x7b\xf5\x38\xaf\xb3\xee" + "\x63\xdc\x7b\xd1\xff\xaa\x8b\xab" + "\x82\x6b\x37\x04\xeb\x74\xbe\x79" + "\xb9\x83\x90\xef\x20\x59\x46\xff" + "\xe9\x97\x3e\x2f\xee\xb6\x64\x18" + "\x38\x4c\x7a\x4a\xf9\x61\xe8\x9a" + "\xa1\xb5\x01\xa6\x47\xd3\x11\xd4" + "\xce\xd3\x91\x49\x88\xc7\xb8\x4d" + "\xb1\xb9\x07\x6d\x16\x72\xae\x46" + "\x5e\x03\xa1\x4b\xb6\x02\x30\xa8" + "\x3d\xa9\x07\x2a\x7c\x19\xe7\x62" + "\x87\xe3\x82\x2f\x6f\xe1\x09\xd9" + "\x94\x97\xea\xdd\x58\x9e\xae\x76" + "\x7e\x35\xe5\xb4\xda\x7e\xf4\xde" + "\xf7\x32\x87\xcd\x93\xbf\x11\x56" + "\x11\xbe\x08\x74\xe1\x69\xad\xe2" + "\xd7\xf8\x86\x75\x8a\x3c\xa4\xbe" + "\x70\xa7\x1b\xfc\x0b\x44\x2a\x76" + "\x35\xea\x5d\x85\x81\xaf\x85\xeb" + "\xa0\x1c\x61\xc2\xf7\x4f\xa5\xdc" + "\x02\x7f\xf6\x95\x40\x6e\x8a\x9a" + "\xf3\x5d\x25\x6e\x14\x3a\x22\xc9" + "\x37\x1c\xeb\x46\x54\x3f\xa5\x91" + "\xc2\xb5\x8c\xfe\x53\x08\x97\x32" + "\x1b\xb2\x30\x27\xfe\x25\x5d\xdc" + "\x08\x87\xd0\xe5\x94\x1a\xd4\xf1" + "\xfe\xd6\xb4\xa3\xe6\x74\x81\x3c" + "\x1b\xb7\x31\xa7\x22\xfd\xd4\xdd" + "\x20\x4e\x7c\x51\xb0\x60\x73\xb8" + "\x9c\xac\x91\x90\x7e\x01\xb0\xe1" + "\x8a\x2f\x75\x1c\x53\x2a\x98\x2a" + "\x06\x52\x95\x52\xb2\xe9\x25\x2e" + "\x4c\xe2\x5a\x00\xb2\x13\x81\x03" + "\x77\x66\x0d\xa5\x99\xda\x4e\x8c" + "\xac\xf3\x13\x53\x27\x45\xaf\x64" + "\x46\xdc\xea\x23\xda\x97\xd1\xab" + "\x7d\x6c\x30\x96\x1f\xbc\x06\x34" + "\x18\x0b\x5e\x21\x35\x11\x8d\x4c" + "\xe0\x2d\xe9\x50\x16\x74\x81\xa8" + "\xb4\x34\xb9\x72\x42\xa6\xcc\xbc" + "\xca\x34\x83\x27\x10\x5b\x68\x45" + "\x8f\x52\x22\x0c\x55\x3d\x29\x7c" + "\xe3\xc0\x66\x05\x42\x91\x5f\x58" + "\xfe\x4a\x62\xd9\x8c\xa9\x04\x19" + "\x04\xa9\x08\x4b\x57\xfc\x67\x53" + "\x08\x7c\xbc\x66\x8a\xb0\xb6\x9f" + "\x92\xd6\x41\x7c\x5b\x2a\x00\x79" + "\x72", + .ctext = "\xe1\xb6\x8b\x5c\x80\xb8\xcc\x08" + "\x1b\x84\xb2\xd1\xad\xa4\x70\xac" + "\x67\xa9\x39\x27\xac\xb4\x5b\xb7" + "\x4c\x26\x77\x23\x1d\xce\x0a\xbe" + "\x18\x9e\x42\x8b\xbd\x7f\xd6\xf1" + "\xf1\x6b\xe2\x6d\x7f\x92\x0e\xcb" + "\xb8\x79\xba\xb4\xac\x7e\x2d\xc0" + "\x9e\x83\x81\x91\xd5\xea\xc3\x12" + "\x8d\xa4\x26\x70\xa4\xf9\x71\x0b" + "\xbd\x2e\xe1\xb3\x80\x42\x25\xb3" + "\x0b\x31\x99\xe1\x0d\xde\xa6\x90" + "\xf2\xa3\x10\xf7\xe5\xf3\x83\x1e" + "\x2c\xfb\x4d\xf0\x45\x3d\x28\x3c" + "\xb8\xf1\xcb\xbf\x67\xd8\x43\x5a" + "\x9d\x7b\x73\x29\x88\x0f\x13\x06" + "\x37\x50\x0d\x7c\xe6\x9b\x07\xdd" + "\x7e\x01\x1f\x81\x90\x10\x69\xdb" + "\xa4\xad\x8a\x5e\xac\x30\x72\xf2" + "\x36\xcd\xe3\x23\x49\x02\x93\xfa" + "\x3d\xbb\xe2\x98\x83\xeb\xe9\x8d" + "\xb3\x8f\x11\xaa\x53\xdb\xaf\x2e" + "\x95\x13\x99\x3d\x71\xbd\x32\x92" + "\xdd\xfc\x9d\x5e\x6f\x63\x2c\xee" + "\x91\x1f\x4c\x64\x3d\x87\x55\x0f" + "\xcc\x3d\x89\x61\x53\x02\x57\x8f" + "\xe4\x77\x29\x32\xaf\xa6\x2f\x0a" + "\xae\x3c\x3f\x3f\xf4\xfb\x65\x52" + "\xc5\xc1\x78\x78\x53\x28\xad\xed" + "\xd1\x67\x37\xc7\x59\x70\xcd\x0a" + "\xb8\x0f\x80\x51\x9f\xc0\x12\x5e" + "\x06\x0a\x7e\xec\x24\x5f\x73\x00" + "\xb1\x0b\x31\x47\x4f\x73\x8d\xb4" + "\xce\xf3\x55\x45\x6c\x84\x27\xba" + "\xb9\x6f\x03\x4a\xeb\x98\x88\x6e" + "\x53\xed\x25\x19\x0d\x8f\xfe\xca" + "\x60\xe5\x00\x93\x6e\x3c\xff\x19" + "\xae\x08\x3b\x8a\xa6\x84\x05\xfe" + "\x9b\x59\xa0\x8c\xc8\x05\x45\xf5" + "\x05\x37\xdc\x45\x6f\x8b\x95\x8c" + "\x4e\x11\x45\x7a\xce\x21\xa5\xf7" + "\x71\x67\xb9\xce\xd7\xf9\xe9\x5e" + "\x60\xf5\x53\x7a\xa8\x85\x14\x03" + "\xa0\x92\xec\xf3\x51\x80\x84\xc4" + "\xdc\x11\x9e\x57\xce\x4b\x45\xcf" + "\x90\x95\x85\x0b\x96\xe9\xee\x35" + "\x10\xb8\x9b\xf2\x59\x4a\xc6\x7e" + "\x85\xe5\x6f\x38\x51\x93\x40\x0c" + "\x99\xd7\x7f\x32\xa8\x06\x27\xd1" + "\x2b\xd5\xb5\x3a\x1a\xe1\x5e\xda" + "\xcd\x5a\x50\x30\x3c\xc7\xe7\x65" + "\xa6\x07\x0b\x98\x91\xc6\x20\x27" + "\x2a\x03\x63\x1b\x1e\x3d\xaf\xc8" + "\x71\x48\x46\x6a\x64\x28\xf9\x3d" + "\xd1\x1d\xab\xc8\x40\x76\xc2\x39" + "\x4e\x00\x75\xd2\x0e\x82\x58\x8c" + "\xd3\x73\x5a\xea\x46\x89\xbe\xfd" + "\x4e\x2c\x0d\x94\xaa\x9b\x68\xac" + "\x86\x87\x30\x7e\xa9\x16\xcd\x59" + "\xd2\xa6\xbe\x0a\xd8\xf5\xfd\x2d" + "\x49\x69\xd2\x1a\x90\xd2\x1b\xed" + "\xff\x71\x04\x87\x87\x21\xc4\xb8" + "\x1f\x5b\x51\x33\xd0\xd6\x59\x9a" + "\x03\x0e\xd3\x8b\xfb\x57\x73\xfd" + "\x5a\x52\x63\x82\xc8\x85\x2f\xcb" + "\x74\x6d\x4e\xd9\x68\x37\x85\x6a" + "\xd4\xfb\x94\xed\x8d\xd1\x1a\xaf" + "\x76\xa7\xb7\x88\xd0\x2b\x4e\xda" + "\xec\x99\x94\x27\x6f\x87\x8c\xdf" + "\x4b\x5e\xa6\x66\xdd\xcb\x33\x7b" + "\x64\x94\x31\xa8\x37\xa6\x1d\xdb" + "\x0d\x5c\x93\xa4\x40\xf9\x30\x53" + "\x4b\x74\x8d\xdd\xf6\xde\x3c\xac" + "\x5c\x80\x01\x3a\xef\xb1\x9a\x02" + "\x0c\x22\x8e\xe7\x44\x09\x74\x4c" + "\xf2\x9a\x27\x69\x7f\x12\x32\x36" + "\xde\x92\xdf\xde\x8f\x5b\x31\xab" + "\x4a\x01\x26\xe0\xb1\xda\xe8\x37" + "\x21\x64\xe8\xff\x69\xfc\x9e\x41" + "\xd2\x96\x2d\x18\x64\x98\x33\x78" + "\x24\x61\x73\x9b\x47\x29\xf1\xa7" + "\xcb\x27\x0f\xf0\x85\x6d\x8c\x9d" + "\x2c\x95\x9e\xe5\xb2\x8e\x30\x29" + "\x78\x8a\x9d\x65\xb4\x8e\xde\x7b" + "\xd9\x00\x50\xf5\x7f\x81\xc3\x1b" + "\x25\x85\xeb\xc2\x8c\x33\x22\x1e" + "\x68\x38\x22\x30\xd8\x2e\x00\x98" + "\x85\x16\x06\x56\xb4\x81\x74\x20" + "\x95\xdb\x1c\x05\x19\xe8\x23\x4d" + "\x65\x5d\xcc\xd8\x7f\xc4\x2d\x0f" + "\x57\x26\x71\x07\xad\xaa\x71\x9f" + "\x19\x76\x2f\x25\x51\x88\xe4\xc0" + "\x82\x6e\x08\x05\x37\x04\xee\x25" + "\x23\x90\xe9\x4e\xce\x9b\x16\xc1" + "\x31\xe7\x6e\x2c\x1b\xe1\x85\x9a" + "\x0c\x8c\xbb\x12\x1e\x68\x7b\x93" + "\xa9\x3c\x39\x56\x23\x3e\x6e\xc7" + "\x77\x84\xd3\xe0\x86\x59\xaa\xb9" + "\xd5\x53\x58\xc9\x0a\x83\x5f\x85" + "\xd8\x47\x14\x67\x8a\x3c\x17\xe0" + "\xab\x02\x51\xea\xf1\xf0\x4f\x30" + "\x7d\xe0\x92\xc2\x5f\xfb\x19\x5a" + "\x3f\xbd\xf4\x39\xa4\x31\x0c\x39" + "\xd1\xae\x4e\xf7\x65\x7f\x1f\xce" + "\xc2\x39\xd1\x84\xd4\xe5\x02\xe0" + "\x58\xaa\xf1\x5e\x81\xaf\x7f\x72" + "\x0f\x08\x99\x43\xb9\xd8\xac\x41" + "\x35\x55\xf2\xb2\xd4\x98\xb8\x3b" + "\x2b\x3c\x3e\x16\x06\x31\xfc\x79" + "\x47\x38\x63\x51\xc5\xd0\x26\xd7" + "\x43\xb4\x2b\xd9\xc5\x05\xf2\x9d" + "\x18\xc9\x26\x82\x56\xd2\x11\x05" + "\xb6\x89\xb4\x43\x9c\xb5\x9d\x11" + "\x6c\x83\x37\x71\x27\x1c\xae\xbf" + "\xcd\x57\xd2\xee\x0d\x5a\x15\x26" + "\x67\x88\x80\x80\x1b\xdc\xc1\x62" + "\xdd\x4c\xff\x92\x5c\x6c\xe1\xa0" + "\xe3\x79\xa9\x65\x8c\x8c\x14\x42" + "\xe5\x11\xd2\x1a\xad\xa9\x56\x6f" + "\x98\xfc\x8a\x7b\x56\x1f\xc6\xc1" + "\x52\x12\x92\x9b\x41\x0f\x4b\xae" + "\x1b\x4a\xbc\xfe\x23\xb6\x94\x70" + "\x04\x30\x9e\x69\x47\xbe\xb8\x8f" + "\xca\x45\xd7\x8a\xf4\x78\x3e\xaa" + "\x71\x17\xd8\x1e\xb8\x11\x8f\xbc" + "\xc8\x1a\x65\x7b\x41\x89\x72\xc7" + "\x5f\xbe\xc5\x2a\xdb\x5c\x54\xf9" + "\x25\xa3\x7a\x80\x56\x9c\x8c\xab" + "\x26\x19\x10\x36\xa6\xf3\x14\x79" + "\x40\x98\x70\x68\xb7\x35\xd9\xb9" + "\x27\xd4\xe7\x74\x5b\x3d\x97\xb4" + "\xd9\xaa\xd9\xf2\xb5\x14\x84\x1f" + "\xa9\xde\x12\x44\x5b\x00\xc0\xbc" + "\xc8\x11\x25\x1b\x67\x7a\x15\x72" + "\xa6\x31\x6f\xf4\x68\x7a\x86\x9d" + "\x43\x1c\x5f\x16\xd3\xad\x2e\x52" + "\xf3\xb4\xc3\xfa\x27\x2e\x68\x6c" + "\x06\xe7\x4c\x4f\xa2\xe0\xe4\x21" + "\x5d\x9e\x33\x58\x8d\xbf\xd5\x70" + "\xf8\x80\xa5\xdd\xe7\x18\x79\xfa" + "\x7b\xfd\x09\x69\x2c\x37\x32\xa8" + "\x65\xfa\x8d\x8b\x5c\xcc\xe8\xf3" + "\x37\xf6\xa6\xc6\x5c\xa2\x66\x79" + "\xfa\x8a\xa7\xd1\x0b\x2e\x1b\x5e" + "\x95\x35\x00\x76\xae\x42\xf7\x50" + "\x51\x78\xfb\xb4\x28\x24\xde\x1a" + "\x70\x8b\xed\xca\x3c\x5e\xe4\xbd" + "\x28\xb5\xf3\x76\x4f\x67\x5d\x81" + "\xb2\x60\x87\xd9\x7b\x19\x1a\xa7" + "\x79\xa2\xfa\x3f\x9e\xa9\xd7\x25" + "\x61\xe1\x74\x31\xa2\x77\xa0\x1b" + "\xf6\xf7\xcb\xc5\xaa\x9e\xce\xf9" + "\x9b\x96\xef\x51\xc3\x1a\x44\x96" + "\xae\x17\x50\xab\x29\x08\xda\xcc" + "\x1a\xb3\x12\xd0\x24\xe4\xe2\xe0" + "\xc6\xe3\xcc\x82\xd0\xba\x47\x4c" + "\x3f\x49\xd7\xe8\xb6\x61\xaa\x65" + "\x25\x18\x40\x2d\x62\x25\x02\x71" + "\x61\xa2\xc1\xb2\x13\xd2\x71\x3f" + "\x43\x1a\xc9\x09\x92\xff\xd5\x57" + "\xf0\xfc\x5e\x1c\xf1\xf5\xf9\xf3" + "\x5b", + .len = 1281, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 3, + .tap = { 1200, 1, 80 }, + }, +}; + /* * CTS (Cipher Text Stealing) mode tests */ diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h index ae79e9983c72..3d261f5cd156 100644 --- a/include/crypto/chacha.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ * XChaCha extends ChaCha's nonce to 192 bits, while provably retaining ChaCha's * security. Here they share the same key size, tfm context, and setkey * function; only their IV size and encrypt/decrypt function differ. + * + * The ChaCha paper specifies 20, 12, and 8-round variants. In general, it is + * recommended to use the 20-round variant ChaCha20. However, the other + * variants can be needed in some performance-sensitive scenarios. The generic + * ChaCha code currently allows only the 20 and 12-round variants. */ #ifndef _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H @@ -39,6 +44,8 @@ void crypto_chacha_init(u32 *state, struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv); int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keysize); +int crypto_chacha12_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keysize); int crypto_chacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); int crypto_xchacha_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req); diff --git a/lib/chacha.c b/lib/chacha.c index 1bdc688c18df..a46d2832dbab 100644 --- a/lib/chacha.c +++ b/lib/chacha.c @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds) int i; /* whitelist the allowed round counts */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(nrounds != 20); + WARN_ON_ONCE(nrounds != 20 && nrounds != 12); for (i = 0; i < nrounds; i += 2) { x[0] += x[4]; x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0], 16); @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds) * chacha_block - generate one keystream block and increment block counter * @state: input state matrix (16 32-bit words) * @stream: output keystream block (64 bytes) - * @nrounds: number of rounds (currently must be 20) + * @nrounds: number of rounds (20 or 12; 20 is recommended) * * This is the ChaCha core, a function from 64-byte strings to 64-byte strings. * The caller has already converted the endianness of the input. This function @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_block); * hchacha_block - abbreviated ChaCha core, for XChaCha * @in: input state matrix (16 32-bit words) * @out: output (8 32-bit words) - * @nrounds: number of rounds (currently must be 20) + * @nrounds: number of rounds (20 or 12; 20 is recommended) * * HChaCha is the ChaCha equivalent of HSalsa and is an intermediate step * towards XChaCha (see https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). HChaCha From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:17 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669363 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5D6EB175A for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5537529FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 48C5A29FF4; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:46 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0498F29FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729105AbeKFItO (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:14 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54536 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727560AbeKFItM (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:12 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 267152086B; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460423; bh=MTnniRuC21q6ao1T6Bax0ts89XPAf67g1vIPUukekYs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=moea1QgFs7FF7uqerXdzrjYtCR9je3w89V+P5nQ6zvW1X5jEY4duB8yJPsTtfXf8S H9RGHCeFFclBGLDgPr17Ip7DMPyVzuYjA429f+9O52c4XM9lNXBgaAxIbkp0ihBWt0 wDLXu4p+8xb6a4z8f9mRbk9+hpGVRhvSZQU3eavc= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 06/15] crypto: arm/chacha20 - limit the preemption-disabled section Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:17 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-7-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers To improve responsivesess, disable preemption for each step of the walk (which is at most PAGE_SIZE) rather than for the entire encryption/decryption operation. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c index 7386eb1c1889..2bc035cb8f23 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c @@ -68,22 +68,22 @@ static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) return crypto_chacha_crypt(req); - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); - kernel_neon_begin(); while (walk.nbytes > 0) { unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; if (nbytes < walk.total) nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride); + kernel_neon_begin(); chacha20_doneon(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes); + kernel_neon_end(); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); } - kernel_neon_end(); return err; } From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:18 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669381 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10745175A for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 048F329FF2 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id ED82D29FF4; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4D00A29FF7 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726848AbeKFItz (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:55 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54554 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725796AbeKFItN (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:13 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 518AA2086C; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460423; bh=MUyeKRW00GhUHdjuZ/5wsnoYZz1NYV+ac4P9PFRghkM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SyO950p3DWxjuVvspwKMvMdScqMN4cE6zC+4kpyLZ4xxNlmz6BCyVPZ/9FC/I69E7 +/PCxSGK0XL1nOSGdnrK9n7iSSYm7wde0b7fGCu5LHnMutA6NQgI4Q8s7ayVu5JRAw DK3YuFVAzuVWZu3BKnVfGNPSsQ9b97sXS4T1y0T4= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 07/15] crypto: arm/chacha20 - add XChaCha20 support Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:18 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-8-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Add an XChaCha20 implementation that is hooked up to the ARM NEON implementation of ChaCha20. This is needed for use in the Adiantum encryption mode; see the generic code patch, "crypto: chacha20-generic - add XChaCha20 support", for more details. We also update the NEON code to support HChaCha20 on one block, so we can use that in XChaCha20 rather than calling the generic HChaCha20. This required factoring the permutation out into its own macro. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-core.S | 70 ++++++++++++------ arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig index ef0c7feea6e2..0aa1471f27d2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ config CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE select CRYPTO_HASH config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON - tristate "NEON accelerated ChaCha20 symmetric cipher" + tristate "NEON accelerated ChaCha20 stream cipher algorithms" depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER select CRYPTO_CHACHA20 diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-core.S index 50e7b9896818..2335e5055d2b 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-core.S +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-core.S @@ -52,27 +52,16 @@ .fpu neon .align 5 -ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_neon) - // r0: Input state matrix, s - // r1: 1 data block output, o - // r2: 1 data block input, i - - // - // This function encrypts one ChaCha20 block by loading the state matrix - // in four NEON registers. It performs matrix operation on four words in - // parallel, but requireds shuffling to rearrange the words after each - // round. - // - - // x0..3 = s0..3 - add ip, r0, #0x20 - vld1.32 {q0-q1}, [r0] - vld1.32 {q2-q3}, [ip] - - vmov q8, q0 - vmov q9, q1 - vmov q10, q2 - vmov q11, q3 +/* + * chacha20_permute - permute one block + * + * Permute one 64-byte block where the state matrix is stored in the four NEON + * registers q0-q3. It performs matrix operations on four words in parallel, + * but requires shuffling to rearrange the words after each round. + * + * Clobbers: r3, ip, q4-q5 + */ +chacha20_permute: adr ip, .Lrol8_table mov r3, #10 @@ -142,6 +131,27 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_neon) subs r3, r3, #1 bne .Ldoubleround + bx lr +ENDPROC(chacha20_permute) + +ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_neon) + // r0: Input state matrix, s + // r1: 1 data block output, o + // r2: 1 data block input, i + push {lr} + + // x0..3 = s0..3 + add ip, r0, #0x20 + vld1.32 {q0-q1}, [r0] + vld1.32 {q2-q3}, [ip] + + vmov q8, q0 + vmov q9, q1 + vmov q10, q2 + vmov q11, q3 + + bl chacha20_permute + add ip, r2, #0x20 vld1.8 {q4-q5}, [r2] vld1.8 {q6-q7}, [ip] @@ -166,9 +176,25 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_neon) vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1] vst1.8 {q2-q3}, [ip] - bx lr + pop {pc} ENDPROC(chacha20_block_xor_neon) +ENTRY(hchacha20_block_neon) + // r0: Input state matrix, s + // r1: output (8 32-bit words) + push {lr} + + vld1.32 {q0-q1}, [r0]! + vld1.32 {q2-q3}, [r0] + + bl chacha20_permute + + vst1.32 {q0}, [r1]! + vst1.32 {q3}, [r1] + + pop {pc} +ENDPROC(hchacha20_block_neon) + .align 4 .Lctrinc: .word 0, 1, 2, 3 .Lrol8_table: .byte 3, 0, 1, 2, 7, 4, 5, 6 diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c index 2bc035cb8f23..f2d3b0f70a8d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * ChaCha20 256-bit cipher algorithm, RFC7539, ARM NEON functions + * ChaCha20 (RFC7539) and XChaCha20 stream ciphers, NEON accelerated * * Copyright (C) 2016 Linaro, Ltd. * @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ asmlinkage void chacha20_block_xor_neon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); asmlinkage void chacha20_4block_xor_neon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); +asmlinkage void hchacha20_block_neon(const u32 *state, u32 *out); static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes) @@ -57,20 +58,16 @@ static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, } } -static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) +static int chacha20_neon_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, + struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) { - struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); struct skcipher_walk walk; u32 state[16]; int err; - if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) - return crypto_chacha_crypt(req); - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); - crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, walk.iv); + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, iv); while (walk.nbytes > 0) { unsigned int nbytes = walk.nbytes; @@ -88,22 +85,73 @@ static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) return err; } -static struct skcipher_alg alg = { - .base.cra_name = "chacha20", - .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-neon", - .base.cra_priority = 300, - .base.cra_blocksize = 1, - .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), - .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - - .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, - .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, - .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE, - .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, - .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, - .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, - .encrypt = chacha20_neon, - .decrypt = chacha20_neon, +static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) + return crypto_chacha_crypt(req); + + return chacha20_neon_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv); +} + +static int xchacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct chacha_ctx subctx; + u32 state[16]; + u8 real_iv[16]; + + if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) + return crypto_xchacha_crypt(req); + + crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv); + + kernel_neon_begin(); + hchacha20_block_neon(state, subctx.key); + kernel_neon_end(); + + memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8); + memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8); + return chacha20_neon_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv); +} + +static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { + { + .base.cra_name = "chacha20", + .base.cra_driver_name = "chacha20-neon", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = CHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = chacha20_neon, + .decrypt = chacha20_neon, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "xchacha20", + .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-neon", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, + .encrypt = xchacha20_neon, + .decrypt = xchacha20_neon, + } }; static int __init chacha20_simd_mod_init(void) @@ -111,12 +159,12 @@ static int __init chacha20_simd_mod_init(void) if (!(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON)) return -ENODEV; - return crypto_register_skcipher(&alg); + return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); } static void __exit chacha20_simd_mod_fini(void) { - crypto_unregister_skcipher(&alg); + crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); } module_init(chacha20_simd_mod_init); @@ -125,3 +173,6 @@ module_exit(chacha20_simd_mod_fini); MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel "); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-neon"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-neon"); From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:19 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669391 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5E21175A for ; 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Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:13 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7CA9120881; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460423; bh=YFKl1p2YHGgY+7CvMGsu/amCi0ZUTI2HS7m9bknZIx0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=GGDZcB9Izr8Moa1Qbd29d4S4hJCCzLGZaOxTkuy9d3JhMI5sX1ZROKDxDLVPtdsKg fTeCdl/Yw1RW09wlXNfErzkN3DTsTWRrEUg7sxoYtJYRcwdTQzInfA+uKtnfLjBf8p UBQiX6Kk99fzrDKgm2Zka0VLzpIeh/udpL56qwjU= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 08/15] crypto: arm/chacha20 - refactor to allow varying number of rounds Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:19 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-9-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers In preparation for adding XChaCha12 support, rename/refactor the NEON implementation of ChaCha20 to support different numbers of rounds. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- arch/arm/crypto/Makefile | 4 +- ...hacha20-neon-core.S => chacha-neon-core.S} | 44 ++++++++------- ...hacha20-neon-glue.c => chacha-neon-glue.c} | 56 ++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) rename arch/arm/crypto/{chacha20-neon-core.S => chacha-neon-core.S} (94%) rename arch/arm/crypto/{chacha20-neon-glue.c => chacha-neon-glue.c} (72%) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile index bd5bceef0605..005482ff9504 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM) += sha1-arm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_NEON) += sha1-arm-neon.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM) += sha256-arm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM) += sha512-arm.o -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha20-neon.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha-neon.o ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE) += aes-arm-ce.o ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE) += sha1-arm-ce.o @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ aes-arm-ce-y := aes-ce-core.o aes-ce-glue.o ghash-arm-ce-y := ghash-ce-core.o ghash-ce-glue.o crct10dif-arm-ce-y := crct10dif-ce-core.o crct10dif-ce-glue.o crc32-arm-ce-y:= crc32-ce-core.o crc32-ce-glue.o -chacha20-neon-y := chacha20-neon-core.o chacha20-neon-glue.o +chacha-neon-y := chacha-neon-core.o chacha-neon-glue.o ifdef REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO quiet_cmd_perl = PERL $@ diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S similarity index 94% rename from arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-core.S rename to arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S index 2335e5055d2b..eb22926d4912 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-core.S +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * ChaCha20 256-bit cipher algorithm, RFC7539, ARM NEON functions + * ChaCha/XChaCha NEON helper functions * * Copyright (C) 2016 Linaro, Ltd. * @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ * (d) vtbl.8 + vtbl.8 (multiple of 8 bits rotations only, * needs index vector) * - * ChaCha20 has 16, 12, 8, and 7-bit rotations. For the 12 and 7-bit - * rotations, the only choices are (a) and (b). We use (a) since it takes - * two-thirds the cycles of (b) on both Cortex-A7 and Cortex-A53. + * ChaCha has 16, 12, 8, and 7-bit rotations. For the 12 and 7-bit rotations, + * the only choices are (a) and (b). We use (a) since it takes two-thirds the + * cycles of (b) on both Cortex-A7 and Cortex-A53. * * For the 16-bit rotation, we use vrev32.16 since it's consistently fastest * and doesn't need a temporary register. @@ -53,18 +53,19 @@ .align 5 /* - * chacha20_permute - permute one block + * chacha_permute - permute one block * * Permute one 64-byte block where the state matrix is stored in the four NEON * registers q0-q3. It performs matrix operations on four words in parallel, * but requires shuffling to rearrange the words after each round. * + * The round count is given in r3. + * * Clobbers: r3, ip, q4-q5 */ -chacha20_permute: +chacha_permute: adr ip, .Lrol8_table - mov r3, #10 vld1.8 {d10}, [ip, :64] .Ldoubleround: @@ -128,16 +129,17 @@ chacha20_permute: // x3 = shuffle32(x3, MASK(0, 3, 2, 1)) vext.8 q3, q3, q3, #4 - subs r3, r3, #1 + subs r3, r3, #2 bne .Ldoubleround bx lr -ENDPROC(chacha20_permute) +ENDPROC(chacha_permute) -ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_neon) +ENTRY(chacha_block_xor_neon) // r0: Input state matrix, s // r1: 1 data block output, o // r2: 1 data block input, i + // r3: nrounds push {lr} // x0..3 = s0..3 @@ -150,7 +152,7 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_neon) vmov q10, q2 vmov q11, q3 - bl chacha20_permute + bl chacha_permute add ip, r2, #0x20 vld1.8 {q4-q5}, [r2] @@ -177,30 +179,32 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_block_xor_neon) vst1.8 {q2-q3}, [ip] pop {pc} -ENDPROC(chacha20_block_xor_neon) +ENDPROC(chacha_block_xor_neon) -ENTRY(hchacha20_block_neon) +ENTRY(hchacha_block_neon) // r0: Input state matrix, s // r1: output (8 32-bit words) + // r2: nrounds push {lr} vld1.32 {q0-q1}, [r0]! vld1.32 {q2-q3}, [r0] - bl chacha20_permute + mov r3, r2 + bl chacha_permute vst1.32 {q0}, [r1]! vst1.32 {q3}, [r1] pop {pc} -ENDPROC(hchacha20_block_neon) +ENDPROC(hchacha_block_neon) .align 4 .Lctrinc: .word 0, 1, 2, 3 .Lrol8_table: .byte 3, 0, 1, 2, 7, 4, 5, 6 .align 5 -ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_neon) +ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon) push {r4-r5} mov r4, sp // preserve the stack pointer sub ip, sp, #0x20 // allocate a 32 byte buffer @@ -210,9 +214,10 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_neon) // r0: Input state matrix, s // r1: 4 data blocks output, o // r2: 4 data blocks input, i + // r3: nrounds // - // This function encrypts four consecutive ChaCha20 blocks by loading + // This function encrypts four consecutive ChaCha blocks by loading // the state matrix in NEON registers four times. The algorithm performs // each operation on the corresponding word of each state matrix, hence // requires no word shuffling. The words are re-interleaved before the @@ -245,7 +250,6 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_neon) vdup.32 q0, d0[0] adr ip, .Lrol8_table - mov r3, #10 b 1f .Ldoubleround4: @@ -443,7 +447,7 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_neon) vsri.u32 q5, q8, #25 vsri.u32 q6, q9, #25 - subs r3, r3, #1 + subs r3, r3, #2 bne .Ldoubleround4 // x0..7[0-3] are in q0-q7, x10..15[0-3] are in q10-q15. @@ -553,4 +557,4 @@ ENTRY(chacha20_4block_xor_neon) pop {r4-r5} bx lr -ENDPROC(chacha20_4block_xor_neon) +ENDPROC(chacha_4block_xor_neon) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c similarity index 72% rename from arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c rename to arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c index f2d3b0f70a8d..385557d38634 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha20-neon-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c @@ -28,24 +28,26 @@ #include #include -asmlinkage void chacha20_block_xor_neon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); -asmlinkage void chacha20_4block_xor_neon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src); -asmlinkage void hchacha20_block_neon(const u32 *state, u32 *out); - -static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, - unsigned int bytes) +asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + int nrounds); +asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + int nrounds); +asmlinkage void hchacha_block_neon(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds); + +static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int bytes, int nrounds) { u8 buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]; while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { - chacha20_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src); + chacha_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds); bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4; state[12] += 4; } while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) { - chacha20_block_xor_neon(state, dst, src); + chacha_block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds); bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; @@ -53,13 +55,13 @@ static void chacha20_doneon(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, } if (bytes) { memcpy(buf, src, bytes); - chacha20_block_xor_neon(state, buf, buf); + chacha_block_xor_neon(state, buf, buf, nrounds); memcpy(dst, buf, bytes); } } -static int chacha20_neon_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, - struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) +static int chacha_neon_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, + struct chacha_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv) { struct skcipher_walk walk; u32 state[16]; @@ -76,8 +78,8 @@ static int chacha20_neon_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride); kernel_neon_begin(); - chacha20_doneon(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - nbytes); + chacha_doneon(state, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, + nbytes, ctx->nrounds); kernel_neon_end(); err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); } @@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ static int chacha20_neon_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req, return err; } -static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) +static int chacha_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); @@ -93,10 +95,10 @@ static int chacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) if (req->cryptlen <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE || !may_use_simd()) return crypto_chacha_crypt(req); - return chacha20_neon_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv); + return chacha_neon_stream_xor(req, ctx, req->iv); } -static int xchacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) +static int xchacha_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); @@ -110,12 +112,13 @@ static int xchacha20_neon(struct skcipher_request *req) crypto_chacha_init(state, ctx, req->iv); kernel_neon_begin(); - hchacha20_block_neon(state, subctx.key); + hchacha_block_neon(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds); kernel_neon_end(); + subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds; memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8); memcpy(&real_iv[8], req->iv + 16, 8); - return chacha20_neon_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv); + return chacha_neon_stream_xor(req, &subctx, real_iv); } static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { @@ -133,8 +136,8 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, - .encrypt = chacha20_neon, - .decrypt = chacha20_neon, + .encrypt = chacha_neon, + .decrypt = chacha_neon, }, { .base.cra_name = "xchacha20", .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha20-neon", @@ -149,12 +152,12 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, - .encrypt = xchacha20_neon, - .decrypt = xchacha20_neon, + .encrypt = xchacha_neon, + .decrypt = xchacha_neon, } }; -static int __init chacha20_simd_mod_init(void) +static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void) { if (!(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON)) return -ENODEV; @@ -162,14 +165,15 @@ static int __init chacha20_simd_mod_init(void) return crypto_register_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); } -static void __exit chacha20_simd_mod_fini(void) +static void __exit chacha_simd_mod_fini(void) { crypto_unregister_skciphers(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs)); } -module_init(chacha20_simd_mod_init); -module_exit(chacha20_simd_mod_fini); +module_init(chacha_simd_mod_init); +module_exit(chacha_simd_mod_fini); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers (NEON accelerated)"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel "); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:20 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669355 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1813A175A for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0EE8929FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 035B029FF2; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:43 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1F4329FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729447AbeKFItj (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:39 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54570 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728874AbeKFItO (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:14 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A757320882; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460423; bh=UfVOfpNm8KumA3Dquyb1Ebjv7QdPISAdQPzqU9X5I5I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=tLcJOvsZfYUcdcvRuhx1XxV8QeymOvIeZ12oyz281QuN6iZOATsfWcYSNPpGWGzH9 Hdmx25fmgFFFMtmPYiMZJhaQ6rxbHbnmmnix0ryeTdL9FPDGx0+ozGsHye7QE9yqzb BZAXnJYGhs53KQUANxT8ylz6mf8wyTpp0gRbsric= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 09/15] crypto: arm/chacha - add XChaCha12 support Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:20 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-10-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Now that the 32-bit ARM NEON implementation of ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 has been refactored to support varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12. This is identical to XChaCha20 except for the number of rounds, which is 12 instead of 20. XChaCha12 is faster than XChaCha20 but has a lower security margin, though still greater than AES-256's since the best known attacks make it through only 7 rounds. See the patch "crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support" for more details about why we need XChaCha12 support. Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig index 0aa1471f27d2..cc932d9bba56 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ config CRYPTO_CRC32_ARM_CE select CRYPTO_HASH config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON - tristate "NEON accelerated ChaCha20 stream cipher algorithms" + tristate "NEON accelerated ChaCha stream cipher algorithms" depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER select CRYPTO_CHACHA20 diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c index 385557d38634..9d6fda81986d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-glue.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* - * ChaCha20 (RFC7539) and XChaCha20 stream ciphers, NEON accelerated + * ARM NEON accelerated ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers, + * including ChaCha20 (RFC7539) * * Copyright (C) 2016 Linaro, Ltd. * @@ -154,6 +155,22 @@ static struct skcipher_alg algs[] = { .setkey = crypto_chacha20_setkey, .encrypt = xchacha_neon, .decrypt = xchacha_neon, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "xchacha12", + .base.cra_driver_name = "xchacha12-neon", + .base.cra_priority = 300, + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct chacha_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = XCHACHA_IV_SIZE, + .chunksize = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .walksize = 4 * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = crypto_chacha12_setkey, + .encrypt = xchacha_neon, + .decrypt = xchacha_neon, } }; @@ -180,3 +197,5 @@ MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("chacha20-neon"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20"); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha20-neon"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xchacha12-neon"); From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:21 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669375 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AB06175A for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5053929FEE for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 440A329FF9; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5A1A29FEE for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729634AbeKFItz (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:55 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54580 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728899AbeKFItN (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:13 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D2FD020883; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460423; bh=hGqL66x/eSNCeQp150v8zDBYpR2Od2WtpCEhTQi8New=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=VklS42xhA0r7uXGlOHo1fXqkUXal1GspsEjfdUhDv6w1LSAkjwxyK4rj7b3PXOU+h tPhHPwSBmq5IRhNwKx5Bi54widbj2OULRa59LFOLLCJB4fS3/Mpr223XWcoZ32WdGW UgHajp+fghWsN8ruiY6jrr5f18Sx3/qER2GAFLxU= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 10/15] crypto: poly1305 - use structures for key and accumulator Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:21 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-11-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers In preparation for exposing a low-level Poly1305 API which implements the ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function underlying the Poly1305 MAC and supports block-aligned inputs only, create structures poly1305_key and poly1305_state which hold the limbs of the Poly1305 "r" key and accumulator, respectively. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c | 20 +++++++------ crypto/poly1305_generic.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++----------------- include/crypto/poly1305.h | 12 ++++++-- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c index f012b7e28ad1..88cc01506c84 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c @@ -83,35 +83,37 @@ static unsigned int poly1305_simd_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, if (poly1305_use_avx2 && srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) { if (unlikely(!sctx->wset)) { if (!sctx->uset) { - memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r, sizeof(sctx->u)); - poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r); + memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r.r, sizeof(sctx->u)); + poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r.r); sctx->uset = true; } memcpy(sctx->u + 5, sctx->u, sizeof(sctx->u)); - poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 5, dctx->r); + poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 5, dctx->r.r); memcpy(sctx->u + 10, sctx->u + 5, sizeof(sctx->u)); - poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 10, dctx->r); + poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u + 10, dctx->r.r); sctx->wset = true; } blocks = srclen / (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4); - poly1305_4block_avx2(dctx->h, src, dctx->r, blocks, sctx->u); + poly1305_4block_avx2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, blocks, + sctx->u); src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 * blocks; srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 * blocks; } #endif if (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)) { if (unlikely(!sctx->uset)) { - memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r, sizeof(sctx->u)); - poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r); + memcpy(sctx->u, dctx->r.r, sizeof(sctx->u)); + poly1305_simd_mult(sctx->u, dctx->r.r); sctx->uset = true; } blocks = srclen / (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2); - poly1305_2block_sse2(dctx->h, src, dctx->r, blocks, sctx->u); + poly1305_2block_sse2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, blocks, + sctx->u); src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 * blocks; srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 * blocks; } if (srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) { - poly1305_block_sse2(dctx->h, src, dctx->r, 1); + poly1305_block_sse2(dctx->h.h, src, dctx->r.r, 1); srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; } return srclen; diff --git a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c index 47d3a6b83931..a23173f351b7 100644 --- a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c +++ b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc) { struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); - memset(dctx->h, 0, sizeof(dctx->h)); + memset(dctx->h.h, 0, sizeof(dctx->h.h)); dctx->buflen = 0; dctx->rset = false; dctx->sset = false; @@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_init); static void poly1305_setrkey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *key) { /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ - dctx->r[0] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff; - dctx->r[1] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03; - dctx->r[2] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff; - dctx->r[3] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 9) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff; - dctx->r[4] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 12) >> 8) & 0x00fffff; + dctx->r.r[0] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff; + dctx->r.r[1] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03; + dctx->r.r[2] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff; + dctx->r.r[3] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 9) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff; + dctx->r.r[4] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 12) >> 8) & 0x00fffff; } static void poly1305_setskey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *key) @@ -107,22 +107,22 @@ static unsigned int poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, srclen = datalen; } - r0 = dctx->r[0]; - r1 = dctx->r[1]; - r2 = dctx->r[2]; - r3 = dctx->r[3]; - r4 = dctx->r[4]; + r0 = dctx->r.r[0]; + r1 = dctx->r.r[1]; + r2 = dctx->r.r[2]; + r3 = dctx->r.r[3]; + r4 = dctx->r.r[4]; s1 = r1 * 5; s2 = r2 * 5; s3 = r3 * 5; s4 = r4 * 5; - h0 = dctx->h[0]; - h1 = dctx->h[1]; - h2 = dctx->h[2]; - h3 = dctx->h[3]; - h4 = dctx->h[4]; + h0 = dctx->h.h[0]; + h1 = dctx->h.h[1]; + h2 = dctx->h.h[2]; + h3 = dctx->h.h[3]; + h4 = dctx->h.h[4]; while (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) { @@ -157,11 +157,11 @@ static unsigned int poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; } - dctx->h[0] = h0; - dctx->h[1] = h1; - dctx->h[2] = h2; - dctx->h[3] = h3; - dctx->h[4] = h4; + dctx->h.h[0] = h0; + dctx->h.h[1] = h1; + dctx->h.h[2] = h2; + dctx->h.h[3] = h3; + dctx->h.h[4] = h4; return srclen; } @@ -220,11 +220,11 @@ int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst) } /* fully carry h */ - h0 = dctx->h[0]; - h1 = dctx->h[1]; - h2 = dctx->h[2]; - h3 = dctx->h[3]; - h4 = dctx->h[4]; + h0 = dctx->h.h[0]; + h1 = dctx->h.h[1]; + h2 = dctx->h.h[2]; + h3 = dctx->h.h[3]; + h4 = dctx->h.h[4]; h2 += (h1 >> 26); h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff; h3 += (h2 >> 26); h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff; diff --git a/include/crypto/poly1305.h b/include/crypto/poly1305.h index f718a19da82f..493244c46664 100644 --- a/include/crypto/poly1305.h +++ b/include/crypto/poly1305.h @@ -13,13 +13,21 @@ #define POLY1305_KEY_SIZE 32 #define POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE 16 +struct poly1305_key { + u32 r[5]; /* key, base 2^26 */ +}; + +struct poly1305_state { + u32 h[5]; /* accumulator, base 2^26 */ +}; + struct poly1305_desc_ctx { /* key */ - u32 r[5]; + struct poly1305_key r; /* finalize key */ u32 s[4]; /* accumulator */ - u32 h[5]; + struct poly1305_state h; /* partial buffer */ u8 buf[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* bytes used in partial buffer */ From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:22 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669369 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16A03175A for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 09AEE29FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id F21E829FF2; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:02 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F8D329FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:28:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729668AbeKFItz (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:55 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54536 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728890AbeKFItN (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:13 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 09FCC20892; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460424; bh=vUWtNMr3XZXP/bkuWpYSdXc1HW5HQXmVoiy9lTrYUhI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=U8sYKTg00LzsZdHn17kn9kI1vngrVzlgW7Lrna3PoOmvmAUIw/HgVsrF1JChXHxue aHls3HQgQLBx8jTB3iXYQXmVhoErY/qit+OqbKPwUmKe7moxT60WEUszSItvAtkV2D O8taKw2Ry7UXKHpzhu8A0pWzSqPI764itBaEwaow= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 11/15] crypto: poly1305 - add Poly1305 core API Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:22 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-12-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Expose a low-level Poly1305 API which implements the ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function underlying the Poly1305 MAC and supports block-aligned inputs only. This is needed for Adiantum hashing, which builds an εA∆U hash function from NH and a polynomial evaluation in GF(2^{130}-5); this polynomial evaluation is identical to the one the Poly1305 MAC does. However, the crypto_shash Poly1305 API isn't very appropriate for this because its calling convention assumes it is used as a MAC, with a 32-byte "one-time key" provided for every digest. But by design, in Adiantum hashing the performance of the polynomial evaluation isn't nearly as critical as NH. So it suffices to just have some C helper functions. Thus, this patch adds such functions. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- crypto/poly1305_generic.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- include/crypto/poly1305.h | 16 ++++ 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c index a23173f351b7..2a06874204e8 100644 --- a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c +++ b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc) { struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); - memset(dctx->h.h, 0, sizeof(dctx->h.h)); + poly1305_core_init(&dctx->h); dctx->buflen = 0; dctx->rset = false; dctx->sset = false; @@ -47,23 +47,16 @@ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_init); -static void poly1305_setrkey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *key) +void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_key *key, const u8 *raw_key) { /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ - dctx->r.r[0] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff; - dctx->r.r[1] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03; - dctx->r.r[2] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff; - dctx->r.r[3] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 9) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff; - dctx->r.r[4] = (get_unaligned_le32(key + 12) >> 8) & 0x00fffff; -} - -static void poly1305_setskey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *key) -{ - dctx->s[0] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 0); - dctx->s[1] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 4); - dctx->s[2] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 8); - dctx->s[3] = get_unaligned_le32(key + 12); + key->r[0] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff; + key->r[1] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03; + key->r[2] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff; + key->r[3] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 9) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff; + key->r[4] = (get_unaligned_le32(raw_key + 12) >> 8) & 0x00fffff; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_setkey); /* * Poly1305 requires a unique key for each tag, which implies that we can't set @@ -75,13 +68,16 @@ unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, { if (!dctx->sset) { if (!dctx->rset && srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) { - poly1305_setrkey(dctx, src); + poly1305_core_setkey(&dctx->r, src); src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; dctx->rset = true; } if (srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) { - poly1305_setskey(dctx, src); + dctx->s[0] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 0); + dctx->s[1] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 4); + dctx->s[2] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 8); + dctx->s[3] = get_unaligned_le32(src + 12); src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; dctx->sset = true; @@ -91,41 +87,37 @@ unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_setdesckey); -static unsigned int poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, - const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen, - u32 hibit) +static void poly1305_blocks_internal(struct poly1305_state *state, + const struct poly1305_key *key, + const void *src, unsigned int nblocks, + u32 hibit) { u32 r0, r1, r2, r3, r4; u32 s1, s2, s3, s4; u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4; u64 d0, d1, d2, d3, d4; - unsigned int datalen; - if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) { - datalen = crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(dctx, src, srclen); - src += srclen - datalen; - srclen = datalen; - } + if (!nblocks) + return; - r0 = dctx->r.r[0]; - r1 = dctx->r.r[1]; - r2 = dctx->r.r[2]; - r3 = dctx->r.r[3]; - r4 = dctx->r.r[4]; + r0 = key->r[0]; + r1 = key->r[1]; + r2 = key->r[2]; + r3 = key->r[3]; + r4 = key->r[4]; s1 = r1 * 5; s2 = r2 * 5; s3 = r3 * 5; s4 = r4 * 5; - h0 = dctx->h.h[0]; - h1 = dctx->h.h[1]; - h2 = dctx->h.h[2]; - h3 = dctx->h.h[3]; - h4 = dctx->h.h[4]; - - while (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) { + h0 = state->h[0]; + h1 = state->h[1]; + h2 = state->h[2]; + h3 = state->h[3]; + h4 = state->h[4]; + do { /* h += m[i] */ h0 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 0) >> 0) & 0x3ffffff; h1 += (get_unaligned_le32(src + 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff; @@ -154,16 +146,36 @@ static unsigned int poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, h1 += h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff; src += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; - srclen -= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; - } + } while (--nblocks); - dctx->h.h[0] = h0; - dctx->h.h[1] = h1; - dctx->h.h[2] = h2; - dctx->h.h[3] = h3; - dctx->h.h[4] = h4; + state->h[0] = h0; + state->h[1] = h1; + state->h[2] = h2; + state->h[3] = h3; + state->h[4] = h4; +} - return srclen; +void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly1305_state *state, + const struct poly1305_key *key, + const void *src, unsigned int nblocks) +{ + poly1305_blocks_internal(state, key, src, nblocks, 1 << 24); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_blocks); + +static void poly1305_blocks(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen, u32 hibit) +{ + unsigned int datalen; + + if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) { + datalen = crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(dctx, src, srclen); + src += srclen - datalen; + srclen = datalen; + } + + poly1305_blocks_internal(&dctx->h, &dctx->r, + src, srclen / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, hibit); } int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc, @@ -187,9 +199,9 @@ int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc, } if (likely(srclen >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE)) { - bytes = poly1305_blocks(dctx, src, srclen, 1 << 24); - src += srclen - bytes; - srclen = bytes; + poly1305_blocks(dctx, src, srclen, 1 << 24); + src += srclen - (srclen % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE); + srclen %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; } if (unlikely(srclen)) { @@ -201,30 +213,18 @@ int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_update); -int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst) +void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, void *dst) { - struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); u32 h0, h1, h2, h3, h4; u32 g0, g1, g2, g3, g4; u32 mask; - u64 f = 0; - - if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) - return -ENOKEY; - - if (unlikely(dctx->buflen)) { - dctx->buf[dctx->buflen++] = 1; - memset(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, 0, - POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->buflen); - poly1305_blocks(dctx, dctx->buf, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 0); - } /* fully carry h */ - h0 = dctx->h.h[0]; - h1 = dctx->h.h[1]; - h2 = dctx->h.h[2]; - h3 = dctx->h.h[3]; - h4 = dctx->h.h[4]; + h0 = state->h[0]; + h1 = state->h[1]; + h2 = state->h[2]; + h3 = state->h[3]; + h4 = state->h[4]; h2 += (h1 >> 26); h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff; h3 += (h2 >> 26); h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff; @@ -254,16 +254,40 @@ int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst) h4 = (h4 & mask) | g4; /* h = h % (2^128) */ - h0 = (h0 >> 0) | (h1 << 26); - h1 = (h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20); - h2 = (h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14); - h3 = (h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8); + put_unaligned_le32((h0 >> 0) | (h1 << 26), dst + 0); + put_unaligned_le32((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20), dst + 4); + put_unaligned_le32((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14), dst + 8); + put_unaligned_le32((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8), dst + 12); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(poly1305_core_emit); + +int crypto_poly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst) +{ + struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + __le32 digest[4]; + u64 f = 0; + + if (unlikely(!dctx->sset)) + return -ENOKEY; + + if (unlikely(dctx->buflen)) { + dctx->buf[dctx->buflen++] = 1; + memset(dctx->buf + dctx->buflen, 0, + POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->buflen); + poly1305_blocks(dctx, dctx->buf, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 0); + } + + poly1305_core_emit(&dctx->h, digest); /* mac = (h + s) % (2^128) */ - f = (f >> 32) + h0 + dctx->s[0]; put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 0); - f = (f >> 32) + h1 + dctx->s[1]; put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4); - f = (f >> 32) + h2 + dctx->s[2]; put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8); - f = (f >> 32) + h3 + dctx->s[3]; put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12); + f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[0]) + dctx->s[0]; + put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 0); + f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[1]) + dctx->s[1]; + put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 4); + f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[2]) + dctx->s[2]; + put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 8); + f = (f >> 32) + le32_to_cpu(digest[3]) + dctx->s[3]; + put_unaligned_le32(f, dst + 12); return 0; } diff --git a/include/crypto/poly1305.h b/include/crypto/poly1305.h index 493244c46664..34317ed2071e 100644 --- a/include/crypto/poly1305.h +++ b/include/crypto/poly1305.h @@ -38,6 +38,22 @@ struct poly1305_desc_ctx { bool sset; }; +/* + * Poly1305 core functions. These implement the ε-almost-∆-universal hash + * function underlying the Poly1305 MAC, i.e. they don't add an encrypted nonce + * ("s key") at the end. They also only support block-aligned inputs. + */ +void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_key *key, const u8 *raw_key); +static inline void poly1305_core_init(struct poly1305_state *state) +{ + memset(state->h, 0, sizeof(state->h)); +} +void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly1305_state *state, + const struct poly1305_key *key, + const void *src, unsigned int nblocks); +void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, void *dst); + +/* Crypto API helper functions for the Poly1305 MAC */ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc); unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen); From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:23 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669343 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDC9F175A for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC23729FEE for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 9C40A29FF4; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F49F29FEE for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729392AbeKFItY (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:24 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54590 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728930AbeKFItQ (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:16 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 35FF920896; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460424; bh=ucRil6WpS1gTUkmlutOlzVFDEl8AhAQHJsGY4Ng5FDI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=m/i7qzLU81+G4mgG0v3I+8BnAhyT13mpKc09sz5kXUdeOIhHlqFUq5DgVFx1LiIBJ 6uvZteqzMu6oWpsv4Ka920NA+8P6hky6Jj8Lnr8FP8jq81sqW64hGlvQIHQlZAAfKL EfG0S5PzhkpSM7pdLqLPeIKEM3xIgKTx+BtcK7ww= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 12/15] crypto: nhpoly1305 - add NHPoly1305 support Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:23 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-13-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Add a generic implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. CONFIG_NHPOLY1305 is not selectable by itself since there won't be any real reason to enable it without also enabling Adiantum support. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- crypto/Kconfig | 5 + crypto/Makefile | 1 + crypto/nhpoly1305.c | 254 +++++++ crypto/testmgr.c | 6 + crypto/testmgr.h | 1240 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/crypto/nhpoly1305.h | 74 +++ 6 files changed, 1576 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/nhpoly1305.c create mode 100644 include/crypto/nhpoly1305.h diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig index 4fa0a4a0e861..431beca90362 100644 --- a/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/Kconfig @@ -493,6 +493,11 @@ config CRYPTO_KEYWRAP Support for key wrapping (NIST SP800-38F / RFC3394) without padding. +config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305 + tristate + select CRYPTO_HASH + select CRYPTO_POLY1305 + comment "Hash modes" config CRYPTO_CMAC diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile index 7e673f7c7110..87b86f221a2a 100644 --- a/crypto/Makefile +++ b/crypto/Makefile @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LRW) += lrw.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS) += xts.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR) += ctr.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEYWRAP) += keywrap.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305) += nhpoly1305.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM) += gcm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM) += ccm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20POLY1305) += chacha20poly1305.o diff --git a/crypto/nhpoly1305.c b/crypto/nhpoly1305.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c8385853f699 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/nhpoly1305.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * NHPoly1305 - ε-almost-∆-universal hash function for Adiantum + * + * Copyright 2018 Google LLC + */ + +/* + * "NHPoly1305" is the main component of Adiantum hashing. + * Specifically, it is the calculation + * + * H_M ← Poly1305_{K_M}(NH_{K_N}(pad_{128}(M))) + * + * from the procedure in section A.5 of the Adiantum paper [1]. It is an + * ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function for equal-length inputs over + * Z/(2^{128}Z), where the "∆" operation is addition. It hashes 1024-byte + * chunks of the input with the NH hash function [2], reducing the input length + * by 32x. The resulting NH digests are evaluated as a polynomial in + * GF(2^{130}-5), like in the Poly1305 MAC [3]. Note that the polynomial + * evaluation by itself would suffice to achieve the εA∆U property; NH is used + * for performance since it's over twice as fast as Poly1305. + * + * This is *not* a cryptographic hash function; do not use it as such! + * + * [1] Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors + * (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) + * [2] UMAC: Fast and Secure Message Authentication + * (https://fastcrypto.org/umac/umac_proc.pdf) + * [3] The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code + * (https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf) + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static void nh_generic(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + __le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]) +{ + u64 sums[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(NH_PAIR_STRIDE != 2); + BUILD_BUG_ON(NH_NUM_PASSES != 4); + + while (message_len) { + u32 m0 = get_unaligned_le32(message + 0); + u32 m1 = get_unaligned_le32(message + 4); + u32 m2 = get_unaligned_le32(message + 8); + u32 m3 = get_unaligned_le32(message + 12); + + sums[0] += (u64)(u32)(m0 + key[ 0]) * (u32)(m2 + key[ 2]); + sums[1] += (u64)(u32)(m0 + key[ 4]) * (u32)(m2 + key[ 6]); + sums[2] += (u64)(u32)(m0 + key[ 8]) * (u32)(m2 + key[10]); + sums[3] += (u64)(u32)(m0 + key[12]) * (u32)(m2 + key[14]); + sums[0] += (u64)(u32)(m1 + key[ 1]) * (u32)(m3 + key[ 3]); + sums[1] += (u64)(u32)(m1 + key[ 5]) * (u32)(m3 + key[ 7]); + sums[2] += (u64)(u32)(m1 + key[ 9]) * (u32)(m3 + key[11]); + sums[3] += (u64)(u32)(m1 + key[13]) * (u32)(m3 + key[15]); + key += NH_MESSAGE_UNIT / sizeof(key[0]); + message += NH_MESSAGE_UNIT; + message_len -= NH_MESSAGE_UNIT; + } + + hash[0] = cpu_to_le64(sums[0]); + hash[1] = cpu_to_le64(sums[1]); + hash[2] = cpu_to_le64(sums[2]); + hash[3] = cpu_to_le64(sums[3]); +} + +/* Pass the next NH hash value through Poly1305 */ +static void process_nh_hash_value(struct nhpoly1305_state *state, + const struct nhpoly1305_key *key) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(NH_HASH_BYTES % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); + + poly1305_core_blocks(&state->poly_state, &key->poly_key, state->nh_hash, + NH_HASH_BYTES / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +/* + * Feed the next portion of the source data, as a whole number of 16-byte + * "NH message units", through NH and Poly1305. Each NH hash is taken over + * 1024 bytes, except possibly the final one which is taken over a multiple of + * 16 bytes up to 1024. Also, in the case where data is passed in misaligned + * chunks, we combine partial hashes; the end result is the same either way. + */ +static void nhpoly1305_units(struct nhpoly1305_state *state, + const struct nhpoly1305_key *key, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen, nh_t nh_fn) +{ + do { + unsigned int bytes; + + if (state->nh_remaining == 0) { + /* Starting a new NH message */ + bytes = min_t(unsigned int, srclen, NH_MESSAGE_BYTES); + nh_fn(key->nh_key, src, bytes, state->nh_hash); + state->nh_remaining = NH_MESSAGE_BYTES - bytes; + } else { + /* Continuing a previous NH message */ + __le64 tmp_hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]; + unsigned int pos; + int i; + + pos = NH_MESSAGE_BYTES - state->nh_remaining; + bytes = min(srclen, state->nh_remaining); + nh_fn(&key->nh_key[pos / 4], src, bytes, tmp_hash); + for (i = 0; i < NH_NUM_PASSES; i++) + le64_add_cpu(&state->nh_hash[i], + le64_to_cpu(tmp_hash[i])); + state->nh_remaining -= bytes; + } + if (state->nh_remaining == 0) + process_nh_hash_value(state, key); + src += bytes; + srclen -= bytes; + } while (srclen); +} + +int crypto_nhpoly1305_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct nhpoly1305_key *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm); + int i; + + if (keylen != NHPOLY1305_KEY_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + poly1305_core_setkey(&ctx->poly_key, key); + key += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; + + for (i = 0; i < NH_KEY_WORDS; i++) + ctx->nh_key[i] = get_unaligned_le32(key + i * sizeof(u32)); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_nhpoly1305_setkey); + +int crypto_nhpoly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct nhpoly1305_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + poly1305_core_init(&state->poly_state); + state->buflen = 0; + state->nh_remaining = 0; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_nhpoly1305_init); + +int crypto_nhpoly1305_update_helper(struct shash_desc *desc, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen, + nh_t nh_fn) +{ + struct nhpoly1305_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct nhpoly1305_key *key = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); + unsigned int bytes; + + if (state->buflen) { + bytes = min(srclen, (int)NH_MESSAGE_UNIT - state->buflen); + memcpy(&state->buffer[state->buflen], src, bytes); + state->buflen += bytes; + if (state->buflen < NH_MESSAGE_UNIT) + return 0; + nhpoly1305_units(state, key, state->buffer, NH_MESSAGE_UNIT, + nh_fn); + state->buflen = 0; + src += bytes; + srclen -= bytes; + } + + if (srclen >= NH_MESSAGE_UNIT) { + bytes = round_down(srclen, NH_MESSAGE_UNIT); + nhpoly1305_units(state, key, src, bytes, nh_fn); + src += bytes; + srclen -= bytes; + } + + if (srclen) { + memcpy(state->buffer, src, srclen); + state->buflen = srclen; + } + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_nhpoly1305_update_helper); + +int crypto_nhpoly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen) +{ + return crypto_nhpoly1305_update_helper(desc, src, srclen, nh_generic); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_nhpoly1305_update); + +int crypto_nhpoly1305_final_helper(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst, nh_t nh_fn) +{ + struct nhpoly1305_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + const struct nhpoly1305_key *key = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); + + if (state->buflen) { + memset(&state->buffer[state->buflen], 0, + NH_MESSAGE_UNIT - state->buflen); + nhpoly1305_units(state, key, state->buffer, NH_MESSAGE_UNIT, + nh_fn); + } + + if (state->nh_remaining) + process_nh_hash_value(state, key); + + poly1305_core_emit(&state->poly_state, dst); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_nhpoly1305_final_helper); + +int crypto_nhpoly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst) +{ + return crypto_nhpoly1305_final_helper(desc, dst, nh_generic); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_nhpoly1305_final); + +static struct shash_alg nhpoly1305_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "nhpoly1305", + .base.cra_driver_name = "nhpoly1305-generic", + .base.cra_priority = 100, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct nhpoly1305_key), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .digestsize = POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = crypto_nhpoly1305_init, + .update = crypto_nhpoly1305_update, + .final = crypto_nhpoly1305_final, + .setkey = crypto_nhpoly1305_setkey, + .descsize = sizeof(struct nhpoly1305_state), +}; + +static int __init nhpoly1305_mod_init(void) +{ + return crypto_register_shash(&nhpoly1305_alg); +} + +static void __exit nhpoly1305_mod_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&nhpoly1305_alg); +} + +module_init(nhpoly1305_mod_init); +module_exit(nhpoly1305_mod_exit); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NHPoly1305 ε-almost-∆-universal hash function"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers "); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("nhpoly1305"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("nhpoly1305-generic"); diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index 3ff70ebc745c..039a5d850a29 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -3291,6 +3291,12 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { .dec = __VECS(morus640_dec_tv_template), } } + }, { + .alg = "nhpoly1305", + .test = alg_test_hash, + .suite = { + .hash = __VECS(nhpoly1305_tv_template) + } }, { .alg = "ofb(aes)", .test = alg_test_skcipher, diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index 3b57b2701fcb..40197d74b3d5 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 #define MAX_TAP 8 -#define MAX_KEYLEN 160 +#define MAX_KEYLEN 1088 #define MAX_IVLEN 32 struct hash_testvec { @@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ struct hash_testvec { const char *key; const char *plaintext; const char *digest; - unsigned char tap[MAX_TAP]; + unsigned short tap[MAX_TAP]; + unsigned short np; unsigned short psize; - unsigned char np; - unsigned char ksize; + unsigned short ksize; }; /* @@ -5593,6 +5593,1238 @@ static const struct hash_testvec poly1305_tv_template[] = { }, }; +/* NHPoly1305 test vectors from https://github.com/google/adiantum */ +static const struct hash_testvec nhpoly1305_tv_template[] = { + { + .key = "\xd2\x5d\x4c\xdd\x8d\x2b\x7f\x7a" + "\xd9\xbe\x71\xec\xd1\x83\x52\xe3" + "\xe1\xad\xd7\x5c\x0a\x75\x9d\xec" + "\x1d\x13\x7e\x5d\x71\x07\xc9\xe4" + "\x57\x2d\x44\x68\xcf\xd8\xd6\xc5" + "\x39\x69\x7d\x32\x75\x51\x4f\x7e" + "\xb2\x4c\xc6\x90\x51\x6e\xd9\xd6" + "\xa5\x8b\x2d\xf1\x94\xf9\xf7\x5e" + "\x2c\x84\x7b\x41\x0f\x88\x50\x89" + "\x30\xd9\xa1\x38\x46\x6c\xc0\x4f" + "\xe8\xdf\xdc\x66\xab\x24\x43\x41" + "\x91\x55\x29\x65\x86\x28\x5e\x45" + "\xd5\x2d\xb7\x80\x08\x9a\xc3\xd4" + "\x9a\x77\x0a\xd4\xef\x3e\xe6\x3f" + "\x6f\x2f\x9b\x3a\x7d\x12\x1e\x80" + "\x6c\x44\xa2\x25\xe1\xf6\x60\xe9" + "\x0d\xaf\xc5\x3c\xa5\x79\xae\x64" + "\xbc\xa0\x39\xa3\x4d\x10\xe5\x4d" + "\xd5\xe7\x89\x7a\x13\xee\x06\x78" + "\xdc\xa4\xdc\x14\x27\xe6\x49\x38" + "\xd0\xe0\x45\x25\x36\xc5\xf4\x79" + "\x2e\x9a\x98\x04\xe4\x2b\x46\x52" + "\x7c\x33\xca\xe2\x56\x51\x50\xe2" + "\xa5\x9a\xae\x18\x6a\x13\xf8\xd2" + "\x21\x31\x66\x02\xe2\xda\x8d\x7e" + "\x41\x19\xb2\x61\xee\x48\x8f\xf1" + "\x65\x24\x2e\x1e\x68\xce\x05\xd9" + "\x2a\xcf\xa5\x3a\x57\xdd\x35\x91" + "\x93\x01\xca\x95\xfc\x2b\x36\x04" + "\xe6\x96\x97\x28\xf6\x31\xfe\xa3" + "\x9d\xf6\x6a\x1e\x80\x8d\xdc\xec" + "\xaf\x66\x11\x13\x02\x88\xd5\x27" + "\x33\xb4\x1a\xcd\xa3\xf6\xde\x31" + "\x8e\xc0\x0e\x6c\xd8\x5a\x97\x5e" + "\xdd\xfd\x60\x69\x38\x46\x3f\x90" + "\x5e\x97\xd3\x32\x76\xc7\x82\x49" + "\xfe\xba\x06\x5f\x2f\xa2\xfd\xff" + "\x80\x05\x40\xe4\x33\x03\xfb\x10" + "\xc0\xde\x65\x8c\xc9\x8d\x3a\x9d" + "\xb5\x7b\x36\x4b\xb5\x0c\xcf\x00" + "\x9c\x87\xe4\x49\xad\x90\xda\x4a" + "\xdd\xbd\xff\xe2\x32\x57\xd6\x78" + "\x36\x39\x6c\xd3\x5b\x9b\x88\x59" + "\x2d\xf0\x46\xe4\x13\x0e\x2b\x35" + "\x0d\x0f\x73\x8a\x4f\x26\x84\x75" + "\x88\x3c\xc5\x58\x66\x18\x1a\xb4" + "\x64\x51\x34\x27\x1b\xa4\x11\xc9" + "\x6d\x91\x8a\xfa\x32\x60\x9d\xd7" + "\x87\xe5\xaa\x43\x72\xf8\xda\xd1" + "\x48\x44\x13\x61\xdc\x8c\x76\x17" + "\x0c\x85\x4e\xf3\xdd\xa2\x42\xd2" + "\x74\xc1\x30\x1b\xeb\x35\x31\x29" + "\x5b\xd7\x4c\x94\x46\x35\xa1\x23" + "\x50\xf2\xa2\x8e\x7e\x4f\x23\x4f" + "\x51\xff\xe2\xc9\xa3\x7d\x56\x8b" + "\x41\xf2\xd0\xc5\x57\x7e\x59\xac" + "\xbb\x65\xf3\xfe\xf7\x17\xef\x63" + "\x7c\x6f\x23\xdd\x22\x8e\xed\x84" + "\x0e\x3b\x09\xb3\xf3\xf4\x8f\xcd" + "\x37\xa8\xe1\xa7\x30\xdb\xb1\xa2" + "\x9c\xa2\xdf\x34\x17\x3e\x68\x44" + "\xd0\xde\x03\x50\xd1\x48\x6b\x20" + "\xe2\x63\x45\xa5\xea\x87\xc2\x42" + "\x95\x03\x49\x05\xed\xe0\x90\x29" + "\x1a\xb8\xcf\x9b\x43\xcf\x29\x7a" + "\x63\x17\x41\x9f\xe0\xc9\x10\xfd" + "\x2c\x56\x8c\x08\x55\xb4\xa9\x27" + "\x0f\x23\xb1\x05\x6a\x12\x46\xc7" + "\xe1\xfe\x28\x93\x93\xd7\x2f\xdc" + "\x98\x30\xdb\x75\x8a\xbe\x97\x7a" + "\x02\xfb\x8c\xba\xbe\x25\x09\xbe" + "\xce\xcb\xa2\xef\x79\x4d\x0e\x9d" + "\x1b\x9d\xb6\x39\x34\x38\xfa\x07" + "\xec\xe8\xfc\x32\x85\x1d\xf7\x85" + "\x63\xc3\x3c\xc0\x02\x75\xd7\x3f" + "\xb2\x68\x60\x66\x65\x81\xc6\xb1" + "\x42\x65\x4b\x4b\x28\xd7\xc7\xaa" + "\x9b\xd2\xdc\x1b\x01\xe0\x26\x39" + "\x01\xc1\x52\x14\xd1\x3f\xb7\xe6" + "\x61\x41\xc7\x93\xd2\xa2\x67\xc6" + "\xf7\x11\xb5\xf5\xea\xdd\x19\xfb" + "\x4d\x21\x12\xd6\x7d\xf1\x10\xb0" + "\x89\x07\xc7\x5a\x52\x73\x70\x2f" + "\x32\xef\x65\x2b\x12\xb2\xf0\xf5" + "\x20\xe0\x90\x59\x7e\x64\xf1\x4c" + "\x41\xb3\xa5\x91\x08\xe6\x5e\x5f" + "\x05\x56\x76\xb4\xb0\xcd\x70\x53" + "\x10\x48\x9c\xff\xc2\x69\x55\x24" + "\x87\xef\x84\xea\xfb\xa7\xbf\xa0" + "\x91\x04\xad\x4f\x8b\x57\x54\x4b" + "\xb6\xe9\xd1\xac\x37\x2f\x1d\x2e" + "\xab\xa5\xa4\xe8\xff\xfb\xd9\x39" + "\x2f\xb7\xac\xd1\xfe\x0b\x9a\x80" + "\x0f\xb6\xf4\x36\x39\x90\x51\xe3" + "\x0a\x2f\xb6\x45\x76\x89\xcd\x61" + "\xfe\x48\x5f\x75\x1d\x13\x00\x62" + "\x80\x24\x47\xe7\xbc\x37\xd7\xe3" + "\x15\xe8\x68\x22\xaf\x80\x6f\x4b" + "\xa8\x9f\x01\x10\x48\x14\xc3\x02" + "\x52\xd2\xc7\x75\x9b\x52\x6d\x30" + "\xac\x13\x85\xc8\xf7\xa3\x58\x4b" + "\x49\xf7\x1c\x45\x55\x8c\x39\x9a" + "\x99\x6d\x97\x27\x27\xe6\xab\xdd" + "\x2c\x42\x1b\x35\xdd\x9d\x73\xbb" + "\x6c\xf3\x64\xf1\xfb\xb9\xf7\xe6" + "\x4a\x3c\xc0\x92\xc0\x2e\xb7\x1a" + "\xbe\xab\xb3\x5a\xe5\xea\xb1\x48" + "\x58\x13\x53\x90\xfd\xc3\x8e\x54" + "\xf9\x18\x16\x73\xe8\xcb\x6d\x39" + "\x0e\xd7\xe0\xfe\xb6\x9f\x43\x97" + "\xe8\xd0\x85\x56\x83\x3e\x98\x68" + "\x7f\xbd\x95\xa8\x9a\x61\x21\x8f" + "\x06\x98\x34\xa6\xc8\xd6\x1d\xf3" + "\x3d\x43\xa4\x9a\x8c\xe5\xd3\x5a" + "\x32\xa2\x04\x22\xa4\x19\x1a\x46" + "\x42\x7e\x4d\xe5\xe0\xe6\x0e\xca" + "\xd5\x58\x9d\x2c\xaf\xda\x33\x5c" + "\xb0\x79\x9e\xc9\xfc\xca\xf0\x2f" + "\xa8\xb2\x77\xeb\x7a\xa2\xdd\x37" + "\x35\x83\x07\xd6\x02\x1a\xb6\x6c" + "\x24\xe2\x59\x08\x0e\xfd\x3e\x46" + "\xec\x40\x93\xf4\x00\x26\x4f\x2a" + "\xff\x47\x2f\xeb\x02\x92\x26\x5b" + "\x53\x17\xc2\x8d\x2a\xc7\xa3\x1b" + "\xcd\xbc\xa7\xe8\xd1\x76\xe3\x80" + "\x21\xca\x5d\x3b\xe4\x9c\x8f\xa9" + "\x5b\x7f\x29\x7f\x7c\xd8\xed\x6d" + "\x8c\xb2\x86\x85\xe7\x77\xf2\x85" + "\xab\x38\xa9\x9d\xc1\x4e\xc5\x64" + "\x33\x73\x8b\x59\x03\xad\x05\xdf" + "\x25\x98\x31\xde\xef\x13\xf1\x9b" + "\x3c\x91\x9d\x7b\xb1\xfa\xe6\xbf" + "\x5b\xed\xa5\x55\xe6\xea\x6c\x74" + "\xf4\xb9\xe4\x45\x64\x72\x81\xc2" + "\x4c\x28\xd4\xcd\xac\xe2\xde\xf9" + "\xeb\x5c\xeb\x61\x60\x5a\xe5\x28", + .ksize = 1088, + .plaintext = "", + .psize = 0, + .digest = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", + }, { + .key = "\x29\x21\x43\xcb\xcb\x13\x07\xde" + "\xbf\x48\xdf\x8a\x7f\xa2\x84\xde" + "\x72\x23\x9d\xf5\xf0\x07\xf2\x4c" + "\x20\x3a\x93\xb9\xcd\x5d\xfe\xcb" + "\x99\x2c\x2b\x58\xc6\x50\x5f\x94" + "\x56\xc3\x7c\x0d\x02\x3f\xb8\x5e" + "\x7b\xc0\x6c\x51\x34\x76\xc0\x0e" + "\xc6\x22\xc8\x9e\x92\xa0\x21\xc9" + "\x85\x5c\x7c\xf8\xe2\x64\x47\xc9" + "\xe4\xa2\x57\x93\xf8\xa2\x69\xcd" + "\x62\x98\x99\xf4\xd7\x7b\x14\xb1" + "\xd8\x05\xff\x04\x15\xc9\xe1\x6e" + "\x9b\xe6\x50\x6b\x0b\x3f\x22\x1f" + "\x08\xde\x0c\x5b\x08\x7e\xc6\x2f" + "\x6c\xed\xd6\xb2\x15\xa4\xb3\xf9" + "\xa7\x46\x38\x2a\xea\x69\xa5\xde" + "\x02\xc3\x96\x89\x4d\x55\x3b\xed" + "\x3d\x3a\x85\x77\xbf\x97\x45\x5c" + "\x9e\x02\x69\xe2\x1b\x68\xbe\x96" + "\xfb\x64\x6f\x0f\xf6\x06\x40\x67" + "\xfa\x04\xe3\x55\xfa\xbe\xa4\x60" + "\xef\x21\x66\x97\xe6\x9d\x5c\x1f" + "\x62\x37\xaa\x31\xde\xe4\x9c\x28" + "\x95\xe0\x22\x86\xf4\x4d\xf3\x07" + "\xfd\x5f\x3a\x54\x2c\x51\x80\x71" + "\xba\x78\x69\x5b\x65\xab\x1f\x81" + "\xed\x3b\xff\x34\xa3\xfb\xbc\x73" + "\x66\x7d\x13\x7f\xdf\x6e\xe2\xe2" + "\xeb\x4f\x6c\xda\x7d\x33\x57\xd0" + "\xd3\x7c\x95\x4f\x33\x58\x21\xc7" + "\xc0\xe5\x6f\x42\x26\xc6\x1f\x5e" + "\x85\x1b\x98\x9a\xa2\x1e\x55\x77" + "\x23\xdf\x81\x5e\x79\x55\x05\xfc" + "\xfb\xda\xee\xba\x5a\xba\xf7\x77" + "\x7f\x0e\xd3\xe1\x37\xfe\x8d\x2b" + "\xd5\x3f\xfb\xd0\xc0\x3c\x0b\x3f" + "\xcf\x3c\x14\xcf\xfb\x46\x72\x4c" + "\x1f\x39\xe2\xda\x03\x71\x6d\x23" + "\xef\x93\xcd\x39\xd9\x37\x80\x4d" + "\x65\x61\xd1\x2c\x03\xa9\x47\x72" + "\x4d\x1e\x0e\x16\x33\x0f\x21\x17" + "\xec\x92\xea\x6f\x37\x22\xa4\xd8" + "\x03\x33\x9e\xd8\x03\x69\x9a\xe8" + "\xb2\x57\xaf\x78\x99\x05\x12\xab" + "\x48\x90\x80\xf0\x12\x9b\x20\x64" + "\x7a\x1d\x47\x5f\xba\x3c\xf9\xc3" + "\x0a\x0d\x8d\xa1\xf9\x1b\x82\x13" + "\x3e\x0d\xec\x0a\x83\xc0\x65\xe1" + "\xe9\x95\xff\x97\xd6\xf2\xe4\xd5" + "\x86\xc0\x1f\x29\x27\x63\xd7\xde" + "\xb7\x0a\x07\x99\x04\x2d\xa3\x89" + "\xa2\x43\xcf\xf3\xe1\x43\xac\x4a" + "\x06\x97\xd0\x05\x4f\x87\xfa\xf9" + "\x9b\xbf\x52\x70\xbd\xbc\x6c\xf3" + "\x03\x13\x60\x41\x28\x09\xec\xcc" + "\xb1\x1a\xec\xd6\xfb\x6f\x2a\x89" + "\x5d\x0b\x53\x9c\x59\xc1\x84\x21" + "\x33\x51\x47\x19\x31\x9c\xd4\x0a" + "\x4d\x04\xec\x50\x90\x61\xbd\xbc" + "\x7e\xc8\xd9\x6c\x98\x1d\x45\x41" + "\x17\x5e\x97\x1c\xc5\xa8\xe8\xea" + "\x46\x58\x53\xf7\x17\xd5\xad\x11" + "\xc8\x54\xf5\x7a\x33\x90\xf5\x19" + "\xba\x36\xb4\xfc\x52\xa5\x72\x3d" + "\x14\xbb\x55\xa7\xe9\xe3\x12\xf7" + "\x1c\x30\xa2\x82\x03\xbf\x53\x91" + "\x2e\x60\x41\x9f\x5b\x69\x39\xf6" + "\x4d\xc8\xf8\x46\x7a\x7f\xa4\x98" + "\x36\xff\x06\xcb\xca\xe7\x33\xf2" + "\xc0\x4a\xf4\x3c\x14\x44\x5f\x6b" + "\x75\xef\x02\x36\x75\x08\x14\xfd" + "\x10\x8e\xa5\x58\xd0\x30\x46\x49" + "\xaf\x3a\xf8\x40\x3d\x35\xdb\x84" + "\x11\x2e\x97\x6a\xb7\x87\x7f\xad" + "\xf1\xfa\xa5\x63\x60\xd8\x5e\xbf" + "\x41\x78\x49\xcf\x77\xbb\x56\xbb" + "\x7d\x01\x67\x05\x22\xc8\x8f\x41" + "\xba\x81\xd2\xca\x2c\x38\xac\x76" + "\x06\xc1\x1a\xc2\xce\xac\x90\x67" + "\x57\x3e\x20\x12\x5b\xd9\x97\x58" + "\x65\x05\xb7\x04\x61\x7e\xd8\x3a" + "\xbf\x55\x3b\x13\xe9\x34\x5a\x37" + "\x36\xcb\x94\x45\xc5\x32\xb3\xa0" + "\x0c\x3e\x49\xc5\xd3\xed\xa7\xf0" + "\x1c\x69\xcc\xea\xcc\x83\xc9\x16" + "\x95\x72\x4b\xf4\x89\xd5\xb9\x10" + "\xf6\x2d\x60\x15\xea\x3c\x06\x66" + "\x9f\x82\xad\x17\xce\xd2\xa4\x48" + "\x7c\x65\xd9\xf8\x02\x4d\x9b\x4c" + "\x89\x06\x3a\x34\x85\x48\x89\x86" + "\xf9\x24\xa9\x54\x72\xdb\x44\x95" + "\xc7\x44\x1c\x19\x11\x4c\x04\xdc" + "\x13\xb9\x67\xc8\xc3\x3a\x6a\x50" + "\xfa\xd1\xfb\xe1\x88\xb6\xf1\xa3" + "\xc5\x3b\xdc\x38\x45\x16\x26\x02" + "\x3b\xb8\x8f\x8b\x58\x7d\x23\x04" + "\x50\x6b\x81\x9f\xae\x66\xac\x6f" + "\xcf\x2a\x9d\xf1\xfd\x1d\x57\x07" + "\xbe\x58\xeb\x77\x0c\xe3\xc2\x19" + "\x14\x74\x1b\x51\x1c\x4f\x41\xf3" + "\x32\x89\xb3\xe7\xde\x62\xf6\x5f" + "\xc7\x6a\x4a\x2a\x5b\x0f\x5f\x87" + "\x9c\x08\xb9\x02\x88\xc8\x29\xb7" + "\x94\x52\xfa\x52\xfe\xaa\x50\x10" + "\xba\x48\x75\x5e\x11\x1b\xe6\x39" + "\xd7\x82\x2c\x87\xf1\x1e\xa4\x38" + "\x72\x3e\x51\xe7\xd8\x3e\x5b\x7b" + "\x31\x16\x89\xba\xd6\xad\x18\x5e" + "\xba\xf8\x12\xb3\xf4\x6c\x47\x30" + "\xc0\x38\x58\xb3\x10\x8d\x58\x5d" + "\xb4\xfb\x19\x7e\x41\xc3\x66\xb8" + "\xd6\x72\x84\xe1\x1a\xc2\x71\x4c" + "\x0d\x4a\x21\x7a\xab\xa2\xc0\x36" + "\x15\xc5\xe9\x46\xd7\x29\x17\x76" + "\x5e\x47\x36\x7f\x72\x05\xa7\xcc" + "\x36\x63\xf9\x47\x7d\xe6\x07\x3c" + "\x8b\x79\x1d\x96\x61\x8d\x90\x65" + "\x7c\xf5\xeb\x4e\x6e\x09\x59\x6d" + "\x62\x50\x1b\x0f\xe0\xdc\x78\xf2" + "\x5b\x83\x1a\xa1\x11\x75\xfd\x18" + "\xd7\xe2\x8d\x65\x14\x21\xce\xbe" + "\xb5\x87\xe3\x0a\xda\x24\x0a\x64" + "\xa9\x9f\x03\x8d\x46\x5d\x24\x1a" + "\x8a\x0c\x42\x01\xca\xb1\x5f\x7c" + "\xa5\xac\x32\x4a\xb8\x07\x91\x18" + "\x6f\xb0\x71\x3c\xc9\xb1\xa8\xf8" + "\x5f\x69\xa5\xa1\xca\x9e\x7a\xaa" + "\xac\xe9\xc7\x47\x41\x75\x25\xc3" + "\x73\xe2\x0b\xdd\x6d\x52\x71\xbe" + "\xc5\xdc\xb4\xe7\x01\x26\x53\x77" + "\x86\x90\x85\x68\x6b\x7b\x03\x53" + "\xda\x52\x52\x51\x68\xc8\xf3\xec" + "\x6c\xd5\x03\x7a\xa3\x0e\xb4\x02" + "\x5f\x1a\xab\xee\xca\x67\x29\x7b" + "\xbd\x96\x59\xb3\x8b\x32\x7a\x92" + "\x9f\xd8\x25\x2b\xdf\xc0\x4c\xda", + .ksize = 1088, + .plaintext = "\xbc\xda\x81\xa8\x78\x79\x1c\xbf" + "\x77\x53\xba\x4c\x30\x5b\xb8\x33", + .psize = 16, + .digest = "\x04\xbf\x7f\x6a\xce\x72\xea\x6a" + "\x79\xdb\xb0\xc9\x60\xf6\x12\xcc", + .np = 6, + .tap = { 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 5 }, + }, { + .key = "\x65\x4d\xe3\xf8\xd2\x4c\xac\x28" + "\x68\xf5\xb3\x81\x71\x4b\xa1\xfa" + "\x04\x0e\xd3\x81\x36\xbe\x0c\x81" + "\x5e\xaf\xbc\x3a\xa4\xc0\x8e\x8b" + "\x55\x63\xd3\x52\x97\x88\xd6\x19" + "\xbc\x96\xdf\x49\xff\x04\x63\xf5" + "\x0c\x11\x13\xaa\x9e\x1f\x5a\xf7" + "\xdd\xbd\x37\x80\xc3\xd0\xbe\xa7" + "\x05\xc8\x3c\x98\x1e\x05\x3c\x84" + "\x39\x61\xc4\xed\xed\x71\x1b\xc4" + "\x74\x45\x2c\xa1\x56\x70\x97\xfd" + "\x44\x18\x07\x7d\xca\x60\x1f\x73" + "\x3b\x6d\x21\xcb\x61\x87\x70\x25" + "\x46\x21\xf1\x1f\x21\x91\x31\x2d" + "\x5d\xcc\xb7\xd1\x84\x3e\x3d\xdb" + "\x03\x53\x2a\x82\xa6\x9a\x95\xbc" + "\x1a\x1e\x0a\x5e\x07\x43\xab\x43" + "\xaf\x92\x82\x06\x91\x04\x09\xf4" + "\x17\x0a\x9a\x2c\x54\xdb\xb8\xf4" + "\xd0\xf0\x10\x66\x24\x8d\xcd\xda" + "\xfe\x0e\x45\x9d\x6f\xc4\x4e\xf4" + "\x96\xaf\x13\xdc\xa9\xd4\x8c\xc4" + "\xc8\x57\x39\x3c\xc2\xd3\x0a\x76" + "\x4a\x1f\x75\x83\x44\xc7\xd1\x39" + "\xd8\xb5\x41\xba\x73\x87\xfa\x96" + "\xc7\x18\x53\xfb\x9b\xda\xa0\x97" + "\x1d\xee\x60\x85\x9e\x14\xc3\xce" + "\xc4\x05\x29\x3b\x95\x30\xa3\xd1" + "\x9f\x82\x6a\x04\xf5\xa7\x75\x57" + "\x82\x04\xfe\x71\x51\x71\xb1\x49" + "\x50\xf8\xe0\x96\xf1\xfa\xa8\x88" + "\x3f\xa0\x86\x20\xd4\x60\x79\x59" + "\x17\x2d\xd1\x09\xf4\xec\x05\x57" + "\xcf\x62\x7e\x0e\x7e\x60\x78\xe6" + "\x08\x60\x29\xd8\xd5\x08\x1a\x24" + "\xc4\x6c\x24\xe7\x92\x08\x3d\x8a" + "\x98\x7a\xcf\x99\x0a\x65\x0e\xdc" + "\x8c\x8a\xbe\x92\x82\x91\xcc\x62" + "\x30\xb6\xf4\x3f\xc6\x8a\x7f\x12" + "\x4a\x8a\x49\xfa\x3f\x5c\xd4\x5a" + "\xa6\x82\xa3\xe6\xaa\x34\x76\xb2" + "\xab\x0a\x30\xef\x6c\x77\x58\x3f" + "\x05\x6b\xcc\x5c\xae\xdc\xd7\xb9" + "\x51\x7e\x8d\x32\x5b\x24\x25\xbe" + "\x2b\x24\x01\xcf\x80\xda\x16\xd8" + "\x90\x72\x2c\xad\x34\x8d\x0c\x74" + "\x02\xcb\xfd\xcf\x6e\xef\x97\xb5" + "\x4c\xf2\x68\xca\xde\x43\x9e\x8a" + "\xc5\x5f\x31\x7f\x14\x71\x38\xec" + "\xbd\x98\xe5\x71\xc4\xb5\xdb\xef" + "\x59\xd2\xca\xc0\xc1\x86\x75\x01" + "\xd4\x15\x0d\x6f\xa4\xf7\x7b\x37" + "\x47\xda\x18\x93\x63\xda\xbe\x9e" + "\x07\xfb\xb2\x83\xd5\xc4\x34\x55" + "\xee\x73\xa1\x42\x96\xf9\x66\x41" + "\xa4\xcc\xd2\x93\x6e\xe1\x0a\xbb" + "\xd2\xdd\x18\x23\xe6\x6b\x98\x0b" + "\x8a\x83\x59\x2c\xc3\xa6\x59\x5b" + "\x01\x22\x59\xf7\xdc\xb0\x87\x7e" + "\xdb\x7d\xf4\x71\x41\xab\xbd\xee" + "\x79\xbe\x3c\x01\x76\x0b\x2d\x0a" + "\x42\xc9\x77\x8c\xbb\x54\x95\x60" + "\x43\x2e\xe0\x17\x52\xbd\x90\xc9" + "\xc2\x2c\xdd\x90\x24\x22\x76\x40" + "\x5c\xb9\x41\xc9\xa1\xd5\xbd\xe3" + "\x44\xe0\xa4\xab\xcc\xb8\xe2\x32" + "\x02\x15\x04\x1f\x8c\xec\x5d\x14" + "\xac\x18\xaa\xef\x6e\x33\x19\x6e" + "\xde\xfe\x19\xdb\xeb\x61\xca\x18" + "\xad\xd8\x3d\xbf\x09\x11\xc7\xa5" + "\x86\x0b\x0f\xe5\x3e\xde\xe8\xd9" + "\x0a\x69\x9e\x4c\x20\xff\xf9\xc5" + "\xfa\xf8\xf3\x7f\xa5\x01\x4b\x5e" + "\x0f\xf0\x3b\x68\xf0\x46\x8c\x2a" + "\x7a\xc1\x8f\xa0\xfe\x6a\x5b\x44" + "\x70\x5c\xcc\x92\x2c\x6f\x0f\xbd" + "\x25\x3e\xb7\x8e\x73\x58\xda\xc9" + "\xa5\xaa\x9e\xf3\x9b\xfd\x37\x3e" + "\xe2\x88\xa4\x7b\xc8\x5c\xa8\x93" + "\x0e\xe7\x9a\x9c\x2e\x95\x18\x9f" + "\xc8\x45\x0c\x88\x9e\x53\x4f\x3a" + "\x76\xc1\x35\xfa\x17\xd8\xac\xa0" + "\x0c\x2d\x47\x2e\x4f\x69\x9b\xf7" + "\xd0\xb6\x96\x0c\x19\xb3\x08\x01" + "\x65\x7a\x1f\xc7\x31\x86\xdb\xc8" + "\xc1\x99\x8f\xf8\x08\x4a\x9d\x23" + "\x22\xa8\xcf\x27\x01\x01\x88\x93" + "\x9c\x86\x45\xbd\xe0\x51\xca\x52" + "\x84\xba\xfe\x03\xf7\xda\xc5\xce" + "\x3e\x77\x75\x86\xaf\x84\xc8\x05" + "\x44\x01\x0f\x02\xf3\x58\xb0\x06" + "\x5a\xd7\x12\x30\x8d\xdf\x1f\x1f" + "\x0a\xe6\xd2\xea\xf6\x3a\x7a\x99" + "\x63\xe8\xd2\xc1\x4a\x45\x8b\x40" + "\x4d\x0a\xa9\x76\x92\xb3\xda\x87" + "\x36\x33\xf0\x78\xc3\x2f\x5f\x02" + "\x1a\x6a\x2c\x32\xcd\x76\xbf\xbd" + "\x5a\x26\x20\x28\x8c\x8c\xbc\x52" + "\x3d\x0a\xc9\xcb\xab\xa4\x21\xb0" + "\x54\x40\x81\x44\xc7\xd6\x1c\x11" + "\x44\xc6\x02\x92\x14\x5a\xbf\x1a" + "\x09\x8a\x18\xad\xcd\x64\x3d\x53" + "\x4a\xb6\xa5\x1b\x57\x0e\xef\xe0" + "\x8c\x44\x5f\x7d\xbd\x6c\xfd\x60" + "\xae\x02\x24\xb6\x99\xdd\x8c\xaf" + "\x59\x39\x75\x3c\xd1\x54\x7b\x86" + "\xcc\x99\xd9\x28\x0c\xb0\x94\x62" + "\xf9\x51\xd1\x19\x96\x2d\x66\xf5" + "\x55\xcf\x9e\x59\xe2\x6b\x2c\x08" + "\xc0\x54\x48\x24\x45\xc3\x8c\x73" + "\xea\x27\x6e\x66\x7d\x1d\x0e\x6e" + "\x13\xe8\x56\x65\x3a\xb0\x81\x5c" + "\xf0\xe8\xd8\x00\x6b\xcd\x8f\xad" + "\xdd\x53\xf3\xa4\x6c\x43\xd6\x31" + "\xaf\xd2\x76\x1e\x91\x12\xdb\x3c" + "\x8c\xc2\x81\xf0\x49\xdb\xe2\x6b" + "\x76\x62\x0a\x04\xe4\xaa\x8a\x7c" + "\x08\x0b\x5d\xd0\xee\x1d\xfb\xc4" + "\x02\x75\x42\xd6\xba\xa7\x22\xa8" + "\x47\x29\xb7\x85\x6d\x93\x3a\xdb" + "\x00\x53\x0b\xa2\xeb\xf8\xfe\x01" + "\x6f\x8a\x31\xd6\x17\x05\x6f\x67" + "\x88\x95\x32\xfe\x4f\xa6\x4b\xf8" + "\x03\xe4\xcd\x9a\x18\xe8\x4e\x2d" + "\xf7\x97\x9a\x0c\x7d\x9f\x7e\x44" + "\x69\x51\xe0\x32\x6b\x62\x86\x8f" + "\xa6\x8e\x0b\x21\x96\xe5\xaf\x77" + "\xc0\x83\xdf\xa5\x0e\xd0\xa1\x04" + "\xaf\xc1\x10\xcb\x5a\x40\xe4\xe3" + "\x38\x7e\x07\xe8\x4d\xfa\xed\xc5" + "\xf0\x37\xdf\xbb\x8a\xcf\x3d\xdc" + "\x61\xd2\xc6\x2b\xff\x07\xc9\x2f" + "\x0c\x2d\x5c\x07\xa8\x35\x6a\xfc" + "\xae\x09\x03\x45\x74\x51\x4d\xc4" + "\xb8\x23\x87\x4a\x99\x27\x20\x87" + "\x62\x44\x0a\x4a\xce\x78\x47\x22", + .ksize = 1088, + .plaintext = "\x8e\xb0\x4c\xde\x9c\x4a\x04\x5a" + "\xf6\xa9\x7f\x45\x25\xa5\x7b\x3a" + "\xbc\x4d\x73\x39\x81\xb5\xbd\x3d" + "\x21\x6f\xd7\x37\x50\x3c\x7b\x28" + "\xd1\x03\x3a\x17\xed\x7b\x7c\x2a" + "\x16\xbc\xdf\x19\x89\x52\x71\x31" + "\xb6\xc0\xfd\xb5\xd3\xba\x96\x99" + "\xb6\x34\x0b\xd0\x99\x93\xfc\x1a" + "\x01\x3c\x85\xc6\x9b\x78\x5c\x8b" + "\xfe\xae\xd2\xbf\xb2\x6f\xf9\xed" + "\xc8\x25\x17\xfe\x10\x3b\x7d\xda" + "\xf4\x8d\x35\x4b\x7c\x7b\x82\xe7" + "\xc2\xb3\xee\x60\x4a\x03\x86\xc9" + "\x4e\xb5\xc4\xbe\xd2\xbd\x66\xf1" + "\x13\xf1\x09\xab\x5d\xca\x63\x1f" + "\xfc\xfb\x57\x2a\xfc\xca\x66\xd8" + "\x77\x84\x38\x23\x1d\xac\xd3\xb3" + "\x7a\xad\x4c\x70\xfa\x9c\xc9\x61" + "\xa6\x1b\xba\x33\x4b\x4e\x33\xec" + "\xa0\xa1\x64\x39\x40\x05\x1c\xc2" + "\x3f\x49\x9d\xae\xf2\xc5\xf2\xc5" + "\xfe\xe8\xf4\xc2\xf9\x96\x2d\x28" + "\x92\x30\x44\xbc\xd2\x7f\xe1\x6e" + "\x62\x02\x8f\x3d\x1c\x80\xda\x0e" + "\x6a\x90\x7e\x75\xff\xec\x3e\xc4" + "\xcd\x16\x34\x3b\x05\x6d\x4d\x20" + "\x1c\x7b\xf5\x57\x4f\xfa\x3d\xac" + "\xd0\x13\x55\xe8\xb3\xe1\x1b\x78" + "\x30\xe6\x9f\x84\xd4\x69\xd1\x08" + "\x12\x77\xa7\x4a\xbd\xc0\xf2\xd2" + "\x78\xdd\xa3\x81\x12\xcb\x6c\x14" + "\x90\x61\xe2\x84\xc6\x2b\x16\xcc" + "\x40\x99\x50\x88\x01\x09\x64\x4f" + "\x0a\x80\xbe\x61\xae\x46\xc9\x0a" + "\x5d\xe0\xfb\x72\x7a\x1a\xdd\x61" + "\x63\x20\x05\xa0\x4a\xf0\x60\x69" + "\x7f\x92\xbc\xbf\x4e\x39\x4d\xdd" + "\x74\xd1\xb7\xc0\x5a\x34\xb7\xae" + "\x76\x65\x2e\xbc\x36\xb9\x04\x95" + "\x42\xe9\x6f\xca\x78\xb3\x72\x07" + "\xa3\xba\x02\x94\x67\x4c\xb1\xd7" + "\xe9\x30\x0d\xf0\x3b\xb8\x10\x6d" + "\xea\x2b\x21\xbf\x74\x59\x82\x97" + "\x85\xaa\xf1\xd7\x54\x39\xeb\x05" + "\xbd\xf3\x40\xa0\x97\xe6\x74\xfe" + "\xb4\x82\x5b\xb1\x36\xcb\xe8\x0d" + "\xce\x14\xd9\xdf\xf1\x94\x22\xcd" + "\xd6\x00\xba\x04\x4c\x05\x0c\xc0" + "\xd1\x5a\xeb\x52\xd5\xa8\x8e\xc8" + "\x97\xa1\xaa\xc1\xea\xc1\xbe\x7c" + "\x36\xb3\x36\xa0\xc6\x76\x66\xc5" + "\xe2\xaf\xd6\x5c\xe2\xdb\x2c\xb3" + "\x6c\xb9\x99\x7f\xff\x9f\x03\x24" + "\xe1\x51\x44\x66\xd8\x0c\x5d\x7f" + "\x5c\x85\x22\x2a\xcf\x6d\x79\x28" + "\xab\x98\x01\x72\xfe\x80\x87\x5f" + "\x46\xba\xef\x81\x24\xee\xbf\xb0" + "\x24\x74\xa3\x65\x97\x12\xc4\xaf" + "\x8b\xa0\x39\xda\x8a\x7e\x74\x6e" + "\x1b\x42\xb4\x44\x37\xfc\x59\xfd" + "\x86\xed\xfb\x8c\x66\x33\xda\x63" + "\x75\xeb\xe1\xa4\x85\x4f\x50\x8f" + "\x83\x66\x0d\xd3\x37\xfa\xe6\x9c" + "\x4f\x30\x87\x35\x18\xe3\x0b\xb7" + "\x6e\x64\x54\xcd\x70\xb3\xde\x54" + "\xb7\x1d\xe6\x4c\x4d\x55\x12\x12" + "\xaf\x5f\x7f\x5e\xee\x9d\xe8\x8e" + "\x32\x9d\x4e\x75\xeb\xc6\xdd\xaa" + "\x48\x82\xa4\x3f\x3c\xd7\xd3\xa8" + "\x63\x9e\x64\xfe\xe3\x97\x00\x62" + "\xe5\x40\x5d\xc3\xad\x72\xe1\x28" + "\x18\x50\xb7\x75\xef\xcd\x23\xbf" + "\x3f\xc0\x51\x36\xf8\x41\xc3\x08" + "\xcb\xf1\x8d\x38\x34\xbd\x48\x45" + "\x75\xed\xbc\x65\x7b\xb5\x0c\x9b" + "\xd7\x67\x7d\x27\xb4\xc4\x80\xd7" + "\xa9\xb9\xc7\x4a\x97\xaa\xda\xc8" + "\x3c\x74\xcf\x36\x8f\xe4\x41\xe3" + "\xd4\xd3\x26\xa7\xf3\x23\x9d\x8f" + "\x6c\x20\x05\x32\x3e\xe0\xc3\xc8" + "\x56\x3f\xa7\x09\xb7\xfb\xc7\xf7" + "\xbe\x2a\xdd\x0f\x06\x7b\x0d\xdd" + "\xb0\xb4\x86\x17\xfd\xb9\x04\xe5" + "\xc0\x64\x5d\xad\x2a\x36\x38\xdb" + "\x24\xaf\x5b\xff\xca\xf9\x41\xe8" + "\xf9\x2f\x1e\x5e\xf9\xf5\xd5\xf2" + "\xb2\x88\xca\xc9\xa1\x31\xe2\xe8" + "\x10\x95\x65\xbf\xf1\x11\x61\x7a" + "\x30\x1a\x54\x90\xea\xd2\x30\xf6" + "\xa5\xad\x60\xf9\x4d\x84\x21\x1b" + "\xe4\x42\x22\xc8\x12\x4b\xb0\x58" + "\x3e\x9c\x2d\x32\x95\x0a\x8e\xb0" + "\x0a\x7e\x77\x2f\xe8\x97\x31\x6a" + "\xf5\x59\xb4\x26\xe6\x37\x12\xc9" + "\xcb\xa0\x58\x33\x6f\xd5\x55\x55" + "\x3c\xa1\x33\xb1\x0b\x7e\x2e\xb4" + "\x43\x2a\x84\x39\xf0\x9c\xf4\x69" + "\x4f\x1e\x79\xa6\x15\x1b\x87\xbb" + "\xdb\x9b\xe0\xf1\x0b\xba\xe3\x6e" + "\xcc\x2f\x49\x19\x22\x29\xfc\x71" + "\xbb\x77\x38\x18\x61\xaf\x85\x76" + "\xeb\xd1\x09\xcc\x86\x04\x20\x9a" + "\x66\x53\x2f\x44\x8b\xc6\xa3\xd2" + "\x5f\xc7\x79\x82\x66\xa8\x6e\x75" + "\x7d\x94\xd1\x86\x75\x0f\xa5\x4f" + "\x3c\x7a\x33\xce\xd1\x6e\x9d\x7b" + "\x1f\x91\x37\xb8\x37\x80\xfb\xe0" + "\x52\x26\xd0\x9a\xd4\x48\x02\x41" + "\x05\xe3\x5a\x94\xf1\x65\x61\x19" + "\xb8\x88\x4e\x2b\xea\xba\x8b\x58" + "\x8b\x42\x01\x00\xa8\xfe\x00\x5c" + "\xfe\x1c\xee\x31\x15\x69\xfa\xb3" + "\x9b\x5f\x22\x8e\x0d\x2c\xe3\xa5" + "\x21\xb9\x99\x8a\x8e\x94\x5a\xef" + "\x13\x3e\x99\x96\x79\x6e\xd5\x42" + "\x36\x03\xa9\xe2\xca\x65\x4e\x8a" + "\x8a\x30\xd2\x7d\x74\xe7\xf0\xaa" + "\x23\x26\xdd\xcb\x82\x39\xfc\x9d" + "\x51\x76\x21\x80\xa2\xbe\x93\x03" + "\x47\xb0\xc1\xb6\xdc\x63\xfd\x9f" + "\xca\x9d\xa5\xca\x27\x85\xe2\xd8" + "\x15\x5b\x7e\x14\x7a\xc4\x89\xcc" + "\x74\x14\x4b\x46\xd2\xce\xac\x39" + "\x6b\x6a\x5a\xa4\x0e\xe3\x7b\x15" + "\x94\x4b\x0f\x74\xcb\x0c\x7f\xa9" + "\xbe\x09\x39\xa3\xdd\x56\x5c\xc7" + "\x99\x56\x65\x39\xf4\x0b\x7d\x87" + "\xec\xaa\xe3\x4d\x22\x65\x39\x4e", + .psize = 1024, + .digest = "\x64\x3a\xbc\xc3\x3f\x74\x40\x51" + "\x6e\x56\x01\x1a\x51\xec\x36\xde", + .np = 8, + .tap = { 64, 203, 267, 28, 263, 62, 54, 83 }, + }, { + .key = "\x1b\x82\x2e\x1b\x17\x23\xb9\x6d" + "\xdc\x9c\xda\x99\x07\xe3\x5f\xd8" + "\xd2\xf8\x43\x80\x8d\x86\x7d\x80" + "\x1a\xd0\xcc\x13\xb9\x11\x05\x3f" + "\x7e\xcf\x7e\x80\x0e\xd8\x25\x48" + "\x8b\xaa\x63\x83\x92\xd0\x72\xf5" + "\x4f\x67\x7e\x50\x18\x25\xa4\xd1" + "\xe0\x7e\x1e\xba\xd8\xa7\x6e\xdb" + "\x1a\xcc\x0d\xfe\x9f\x6d\x22\x35" + "\xe1\xe6\xe0\xa8\x7b\x9c\xb1\x66" + "\xa3\xf8\xff\x4d\x90\x84\x28\xbc" + "\xdc\x19\xc7\x91\x49\xfc\xf6\x33" + "\xc9\x6e\x65\x7f\x28\x6f\x68\x2e" + "\xdf\x1a\x75\xe9\xc2\x0c\x96\xb9" + "\x31\x22\xc4\x07\xc6\x0a\x2f\xfd" + "\x36\x06\x5f\x5c\xc5\xb1\x3a\xf4" + "\x5e\x48\xa4\x45\x2b\x88\xa7\xee" + "\xa9\x8b\x52\xcc\x99\xd9\x2f\xb8" + "\xa4\x58\x0a\x13\xeb\x71\x5a\xfa" + "\xe5\x5e\xbe\xf2\x64\xad\x75\xbc" + "\x0b\x5b\x34\x13\x3b\x23\x13\x9a" + "\x69\x30\x1e\x9a\xb8\x03\xb8\x8b" + "\x3e\x46\x18\x6d\x38\xd9\xb3\xd8" + "\xbf\xf1\xd0\x28\xe6\x51\x57\x80" + "\x5e\x99\xfb\xd0\xce\x1e\x83\xf7" + "\xe9\x07\x5a\x63\xa9\xef\xce\xa5" + "\xfb\x3f\x37\x17\xfc\x0b\x37\x0e" + "\xbb\x4b\x21\x62\xb7\x83\x0e\xa9" + "\x9e\xb0\xc4\xad\x47\xbe\x35\xe7" + "\x51\xb2\xf2\xac\x2b\x65\x7b\x48" + "\xe3\x3f\x5f\xb6\x09\x04\x0c\x58" + "\xce\x99\xa9\x15\x2f\x4e\xc1\xf2" + "\x24\x48\xc0\xd8\x6c\xd3\x76\x17" + "\x83\x5d\xe6\xe3\xfd\x01\x8e\xf7" + "\x42\xa5\x04\x29\x30\xdf\xf9\x00" + "\x4a\xdc\x71\x22\x1a\x33\x15\xb6" + "\xd7\x72\xfb\x9a\xb8\xeb\x2b\x38" + "\xea\xa8\x61\xa8\x90\x11\x9d\x73" + "\x2e\x6c\xce\x81\x54\x5a\x9f\xcd" + "\xcf\xd5\xbd\x26\x5d\x66\xdb\xfb" + "\xdc\x1e\x7c\x10\xfe\x58\x82\x10" + "\x16\x24\x01\xce\x67\x55\x51\xd1" + "\xdd\x6b\x44\xa3\x20\x8e\xa9\xa6" + "\x06\xa8\x29\x77\x6e\x00\x38\x5b" + "\xde\x4d\x58\xd8\x1f\x34\xdf\xf9" + "\x2c\xac\x3e\xad\xfb\x92\x0d\x72" + "\x39\xa4\xac\x44\x10\xc0\x43\xc4" + "\xa4\x77\x3b\xfc\xc4\x0d\x37\xd3" + "\x05\x84\xda\x53\x71\xf8\x80\xd3" + "\x34\x44\xdb\x09\xb4\x2b\x8e\xe3" + "\x00\x75\x50\x9e\x43\x22\x00\x0b" + "\x7c\x70\xab\xd4\x41\xf1\x93\xcd" + "\x25\x2d\x84\x74\xb5\xf2\x92\xcd" + "\x0a\x28\xea\x9a\x49\x02\x96\xcb" + "\x85\x9e\x2f\x33\x03\x86\x1d\xdc" + "\x1d\x31\xd5\xfc\x9d\xaa\xc5\xe9" + "\x9a\xc4\x57\xf5\x35\xed\xf4\x4b" + "\x3d\x34\xc2\x29\x13\x86\x36\x42" + "\x5d\xbf\x90\x86\x13\x77\xe5\xc3" + "\x62\xb4\xfe\x0b\x70\x39\x35\x65" + "\x02\xea\xf6\xce\x57\x0c\xbb\x74" + "\x29\xe3\xfd\x60\x90\xfd\x10\x38" + "\xd5\x4e\x86\xbd\x37\x70\xf0\x97" + "\xa6\xab\x3b\x83\x64\x52\xca\x66" + "\x2f\xf9\xa4\xca\x3a\x55\x6b\xb0" + "\xe8\x3a\x34\xdb\x9e\x48\x50\x2f" + "\x3b\xef\xfd\x08\x2d\x5f\xc1\x37" + "\x5d\xbe\x73\xe4\xd8\xe9\xac\xca" + "\x8a\xaa\x48\x7c\x5c\xf4\xa6\x96" + "\x5f\xfa\x70\xa6\xb7\x8b\x50\xcb" + "\xa6\xf5\xa9\xbd\x7b\x75\x4c\x22" + "\x0b\x19\x40\x2e\xc9\x39\x39\x32" + "\x83\x03\xa8\xa4\x98\xe6\x8e\x16" + "\xb9\xde\x08\xc5\xfc\xbf\xad\x39" + "\xa8\xc7\x93\x6c\x6f\x23\xaf\xc1" + "\xab\xe1\xdf\xbb\x39\xae\x93\x29" + "\x0e\x7d\x80\x8d\x3e\x65\xf3\xfd" + "\x96\x06\x65\x90\xa1\x28\x64\x4b" + "\x69\xf9\xa8\x84\x27\x50\xfc\x87" + "\xf7\xbf\x55\x8e\x56\x13\x58\x7b" + "\x85\xb4\x6a\x72\x0f\x40\xf1\x4f" + "\x83\x81\x1f\x76\xde\x15\x64\x7a" + "\x7a\x80\xe4\xc7\x5e\x63\x01\x91" + "\xd7\x6b\xea\x0b\x9b\xa2\x99\x3b" + "\x6c\x88\xd8\xfd\x59\x3c\x8d\x22" + "\x86\x56\xbe\xab\xa1\x37\x08\x01" + "\x50\x85\x69\x29\xee\x9f\xdf\x21" + "\x3e\x20\x20\xf5\xb0\xbb\x6b\xd0" + "\x9c\x41\x38\xec\x54\x6f\x2d\xbd" + "\x0f\xe1\xbd\xf1\x2b\x6e\x60\x56" + "\x29\xe5\x7a\x70\x1c\xe2\xfc\x97" + "\x82\x68\x67\xd9\x3d\x1f\xfb\xd8" + "\x07\x9f\xbf\x96\x74\xba\x6a\x0e" + "\x10\x48\x20\xd8\x13\x1e\xb5\x44" + "\xf2\xcc\xb1\x8b\xfb\xbb\xec\xd7" + "\x37\x70\x1f\x7c\x55\xd2\x4b\xb9" + "\xfd\x70\x5e\xa3\x91\x73\x63\x52" + "\x13\x47\x5a\x06\xfb\x01\x67\xa5" + "\xc0\xd0\x49\x19\x56\x66\x9a\x77" + "\x64\xaf\x8c\x25\x91\x52\x87\x0e" + "\x18\xf3\x5f\x97\xfd\x71\x13\xf8" + "\x05\xa5\x39\xcc\x65\xd3\xcc\x63" + "\x5b\xdb\x5f\x7e\x5f\x6e\xad\xc4" + "\xf4\xa0\xc5\xc2\x2b\x4d\x97\x38" + "\x4f\xbc\xfa\x33\x17\xb4\x47\xb9" + "\x43\x24\x15\x8d\xd2\xed\x80\x68" + "\x84\xdb\x04\x80\xca\x5e\x6a\x35" + "\x2c\x2c\xe7\xc5\x03\x5f\x54\xb0" + "\x5e\x4f\x1d\x40\x54\x3d\x78\x9a" + "\xac\xda\x80\x27\x4d\x15\x4c\x1a" + "\x6e\x80\xc9\xc4\x3b\x84\x0e\xd9" + "\x2e\x93\x01\x8c\xc3\xc8\x91\x4b" + "\xb3\xaa\x07\x04\x68\x5b\x93\xa5" + "\xe7\xc4\x9d\xe7\x07\xee\xf5\x3b" + "\x40\x89\xcc\x60\x34\x9d\xb4\x06" + "\x1b\xef\x92\xe6\xc1\x2a\x7d\x0f" + "\x81\xaa\x56\xe3\xd7\xed\xa7\xd4" + "\xa7\x3a\x49\xc4\xad\x81\x5c\x83" + "\x55\x8e\x91\x54\xb7\x7d\x65\xa5" + "\x06\x16\xd5\x9a\x16\xc1\xb0\xa2" + "\x06\xd8\x98\x47\x73\x7e\x73\xa0" + "\xb8\x23\xb1\x52\xbf\x68\x74\x5d" + "\x0b\xcb\xfa\x8c\x46\xe3\x24\xe6" + "\xab\xd4\x69\x8d\x8c\xf2\x8a\x59" + "\xbe\x48\x46\x50\x8c\x9a\xe8\xe3" + "\x31\x55\x0a\x06\xed\x4f\xf8\xb7" + "\x4f\xe3\x85\x17\x30\xbd\xd5\x20" + "\xe7\x5b\xb2\x32\xcf\x6b\x16\x44" + "\xd2\xf5\x7e\xd7\xd1\x2f\xee\x64" + "\x3e\x9d\x10\xef\x27\x35\x43\x64" + "\x67\xfb\x7a\x7b\xe0\x62\x31\x9a" + "\x4d\xdf\xa5\xab\xc0\x20\xbb\x01" + "\xe9\x7b\x54\xf1\xde\xb2\x79\x50" + "\x6c\x4b\x91\xdb\x7f\xbb\x50\xc1" + "\x55\x44\x38\x9a\xe0\x9f\xe8\x29" + "\x6f\x15\xf8\x4e\xa6\xec\xa0\x60", + .ksize = 1088, + .plaintext = "\x15\x68\x9e\x2f\xad\x15\x52\xdf" + "\xf0\x42\x62\x24\x2a\x2d\xea\xbf" + "\xc7\xf3\xb4\x1a\xf5\xed\xb2\x08" + "\x15\x60\x1c\x00\x77\xbf\x0b\x0e" + "\xb7\x2c\xcf\x32\x3a\xc7\x01\x77" + "\xef\xa6\x75\xd0\x29\xc7\x68\x20" + "\xb2\x92\x25\xbf\x12\x34\xe9\xa4" + "\xfd\x32\x7b\x3f\x7c\xbd\xa5\x02" + "\x38\x41\xde\xc9\xc1\x09\xd9\xfc" + "\x6e\x78\x22\x83\x18\xf7\x50\x8d" + "\x8f\x9c\x2d\x02\xa5\x30\xac\xff" + "\xea\x63\x2e\x80\x37\x83\xb0\x58" + "\xda\x2f\xef\x21\x55\xba\x7b\xb1" + "\xb6\xed\xf5\xd2\x4d\xaa\x8c\xa9" + "\xdd\xdb\x0f\xb4\xce\xc1\x9a\xb1" + "\xc1\xdc\xbd\xab\x86\xc2\xdf\x0b" + "\xe1\x2c\xf9\xbe\xf6\xd8\xda\x62" + "\x72\xdd\x98\x09\x52\xc0\xc4\xb6" + "\x7b\x17\x5c\xf5\xd8\x4b\x88\xd6" + "\x6b\xbf\x84\x4a\x3f\xf5\x4d\xd2" + "\x94\xe2\x9c\xff\xc7\x3c\xd9\xc8" + "\x37\x38\xbc\x8c\xf3\xe7\xb7\xd0" + "\x1d\x78\xc4\x39\x07\xc8\x5e\x79" + "\xb6\x5a\x90\x5b\x6e\x97\xc9\xd4" + "\x82\x9c\xf3\x83\x7a\xe7\x97\xfc" + "\x1d\xbb\xef\xdb\xce\xe0\x82\xad" + "\xca\x07\x6c\x54\x62\x6f\x81\xe6" + "\x7a\x5a\x96\x6e\x80\x3a\xa2\x37" + "\x6f\xc6\xa4\x29\xc3\x9e\x19\x94" + "\x9f\xb0\x3e\x38\xfb\x3c\x2b\x7d" + "\xaa\xb8\x74\xda\x54\x23\x51\x12" + "\x4b\x96\x36\x8f\x91\x4f\x19\x37" + "\x83\xc9\xdd\xc7\x1a\x32\x2d\xab" + "\xc7\x89\xe2\x07\x47\x6c\xe8\xa6" + "\x70\x6b\x8e\x0c\xda\x5c\x6a\x59" + "\x27\x33\x0e\xe1\xe1\x20\xe8\xc8" + "\xae\xdc\xd0\xe3\x6d\xa8\xa6\x06" + "\x41\xb4\xd4\xd4\xcf\x91\x3e\x06" + "\xb0\x9a\xf7\xf1\xaa\xa6\x23\x92" + "\x10\x86\xf0\x94\xd1\x7c\x2e\x07" + "\x30\xfb\xc5\xd8\xf3\x12\xa9\xe8" + "\x22\x1c\x97\x1a\xad\x96\xb0\xa1" + "\x72\x6a\x6b\xb4\xfd\xf7\xe8\xfa" + "\xe2\x74\xd8\x65\x8d\x35\x17\x4b" + "\x00\x23\x5c\x8c\x70\xad\x71\xa2" + "\xca\xc5\x6c\x59\xbf\xb4\xc0\x6d" + "\x86\x98\x3e\x19\x5a\x90\x92\xb1" + "\x66\x57\x6a\x91\x68\x7c\xbc\xf3" + "\xf1\xdb\x94\xf8\x48\xf1\x36\xd8" + "\x78\xac\x1c\xa9\xcc\xd6\x27\xba" + "\x91\x54\x22\xf5\xe6\x05\x3f\xcc" + "\xc2\x8f\x2c\x3b\x2b\xc3\x2b\x2b" + "\x3b\xb8\xb6\x29\xb7\x2f\x94\xb6" + "\x7b\xfc\x94\x3e\xd0\x7a\x41\x59" + "\x7b\x1f\x9a\x09\xa6\xed\x4a\x82" + "\x9d\x34\x1c\xbd\x4e\x1c\x3a\x66" + "\x80\x74\x0e\x9a\x4f\x55\x54\x47" + "\x16\xba\x2a\x0a\x03\x35\x99\xa3" + "\x5c\x63\x8d\xa2\x72\x8b\x17\x15" + "\x68\x39\x73\xeb\xec\xf2\xe8\xf5" + "\x95\x32\x27\xd6\xc4\xfe\xb0\x51" + "\xd5\x0c\x50\xc5\xcd\x6d\x16\xb3" + "\xa3\x1e\x95\x69\xad\x78\x95\x06" + "\xb9\x46\xf2\x6d\x24\x5a\x99\x76" + "\x73\x6a\x91\xa6\xac\x12\xe1\x28" + "\x79\xbc\x08\x4e\x97\x00\x98\x63" + "\x07\x1c\x4e\xd1\x68\xf3\xb3\x81" + "\xa8\xa6\x5f\xf1\x01\xc9\xc1\xaf" + "\x3a\x96\xf9\x9d\xb5\x5a\x5f\x8f" + "\x7e\xc1\x7e\x77\x0a\x40\xc8\x8e" + "\xfc\x0e\xed\xe1\x0d\xb0\xe5\x5e" + "\x5e\x6f\xf5\x7f\xab\x33\x7d\xcd" + "\xf0\x09\x4b\xb2\x11\x37\xdc\x65" + "\x97\x32\x62\x71\x3a\x29\x54\xb9" + "\xc7\xa4\xbf\x75\x0f\xf9\x40\xa9" + "\x8d\xd7\x8b\xa7\xe0\x9a\xbe\x15" + "\xc6\xda\xd8\x00\x14\x69\x1a\xaf" + "\x5f\x79\xc3\xf5\xbb\x6c\x2a\x9d" + "\xdd\x3c\x5f\x97\x21\xe1\x3a\x03" + "\x84\x6a\xe9\x76\x11\x1f\xd3\xd5" + "\xf0\x54\x20\x4d\xc2\x91\xc3\xa4" + "\x36\x25\xbe\x1b\x2a\x06\xb7\xf3" + "\xd1\xd0\x55\x29\x81\x4c\x83\xa3" + "\xa6\x84\x1e\x5c\xd1\xd0\x6c\x90" + "\xa4\x11\xf0\xd7\x63\x6a\x48\x05" + "\xbc\x48\x18\x53\xcd\xb0\x8d\xdb" + "\xdc\xfe\x55\x11\x5c\x51\xb3\xab" + "\xab\x63\x3e\x31\x5a\x8b\x93\x63" + "\x34\xa9\xba\x2b\x69\x1a\xc0\xe3" + "\xcb\x41\xbc\xd7\xf5\x7f\x82\x3e" + "\x01\xa3\x3c\x72\xf4\xfe\xdf\xbe" + "\xb1\x67\x17\x2b\x37\x60\x0d\xca" + "\x6f\xc3\x94\x2c\xd2\x92\x6d\x9d" + "\x75\x18\x77\xaa\x29\x38\x96\xed" + "\x0e\x20\x70\x92\xd5\xd0\xb4\x00" + "\xc0\x31\xf2\xc9\x43\x0e\x75\x1d" + "\x4b\x64\xf2\x1f\xf2\x29\x6c\x7b" + "\x7f\xec\x59\x7d\x8c\x0d\xd4\xd3" + "\xac\x53\x4c\xa3\xde\x42\x92\x95" + "\x6d\xa3\x4f\xd0\xe6\x3d\xe7\xec" + "\x7a\x4d\x68\xf1\xfe\x67\x66\x09" + "\x83\x22\xb1\x98\x43\x8c\xab\xb8" + "\x45\xe6\x6d\xdf\x5e\x50\x71\xce" + "\xf5\x4e\x40\x93\x2b\xfa\x86\x0e" + "\xe8\x30\xbd\x82\xcc\x1c\x9c\x5f" + "\xad\xfd\x08\x31\xbe\x52\xe7\xe6" + "\xf2\x06\x01\x62\x25\x15\x99\x74" + "\x33\x51\x52\x57\x3f\x57\x87\x61" + "\xb9\x7f\x29\x3d\xcd\x92\x5e\xa6" + "\x5c\x3b\xf1\xed\x5f\xeb\x82\xed" + "\x56\x7b\x61\xe7\xfd\x02\x47\x0e" + "\x2a\x15\xa4\xce\x43\x86\x9b\xe1" + "\x2b\x4c\x2a\xd9\x42\x97\xf7\x9a" + "\xe5\x47\x46\x48\xd3\x55\x6f\x4d" + "\xd9\xeb\x4b\xdd\x7b\x21\x2f\xb3" + "\xa8\x36\x28\xdf\xca\xf1\xf6\xd9" + "\x10\xf6\x1c\xfd\x2e\x0c\x27\xe0" + "\x01\xb3\xff\x6d\x47\x08\x4d\xd4" + "\x00\x25\xee\x55\x4a\xe9\xe8\x5b" + "\xd8\xf7\x56\x12\xd4\x50\xb2\xe5" + "\x51\x6f\x34\x63\x69\xd2\x4e\x96" + "\x4e\xbc\x79\xbf\x18\xae\xc6\x13" + "\x80\x92\x77\xb0\xb4\x0f\x29\x94" + "\x6f\x4c\xbb\x53\x11\x36\xc3\x9f" + "\x42\x8e\x96\x8a\x91\xc8\xe9\xfc" + "\xfe\xbf\x7c\x2d\x6f\xf9\xb8\x44" + "\x89\x1b\x09\x53\x0a\x2a\x92\xc3" + "\x54\x7a\x3a\xf9\xe2\xe4\x75\x87" + "\xa0\x5e\x4b\x03\x7a\x0d\x8a\xf4" + "\x55\x59\x94\x2b\x63\x96\x0e\xf5", + .psize = 1040, + .digest = "\xb5\xb9\x08\xb3\x24\x3e\x03\xf0" + "\xd6\x0b\x57\xbc\x0a\x6d\x89\x59", + }, { + .key = "\xf6\x34\x42\x71\x35\x52\x8b\x58" + "\x02\x3a\x8e\x4a\x8d\x41\x13\xe9" + "\x7f\xba\xb9\x55\x9d\x73\x4d\xf8" + "\x3f\x5d\x73\x15\xff\xd3\x9e\x7f" + "\x20\x2a\x6a\xa8\xd1\xf0\x8f\x12" + "\x6b\x02\xd8\x6c\xde\xba\x80\x22" + "\x19\x37\xc8\xd0\x4e\x89\x17\x7c" + "\x7c\xdd\x88\xfd\x41\xc0\x04\xb7" + "\x1d\xac\x19\xe3\x20\xc7\x16\xcf" + "\x58\xee\x1d\x7a\x61\x69\xa9\x12" + "\x4b\xef\x4f\xb6\x38\xdd\x78\xf8" + "\x28\xee\x70\x08\xc7\x7c\xcc\xc8" + "\x1e\x41\xf5\x80\x86\x70\xd0\xf0" + "\xa3\x87\x6b\x0a\x00\xd2\x41\x28" + "\x74\x26\xf1\x24\xf3\xd0\x28\x77" + "\xd7\xcd\xf6\x2d\x61\xf4\xa2\x13" + "\x77\xb4\x6f\xa0\xf4\xfb\xd6\xb5" + "\x38\x9d\x5a\x0c\x51\xaf\xad\x63" + "\x27\x67\x8c\x01\xea\x42\x1a\x66" + "\xda\x16\x7c\x3c\x30\x0c\x66\x53" + "\x1c\x88\xa4\x5c\xb2\xe3\x78\x0a" + "\x13\x05\x6d\xe2\xaf\xb3\xe4\x75" + "\x00\x99\x58\xee\x76\x09\x64\xaa" + "\xbb\x2e\xb1\x81\xec\xd8\x0e\xd3" + "\x0c\x33\x5d\xb7\x98\xef\x36\xb6" + "\xd2\x65\x69\x41\x70\x12\xdc\x25" + "\x41\x03\x99\x81\x41\x19\x62\x13" + "\xd1\x0a\x29\xc5\x8c\xe0\x4c\xf3" + "\xd6\xef\x4c\xf4\x1d\x83\x2e\x6d" + "\x8e\x14\x87\xed\x80\xe0\xaa\xd3" + "\x08\x04\x73\x1a\x84\x40\xf5\x64" + "\xbd\x61\x32\x65\x40\x42\xfb\xb0" + "\x40\xf6\x40\x8d\xc7\x7f\x14\xd0" + "\x83\x99\xaa\x36\x7e\x60\xc6\xbf" + "\x13\x8a\xf9\x21\xe4\x7e\x68\x87" + "\xf3\x33\x86\xb4\xe0\x23\x7e\x0a" + "\x21\xb1\xf5\xad\x67\x3c\x9c\x9d" + "\x09\xab\xaf\x5f\xba\xe0\xd0\x82" + "\x48\x22\x70\xb5\x6d\x53\xd6\x0e" + "\xde\x64\x92\x41\xb0\xd3\xfb\xda" + "\x21\xfe\xab\xea\x20\xc4\x03\x58" + "\x18\x2e\x7d\x2f\x03\xa9\x47\x66" + "\xdf\x7b\xa4\x6b\x34\x6b\x55\x9c" + "\x4f\xd7\x9c\x47\xfb\xa9\x42\xec" + "\x5a\x12\xfd\xfe\x76\xa0\x92\x9d" + "\xfe\x1e\x16\xdd\x24\x2a\xe4\x27" + "\xd5\xa9\xf2\x05\x4f\x83\xa2\xaf" + "\xfe\xee\x83\x7a\xad\xde\xdf\x9a" + "\x80\xd5\x81\x14\x93\x16\x7e\x46" + "\x47\xc2\x14\xef\x49\x6e\xb9\xdb" + "\x40\xe8\x06\x6f\x9c\x2a\xfd\x62" + "\x06\x46\xfd\x15\x1d\x36\x61\x6f" + "\x77\x77\x5e\x64\xce\x78\x1b\x85" + "\xbf\x50\x9a\xfd\x67\xa6\x1a\x65" + "\xad\x5b\x33\x30\xf1\x71\xaa\xd9" + "\x23\x0d\x92\x24\x5f\xae\x57\xb0" + "\x24\x37\x0a\x94\x12\xfb\xb5\xb1" + "\xd3\xb8\x1d\x12\x29\xb0\x80\x24" + "\x2d\x47\x9f\x96\x1f\x95\xf1\xb1" + "\xda\x35\xf6\x29\xe0\xe1\x23\x96" + "\xc7\xe8\x22\x9b\x7c\xac\xf9\x41" + "\x39\x01\xe5\x73\x15\x5e\x99\xec" + "\xb4\xc1\xf4\xe7\xa7\x97\x6a\xd5" + "\x90\x9a\xa0\x1d\xf3\x5a\x8b\x5f" + "\xdf\x01\x52\xa4\x93\x31\x97\xb0" + "\x93\x24\xb5\xbc\xb2\x14\x24\x98" + "\x4a\x8f\x19\x85\xc3\x2d\x0f\x74" + "\x9d\x16\x13\x80\x5e\x59\x62\x62" + "\x25\xe0\xd1\x2f\x64\xef\xba\xac" + "\xcd\x09\x07\x15\x8a\xcf\x73\xb5" + "\x8b\xc9\xd8\x24\xb0\x53\xd5\x6f" + "\xe1\x2b\x77\xb1\xc5\xe4\xa7\x0e" + "\x18\x45\xab\x36\x03\x59\xa8\xbd" + "\x43\xf0\xd8\x2c\x1a\x69\x96\xbb" + "\x13\xdf\x6c\x33\x77\xdf\x25\x34" + "\x5b\xa5\x5b\x8c\xf9\x51\x05\xd4" + "\x8b\x8b\x44\x87\x49\xfc\xa0\x8f" + "\x45\x15\x5b\x40\x42\xc4\x09\x92" + "\x98\x0c\x4d\xf4\x26\x37\x1b\x13" + "\x76\x01\x93\x8d\x4f\xe6\xed\x18" + "\xd0\x79\x7b\x3f\x44\x50\xcb\xee" + "\xf7\x4a\xc9\x9e\xe0\x96\x74\xa7" + "\xe6\x93\xb2\x53\xca\x55\xa8\xdc" + "\x1e\x68\x07\x87\xb7\x2e\xc1\x08" + "\xb2\xa4\x5b\xaf\xc6\xdb\x5c\x66" + "\x41\x1c\x51\xd9\xb0\x07\x00\x0d" + "\xf0\x4c\xdc\x93\xde\xa9\x1e\x8e" + "\xd3\x22\x62\xd8\x8b\x88\x2c\xea" + "\x5e\xf1\x6e\x14\x40\xc7\xbe\xaa" + "\x42\x28\xd0\x26\x30\x78\x01\x9b" + "\x83\x07\xbc\x94\xc7\x57\xa2\x9f" + "\x03\x07\xff\x16\xff\x3c\x6e\x48" + "\x0a\xd0\xdd\x4c\xf6\x64\x9a\xf1" + "\xcd\x30\x12\x82\x2c\x38\xd3\x26" + "\x83\xdb\xab\x3e\xc6\xf8\xe6\xfa" + "\x77\x0a\x78\x82\x75\xf8\x63\x51" + "\x59\xd0\x8d\x24\x9f\x25\xe6\xa3" + "\x4c\xbc\x34\xfc\xe3\x10\xc7\x62" + "\xd4\x23\xc8\x3d\xa7\xc6\xa6\x0a" + "\x4f\x7e\x29\x9d\x6d\xbe\xb5\xf1" + "\xdf\xa4\x53\xfa\xc0\x23\x0f\x37" + "\x84\x68\xd0\xb5\xc8\xc6\xae\xf8" + "\xb7\x8d\xb3\x16\xfe\x8f\x87\xad" + "\xd0\xc1\x08\xee\x12\x1c\x9b\x1d" + "\x90\xf8\xd1\x63\xa4\x92\x3c\xf0" + "\xc7\x34\xd8\xf1\x14\xed\xa3\xbc" + "\x17\x7e\xd4\x62\x42\x54\x57\x2c" + "\x3e\x7a\x35\x35\x17\x0f\x0b\x7f" + "\x81\xa1\x3f\xd0\xcd\xc8\x3b\x96" + "\xe9\xe0\x4a\x04\xe1\xb6\x3c\xa1" + "\xd6\xca\xc4\xbd\xb6\xb5\x95\x34" + "\x12\x9d\xc5\x96\xf2\xdf\xba\x54" + "\x76\xd1\xb2\x6b\x3b\x39\xe0\xb9" + "\x18\x62\xfb\xf7\xfc\x12\xf1\x5f" + "\x7e\xc7\xe3\x59\x4c\xa6\xc2\x3d" + "\x40\x15\xf9\xa3\x95\x64\x4c\x74" + "\x8b\x73\x77\x33\x07\xa7\x04\x1d" + "\x33\x5a\x7e\x8f\xbd\x86\x01\x4f" + "\x3e\xb9\x27\x6f\xe2\x41\xf7\x09" + "\x67\xfd\x29\x28\xc5\xe4\xf6\x18" + "\x4c\x1b\x49\xb2\x9c\x5b\xf6\x81" + "\x4f\xbb\x5c\xcc\x0b\xdf\x84\x23" + "\x58\xd6\x28\x34\x93\x3a\x25\x97" + "\xdf\xb2\xc3\x9e\x97\x38\x0b\x7d" + "\x10\xb3\x54\x35\x23\x8c\x64\xee" + "\xf0\xd8\x66\xff\x8b\x22\xd2\x5b" + "\x05\x16\x3c\x89\xf7\xb1\x75\xaf" + "\xc0\xae\x6a\x4f\x3f\xaf\x9a\xf4" + "\xf4\x9a\x24\xd9\x80\x82\xc0\x12" + "\xde\x96\xd1\xbe\x15\x0b\x8d\x6a" + "\xd7\x12\xe4\x85\x9f\x83\xc9\xc3" + "\xff\x0b\xb5\xaf\x3b\xd8\x6d\x67" + "\x81\x45\xe6\xac\xec\xc1\x7b\x16" + "\x18\x0a\xce\x4b\xc0\x2e\x76\xbc" + "\x1b\xfa\xb4\x34\xb8\xfc\x3e\xc8" + "\x5d\x90\x71\x6d\x7a\x79\xef\x06", + .ksize = 1088, + .plaintext = "\xaa\x5d\x54\xcb\xea\x1e\x46\x0f" + "\x45\x87\x70\x51\x8a\x66\x7a\x33" + "\xb4\x18\xff\xa9\x82\xf9\x45\x4b" + "\x93\xae\x2e\x7f\xab\x98\xfe\xbf" + "\x01\xee\xe5\xa0\x37\x8f\x57\xa6" + "\xb0\x76\x0d\xa4\xd6\x28\x2b\x5d" + "\xe1\x03\xd6\x1c\x6f\x34\x0d\xe7" + "\x61\x2d\x2e\xe5\xae\x5d\x47\xc7" + "\x80\x4b\x18\x8f\xa8\x99\xbc\x28" + "\xed\x1d\x9d\x86\x7d\xd7\x41\xd1" + "\xe0\x2b\xe1\x8c\x93\x2a\xa7\x80" + "\xe1\x07\xa0\xa9\x9f\x8c\x8d\x1a" + "\x55\xfc\x6b\x24\x7a\xbd\x3e\x51" + "\x68\x4b\x26\x59\xc8\xa7\x16\xd9" + "\xb9\x61\x13\xde\x8b\x63\x1c\xf6" + "\x60\x01\xfb\x08\xb3\x5b\x0a\xbf" + "\x34\x73\xda\x87\x87\x3d\x6f\x97" + "\x4a\x0c\xa3\x58\x20\xa2\xc0\x81" + "\x5b\x8c\xef\xa9\xc2\x01\x1e\x64" + "\x83\x8c\xbc\x03\xb6\xd0\x29\x9f" + "\x54\xe2\xce\x8b\xc2\x07\x85\x78" + "\x25\x38\x96\x4c\xb4\xbe\x17\x4a" + "\x65\xa6\xfa\x52\x9d\x66\x9d\x65" + "\x4a\xd1\x01\x01\xf0\xcb\x13\xcc" + "\xa5\x82\xf3\xf2\x66\xcd\x3f\x9d" + "\xd1\xaa\xe4\x67\xea\xf2\xad\x88" + "\x56\x76\xa7\x9b\x59\x3c\xb1\x5d" + "\x78\xfd\x69\x79\x74\x78\x43\x26" + "\x7b\xde\x3f\xf1\xf5\x4e\x14\xd9" + "\x15\xf5\x75\xb5\x2e\x19\xf3\x0c" + "\x48\x72\xd6\x71\x6d\x03\x6e\xaa" + "\xa7\x08\xf9\xaa\x70\xa3\x0f\x4d" + "\x12\x8a\xdd\xe3\x39\x73\x7e\xa7" + "\xea\x1f\x6d\x06\x26\x2a\xf2\xc5" + "\x52\xb4\xbf\xfd\x52\x0c\x06\x60" + "\x90\xd1\xb2\x7b\x56\xae\xac\x58" + "\x5a\x6b\x50\x2a\xf5\xe0\x30\x3c" + "\x2a\x98\x0f\x1b\x5b\x0a\x84\x6c" + "\x31\xae\x92\xe2\xd4\xbb\x7f\x59" + "\x26\x10\xb9\x89\x37\x68\x26\xbf" + "\x41\xc8\x49\xc4\x70\x35\x7d\xff" + "\x2d\x7f\xf6\x8a\x93\x68\x8c\x78" + "\x0d\x53\xce\x7d\xff\x7d\xfb\xae" + "\x13\x1b\x75\xc4\x78\xd7\x71\xd8" + "\xea\xd3\xf4\x9d\x95\x64\x8e\xb4" + "\xde\xb8\xe4\xa6\x68\xc8\xae\x73" + "\x58\xaf\xa8\xb0\x5a\x20\xde\x87" + "\x43\xb9\x0f\xe3\xad\x41\x4b\xd5" + "\xb7\xad\x16\x00\xa6\xff\xf6\x74" + "\xbf\x8c\x9f\xb3\x58\x1b\xb6\x55" + "\xa9\x90\x56\x28\xf0\xb5\x13\x4e" + "\x9e\xf7\x25\x86\xe0\x07\x7b\x98" + "\xd8\x60\x5d\x38\x95\x3c\xe4\x22" + "\x16\x2f\xb2\xa2\xaf\xe8\x90\x17" + "\xec\x11\x83\x1a\xf4\xa9\x26\xda" + "\x39\x72\xf5\x94\x61\x05\x51\xec" + "\xa8\x30\x8b\x2c\x13\xd0\x72\xac" + "\xb9\xd2\xa0\x4c\x4b\x78\xe8\x6e" + "\x04\x85\xe9\x04\x49\x82\x91\xff" + "\x89\xe5\xab\x4c\xaa\x37\x03\x12" + "\xca\x8b\x74\x10\xfd\x9e\xd9\x7b" + "\xcb\xdb\x82\x6e\xce\x2e\x33\x39" + "\xce\xd2\x84\x6e\x34\x71\x51\x6e" + "\x0d\xd6\x01\x87\xc7\xfa\x0a\xd3" + "\xad\x36\xf3\x4c\x9f\x96\x5e\x62" + "\x62\x54\xc3\x03\x78\xd6\xab\xdd" + "\x89\x73\x55\x25\x30\xf8\xa7\xe6" + "\x4f\x11\x0c\x7c\x0a\xa1\x2b\x7b" + "\x3d\x0d\xde\x81\xd4\x9d\x0b\xae" + "\xdf\x00\xf9\x4c\xb6\x90\x8e\x16" + "\xcb\x11\xc8\xd1\x2e\x73\x13\x75" + "\x75\x3e\xaa\xf5\xee\x02\xb3\x18" + "\xa6\x2d\xf5\x3b\x51\xd1\x1f\x47" + "\x6b\x2c\xdb\xc4\x10\xe0\xc8\xba" + "\x9d\xac\xb1\x9d\x75\xd5\x41\x0e" + "\x7e\xbe\x18\x5b\xa4\x1f\xf8\x22" + "\x4c\xc1\x68\xda\x6d\x51\x34\x6c" + "\x19\x59\xec\xb5\xb1\xec\xa7\x03" + "\xca\x54\x99\x63\x05\x6c\xb1\xac" + "\x9c\x31\xd6\xdb\xba\x7b\x14\x12" + "\x7a\xc3\x2f\xbf\x8d\xdc\x37\x46" + "\xdb\xd2\xbc\xd4\x2f\xab\x30\xd5" + "\xed\x34\x99\x8e\x83\x3e\xbe\x4c" + "\x86\x79\x58\xe0\x33\x8d\x9a\xb8" + "\xa9\xa6\x90\x46\xa2\x02\xb8\xdd" + "\xf5\xf9\x1a\x5c\x8c\x01\xaa\x6e" + "\xb4\x22\x12\xf5\x0c\x1b\x9b\x7a" + "\xc3\x80\xf3\x06\x00\x5f\x30\xd5" + "\x06\xdb\x7d\x82\xc2\xd4\x0b\x4c" + "\x5f\xe9\xc5\xf5\xdf\x97\x12\xbf" + "\x56\xaf\x9b\x69\xcd\xee\x30\xb4" + "\xa8\x71\xff\x3e\x7d\x73\x7a\xb4" + "\x0d\xa5\x46\x7a\xf3\xf4\x15\x87" + "\x5d\x93\x2b\x8c\x37\x64\xb5\xdd" + "\x48\xd1\xe5\x8c\xae\xd4\xf1\x76" + "\xda\xf4\xba\x9e\x25\x0e\xad\xa3" + "\x0d\x08\x7c\xa8\x82\x16\x8d\x90" + "\x56\x40\x16\x84\xe7\x22\x53\x3a" + "\x58\xbc\xb9\x8f\x33\xc8\xc2\x84" + "\x22\xe6\x0d\xe7\xb3\xdc\x5d\xdf" + "\xd7\x2a\x36\xe4\x16\x06\x07\xd2" + "\x97\x60\xb2\xf5\x5e\x14\xc9\xfd" + "\x8b\x05\xd1\xce\xee\x9a\x65\x99" + "\xb7\xae\x19\xb7\xc8\xbc\xd5\xa2" + "\x7b\x95\xe1\xcc\xba\x0d\xdc\x8a" + "\x1d\x59\x52\x50\xaa\x16\x02\x82" + "\xdf\x61\x33\x2e\x44\xce\x49\xc7" + "\xe5\xc6\x2e\x76\xcf\x80\x52\xf0" + "\x3d\x17\x34\x47\x3f\xd3\x80\x48" + "\xa2\xba\xd5\xc7\x7b\x02\x28\xdb" + "\xac\x44\xc7\x6e\x05\x5c\xc2\x79" + "\xb3\x7d\x6a\x47\x77\x66\xf1\x38" + "\xf0\xf5\x4f\x27\x1a\x31\xca\x6c" + "\x72\x95\x92\x8e\x3f\xb0\xec\x1d" + "\xc7\x2a\xff\x73\xee\xdf\x55\x80" + "\x93\xd2\xbd\x34\xd3\x9f\x00\x51" + "\xfb\x2e\x41\xba\x6c\x5a\x7c\x17" + "\x7f\xe6\x70\xac\x8d\x39\x3f\x77" + "\xe2\x23\xac\x8f\x72\x4e\xe4\x53" + "\xcc\xf1\x1b\xf1\x35\xfe\x52\xa4" + "\xd6\xb8\x40\x6b\xc1\xfd\xa0\xa1" + "\xf5\x46\x65\xc2\x50\xbb\x43\xe2" + "\xd1\x43\x28\x34\x74\xf5\x87\xa0" + "\xf2\x5e\x27\x3b\x59\x2b\x3e\x49" + "\xdf\x46\xee\xaf\x71\xd7\x32\x36" + "\xc7\x14\x0b\x58\x6e\x3e\x2d\x41" + "\xfa\x75\x66\x3a\x54\xe0\xb2\xb9" + "\xaf\xdd\x04\x80\x15\x19\x3f\x6f" + "\xce\x12\xb4\xd8\xe8\x89\x3c\x05" + "\x30\xeb\xf3\x3d\xcd\x27\xec\xdc" + "\x56\x70\x12\xcf\x78\x2b\x77\xbf" + "\x22\xf0\x1b\x17\x9c\xcc\xd6\x1b" + "\x2d\x3d\xa0\x3b\xd8\xc9\x70\xa4" + "\x7a\x3e\x07\xb9\x06\xc3\xfa\xb0" + "\x33\xee\xc1\xd8\xf6\xe0\xf0\xb2" + "\x61\x12\x69\xb0\x5f\x28\x99\xda" + "\xc3\x61\x48\xfa\x07\x16\x03\xc4" + "\xa8\xe1\x3c\xe8\x0e\x64\x15\x30" + "\xc1\x9d\x84\x2f\x73\x98\x0e\x3a" + "\xf2\x86\x21\xa4\x9e\x1d\xb5\x86" + "\x16\xdb\x2b\x9a\x06\x64\x8e\x79" + "\x8d\x76\x3e\xc3\xc2\x64\x44\xe3" + "\xda\xbc\x1a\x52\xd7\x61\x03\x65" + "\x54\x32\x77\x01\xed\x9d\x8a\x43" + "\x25\x24\xe3\xc1\xbe\xb8\x2f\xcb" + "\x89\x14\x64\xab\xf6\xa0\x6e\x02" + "\x57\xe4\x7d\xa9\x4e\x9a\x03\x36" + "\xad\xf1\xb1\xfc\x0b\xe6\x79\x51" + "\x9f\x81\x77\xc4\x14\x78\x9d\xbf" + "\xb6\xd6\xa3\x8c\xba\x0b\x26\xe7" + "\xc8\xb9\x5c\xcc\xe1\x5f\xd5\xc6" + "\xc4\xca\xc2\xa3\x45\xba\x94\x13" + "\xb2\x8f\xc3\x54\x01\x09\xe7\x8b" + "\xda\x2a\x0a\x11\x02\x43\xcb\x57" + "\xc9\xcc\xb5\x5c\xab\xc4\xec\x54" + "\x00\x06\x34\xe1\x6e\x03\x89\x7c" + "\xc6\xfb\x6a\xc7\x60\x43\xd6\xc5" + "\xb5\x68\x72\x89\x8f\x42\xc3\x74" + "\xbd\x25\xaa\x9f\x67\xb5\xdf\x26" + "\x20\xe8\xb7\x01\x3c\xe4\x77\xce" + "\xc4\x65\xa7\x23\x79\xea\x33\xc7" + "\x82\x14\x5c\x82\xf2\x4e\x3d\xf6" + "\xc6\x4a\x0e\x29\xbb\xec\x44\xcd" + "\x2f\xd1\x4f\x21\x71\xa9\xce\x0f" + "\x5c\xf2\x72\x5c\x08\x2e\x21\xd2" + "\xc3\x29\x13\xd8\xac\xc3\xda\x13" + "\x1a\x9d\xa7\x71\x1d\x27\x1d\x27" + "\x1d\xea\xab\x44\x79\xad\xe5\xeb" + "\xef\x1f\x22\x0a\x44\x4f\xcb\x87" + "\xa7\x58\x71\x0e\x66\xf8\x60\xbf" + "\x60\x74\x4a\xb4\xec\x2e\xfe\xd3" + "\xf5\xb8\xfe\x46\x08\x50\x99\x6c" + "\x66\xa5\xa8\x34\x44\xb5\xe5\xf0" + "\xdd\x2c\x67\x4e\x35\x96\x8e\x67" + "\x48\x3f\x5f\x37\x44\x60\x51\x2e" + "\x14\x91\x5e\x57\xc3\x0e\x79\x77" + "\x2f\x03\xf4\xe2\x1c\x72\xbf\x85" + "\x5d\xd3\x17\xdf\x6c\xc5\x70\x24" + "\x42\xdf\x51\x4e\x2a\xb2\xd2\x5b" + "\x9e\x69\x83\x41\x11\xfe\x73\x22" + "\xde\x8a\x9e\xd8\x8a\xfb\x20\x38" + "\xd8\x47\x6f\xd5\xed\x8f\x41\xfd" + "\x13\x7a\x18\x03\x7d\x0f\xcd\x7d" + "\xa6\x7d\x31\x9e\xf1\x8f\x30\xa3" + "\x8b\x4c\x24\xb7\xf5\x48\xd7\xd9" + "\x12\xe7\x84\x97\x5c\x31\x6d\xfb" + "\xdf\xf3\xd3\xd1\xd5\x0c\x30\x06" + "\x01\x6a\xbc\x6c\x78\x7b\xa6\x50" + "\xfa\x0f\x3c\x42\x2d\xa5\xa3\x3b" + "\xcf\x62\x50\xff\x71\x6d\xe7\xda" + "\x27\xab\xc6\x67\x16\x65\x68\x64" + "\xc7\xd5\x5f\x81\xa9\xf6\x65\xb3" + "\x5e\x43\x91\x16\xcd\x3d\x55\x37" + "\x55\xb3\xf0\x28\xc5\x54\x19\xc0" + "\xe0\xd6\x2a\x61\xd4\xc8\x72\x51" + "\xe9\xa1\x7b\x48\x21\xad\x44\x09" + "\xe4\x01\x61\x3c\x8a\x5b\xf9\xa1" + "\x6e\x1b\xdf\xc0\x04\xa8\x8b\xf2" + "\x21\xbe\x34\x7b\xfc\xa1\xcd\xc9" + "\xa9\x96\xf4\xa4\x4c\xf7\x4e\x8f" + "\x84\xcc\xd3\xa8\x92\x77\x8f\x36" + "\xe2\x2e\x8c\x33\xe8\x84\xa6\x0c" + "\x6c\x8a\xda\x14\x32\xc2\x96\xff" + "\xc6\x4a\xc2\x9b\x30\x7f\xd1\x29" + "\xc0\xd5\x78\x41\x00\x80\x80\x03" + "\x2a\xb1\xde\x26\x03\x48\x49\xee" + "\x57\x14\x76\x51\x3c\x36\x5d\x0a" + "\x5c\x9f\xe8\xd8\x53\xdb\x4f\xd4" + "\x38\xbf\x66\xc9\x75\x12\x18\x75" + "\x34\x2d\x93\x22\x96\x51\x24\x6e" + "\x4e\xd9\x30\xea\x67\xff\x92\x1c" + "\x16\x26\xe9\xb5\x33\xab\x8c\x22" + "\x47\xdb\xa0\x2c\x08\xf0\x12\x69" + "\x7e\x93\x52\xda\xa5\xe5\xca\xc1" + "\x0f\x55\x2a\xbd\x09\x30\x88\x1b" + "\x9c\xc6\x9f\xe6\xdb\xa6\x92\xeb" + "\xf4\xbd\x5c\xc4\xdb\xc6\x71\x09" + "\xab\x5e\x48\x0c\xed\x6f\xda\x8e" + "\x8d\x0c\x98\x71\x7d\x10\xd0\x9c" + "\x20\x9b\x79\x53\x26\x5d\xb9\x85" + "\x8a\x31\xb8\xc5\x1c\x97\xde\x88" + "\x61\x55\x7f\x7c\x21\x06\xea\xc4" + "\x5f\xaf\xf2\xf0\xd5\x5e\x7d\xb4" + "\x6e\xcf\xe9\xae\x1b\x0e\x11\x80" + "\xc1\x9a\x74\x7e\x52\x6f\xa0\xb7" + "\x24\xcd\x8d\x0a\x11\x40\x63\x72" + "\xfa\xe2\xc5\xb3\x94\xef\x29\xa2" + "\x1a\x23\x43\x04\x37\x55\x0d\xe9" + "\x83\xb2\x29\x51\x49\x64\xa0\xbd" + "\xde\x73\xfd\xa5\x7c\x95\x70\x62" + "\x58\xdc\xe2\xd0\xbf\x98\xf5\x8a" + "\x6a\xfd\xce\xa8\x0e\x42\x2a\xeb" + "\xd2\xff\x83\x27\x53\x5c\xa0\x6e" + "\x93\xef\xe2\xb9\x5d\x35\xd6\x98" + "\xf6\x71\x19\x7a\x54\xa1\xa7\xe8" + "\x09\xfe\xf6\x9e\xc7\xbd\x3e\x29" + "\xbd\x6b\x17\xf4\xe7\x3e\x10\x5c" + "\xc1\xd2\x59\x4f\x4b\x12\x1a\x5b" + "\x50\x80\x59\xb9\xec\x13\x66\xa8" + "\xd2\x31\x7b\x6a\x61\x22\xdd\x7d" + "\x61\xee\x87\x16\x46\x9f\xf9\xc7" + "\x41\xee\x74\xf8\xd0\x96\x2c\x76" + "\x2a\xac\x7d\x6e\x9f\x0e\x7f\x95" + "\xfe\x50\x16\xb2\x23\xca\x62\xd5" + "\x68\xcf\x07\x3f\x3f\x97\x85\x2a" + "\x0c\x25\x45\xba\xdb\x32\xcb\x83" + "\x8c\x4f\xe0\x6d\x9a\x99\xf9\xc9" + "\xda\xd4\x19\x31\xc1\x7c\x6d\xd9" + "\x9c\x56\xd3\xec\xc1\x81\x4c\xed" + "\x28\x9d\x87\xeb\x19\xd7\x1a\x4f" + "\x04\x6a\xcb\x1f\xcf\x1f\xa2\x16" + "\xfc\x2a\x0d\xa1\x14\x2d\xfa\xc5" + "\x5a\xd2\xc5\xf9\x19\x7c\x20\x1f" + "\x2d\x10\xc0\x66\x7c\xd9\x2d\xe5" + "\x88\x70\x59\xa7\x85\xd5\x2e\x7c" + "\x5c\xe3\xb7\x12\xd6\x97\x3f\x29", + .psize = 2048, + .digest = "\x37\x90\x92\xc2\xeb\x01\x87\xd9" + "\x95\xc7\x91\xc3\x17\x8b\x38\x52", + } +}; + + /* * DES test vectors. */ diff --git a/include/crypto/nhpoly1305.h b/include/crypto/nhpoly1305.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..53c04423c582 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/nhpoly1305.h @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Common values and helper functions for the NHPoly1305 hash function. + */ + +#ifndef _NHPOLY1305_H +#define _NHPOLY1305_H + +#include +#include + +/* NH parameterization: */ + +/* Endianness: little */ +/* Word size: 32 bits (works well on NEON, SSE2, AVX2) */ + +/* Stride: 2 words (optimal on ARM32 NEON; works okay on other CPUs too) */ +#define NH_PAIR_STRIDE 2 +#define NH_MESSAGE_UNIT (NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * sizeof(u32)) + +/* Num passes (Toeplitz iteration count): 4, to give ε = 2^{-128} */ +#define NH_NUM_PASSES 4 +#define NH_HASH_BYTES (NH_NUM_PASSES * sizeof(u64)) + +/* Max message size: 1024 bytes (32x compression factor) */ +#define NH_NUM_STRIDES 64 +#define NH_MESSAGE_WORDS (NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * NH_NUM_STRIDES) +#define NH_MESSAGE_BYTES (NH_MESSAGE_WORDS * sizeof(u32)) +#define NH_KEY_WORDS (NH_MESSAGE_WORDS + \ + NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * (NH_NUM_PASSES - 1)) +#define NH_KEY_BYTES (NH_KEY_WORDS * sizeof(u32)) + +#define NHPOLY1305_KEY_SIZE (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE + NH_KEY_BYTES) + +struct nhpoly1305_key { + struct poly1305_key poly_key; + u32 nh_key[NH_KEY_WORDS]; +}; + +struct nhpoly1305_state { + + /* Running total of polynomial evaluation */ + struct poly1305_state poly_state; + + /* Partial block buffer */ + u8 buffer[NH_MESSAGE_UNIT]; + unsigned int buflen; + + /* + * Number of bytes remaining until the current NH message reaches + * NH_MESSAGE_BYTES. When nonzero, 'nh_hash' holds the partial NH hash. + */ + unsigned int nh_remaining; + + __le64 nh_hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]; +}; + +typedef void (*nh_t)(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + __le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]); + +int crypto_nhpoly1305_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen); + +int crypto_nhpoly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc); +int crypto_nhpoly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen); +int crypto_nhpoly1305_update_helper(struct shash_desc *desc, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen, + nh_t nh_fn); +int crypto_nhpoly1305_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst); +int crypto_nhpoly1305_final_helper(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst, + nh_t nh_fn); + +#endif /* _NHPOLY1305_H */ From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:24 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669359 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A95015E9 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4224929FEE for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 36C9529FF9; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:44 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AAFF329FEE for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725838AbeKFItj (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:39 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54600 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729098AbeKFItO (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:14 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6710F2089F; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460424; bh=za/2Q23QMwjgJl4MpEUhOjAbrbbSwbZnvKxbkFeGecA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=IHUIlFCTQLBaOg+LAMZYTFjCF0twjLk+aNKB+x67KTkIt+Wzk+gTeSVnqs3ewGeVq o4SgZqym2RlRDETNMDWdHhF7xJVxeT60WTPhW9ujHrIjzetwvucBJTntMEa+MvMv9B tannj0f+1SHRd4rCeq4JwnCvMPCfnME0ACo0fA0g= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 13/15] crypto: arm/nhpoly1305 - add NEON-accelerated NHPoly1305 Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:24 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-14-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Add an ARM NEON implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash function used in the Adiantum encryption mode. For now, only the NH portion is actually NEON-accelerated; the Poly1305 part is less performance-critical so is just implemented in C. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig | 5 ++ arch/arm/crypto/Makefile | 2 + arch/arm/crypto/nh-neon-core.S | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm/crypto/nhpoly1305-neon-glue.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 200 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/nh-neon-core.S create mode 100644 arch/arm/crypto/nhpoly1305-neon-glue.c diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig index cc932d9bba56..458562a34aab 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig @@ -122,4 +122,9 @@ config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER select CRYPTO_CHACHA20 +config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON + tristate "NEON accelerated NHPoly1305 hash function (for Adiantum)" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305 + endif diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile index 005482ff9504..b65d6bfab8e6 100644 --- a/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Makefile @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_NEON) += sha1-arm-neon.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM) += sha256-arm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM) += sha512-arm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha-neon.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON) += nhpoly1305-neon.o ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM_CE) += aes-arm-ce.o ce-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_CE) += sha1-arm-ce.o @@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ ghash-arm-ce-y := ghash-ce-core.o ghash-ce-glue.o crct10dif-arm-ce-y := crct10dif-ce-core.o crct10dif-ce-glue.o crc32-arm-ce-y:= crc32-ce-core.o crc32-ce-glue.o chacha-neon-y := chacha-neon-core.o chacha-neon-glue.o +nhpoly1305-neon-y := nh-neon-core.o nhpoly1305-neon-glue.o ifdef REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO quiet_cmd_perl = PERL $@ diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/nh-neon-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/nh-neon-core.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..434d80ab531c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/nh-neon-core.S @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * NH - ε-almost-universal hash function, NEON accelerated version + * + * Copyright 2018 Google LLC + * + * Author: Eric Biggers + */ + +#include + + .text + .fpu neon + + KEY .req r0 + MESSAGE .req r1 + MESSAGE_LEN .req r2 + HASH .req r3 + + PASS0_SUMS .req q0 + PASS0_SUM_A .req d0 + PASS0_SUM_B .req d1 + PASS1_SUMS .req q1 + PASS1_SUM_A .req d2 + PASS1_SUM_B .req d3 + PASS2_SUMS .req q2 + PASS2_SUM_A .req d4 + PASS2_SUM_B .req d5 + PASS3_SUMS .req q3 + PASS3_SUM_A .req d6 + PASS3_SUM_B .req d7 + K0 .req q4 + K1 .req q5 + K2 .req q6 + K3 .req q7 + T0 .req q8 + T0_L .req d16 + T0_H .req d17 + T1 .req q9 + T1_L .req d18 + T1_H .req d19 + T2 .req q10 + T2_L .req d20 + T2_H .req d21 + T3 .req q11 + T3_L .req d22 + T3_H .req d23 + +.macro _nh_stride k0, k1, k2, k3 + + // Load next message stride + vld1.8 {T3}, [MESSAGE]! + + // Load next key stride + vld1.32 {\k3}, [KEY]! + + // Add message words to key words + vadd.u32 T0, T3, \k0 + vadd.u32 T1, T3, \k1 + vadd.u32 T2, T3, \k2 + vadd.u32 T3, T3, \k3 + + // Multiply 32x32 => 64 and accumulate + vmlal.u32 PASS0_SUMS, T0_L, T0_H + vmlal.u32 PASS1_SUMS, T1_L, T1_H + vmlal.u32 PASS2_SUMS, T2_L, T2_H + vmlal.u32 PASS3_SUMS, T3_L, T3_H +.endm + +/* + * void nh_neon(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + * u8 hash[NH_HASH_BYTES]) + * + * It's guaranteed that message_len % 16 == 0. + */ +ENTRY(nh_neon) + + vld1.32 {K0,K1}, [KEY]! + vmov.u64 PASS0_SUMS, #0 + vmov.u64 PASS1_SUMS, #0 + vld1.32 {K2}, [KEY]! + vmov.u64 PASS2_SUMS, #0 + vmov.u64 PASS3_SUMS, #0 + + subs MESSAGE_LEN, MESSAGE_LEN, #64 + blt .Lloop4_done +.Lloop4: + _nh_stride K0, K1, K2, K3 + _nh_stride K1, K2, K3, K0 + _nh_stride K2, K3, K0, K1 + _nh_stride K3, K0, K1, K2 + subs MESSAGE_LEN, MESSAGE_LEN, #64 + bge .Lloop4 + +.Lloop4_done: + ands MESSAGE_LEN, MESSAGE_LEN, #63 + beq .Ldone + _nh_stride K0, K1, K2, K3 + + subs MESSAGE_LEN, MESSAGE_LEN, #16 + beq .Ldone + _nh_stride K1, K2, K3, K0 + + subs MESSAGE_LEN, MESSAGE_LEN, #16 + beq .Ldone + _nh_stride K2, K3, K0, K1 + +.Ldone: + // Sum the accumulators for each pass, then store the sums to 'hash' + vadd.u64 T0_L, PASS0_SUM_A, PASS0_SUM_B + vadd.u64 T0_H, PASS1_SUM_A, PASS1_SUM_B + vadd.u64 T1_L, PASS2_SUM_A, PASS2_SUM_B + vadd.u64 T1_H, PASS3_SUM_A, PASS3_SUM_B + vst1.8 {T0-T1}, [HASH] + bx lr +ENDPROC(nh_neon) diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/nhpoly1305-neon-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/nhpoly1305-neon-glue.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..49aae87cb2bc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/crypto/nhpoly1305-neon-glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * NHPoly1305 - ε-almost-∆-universal hash function for Adiantum + * (NEON accelerated version) + * + * Copyright 2018 Google LLC + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +asmlinkage void nh_neon(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + u8 hash[NH_HASH_BYTES]); + +/* wrapper to avoid indirect call to assembly, which doesn't work with CFI */ +static void _nh_neon(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + __le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]) +{ + nh_neon(key, message, message_len, (u8 *)hash); +} + +static int nhpoly1305_neon_update(struct shash_desc *desc, + const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen) +{ + if (srclen < 64 || !may_use_simd()) + return crypto_nhpoly1305_update(desc, src, srclen); + + do { + unsigned int n = min_t(unsigned int, srclen, PAGE_SIZE); + + kernel_neon_begin(); + crypto_nhpoly1305_update_helper(desc, src, n, _nh_neon); + kernel_neon_end(); + src += n; + srclen -= n; + } while (srclen); + return 0; +} + +static struct shash_alg nhpoly1305_alg = { + .base.cra_name = "nhpoly1305", + .base.cra_driver_name = "nhpoly1305-neon", + .base.cra_priority = 200, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct nhpoly1305_key), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .digestsize = POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = crypto_nhpoly1305_init, + .update = nhpoly1305_neon_update, + .final = crypto_nhpoly1305_final, + .setkey = crypto_nhpoly1305_setkey, + .descsize = sizeof(struct nhpoly1305_state), +}; + +static int __init nhpoly1305_mod_init(void) +{ + if (!(elf_hwcap & HWCAP_NEON)) + return -ENODEV; + + return crypto_register_shash(&nhpoly1305_alg); +} + +static void __exit nhpoly1305_mod_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&nhpoly1305_alg); +} + +module_init(nhpoly1305_mod_init); +module_exit(nhpoly1305_mod_exit); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NHPoly1305 ε-almost-∆-universal hash function (NEON-accelerated)"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers "); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("nhpoly1305"); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("nhpoly1305-neon"); From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:25 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669341 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15ABD175A for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0515C29FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id EC92129FF2; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:19 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 452E129FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729444AbeKFItZ (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:25 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54612 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729100AbeKFItP (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Nov 2018 03:49:15 -0500 Received: from ebiggers-linuxstation.kir.corp.google.com (unknown [104.132.51.88]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9258F208A3; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1541460424; bh=e3GrMV2wCC/XjlRu9dq+mgVF1YVmr8oYmdru4uDBr3Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Lx2GBCLZL+zDFm9GFl/eHOagYMz3LKzPan+uq/bpXa2GF23wair8bIaVKiI6i/Bl9 KAKUUrQtHU5YK2OufYeA1LLo/R+xXqW1RaUlPXjOEZtsqYvdR+mA2nAZaFfs8qtu3w m5b4lbuAvc+3cZibVjT/KB3H1hxxzEPxwQ3OgnQQ= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 14/15] crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:25 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-15-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode. Adiantum was designed by Paul Crowley and is specified by our paper: Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) See our paper for full details; this patch only provides an overview. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for fast and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12 stream cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single 16-byte block. On CPUs without AES instructions, Adiantum is much faster than AES-XTS; for example, on ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte sectors Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption, and decryption about 5 times faster. Adiantum is a specialization of the more general HBSH construction. Our earlier proposal, HPolyC, was also a HBSH specialization, but it used a different εA∆U hash function, one based on Poly1305 only. Adiantum's εA∆U hash function, which is based primarily on the "NH" hash function like that used in UMAC (RFC4418), is about twice as fast as HPolyC's; consequently, Adiantum is about 20% faster than HPolyC. This speed comes with no loss of security: Adiantum is provably just as secure as HPolyC, in fact slightly *more* secure. Like HPolyC, Adiantum's security is reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. XChaCha12 itself has a security reduction to ChaCha12. Therefore, one need not "trust" Adiantum; one need only trust ChaCha12 and AES-256. Note that the εA∆U hash function is only used for its proven combinatorical properties so cannot be "broken". Adiantum is also a true wide-block encryption mode, so flipping any plaintext bit in the sector scrambles the entire ciphertext, and vice versa. No other such mode is available in the kernel currently; doing the same with XTS scrambles only 16 bytes. Adiantum also supports arbitrary-length tweaks and naturally supports any length input >= 16 bytes without needing "ciphertext stealing". For the stream cipher, Adiantum uses XChaCha12 rather than XChaCha20 in order to make encryption feasible on the widest range of devices. Although the 20-round variant is quite popular, the best known attacks on ChaCha are on only 7 rounds, so ChaCha12 still has a substantial security margin; in fact, larger than AES-256's. 12-round Salsa20 is also the eSTREAM recommendation. For the block cipher, Adiantum uses AES-256, despite it having a lower security margin than XChaCha12 and needing table lookups, due to AES's extensive adoption and analysis making it the obvious first choice. Nevertheless, for flexibility this patch also permits the "adiantum" template to be instantiated with XChaCha20 and/or with an alternate block cipher. We need Adiantum support in the kernel for use in dm-crypt and fscrypt, where currently the only other suitable options are block cipher modes such as AES-XTS. A big problem with this is that many low-end mobile devices (e.g. Android Go phones sold primarily in developing countries, as well as some smartwatches) still have CPUs that lack AES instructions, e.g. ARM Cortex-A7. Sadly, AES-XTS encryption is much too slow to be viable on these devices. We did find that some "lightweight" block ciphers are fast enough, but these suffer from problems such as not having much cryptanalysis or being too controversial. The ChaCha stream cipher has excellent performance but is insecure to use directly for disk encryption, since each sector's IV is reused each time it is overwritten. Even restricting the threat model to offline attacks only isn't enough, since modern flash storage devices don't guarantee that "overwrites" are really overwrites, due to wear-leveling. Adiantum avoids this problem by constructing a "tweakable super-pseudorandom permutation"; this is the strongest possible security model for length-preserving encryption. Of course, storing random nonces along with the ciphertext would be the ideal solution. But doing that with existing hardware and filesystems runs into major practical problems; in most cases it would require data journaling (like dm-integrity) which severely degrades performance. Thus, for now length-preserving encryption is still needed. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- crypto/Kconfig | 23 ++ crypto/Makefile | 1 + crypto/adiantum.c | 658 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/tcrypt.c | 12 + crypto/testmgr.c | 12 + crypto/testmgr.h | 461 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 1167 insertions(+) create mode 100644 crypto/adiantum.c diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig index 431beca90362..d60a8575049c 100644 --- a/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/Kconfig @@ -498,6 +498,29 @@ config CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305 select CRYPTO_HASH select CRYPTO_POLY1305 +config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM + tristate "Adiantum support" + select CRYPTO_CHACHA20 + select CRYPTO_POLY1305 + select CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305 + help + Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode + designed for fast and secure disk encryption, especially on + CPUs without dedicated crypto instructions. It encrypts + each sector using the XChaCha12 stream cipher, two passes of + an ε-almost-∆-universal hash function, and an invocation of + the AES-256 block cipher on a single 16-byte block. On CPUs + without AES instructions, Adiantum is much faster than + AES-XTS. + + Adiantum's security is provably reducible to that of its + underlying stream and block ciphers, subject to a security + bound. Unlike XTS, Adiantum is a true wide-block encryption + mode, so it actually provides an even stronger notion of + security than XTS, subject to the security bound. + + If unsure, say N. + comment "Hash modes" config CRYPTO_CMAC diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile index 87b86f221a2a..1c66475593af 100644 --- a/crypto/Makefile +++ b/crypto/Makefile @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LRW) += lrw.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS) += xts.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR) += ctr.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEYWRAP) += keywrap.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM) += adiantum.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305) += nhpoly1305.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM) += gcm.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM) += ccm.o diff --git a/crypto/adiantum.c b/crypto/adiantum.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2dfcf12fd452 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/adiantum.c @@ -0,0 +1,658 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Adiantum length-preserving encryption mode + * + * Copyright 2018 Google LLC + */ + +/* + * Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for fast + * and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated crypto + * instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12 stream + * cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function based on + * NH and Poly1305, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single + * 16-byte block. See the paper for details: + * + * Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors + * (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) + * + * For flexibility, this implementation also allows other ciphers: + * + * - Stream cipher: XChaCha12 or XChaCha20 + * - Block cipher: any with a 128-bit block size and 256-bit key + * + * This implementation doesn't currently allow other εA∆U hash functions, i.e. + * HPolyC is not supported. This is because Adiantum is ~20% faster than HPolyC + * but still provably as secure, and also the εA∆U hash function of HBSH is + * formally defined to take two inputs (tweak, message) which makes it difficult + * to wrap with the crypto_shash API. Rather, some details need to be handled + * here. Nevertheless, if needed in the future, support for other εA∆U hash + * functions could be added here. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "internal.h" + +/* + * Size of right-hand block of input data, in bytes; also the size of the block + * cipher's block size and the hash function's output. + */ +#define BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16 + +/* Size of the block cipher key (K_E) in bytes */ +#define BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE 32 + +/* Size of the hash key (K_H) in bytes */ +#define HASH_KEY_SIZE (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE + NHPOLY1305_KEY_SIZE) + +/* + * The specification allows variable-length tweaks, but Linux's crypto API + * currently only allows algorithms to support a single length. The "natural" + * tweak length for Adiantum is 16, since that fits into one Poly1305 block for + * the best performance. But longer tweaks are useful for fscrypt, to avoid + * needing to derive per-file keys. So instead we use two blocks, or 32 bytes. + */ +#define TWEAK_SIZE 32 + +struct adiantum_instance_ctx { + struct crypto_skcipher_spawn streamcipher_spawn; + struct crypto_spawn blockcipher_spawn; + struct crypto_shash_spawn hash_spawn; +}; + +struct adiantum_tfm_ctx { + struct crypto_skcipher *streamcipher; + struct crypto_cipher *blockcipher; + struct crypto_shash *hash; + struct poly1305_key header_hash_key; +}; + +struct adiantum_request_ctx { + + /* + * Buffer for right-hand block of data, i.e. + * + * P_L => P_M => C_M => C_R when encrypting, or + * C_R => C_M => P_M => P_L when decrypting. + * + * Also used to build the IV for the stream cipher. + */ + union { + u8 bytes[XCHACHA_IV_SIZE]; + __le32 words[XCHACHA_IV_SIZE / sizeof(__le32)]; + le128 bignum; /* interpret as element of Z/(2^{128}Z) */ + } rbuf; + + bool enc; /* true if encrypting, false if decrypting */ + + /* + * The result of the Poly1305 εA∆U hash function applied to + * (message length, tweak). + */ + le128 header_hash; + + /* Sub-requests, must be last */ + union { + struct shash_desc hash_desc; + struct skcipher_request streamcipher_req; + } u; +}; + +/* + * Given the XChaCha stream key K_S, derive the block cipher key K_E and the + * hash key K_H as follows: + * + * K_E || K_H || ... = XChaCha(key=K_S, nonce=1||0^191) + * + * Note that this denotes using bits from the XChaCha keystream, which here we + * get indirectly by encrypting a buffer containing all 0's. + */ +static int adiantum_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct { + u8 iv[XCHACHA_IV_SIZE]; + u8 derived_keys[BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE + HASH_KEY_SIZE]; + struct scatterlist sg; + struct crypto_wait wait; + struct skcipher_request req; /* must be last */ + } *data; + u8 *keyp; + int err; + + /* Set the stream cipher key (K_S) */ + crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tctx->streamcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tctx->streamcipher, + crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->streamcipher, key, keylen); + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, + crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tctx->streamcipher) & + CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK); + if (err) + return err; + + /* Derive the subkeys */ + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data) + + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tctx->streamcipher), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + data->iv[0] = 1; + sg_init_one(&data->sg, data->derived_keys, sizeof(data->derived_keys)); + crypto_init_wait(&data->wait); + skcipher_request_set_tfm(&data->req, tctx->streamcipher); + skcipher_request_set_callback(&data->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &data->wait); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(&data->req, &data->sg, &data->sg, + sizeof(data->derived_keys), data->iv); + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&data->req), &data->wait); + if (err) + goto out; + keyp = data->derived_keys; + + /* Set the block cipher key (K_E) */ + crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->blockcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->blockcipher, + crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->blockcipher, keyp, + BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE); + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, + crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->blockcipher) & + CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK); + if (err) + goto out; + keyp += BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE; + + /* Set the hash key (K_H) */ + poly1305_core_setkey(&tctx->header_hash_key, keyp); + keyp += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; + + crypto_shash_clear_flags(tctx->hash, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + crypto_shash_set_flags(tctx->hash, crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + err = crypto_shash_setkey(tctx->hash, keyp, NHPOLY1305_KEY_SIZE); + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, crypto_shash_get_flags(tctx->hash) & + CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK); + keyp += NHPOLY1305_KEY_SIZE; + WARN_ON(keyp != &data->derived_keys[ARRAY_SIZE(data->derived_keys)]); +out: + kzfree(data); + return err; +} + +/* Addition in Z/(2^{128}Z) */ +static inline void le128_add(le128 *r, const le128 *v1, const le128 *v2) +{ + u64 x = le64_to_cpu(v1->b); + u64 y = le64_to_cpu(v2->b); + + r->b = cpu_to_le64(x + y); + r->a = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(v1->a) + le64_to_cpu(v2->a) + + (x + y < x)); +} + +/* Subtraction in Z/(2^{128}Z) */ +static inline void le128_sub(le128 *r, const le128 *v1, const le128 *v2) +{ + u64 x = le64_to_cpu(v1->b); + u64 y = le64_to_cpu(v2->b); + + r->b = cpu_to_le64(x - y); + r->a = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(v1->a) - le64_to_cpu(v2->a) - + (x - y > x)); +} + +/* + * Apply the Poly1305 εA∆U hash function to (message length, tweak) and save the + * result to rctx->header_hash. + * + * This value is reused in both the first and second hash steps. Specifically, + * it's added to the result of an independently keyed εA∆U hash function (for + * equal length inputs only) taken over the message. This gives the overall + * Adiantum hash of the (tweak, message) pair. + */ +static void adiantum_hash_header(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct adiantum_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + const unsigned int bulk_len = req->cryptlen - BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; + struct { + __le64 message_bits; + __le64 padding; + } header = { + .message_bits = cpu_to_le64((u64)bulk_len * 8) + }; + struct poly1305_state state; + + poly1305_core_init(&state); + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(header) % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); + poly1305_core_blocks(&state, &tctx->header_hash_key, + &header, sizeof(header) / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE); + + BUILD_BUG_ON(TWEAK_SIZE % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); + poly1305_core_blocks(&state, &tctx->header_hash_key, req->iv, + TWEAK_SIZE / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE); + + poly1305_core_emit(&state, &rctx->header_hash); +} + +/* Hash the left-hand block (the "bulk") of the message using NHPoly1305 */ +static int adiantum_hash_message(struct skcipher_request *req, + struct scatterlist *sgl, le128 *digest) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct adiantum_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + const unsigned int bulk_len = req->cryptlen - BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; + struct shash_desc *hash_desc = &rctx->u.hash_desc; + struct sg_mapping_iter miter; + unsigned int i, n; + int err; + + hash_desc->tfm = tctx->hash; + hash_desc->flags = 0; + + err = crypto_shash_init(hash_desc); + if (err) + return err; + + sg_miter_start(&miter, sgl, sg_nents(sgl), + SG_MITER_FROM_SG | SG_MITER_ATOMIC); + for (i = 0; i < bulk_len; i += n) { + sg_miter_next(&miter); + n = min_t(unsigned int, miter.length, bulk_len - i); + err = crypto_shash_update(hash_desc, miter.addr, n); + if (err) + break; + } + sg_miter_stop(&miter); + if (err) + return err; + + return crypto_shash_final(hash_desc, (u8 *)digest); +} + +/* Continue Adiantum encryption/decryption after the stream cipher step */ +static int adiantum_finish(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct adiantum_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + const unsigned int bulk_len = req->cryptlen - BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; + le128 digest; + int err; + + /* If decrypting, decrypt C_M with the block cipher to get P_M */ + if (!rctx->enc) + crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(tctx->blockcipher, rctx->rbuf.bytes, + rctx->rbuf.bytes); + + /* + * Second hash step + * enc: C_R = C_M - H_{K_H}(T, C_L) + * dec: P_R = P_M - H_{K_H}(T, P_L) + */ + err = adiantum_hash_message(req, req->dst, &digest); + if (err) + return err; + le128_add(&digest, &digest, &rctx->header_hash); + le128_sub(&rctx->rbuf.bignum, &rctx->rbuf.bignum, &digest); + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&rctx->rbuf.bignum, req->dst, + bulk_len, BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, 1); + return 0; +} + +static void adiantum_streamcipher_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, + int err) +{ + struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data; + + if (!err) + err = adiantum_finish(req); + + skcipher_request_complete(req, err); +} + +static int adiantum_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct adiantum_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + const unsigned int bulk_len = req->cryptlen - BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; + unsigned int stream_len; + le128 digest; + int err; + + if (req->cryptlen < BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + rctx->enc = enc; + + /* + * First hash step + * enc: P_M = P_R + H_{K_H}(T, P_L) + * dec: C_M = C_R + H_{K_H}(T, C_L) + */ + adiantum_hash_header(req); + err = adiantum_hash_message(req, req->src, &digest); + if (err) + return err; + le128_add(&digest, &digest, &rctx->header_hash); + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&rctx->rbuf.bignum, req->src, + bulk_len, BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, 0); + le128_add(&rctx->rbuf.bignum, &rctx->rbuf.bignum, &digest); + + /* If encrypting, encrypt P_M with the block cipher to get C_M */ + if (enc) + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->blockcipher, rctx->rbuf.bytes, + rctx->rbuf.bytes); + + /* Initialize the rest of the XChaCha IV (first part is C_M) */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE != 16); + BUILD_BUG_ON(XCHACHA_IV_SIZE != 32); /* nonce || stream position */ + rctx->rbuf.words[4] = cpu_to_le32(1); + rctx->rbuf.words[5] = 0; + rctx->rbuf.words[6] = 0; + rctx->rbuf.words[7] = 0; + + /* + * XChaCha needs to be done on all the data except the last 16 bytes; + * for disk encryption that usually means 4080 or 496 bytes. But ChaCha + * implementations tend to be most efficient when passed a whole number + * of 64-byte ChaCha blocks, or sometimes even a multiple of 256 bytes. + * And here it doesn't matter whether the last 16 bytes are written to, + * as the second hash step will overwrite them. Thus, round the XChaCha + * length up to the next 64-byte boundary if possible. + */ + stream_len = bulk_len; + if (round_up(stream_len, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) <= req->cryptlen) + stream_len = round_up(stream_len, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); + + skcipher_request_set_tfm(&rctx->u.streamcipher_req, tctx->streamcipher); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->u.streamcipher_req, req->src, + req->dst, stream_len, &rctx->rbuf); + skcipher_request_set_callback(&rctx->u.streamcipher_req, + req->base.flags, + adiantum_streamcipher_done, req); + return crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&rctx->u.streamcipher_req) ?: + adiantum_finish(req); +} + +static int adiantum_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return adiantum_crypt(req, true); +} + +static int adiantum_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return adiantum_crypt(req, false); +} + +static int adiantum_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm); + struct adiantum_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst); + struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct crypto_skcipher *streamcipher; + struct crypto_cipher *blockcipher; + struct crypto_shash *hash; + unsigned int subreq_size; + int err; + + streamcipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn); + if (IS_ERR(streamcipher)) + return PTR_ERR(streamcipher); + + blockcipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn); + if (IS_ERR(blockcipher)) { + err = PTR_ERR(blockcipher); + goto err_free_streamcipher; + } + + hash = crypto_spawn_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn); + if (IS_ERR(hash)) { + err = PTR_ERR(hash); + goto err_free_blockcipher; + } + + tctx->streamcipher = streamcipher; + tctx->blockcipher = blockcipher; + tctx->hash = hash; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct adiantum_request_ctx, u) != + sizeof(struct adiantum_request_ctx)); + subreq_size = max(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct adiantum_request_ctx, + u.hash_desc) + + crypto_shash_descsize(hash), + FIELD_SIZEOF(struct adiantum_request_ctx, + u.streamcipher_req) + + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(streamcipher)); + + crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, + offsetof(struct adiantum_request_ctx, u) + + subreq_size); + return 0; + +err_free_blockcipher: + crypto_free_cipher(blockcipher); +err_free_streamcipher: + crypto_free_skcipher(streamcipher); + return err; +} + +static void adiantum_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->streamcipher); + crypto_free_cipher(tctx->blockcipher); + crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash); +} + +static void adiantum_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst) +{ + struct adiantum_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst); + + crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn); + crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn); + crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn); + kfree(inst); +} + +/* + * Check for a supported set of inner algorithms. + * See the comment at the beginning of this file. + */ +static bool adiantum_supported_algorithms(struct skcipher_alg *streamcipher_alg, + struct crypto_alg *blockcipher_alg, + struct shash_alg *hash_alg) +{ + if (strcmp(streamcipher_alg->base.cra_name, "xchacha12") != 0 && + strcmp(streamcipher_alg->base.cra_name, "xchacha20") != 0) + return false; + + if (blockcipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize > BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE || + blockcipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize < BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE) + return false; + if (blockcipher_alg->cra_blocksize != BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) + return false; + + if (strcmp(hash_alg->base.cra_name, "nhpoly1305") != 0) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static int adiantum_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) +{ + struct crypto_attr_type *algt; + const char *streamcipher_name; + const char *blockcipher_name; + const char *nhpoly1305_name; + struct skcipher_instance *inst; + struct adiantum_instance_ctx *ictx; + struct skcipher_alg *streamcipher_alg; + struct crypto_alg *blockcipher_alg; + struct crypto_alg *_hash_alg; + struct shash_alg *hash_alg; + int err; + + algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb); + if (IS_ERR(algt)) + return PTR_ERR(algt); + + if ((algt->type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER) & algt->mask) + return -EINVAL; + + streamcipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]); + if (IS_ERR(streamcipher_name)) + return PTR_ERR(streamcipher_name); + + blockcipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); + if (IS_ERR(blockcipher_name)) + return PTR_ERR(blockcipher_name); + + nhpoly1305_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[3]); + if (nhpoly1305_name == ERR_PTR(-ENOENT)) + nhpoly1305_name = "nhpoly1305"; + if (IS_ERR(nhpoly1305_name)) + return PTR_ERR(nhpoly1305_name); + + inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!inst) + return -ENOMEM; + ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst); + + /* Stream cipher, e.g. "xchacha12" */ + err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn, streamcipher_name, + 0, crypto_requires_sync(algt->type, + algt->mask)); + if (err) + goto out_free_inst; + streamcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn); + + /* Block cipher, e.g. "aes" */ + err = crypto_grab_spawn(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn, blockcipher_name, + CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK); + if (err) + goto out_drop_streamcipher; + blockcipher_alg = ictx->blockcipher_spawn.alg; + + /* NHPoly1305 εA∆U hash function */ + _hash_alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(nhpoly1305_name, + CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH, + CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK); + if (IS_ERR(_hash_alg)) { + err = PTR_ERR(_hash_alg); + goto out_drop_blockcipher; + } + hash_alg = __crypto_shash_alg(_hash_alg); + err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(&ictx->hash_spawn, hash_alg, + skcipher_crypto_instance(inst)); + if (err) { + crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg); + goto out_drop_blockcipher; + } + + /* Check the set of algorithms */ + if (!adiantum_supported_algorithms(streamcipher_alg, blockcipher_alg, + hash_alg)) { + pr_warn("Unsupported Adiantum instantiation: (%s,%s,%s)\n", + streamcipher_alg->base.cra_name, + blockcipher_alg->cra_name, hash_alg->base.cra_name); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_drop_hash; + } + + /* Instance fields */ + + err = -ENAMETOOLONG; + if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, + "adiantum(%s,%s)", streamcipher_alg->base.cra_name, + blockcipher_alg->cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) + goto out_drop_hash; + if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, + "adiantum(%s,%s,%s)", + streamcipher_alg->base.cra_driver_name, + blockcipher_alg->cra_driver_name, + hash_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) + goto out_drop_hash; + + inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; + inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct adiantum_tfm_ctx); + inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = streamcipher_alg->base.cra_alignmask | + hash_alg->base.cra_alignmask; + /* + * The block cipher is only invoked once per message, so for long + * messages (e.g. sectors for disk encryption) its performance doesn't + * matter as much as that of the stream cipher and hash function. Thus, + * weigh the block cipher's ->cra_priority less. + */ + inst->alg.base.cra_priority = (4 * streamcipher_alg->base.cra_priority + + 2 * hash_alg->base.cra_priority + + blockcipher_alg->cra_priority) / 7; + + inst->alg.setkey = adiantum_setkey; + inst->alg.encrypt = adiantum_encrypt; + inst->alg.decrypt = adiantum_decrypt; + inst->alg.init = adiantum_init_tfm; + inst->alg.exit = adiantum_exit_tfm; + inst->alg.min_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(streamcipher_alg); + inst->alg.max_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_max_keysize(streamcipher_alg); + inst->alg.ivsize = TWEAK_SIZE; + + inst->free = adiantum_free_instance; + + err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, inst); + if (err) + goto out_drop_hash; + + return 0; + +out_drop_hash: + crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn); +out_drop_blockcipher: + crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn); +out_drop_streamcipher: + crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn); +out_free_inst: + kfree(inst); + return err; +} + +/* adiantum(streamcipher_name, blockcipher_name [, nhpoly1305_name]) */ +static struct crypto_template adiantum_tmpl = { + .name = "adiantum", + .create = adiantum_create, + .module = THIS_MODULE, +}; + +static int __init adiantum_module_init(void) +{ + return crypto_register_template(&adiantum_tmpl); +} + +static void __exit adiantum_module_exit(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_template(&adiantum_tmpl); +} + +module_init(adiantum_module_init); +module_exit(adiantum_module_exit); + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Adiantum length-preserving encryption mode"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers "); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("adiantum"); diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c index c20c9f5c18f2..7e8e3adac855 100644 --- a/crypto/tcrypt.c +++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c @@ -2297,6 +2297,18 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb) test_cipher_speed("ctr(sm4)", DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0, speed_template_16); break; + + case 219: + test_cipher_speed("adiantum(xchacha12,aes)", ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, + 0, speed_template_32); + test_cipher_speed("adiantum(xchacha12,aes)", DECRYPT, sec, NULL, + 0, speed_template_32); + test_cipher_speed("adiantum(xchacha20,aes)", ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, + 0, speed_template_32); + test_cipher_speed("adiantum(xchacha20,aes)", DECRYPT, sec, NULL, + 0, speed_template_32); + break; + case 300: if (alg) { test_hash_speed(alg, sec, generic_hash_speed_template); diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index 039a5d850a29..4ce255a4509d 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -2404,6 +2404,18 @@ static int alg_test_null(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, /* Please keep this list sorted by algorithm name. */ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = { { + .alg = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha12_aes_tv_template) + }, + }, { + .alg = "adiantum(xchacha20,aes)", + .test = alg_test_skcipher, + .suite = { + .cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha20_aes_tv_template) + }, + }, { .alg = "aegis128", .test = alg_test_aead, .suite = { diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h index 40197d74b3d5..6b2fb444f687 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.h +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h @@ -33189,6 +33189,467 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec xchacha12_tv_template[] = { }, }; +/* Adiantum test vectors from https://github.com/google/adiantum */ +static const struct cipher_testvec adiantum_xchacha12_aes_tv_template[] = { + { + .key = "\x9e\xeb\xb2\x49\x3c\x1c\xf5\xf4" + "\x6a\x99\xc2\xc4\xdf\xb1\xf4\xdd" + "\x75\x20\x57\xea\x2c\x4f\xcd\xb2" + "\xa5\x3d\x7b\x49\x1e\xab\xfd\x0f", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xdf\x63\xd4\xab\xd2\x49\xf3\xd8" + "\x33\x81\x37\x60\x7d\xfa\x73\x08" + "\xd8\x49\x6d\x80\xe8\x2f\x62\x54" + "\xeb\x0e\xa9\x39\x5b\x45\x7f\x8a", + .ptext = "\x67\xc9\xf2\x30\x84\x41\x8e\x43" + "\xfb\xf3\xb3\x3e\x79\x36\x7f\xe8", + .ctext = "\x6d\x32\x86\x18\x67\x86\x0f\x3f" + "\x96\x7c\x9d\x28\x0d\x53\xec\x9f", + .len = 16, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 2, + .tap = { 14, 2 }, + }, { + .key = "\x36\x2b\x57\x97\xf8\x5d\xcd\x99" + "\x5f\x1a\x5a\x44\x1d\x92\x0f\x27" + "\xcc\x16\xd7\x2b\x85\x63\x99\xd3" + "\xba\x96\xa1\xdb\xd2\x60\x68\xda", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xef\x58\x69\xb1\x2c\x5e\x9a\x47" + "\x24\xc1\xb1\x69\xe1\x12\x93\x8f" + "\x43\x3d\x6d\x00\xdb\x5e\xd8\xd9" + "\x12\x9a\xfe\xd9\xff\x2d\xaa\xc4", + .ptext = "\x5e\xa8\x68\x19\x85\x98\x12\x23" + "\x26\x0a\xcc\xdb\x0a\x04\xb9\xdf" + "\x4d\xb3\x48\x7b\xb0\xe3\xc8\x19" + "\x43\x5a\x46\x06\x94\x2d\xf2", + .ctext = "\xc7\xc6\xf1\x73\x8f\xc4\xff\x4a" + "\x39\xbe\x78\xbe\x8d\x28\xc8\x89" + "\x46\x63\xe7\x0c\x7d\x87\xe8\x4e" + "\xc9\x18\x7b\xbe\x18\x60\x50", + .len = 31, + }, { + .key = "\xa5\x28\x24\x34\x1a\x3c\xd8\xf7" + "\x05\x91\x8f\xee\x85\x1f\x35\x7f" + "\x80\x3d\xfc\x9b\x94\xf6\xfc\x9e" + "\x19\x09\x00\xa9\x04\x31\x4f\x11", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xa1\xba\x49\x95\xff\x34\x6d\xb8" + "\xcd\x87\x5d\x5e\xfd\xea\x85\xdb" + "\x8a\x7b\x5e\xb2\x5d\x57\xdd\x62" + "\xac\xa9\x8c\x41\x42\x94\x75\xb7", + .ptext = "\x69\xb4\xe8\x8c\x37\xe8\x67\x82" + "\xf1\xec\x5d\x04\xe5\x14\x91\x13" + "\xdf\xf2\x87\x1b\x69\x81\x1d\x71" + "\x70\x9e\x9c\x3b\xde\x49\x70\x11" + "\xa0\xa3\xdb\x0d\x54\x4f\x66\x69" + "\xd7\xdb\x80\xa7\x70\x92\x68\xce" + "\x81\x04\x2c\xc6\xab\xae\xe5\x60" + "\x15\xe9\x6f\xef\xaa\x8f\xa7\xa7" + "\x63\x8f\xf2\xf0\x77\xf1\xa8\xea" + "\xe1\xb7\x1f\x9e\xab\x9e\x4b\x3f" + "\x07\x87\x5b\x6f\xcd\xa8\xaf\xb9" + "\xfa\x70\x0b\x52\xb8\xa8\xa7\x9e" + "\x07\x5f\xa6\x0e\xb3\x9b\x79\x13" + "\x79\xc3\x3e\x8d\x1c\x2c\x68\xc8" + "\x51\x1d\x3c\x7b\x7d\x79\x77\x2a" + "\x56\x65\xc5\x54\x23\x28\xb0\x03", + .ctext = "\x9e\x16\xab\xed\x4b\xa7\x42\x5a" + "\xc6\xfb\x4e\x76\xff\xbe\x03\xa0" + "\x0f\xe3\xad\xba\xe4\x98\x2b\x0e" + "\x21\x48\xa0\xb8\x65\x48\x27\x48" + "\x84\x54\x54\xb2\x9a\x94\x7b\xe6" + "\x4b\x29\xe9\xcf\x05\x91\x80\x1a" + "\x3a\xf3\x41\x96\x85\x1d\x9f\x74" + "\x51\x56\x63\xfa\x7c\x28\x85\x49" + "\xf7\x2f\xf9\xf2\x18\x46\xf5\x33" + "\x80\xa3\x3c\xce\xb2\x57\x93\xf5" + "\xae\xbd\xa9\xf5\x7b\x30\xc4\x93" + "\x66\xe0\x30\x77\x16\xe4\xa0\x31" + "\xba\x70\xbc\x68\x13\xf5\xb0\x9a" + "\xc1\xfc\x7e\xfe\x55\x80\x5c\x48" + "\x74\xa6\xaa\xa3\xac\xdc\xc2\xf5" + "\x8d\xde\x34\x86\x78\x60\x75\x8d", + .len = 128, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 4, + .tap = { 104, 16, 4, 4 }, + }, { + .key = "\xd3\x81\x72\x18\x23\xff\x6f\x4a" + "\x25\x74\x29\x0d\x51\x8a\x0e\x13" + "\xc1\x53\x5d\x30\x8d\xee\x75\x0d" + "\x14\xd6\x69\xc9\x15\xa9\x0c\x60", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x65\x9b\xd4\xa8\x7d\x29\x1d\xf4" + "\xc4\xd6\x9b\x6a\x28\xab\x64\xe2" + "\x62\x81\x97\xc5\x81\xaa\xf9\x44" + "\xc1\x72\x59\x82\xaf\x16\xc8\x2c", + .ptext = "\xc7\x6b\x52\x6a\x10\xf0\xcc\x09" + "\xc1\x12\x1d\x6d\x21\xa6\x78\xf5" + "\x05\xa3\x69\x60\x91\x36\x98\x57" + "\xba\x0c\x14\xcc\xf3\x2d\x73\x03" + "\xc6\xb2\x5f\xc8\x16\x27\x37\x5d" + "\xd0\x0b\x87\xb2\x50\x94\x7b\x58" + "\x04\xf4\xe0\x7f\x6e\x57\x8e\xc9" + "\x41\x84\xc1\xb1\x7e\x4b\x91\x12" + "\x3a\x8b\x5d\x50\x82\x7b\xcb\xd9" + "\x9a\xd9\x4e\x18\x06\x23\x9e\xd4" + "\xa5\x20\x98\xef\xb5\xda\xe5\xc0" + "\x8a\x6a\x83\x77\x15\x84\x1e\xae" + "\x78\x94\x9d\xdf\xb7\xd1\xea\x67" + "\xaa\xb0\x14\x15\xfa\x67\x21\x84" + "\xd3\x41\x2a\xce\xba\x4b\x4a\xe8" + "\x95\x62\xa9\x55\xf0\x80\xad\xbd" + "\xab\xaf\xdd\x4f\xa5\x7c\x13\x36" + "\xed\x5e\x4f\x72\xad\x4b\xf1\xd0" + "\x88\x4e\xec\x2c\x88\x10\x5e\xea" + "\x12\xc0\x16\x01\x29\xa3\xa0\x55" + "\xaa\x68\xf3\xe9\x9d\x3b\x0d\x3b" + "\x6d\xec\xf8\xa0\x2d\xf0\x90\x8d" + "\x1c\xe2\x88\xd4\x24\x71\xf9\xb3" + "\xc1\x9f\xc5\xd6\x76\x70\xc5\x2e" + "\x9c\xac\xdb\x90\xbd\x83\x72\xba" + "\x6e\xb5\xa5\x53\x83\xa9\xa5\xbf" + "\x7d\x06\x0e\x3c\x2a\xd2\x04\xb5" + "\x1e\x19\x38\x09\x16\xd2\x82\x1f" + "\x75\x18\x56\xb8\x96\x0b\xa6\xf9" + "\xcf\x62\xd9\x32\x5d\xa9\xd7\x1d" + "\xec\xe4\xdf\x1b\xbe\xf1\x36\xee" + "\xe3\x7b\xb5\x2f\xee\xf8\x53\x3d" + "\x6a\xb7\x70\xa9\xfc\x9c\x57\x25" + "\xf2\x89\x10\xd3\xb8\xa8\x8c\x30" + "\xae\x23\x4f\x0e\x13\x66\x4f\xe1" + "\xb6\xc0\xe4\xf8\xef\x93\xbd\x6e" + "\x15\x85\x6b\xe3\x60\x81\x1d\x68" + "\xd7\x31\x87\x89\x09\xab\xd5\x96" + "\x1d\xf3\x6d\x67\x80\xca\x07\x31" + "\x5d\xa7\xe4\xfb\x3e\xf2\x9b\x33" + "\x52\x18\xc8\x30\xfe\x2d\xca\x1e" + "\x79\x92\x7a\x60\x5c\xb6\x58\x87" + "\xa4\x36\xa2\x67\x92\x8b\xa4\xb7" + "\xf1\x86\xdf\xdc\xc0\x7e\x8f\x63" + "\xd2\xa2\xdc\x78\xeb\x4f\xd8\x96" + "\x47\xca\xb8\x91\xf9\xf7\x94\x21" + "\x5f\x9a\x9f\x5b\xb8\x40\x41\x4b" + "\x66\x69\x6a\x72\xd0\xcb\x70\xb7" + "\x93\xb5\x37\x96\x05\x37\x4f\xe5" + "\x8c\xa7\x5a\x4e\x8b\xb7\x84\xea" + "\xc7\xfc\x19\x6e\x1f\x5a\xa1\xac" + "\x18\x7d\x52\x3b\xb3\x34\x62\x99" + "\xe4\x9e\x31\x04\x3f\xc0\x8d\x84" + "\x17\x7c\x25\x48\x52\x67\x11\x27" + "\x67\xbb\x5a\x85\xca\x56\xb2\x5c" + "\xe6\xec\xd5\x96\x3d\x15\xfc\xfb" + "\x22\x25\xf4\x13\xe5\x93\x4b\x9a" + "\x77\xf1\x52\x18\xfa\x16\x5e\x49" + "\x03\x45\xa8\x08\xfa\xb3\x41\x92" + "\x79\x50\x33\xca\xd0\xd7\x42\x55" + "\xc3\x9a\x0c\x4e\xd9\xa4\x3c\x86" + "\x80\x9f\x53\xd1\xa4\x2e\xd1\xbc" + "\xf1\x54\x6e\x93\xa4\x65\x99\x8e" + "\xdf\x29\xc0\x64\x63\x07\xbb\xea", + .ctext = "\x15\x97\xd0\x86\x18\x03\x9c\x51" + "\xc5\x11\x36\x62\x13\x92\xe6\x73" + "\x29\x79\xde\xa1\x00\x3e\x08\x64" + "\x17\x1a\xbc\xd5\xfe\x33\x0e\x0c" + "\x7c\x94\xa7\xc6\x3c\xbe\xac\xa2" + "\x89\xe6\xbc\xdf\x0c\x33\x27\x42" + "\x46\x73\x2f\xba\x4e\xa6\x46\x8f" + "\xe4\xee\x39\x63\x42\x65\xa3\x88" + "\x7a\xad\x33\x23\xa9\xa7\x20\x7f" + "\x0b\xe6\x6a\xc3\x60\xda\x9e\xb4" + "\xd6\x07\x8a\x77\x26\xd1\xab\x44" + "\x99\x55\x03\x5e\xed\x8d\x7b\xbd" + "\xc8\x21\xb7\x21\x30\x3f\xc0\xb5" + "\xc8\xec\x6c\x23\xa6\xa3\x6d\xf1" + "\x30\x0a\xd0\xa6\xa9\x28\x69\xae" + "\x2a\xe6\x54\xac\x82\x9d\x6a\x95" + "\x6f\x06\x44\xc5\x5a\x77\x6e\xec" + "\xf8\xf8\x63\xb2\xe6\xaa\xbd\x8e" + "\x0e\x8a\x62\x00\x03\xc8\x84\xdd" + "\x47\x4a\xc3\x55\xba\xb7\xe7\xdf" + "\x08\xbf\x62\xf5\xe8\xbc\xb6\x11" + "\xe4\xcb\xd0\x66\x74\x32\xcf\xd4" + "\xf8\x51\x80\x39\x14\x05\x12\xdb" + "\x87\x93\xe2\x26\x30\x9c\x3a\x21" + "\xe5\xd0\x38\x57\x80\x15\xe4\x08" + "\x58\x05\x49\x7d\xe6\x92\x77\x70" + "\xfb\x1e\x2d\x6a\x84\x00\xc8\x68" + "\xf7\x1a\xdd\xf0\x7b\x38\x1e\xd8" + "\x2c\x78\x78\x61\xcf\xe3\xde\x69" + "\x1f\xd5\x03\xd5\x1a\xb4\xcf\x03" + "\xc8\x7a\x70\x68\x35\xb4\xf6\xbe" + "\x90\x62\xb2\x28\x99\x86\xf5\x44" + "\x99\xeb\x31\xcf\xca\xdf\xd0\x21" + "\xd6\x60\xf7\x0f\x40\xb4\x80\xb7" + "\xab\xe1\x9b\x45\xba\x66\xda\xee" + "\xdd\x04\x12\x40\x98\xe1\x69\xe5" + "\x2b\x9c\x59\x80\xe7\x7b\xcc\x63" + "\xa6\xc0\x3a\xa9\xfe\x8a\xf9\x62" + "\x11\x34\x61\x94\x35\xfe\xf2\x99" + "\xfd\xee\x19\xea\x95\xb6\x12\xbf" + "\x1b\xdf\x02\x1a\xcc\x3e\x7e\x65" + "\x78\x74\x10\x50\x29\x63\x28\xea" + "\x6b\xab\xd4\x06\x4d\x15\x24\x31" + "\xc7\x0a\xc9\x16\xb6\x48\xf0\xbf" + "\x49\xdb\x68\x71\x31\x8f\x87\xe2" + "\x13\x05\x64\xd6\x22\x0c\xf8\x36" + "\x84\x24\x3e\x69\x5e\xb8\x9e\x16" + "\x73\x6c\x83\x1e\xe0\x9f\x9e\xba" + "\xe5\x59\x21\x33\x1b\xa9\x26\xc2" + "\xc7\xd9\x30\x73\xb6\xa6\x73\x82" + "\x19\xfa\x44\x4d\x40\x8b\x69\x04" + "\x94\x74\xea\x6e\xb3\x09\x47\x01" + "\x2a\xb9\x78\x34\x43\x11\xed\xd6" + "\x8c\x95\x65\x1b\x85\x67\xa5\x40" + "\xac\x9c\x05\x4b\x57\x4a\xa9\x96" + "\x0f\xdd\x4f\xa1\xe0\xcf\x6e\xc7" + "\x1b\xed\xa2\xb4\x56\x8c\x09\x6e" + "\xa6\x65\xd7\x55\x81\xb7\xed\x11" + "\x9b\x40\x75\xa8\x6b\x56\xaf\x16" + "\x8b\x3d\xf4\xcb\xfe\xd5\x1d\x3d" + "\x85\xc2\xc0\xde\x43\x39\x4a\x96" + "\xba\x88\x97\xc0\xd6\x00\x0e\x27" + "\x21\xb0\x21\x52\xba\xa7\x37\xaa" + "\xcc\xbf\x95\xa8\xf4\xd0\x91\xf6", + .len = 512, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 2, + .tap = { 144, 368 }, + } +}; + +/* Adiantum with XChaCha20 instead of XChaCha12 */ +/* Test vectors from https://github.com/google/adiantum */ +static const struct cipher_testvec adiantum_xchacha20_aes_tv_template[] = { + { + .key = "\x9e\xeb\xb2\x49\x3c\x1c\xf5\xf4" + "\x6a\x99\xc2\xc4\xdf\xb1\xf4\xdd" + "\x75\x20\x57\xea\x2c\x4f\xcd\xb2" + "\xa5\x3d\x7b\x49\x1e\xab\xfd\x0f", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xdf\x63\xd4\xab\xd2\x49\xf3\xd8" + "\x33\x81\x37\x60\x7d\xfa\x73\x08" + "\xd8\x49\x6d\x80\xe8\x2f\x62\x54" + "\xeb\x0e\xa9\x39\x5b\x45\x7f\x8a", + .ptext = "\x67\xc9\xf2\x30\x84\x41\x8e\x43" + "\xfb\xf3\xb3\x3e\x79\x36\x7f\xe8", + .ctext = "\xf6\x78\x97\xd6\xaa\x94\x01\x27" + "\x2e\x4d\x83\xe0\x6e\x64\x9a\xdf", + .len = 16, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 3, + .tap = { 5, 2, 9 }, + }, { + .key = "\x36\x2b\x57\x97\xf8\x5d\xcd\x99" + "\x5f\x1a\x5a\x44\x1d\x92\x0f\x27" + "\xcc\x16\xd7\x2b\x85\x63\x99\xd3" + "\xba\x96\xa1\xdb\xd2\x60\x68\xda", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xef\x58\x69\xb1\x2c\x5e\x9a\x47" + "\x24\xc1\xb1\x69\xe1\x12\x93\x8f" + "\x43\x3d\x6d\x00\xdb\x5e\xd8\xd9" + "\x12\x9a\xfe\xd9\xff\x2d\xaa\xc4", + .ptext = "\x5e\xa8\x68\x19\x85\x98\x12\x23" + "\x26\x0a\xcc\xdb\x0a\x04\xb9\xdf" + "\x4d\xb3\x48\x7b\xb0\xe3\xc8\x19" + "\x43\x5a\x46\x06\x94\x2d\xf2", + .ctext = "\x4b\xb8\x90\x10\xdf\x7f\x64\x08" + "\x0e\x14\x42\x5f\x00\x74\x09\x36" + "\x57\x72\xb5\xfd\xb5\x5d\xb8\x28" + "\x0c\x04\x91\x14\x91\xe9\x37", + .len = 31, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 2, + .tap = { 16, 15 }, + }, { + .key = "\xa5\x28\x24\x34\x1a\x3c\xd8\xf7" + "\x05\x91\x8f\xee\x85\x1f\x35\x7f" + "\x80\x3d\xfc\x9b\x94\xf6\xfc\x9e" + "\x19\x09\x00\xa9\x04\x31\x4f\x11", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\xa1\xba\x49\x95\xff\x34\x6d\xb8" + "\xcd\x87\x5d\x5e\xfd\xea\x85\xdb" + "\x8a\x7b\x5e\xb2\x5d\x57\xdd\x62" + "\xac\xa9\x8c\x41\x42\x94\x75\xb7", + .ptext = "\x69\xb4\xe8\x8c\x37\xe8\x67\x82" + "\xf1\xec\x5d\x04\xe5\x14\x91\x13" + "\xdf\xf2\x87\x1b\x69\x81\x1d\x71" + "\x70\x9e\x9c\x3b\xde\x49\x70\x11" + "\xa0\xa3\xdb\x0d\x54\x4f\x66\x69" + "\xd7\xdb\x80\xa7\x70\x92\x68\xce" + "\x81\x04\x2c\xc6\xab\xae\xe5\x60" + "\x15\xe9\x6f\xef\xaa\x8f\xa7\xa7" + "\x63\x8f\xf2\xf0\x77\xf1\xa8\xea" + "\xe1\xb7\x1f\x9e\xab\x9e\x4b\x3f" + "\x07\x87\x5b\x6f\xcd\xa8\xaf\xb9" + "\xfa\x70\x0b\x52\xb8\xa8\xa7\x9e" + "\x07\x5f\xa6\x0e\xb3\x9b\x79\x13" + "\x79\xc3\x3e\x8d\x1c\x2c\x68\xc8" + "\x51\x1d\x3c\x7b\x7d\x79\x77\x2a" + "\x56\x65\xc5\x54\x23\x28\xb0\x03", + .ctext = "\xb1\x8b\xa0\x05\x77\xa8\x4d\x59" + "\x1b\x8e\x21\xfc\x3a\x49\xfa\xd4" + "\xeb\x36\xf3\xc4\xdf\xdc\xae\x67" + "\x07\x3f\x70\x0e\xe9\x66\xf5\x0c" + "\x30\x4d\x66\xc9\xa4\x2f\x73\x9c" + "\x13\xc8\x49\x44\xcc\x0a\x90\x9d" + "\x7c\xdd\x19\x3f\xea\x72\x8d\x58" + "\xab\xe7\x09\x2c\xec\xb5\x44\xd2" + "\xca\xa6\x2d\x7a\x5c\x9c\x2b\x15" + "\xec\x2a\xa6\x69\x91\xf9\xf3\x13" + "\xf7\x72\xc1\xc1\x40\xd5\xe1\x94" + "\xf4\x29\xa1\x3e\x25\x02\xa8\x3e" + "\x94\xc1\x91\x14\xa1\x14\xcb\xbe" + "\x67\x4c\xb9\x38\xfe\xa7\xaa\x32" + "\x29\x62\x0d\xb2\xf6\x3c\x58\x57" + "\xc1\xd5\x5a\xbb\xd6\xa6\x2a\xe5", + .len = 128, + .also_non_np = 1, + .np = 4, + .tap = { 112, 7, 8, 1 }, + }, { + .key = "\xd3\x81\x72\x18\x23\xff\x6f\x4a" + "\x25\x74\x29\x0d\x51\x8a\x0e\x13" + "\xc1\x53\x5d\x30\x8d\xee\x75\x0d" + "\x14\xd6\x69\xc9\x15\xa9\x0c\x60", + .klen = 32, + .iv = "\x65\x9b\xd4\xa8\x7d\x29\x1d\xf4" + "\xc4\xd6\x9b\x6a\x28\xab\x64\xe2" + "\x62\x81\x97\xc5\x81\xaa\xf9\x44" + "\xc1\x72\x59\x82\xaf\x16\xc8\x2c", + .ptext = "\xc7\x6b\x52\x6a\x10\xf0\xcc\x09" + "\xc1\x12\x1d\x6d\x21\xa6\x78\xf5" + "\x05\xa3\x69\x60\x91\x36\x98\x57" + "\xba\x0c\x14\xcc\xf3\x2d\x73\x03" + "\xc6\xb2\x5f\xc8\x16\x27\x37\x5d" + "\xd0\x0b\x87\xb2\x50\x94\x7b\x58" + "\x04\xf4\xe0\x7f\x6e\x57\x8e\xc9" + "\x41\x84\xc1\xb1\x7e\x4b\x91\x12" + "\x3a\x8b\x5d\x50\x82\x7b\xcb\xd9" + "\x9a\xd9\x4e\x18\x06\x23\x9e\xd4" + "\xa5\x20\x98\xef\xb5\xda\xe5\xc0" + "\x8a\x6a\x83\x77\x15\x84\x1e\xae" + "\x78\x94\x9d\xdf\xb7\xd1\xea\x67" + "\xaa\xb0\x14\x15\xfa\x67\x21\x84" + "\xd3\x41\x2a\xce\xba\x4b\x4a\xe8" + "\x95\x62\xa9\x55\xf0\x80\xad\xbd" + "\xab\xaf\xdd\x4f\xa5\x7c\x13\x36" + "\xed\x5e\x4f\x72\xad\x4b\xf1\xd0" + "\x88\x4e\xec\x2c\x88\x10\x5e\xea" + "\x12\xc0\x16\x01\x29\xa3\xa0\x55" + "\xaa\x68\xf3\xe9\x9d\x3b\x0d\x3b" + "\x6d\xec\xf8\xa0\x2d\xf0\x90\x8d" + "\x1c\xe2\x88\xd4\x24\x71\xf9\xb3" + "\xc1\x9f\xc5\xd6\x76\x70\xc5\x2e" + "\x9c\xac\xdb\x90\xbd\x83\x72\xba" + "\x6e\xb5\xa5\x53\x83\xa9\xa5\xbf" + "\x7d\x06\x0e\x3c\x2a\xd2\x04\xb5" + "\x1e\x19\x38\x09\x16\xd2\x82\x1f" + "\x75\x18\x56\xb8\x96\x0b\xa6\xf9" + "\xcf\x62\xd9\x32\x5d\xa9\xd7\x1d" + "\xec\xe4\xdf\x1b\xbe\xf1\x36\xee" + "\xe3\x7b\xb5\x2f\xee\xf8\x53\x3d" + "\x6a\xb7\x70\xa9\xfc\x9c\x57\x25" + "\xf2\x89\x10\xd3\xb8\xa8\x8c\x30" + "\xae\x23\x4f\x0e\x13\x66\x4f\xe1" + "\xb6\xc0\xe4\xf8\xef\x93\xbd\x6e" + "\x15\x85\x6b\xe3\x60\x81\x1d\x68" + "\xd7\x31\x87\x89\x09\xab\xd5\x96" + "\x1d\xf3\x6d\x67\x80\xca\x07\x31" + "\x5d\xa7\xe4\xfb\x3e\xf2\x9b\x33" + "\x52\x18\xc8\x30\xfe\x2d\xca\x1e" + "\x79\x92\x7a\x60\x5c\xb6\x58\x87" + "\xa4\x36\xa2\x67\x92\x8b\xa4\xb7" + "\xf1\x86\xdf\xdc\xc0\x7e\x8f\x63" + "\xd2\xa2\xdc\x78\xeb\x4f\xd8\x96" + "\x47\xca\xb8\x91\xf9\xf7\x94\x21" + "\x5f\x9a\x9f\x5b\xb8\x40\x41\x4b" + "\x66\x69\x6a\x72\xd0\xcb\x70\xb7" + "\x93\xb5\x37\x96\x05\x37\x4f\xe5" + "\x8c\xa7\x5a\x4e\x8b\xb7\x84\xea" + "\xc7\xfc\x19\x6e\x1f\x5a\xa1\xac" + "\x18\x7d\x52\x3b\xb3\x34\x62\x99" + "\xe4\x9e\x31\x04\x3f\xc0\x8d\x84" + "\x17\x7c\x25\x48\x52\x67\x11\x27" + "\x67\xbb\x5a\x85\xca\x56\xb2\x5c" + "\xe6\xec\xd5\x96\x3d\x15\xfc\xfb" + "\x22\x25\xf4\x13\xe5\x93\x4b\x9a" + "\x77\xf1\x52\x18\xfa\x16\x5e\x49" + "\x03\x45\xa8\x08\xfa\xb3\x41\x92" + "\x79\x50\x33\xca\xd0\xd7\x42\x55" + "\xc3\x9a\x0c\x4e\xd9\xa4\x3c\x86" + "\x80\x9f\x53\xd1\xa4\x2e\xd1\xbc" + "\xf1\x54\x6e\x93\xa4\x65\x99\x8e" + "\xdf\x29\xc0\x64\x63\x07\xbb\xea", + .ctext = "\xe0\x33\xf6\xe0\xb4\xa5\xdd\x2b" + "\xdd\xce\xfc\x12\x1e\xfc\x2d\xf2" + "\x8b\xc7\xeb\xc1\xc4\x2a\xe8\x44" + "\x0f\x3d\x97\x19\x2e\x6d\xa2\x38" + "\x9d\xa6\xaa\xe1\x96\xb9\x08\xe8" + "\x0b\x70\x48\x5c\xed\xb5\x9b\xcb" + "\x8b\x40\x88\x7e\x69\x73\xf7\x16" + "\x71\xbb\x5b\xfc\xa3\x47\x5d\xa6" + "\xae\x3a\x64\xc4\xe7\xb8\xa8\xe7" + "\xb1\x32\x19\xdb\xe3\x01\xb8\xf0" + "\xa4\x86\xb4\x4c\xc2\xde\x5c\xd2" + "\x6c\x77\xd2\xe8\x18\xb7\x0a\xc9" + "\x3d\x53\xb5\xc4\x5c\xf0\x8c\x06" + "\xdc\x90\xe0\x74\x47\x1b\x0b\xf6" + "\xd2\x71\x6b\xc4\xf1\x97\x00\x2d" + "\x63\x57\x44\x1f\x8c\xf4\xe6\x9b" + "\xe0\x7a\xdd\xec\x32\x73\x42\x32" + "\x7f\x35\x67\x60\x0d\xcf\x10\x52" + "\x61\x22\x53\x8d\x8e\xbb\x33\x76" + "\x59\xd9\x10\xce\xdf\xef\xc0\x41" + "\xd5\x33\x29\x6a\xda\x46\xa4\x51" + "\xf0\x99\x3d\x96\x31\xdd\xb5\xcb" + "\x3e\x2a\x1f\xc7\x5c\x79\xd3\xc5" + "\x20\xa1\xb1\x39\x1b\xc6\x0a\x70" + "\x26\x39\x95\x07\xad\x7a\xc9\x69" + "\xfe\x81\xc7\x88\x08\x38\xaf\xad" + "\x9e\x8d\xfb\xe8\x24\x0d\x22\xb8" + "\x0e\xed\xbe\x37\x53\x7c\xa6\xc6" + "\x78\x62\xec\xa3\x59\xd9\xc6\x9d" + "\xb8\x0e\x69\x77\x84\x2d\x6a\x4c" + "\xc5\xd9\xb2\xa0\x2b\xa8\x80\xcc" + "\xe9\x1e\x9c\x5a\xc4\xa1\xb2\x37" + "\x06\x9b\x30\x32\x67\xf7\xe7\xd2" + "\x42\xc7\xdf\x4e\xd4\xcb\xa0\x12" + "\x94\xa1\x34\x85\x93\x50\x4b\x0a" + "\x3c\x7d\x49\x25\x01\x41\x6b\x96" + "\xa9\x12\xbb\x0b\xc0\xd7\xd0\x93" + "\x1f\x70\x38\xb8\x21\xee\xf6\xa7" + "\xee\xeb\xe7\x81\xa4\x13\xb4\x87" + "\xfa\xc1\xb0\xb5\x37\x8b\x74\xa2" + "\x4e\xc7\xc2\xad\x3d\x62\x3f\xf8" + "\x34\x42\xe5\xae\x45\x13\x63\xfe" + "\xfc\x2a\x17\x46\x61\xa9\xd3\x1c" + "\x4c\xaf\xf0\x09\x62\x26\x66\x1e" + "\x74\xcf\xd6\x68\x3d\x7d\xd8\xb7" + "\xe7\xe6\xf8\xf0\x08\x20\xf7\x47" + "\x1c\x52\xaa\x0f\x3e\x21\xa3\xf2" + "\xbf\x2f\x95\x16\xa8\xc8\xc8\x8c" + "\x99\x0f\x5d\xfb\xfa\x2b\x58\x8a" + "\x7e\xd6\x74\x02\x60\xf0\xd0\x5b" + "\x65\xa8\xac\xea\x8d\x68\x46\x34" + "\x26\x9d\x4f\xb1\x9a\x8e\xc0\x1a" + "\xf1\xed\xc6\x7a\x83\xfd\x8a\x57" + "\xf2\xe6\xe4\xba\xfc\xc6\x3c\xad" + "\x5b\x19\x50\x2f\x3a\xcc\x06\x46" + "\x04\x51\x3f\x91\x97\xf0\xd2\x07" + "\xe7\x93\x89\x7e\xb5\x32\x0f\x03" + "\xe5\x58\x9e\x74\x72\xeb\xc2\x38" + "\x00\x0c\x91\x72\x69\xed\x7d\x6d" + "\xc8\x71\xf0\xec\xff\x80\xd9\x1c" + "\x9e\xd2\xfa\x15\xfc\x6c\x4e\xbc" + "\xb1\xa6\xbd\xbd\x70\x40\xca\x20" + "\xb8\x78\xd2\xa3\xc6\xf3\x79\x9c" + "\xc7\x27\xe1\x6a\x29\xad\xa4\x03", + .len = 512, + } +}; + /* * CTS (Cipher Text Stealing) mode tests */ From patchwork Mon Nov 5 23:25:26 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 10669337 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D830B15E9 for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5AAF29FED for ; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id B823E29FF4; Mon, 5 Nov 2018 23:27:15 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by 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U320y6yAozKMo/mpwSB2pAIYQxKH01oEy401VyGh9h60n5yLZKssWaHy1mZm6LlO71 t1ScBrb4Jwm+uNH4Z3HxJGCcREYBjVEM9wZu+tqA= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu , Paul Crowley , Greg Kaiser , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Samuel Neves , Tomer Ashur Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 15/15] fscrypt: add Adiantum support Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:25:26 -0800 Message-Id: <20181105232526.173947-16-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog In-Reply-To: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20181105232526.173947-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Eric Biggers Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for full details; also see the crypto API patch which added Adiantum. On sufficiently long inputs, Adiantum's performance-critical parts are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. Adiantum is also suitable to replace CTS-CBC for fscrypt's filenames encryption, fixing the information leakage in encrypted filenames when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix. Adiantum accepts long IVs, so in fscrypt we include the 16-byte per-inode nonce in the IVs too, and we allow userspace to choose to use the master key directly rather than deriving per-file keys. This is especially desirable because each Adiantum tfm (crypto_skcipher) uses more memory than an AES-XTS tfm, since Adiantum has more sub-tfms as well as a long subkey for NH. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 187 ++++++++------- fs/crypto/crypto.c | 35 +-- fs/crypto/fname.c | 22 +- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 66 +++++- fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 322 ++++++++++++++++++++------ fs/crypto/policy.c | 5 +- include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 4 +- 7 files changed, 454 insertions(+), 187 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst index cfbc18f0d9c9..4e64d0fee07b 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst @@ -132,47 +132,31 @@ designed for this purpose be used, such as scrypt, PBKDF2, or Argon2. Per-file keys ------------- -Master keys are not used to encrypt file contents or names directly. -Instead, a unique key is derived for each encrypted file, including -each regular file, directory, and symbolic link. This has several -advantages: - -- In cryptosystems, the same key material should never be used for - different purposes. Using the master key as both an XTS key for - contents encryption and as a CTS-CBC key for filenames encryption - would violate this rule. -- Per-file keys simplify the choice of IVs (Initialization Vectors) - for contents encryption. Without per-file keys, to ensure IV - uniqueness both the inode and logical block number would need to be - encoded in the IVs. This would make it impossible to renumber - inodes, which e.g. ``resize2fs`` can do when resizing an ext4 - filesystem. With per-file keys, it is sufficient to encode just the - logical block number in the IVs. -- Per-file keys strengthen the encryption of filenames, where IVs are - reused out of necessity. With a unique key per directory, IV reuse - is limited to within a single directory. -- Per-file keys allow individual files to be securely erased simply by - securely erasing their keys. (Not yet implemented.) - -A KDF (Key Derivation Function) is used to derive per-file keys from -the master key. This is done instead of wrapping a randomly-generated -key for each file because it reduces the size of the encryption xattr, -which for some filesystems makes the xattr more likely to fit in-line -in the filesystem's inode table. With a KDF, only a 16-byte nonce is -required --- long enough to make key reuse extremely unlikely. A -wrapped key, on the other hand, would need to be up to 64 bytes --- -the length of an AES-256-XTS key. Furthermore, currently there is no -requirement to support unlocking a file with multiple alternative -master keys or to support rotating master keys. Instead, the master -keys may be wrapped in userspace, e.g. as done by the `fscrypt -`_ tool. - -The current KDF encrypts the master key using the 16-byte nonce as an -AES-128-ECB key. The output is used as the derived key. If the -output is longer than needed, then it is truncated to the needed -length. Truncation is the norm for directories and symlinks, since -those use the CTS-CBC encryption mode which requires a key half as -long as that required by the XTS encryption mode. +Since each master key can protect many files, it is necessary to +"tweak" the encryption of each file, so that the same plaintext in two +files doesn't map to the same ciphertext, or vice versa. + +In most cases, fscrypt solves this problem by deriving per-file keys. +When a new encrypted inode (regular file, directory, or symlink) is +created, fscrypt generates a 16-byte nonce uniformly at random and +stores it in the inode's encryption xattr. Then, a KDF (Key +Derivation Function) is used to derive an inode-specific encryption +key from the master key and nonce. + +The Adiantum encryption mode (see `Encryption modes and usage`_) is +special, since it accepts long IVs and is suited for both contents and +filenames encryption. For it, fscrypt includes the 16-byte nonce in +the IVs, and users can choose to use the master key for Adiantum +encryption directly, for added efficiency. In this configuration, no +per-file keys are derived. However, when doing this, users must take +care not to reuse the same master key for any other modes. + +Below, the KDF and design considerations are described in more detail. + +The current KDF works by encrypting the master key with AES-128-ECB, +using the 16-byte nonce as the AES key. The output is used as the +derived key. If the output is longer than needed, then it is +truncated to the needed length. Note: this KDF meets the primary security requirement, which is to produce unique derived keys that preserve the entropy of the master @@ -181,6 +165,28 @@ However, it is nonstandard and has some problems such as being reversible, so it is generally considered to be a mistake! It may be replaced with HKDF or another more standard KDF in the future. +Key derivation was chosen over key wrapping because wrapped keys would +require larger xattrs which would be less likely to fit in-line in the +filesystem's inode table, and there didn't appear to be any +significant advantages to key wrapping. In particular, currently +there is no requirement to support unlocking a file with multiple +alternative master keys or to support rotating master keys. Instead, +the master keys may be wrapped in userspace, e.g. as done by the +`fscrypt `_ tool. + +Including the inode number in the IVs was considered. However, it was +rejected as it would have prevented ext4 filesystems from being +resized, and by itself still wouldn't have been sufficient to prevent +the same key from being directly reused for both XTS and CTS-CBC. + +Including the per-inode nonce in the IVs would allow filesystem +resizing, but it wouldn't allow key reuse between two different modes, +nor would it be compatible with XTS and CTS-CBC since a 16-byte IV +isn't long enough to contain both a collision-resistant nonce and a +block offset. However, this method works well for Adiantum, which +accepts longer IVs and is suited for both contents and filenames +encryption. + Encryption modes and usage ========================== @@ -191,54 +197,76 @@ Currently, the following pairs of encryption modes are supported: - AES-256-XTS for contents and AES-256-CTS-CBC for filenames - AES-128-CBC for contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC for filenames +- Adiantum for both contents and filenames + +If unsure, you should use the (AES-256-XTS, AES-256-CTS-CBC) pair. -It is strongly recommended to use AES-256-XTS for contents encryption. AES-128-CBC was added only for low-powered embedded devices with crypto accelerators such as CAAM or CESA that do not support XTS. +Adiantum is a (primarily) stream cipher-based mode that was designed +primarily for CPUs that don't support AES instructions. Though +Adiantum actually provides a stronger formal notion of security than +XTS and CTS-CBC (since it's a true wide-block mode), it's also newer +and depends on the security of XChaCha12 in addition to AES-256. +Adiantum support is only available if it has been enabled in the +crypto API via CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM. Also, on ARM platforms, to get +good performance CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON and +CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON must be enabled. + New encryption modes can be added relatively easily, without changes to individual filesystems. However, authenticated encryption (AE) modes are not currently supported because of the difficulty of dealing with ciphertext expansion. +Contents encryption +------------------- + For file contents, each filesystem block is encrypted independently. Currently, only the case where the filesystem block size is equal to -the system's page size (usually 4096 bytes) is supported. With the -XTS mode of operation (recommended), the logical block number within -the file is used as the IV. With the CBC mode of operation (not -recommended), ESSIV is used; specifically, the IV for CBC is the -logical block number encrypted with AES-256, where the AES-256 key is -the SHA-256 hash of the inode's data encryption key. - -For filenames, the full filename is encrypted at once. Because of the -requirements to retain support for efficient directory lookups and -filenames of up to 255 bytes, a constant initialization vector (IV) is -used. However, each encrypted directory uses a unique key, which -limits IV reuse to within a single directory. Note that IV reuse in -the context of CTS-CBC encryption means that when the original -filenames share a common prefix at least as long as the cipher block -size (16 bytes for AES), the corresponding encrypted filenames will -also share a common prefix. This is undesirable; it may be fixed in -the future by switching to an encryption mode that is a strong -pseudorandom permutation on arbitrary-length messages, e.g. the HEH -(Hash-Encrypt-Hash) mode. - -Since filenames are encrypted with the CTS-CBC mode of operation, the -plaintext and ciphertext filenames need not be multiples of the AES -block size, i.e. 16 bytes. However, the minimum size that can be -encrypted is 16 bytes, so shorter filenames are NUL-padded to 16 bytes -before being encrypted. In addition, to reduce leakage of filename -lengths via their ciphertexts, all filenames are NUL-padded to the -next 4, 8, 16, or 32-byte boundary (configurable). 32 is recommended -since this provides the best confidentiality, at the cost of making -directory entries consume slightly more space. Note that since NUL -(``\0``) is not otherwise a valid character in filenames, the padding -will never produce duplicate plaintexts. +the system's page size (usually 4096 bytes) is supported. IVs are +chosen as follows, depending on the contents encryption mode: + +- XTS: the logical block number within the file. +- CBC: ESSIV, specifically the logical block number within the file + encrypted with AES-256, where the AES-256 key is the SHA-256 hash of + the inode's data encryption key. +- Adiantum: the logical block number within the file concatenated with + the per-file nonce. (As noted earlier, including the nonce makes it + safe to use the same key for many files.) + +Filenames encryption +-------------------- + +For filenames, each full filename is encrypted at once. Because of +the requirements to retain support for efficient directory lookups and +filenames of up to 255 bytes, the same IV is used for every filename +in a directory. + +However, each encrypted directory still uses a unique key; or +alternatively has the inode's nonce included in the IV (for Adiantum). +Thus, IV reuse is limited to within a single directory. + +With CTS-CBC, the IV reuse means that when the plaintext filenames +share a common prefix at least as long as the cipher block size (16 +bytes for AES), the corresponding encrypted filenames will also share +a common prefix. This is undesirable. Adiantum does not have this +weakness, as it is a super-pseudorandom permutation. + +All supported filenames encryption modes accept any plaintext length +>= 16 bytes; cipher block alignment is not required. However, +filenames shorter than 16 bytes are NUL-padded to 16 bytes before +being encrypted. In addition, to reduce leakage of filename lengths +via their ciphertexts, all filenames are NUL-padded to the next 4, 8, +16, or 32-byte boundary (configurable). 32 is recommended since this +provides the best confidentiality, at the cost of making directory +entries consume slightly more space. Note that since NUL (``\0``) is +not otherwise a valid character in filenames, the padding will never +produce duplicate plaintexts. Symbolic link targets are considered a type of filename and are -encrypted in the same way as filenames in directory entries. Each -symlink also uses a unique key; hence, the hardcoded IV is not a -problem for symlinks. +encrypted in the same way as filenames in directory entries, except +that IV reuse is not a problem as each symlink has its own inode. User API ======== @@ -272,9 +300,12 @@ This structure must be initialized as follows: and FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS (4) for ``filenames_encryption_mode``. -- ``flags`` must be set to a value from ```` which +- ``flags`` must contain a value from ```` which identifies the amount of NUL-padding to use when encrypting - filenames. If unsure, use FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 (0x3). + filenames. In addition, if the chosen encryption modes are both + FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM, this can contain FS_POLICY_FLAGS_DIRECT + to specify that the master key should be used directly, without key + derivation. If unsure, use FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 (0x3). - ``master_key_descriptor`` specifies how to find the master key in the keyring; see `Adding keys`_. It is up to userspace to choose a diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c index 0f46cf550907..5dd59e790ad3 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c +++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c @@ -133,15 +133,32 @@ struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(const struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp_flags) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_ctx); +void fscrypt_prepare_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num, + const struct fscrypt_info *ci) +{ + if (ci->ci_mode->uses_long_ivs) { + /* Using lblk_num and nonce as tweak */ + iv->long_iv.index = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num); + memcpy(iv->long_iv.nonce, ci->ci_nonce, + FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE); + iv->long_iv.unused = 0; + } else { + /* Using only lblk_num as tweak (key was derived from nonce) */ + iv->short_iv.index = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num); + iv->short_iv.unused = 0; + if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL) { + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, (u8 *)iv, + (const u8 *)iv); + } + } +} + int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw, u64 lblk_num, struct page *src_page, struct page *dest_page, unsigned int len, unsigned int offs, gfp_t gfp_flags) { - struct { - __le64 index; - u8 padding[FS_IV_SIZE - sizeof(__le64)]; - } iv; + union fscrypt_iv iv; struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); struct scatterlist dst, src; @@ -151,15 +168,7 @@ int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw, BUG_ON(len == 0); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(iv) != FS_IV_SIZE); - BUILD_BUG_ON(AES_BLOCK_SIZE != FS_IV_SIZE); - iv.index = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num); - memset(iv.padding, 0, sizeof(iv.padding)); - - if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL) { - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, (u8 *)&iv, - (u8 *)&iv); - } + fscrypt_prepare_iv(&iv, lblk_num, ci); req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, gfp_flags); if (!req) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c index d7a0f682ca12..c60ae8f70395 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fname.c +++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c @@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname, { struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); - struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = inode->i_crypt_info->ci_ctfm; - int res = 0; - char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE]; + struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm; + union fscrypt_iv iv; struct scatterlist sg; + int res; /* * Copy the filename to the output buffer for encrypting in-place and @@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname, memset(out + iname->len, 0, olen - iname->len); /* Initialize the IV */ - memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE); + fscrypt_prepare_iv(&iv, 0, ci); /* Set up the encryption request */ req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, crypto_req_done, &wait); sg_init_one(&sg, out, olen); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, olen, iv); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, olen, &iv); /* Do the encryption */ res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait); @@ -94,9 +95,10 @@ static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode, struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; - struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = inode->i_crypt_info->ci_ctfm; - int res = 0; - char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE]; + struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm; + union fscrypt_iv iv; + int res; /* Allocate request */ req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); @@ -107,12 +109,12 @@ static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode, crypto_req_done, &wait); /* Initialize IV */ - memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE); + fscrypt_prepare_iv(&iv, 0, ci); /* Create decryption request */ sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len); sg_init_one(&dst_sg, oname->name, oname->len); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, iv); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, &iv); res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait); skcipher_request_free(req); if (res < 0) { diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index 79debfc9cef9..a3ec179051dc 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ #include /* Encryption parameters */ -#define FS_IV_SIZE 16 #define FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE 16 /** @@ -52,16 +51,42 @@ struct fscrypt_symlink_data { } __packed; /* - * A pointer to this structure is stored in the file system's in-core - * representation of an inode. + * fscrypt_info - the "encryption key" for an inode + * + * When an encrypted file's key is made available, an instance of this struct is + * allocated and stored in ->i_crypt_info. Once created, it remains until the + * inode is evicted. */ struct fscrypt_info { + + /* The actual crypto transform used for encryption and decryption */ + struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm; + + /* + * Cipher for ESSIV IV generation. Only set for CBC contents + * encryption, otherwise is NULL. + */ + struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm; + + /* + * Encryption mode used for this inode. It corresponds to either + * ci_data_mode or ci_filename_mode, depending on the inode type. + */ + struct fscrypt_mode *ci_mode; + + /* + * If non-NULL, then this inode uses a master key directly rather than a + * derived key, and ci_ctfm will equal ci_master_key->mk_ctfm. + * Otherwise, this inode uses a derived key. + */ + struct fscrypt_master_key *ci_master_key; + + /* fields from the fscrypt_context */ u8 ci_data_mode; u8 ci_filename_mode; u8 ci_flags; - struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm; - struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm; - u8 ci_master_key[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; + u8 ci_master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; + u8 ci_nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE]; }; typedef enum { @@ -83,6 +108,10 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(u32 contents_mode, filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS) return true; + if (contents_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM && + filenames_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM) + return true; + return false; } @@ -107,6 +136,21 @@ fscrypt_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...); #define fscrypt_err(sb, fmt, ...) \ fscrypt_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +union fscrypt_iv { + struct { + __le64 index; + __le64 unused; + } short_iv; + struct { + __le64 index; + u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE]; + __le64 unused; + } long_iv; +}; + +void fscrypt_prepare_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num, + const struct fscrypt_info *ci); + /* fname.c */ extern int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname, u8 *out, unsigned int olen); @@ -115,6 +159,16 @@ extern bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 *encrypted_len_ret); /* keyinfo.c */ + +struct fscrypt_mode { + const char *friendly_name; + const char *cipher_str; + int keysize; + bool logged_impl_name; + bool uses_essiv; + bool uses_long_ivs; +}; + extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void); #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c index 7874c9bb2fc5..49bfbe8c15cd 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c @@ -10,15 +10,20 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include "fscrypt_private.h" static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm; +static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(fscrypt_master_keys, 6); /* 6 bits = 64 buckets */ +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fscrypt_master_keys_lock); + /* * Key derivation function. This generates the derived key by encrypting the * master key with AES-128-ECB using the inode's nonce as the AES key. @@ -123,37 +128,7 @@ find_and_lock_process_key(const char *prefix, return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); } -/* Find the master key, then derive the inode's actual encryption key */ -static int find_and_derive_key(const struct inode *inode, - const struct fscrypt_context *ctx, - u8 *derived_key, unsigned int derived_keysize) -{ - struct key *key; - const struct fscrypt_key *payload; - int err; - - key = find_and_lock_process_key(FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX, - ctx->master_key_descriptor, - derived_keysize, &payload); - if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) { - key = find_and_lock_process_key(inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix, - ctx->master_key_descriptor, - derived_keysize, &payload); - } - if (IS_ERR(key)) - return PTR_ERR(key); - err = derive_key_aes(payload->raw, ctx, derived_key, derived_keysize); - up_read(&key->sem); - key_put(key); - return err; -} - -static struct fscrypt_mode { - const char *friendly_name; - const char *cipher_str; - int keysize; - bool logged_impl_name; -} available_modes[] = { +static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = { [FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = { .friendly_name = "AES-256-XTS", .cipher_str = "xts(aes)", @@ -168,12 +143,19 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode { .friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC", .cipher_str = "cbc(aes)", .keysize = 16, + .uses_essiv = true, }, [FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = { .friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC", .cipher_str = "cts(cbc(aes))", .keysize = 16, }, + [FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM] = { + .friendly_name = "Adiantum", + .cipher_str = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)", + .keysize = 32, + .uses_long_ivs = true, + }, }; static struct fscrypt_mode * @@ -198,14 +180,178 @@ select_encryption_mode(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const struct inode *inode) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } -static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci) +/* Find the master key, then derive the inode's actual encryption key */ +static int find_and_derive_key(const struct inode *inode, + const struct fscrypt_context *ctx, + u8 *derived_key, const struct fscrypt_mode *mode) { - if (!ci) + struct key *key; + const struct fscrypt_key *payload; + int err; + + key = find_and_lock_process_key(FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX, + ctx->master_key_descriptor, + mode->keysize, &payload); + if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) { + key = find_and_lock_process_key(inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix, + ctx->master_key_descriptor, + mode->keysize, &payload); + } + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return PTR_ERR(key); + + if (ctx->flags & FS_POLICY_FLAGS_DIRECT) { + if (mode->uses_long_ivs) { + memcpy(derived_key, payload->raw, mode->keysize); + err = 0; + } else { + fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb, + "direct key mode not allowed with %s\n", + mode->friendly_name); + err = -EINVAL; + } + } else { + err = derive_key_aes(payload->raw, ctx, derived_key, + mode->keysize); + } + up_read(&key->sem); + key_put(key); + return err; +} + +/* Allocate and key a symmetric cipher object for the given encryption mode */ +static struct crypto_skcipher * +allocate_skcipher_for_mode(struct fscrypt_mode *mode, const u8 *raw_key, + const struct inode *inode) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; + int err; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb, + "error allocating '%s' transform for inode %lu: %ld", + mode->cipher_str, inode->i_ino, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return tfm; + } + if (unlikely(!mode->logged_impl_name)) { + /* + * fscrypt performance can vary greatly depending on which + * crypto algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug + * performance problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name the + * first time a mode is used. Note that multiple threads can + * race here, but it doesn't really matter. + */ + mode->logged_impl_name = true; + pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n", + mode->friendly_name, + crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_driver_name); + } + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY); + err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, raw_key, mode->keysize); + if (err) + goto err_free_tfm; + + return tfm; + +err_free_tfm: + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); + return ERR_PTR(err); +} + +/* Master key referenced by FS_POLICY_FLAGS_DIRECT policy */ +struct fscrypt_master_key { + struct hlist_node mk_node; + refcount_t mk_refcount; + const struct fscrypt_mode *mk_mode; + struct crypto_skcipher *mk_ctfm; + u8 mk_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; + u8 mk_raw[FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; +}; + +static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) +{ + if (mk) { + crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_ctfm); + kzfree(mk); + } +} + +static void put_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) +{ + if (!refcount_dec_and_lock(&mk->mk_refcount, &fscrypt_master_keys_lock)) return; + hash_del(&mk->mk_node); + spin_unlock(&fscrypt_master_keys_lock); - crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm); - crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm); - kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci); + free_master_key(mk); +} + +static struct fscrypt_master_key * +find_or_insert_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *to_insert, + const u8 *raw_key, const struct fscrypt_mode *mode, + const struct fscrypt_info *ci) +{ + unsigned long hash_key; + struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hash_key) > FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); + memcpy(&hash_key, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, sizeof(hash_key)); + + spin_lock(&fscrypt_master_keys_lock); + hash_for_each_possible(fscrypt_master_keys, mk, mk_node, hash_key) { + if (memcmp(mk->mk_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, + FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) != 0) + continue; + if (mode != mk->mk_mode || + crypto_memneq(raw_key, mk->mk_raw, mode->keysize)) + continue; + /* using existing tfm with same (descriptor, mode, raw_key) */ + refcount_inc(&mk->mk_refcount); + spin_unlock(&fscrypt_master_keys_lock); + free_master_key(to_insert); + return mk; + } + if (to_insert) + hash_add(fscrypt_master_keys, &to_insert->mk_node, hash_key); + spin_unlock(&fscrypt_master_keys_lock); + return to_insert; +} + +/* Prepare to encrypt directly using the master key in the given mode */ +static struct fscrypt_master_key * +fscrypt_get_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct fscrypt_mode *mode, + const u8 *raw_key, const struct inode *inode) +{ + struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; + int err; + + /* Is there already a tfm for this key? */ + mk = find_or_insert_master_key(NULL, raw_key, mode, ci); + if (mk) + return mk; + + /* Nope, allocate one. */ + mk = kzalloc(sizeof(*mk), GFP_NOFS); + if (!mk) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + refcount_set(&mk->mk_refcount, 1); + mk->mk_mode = mode; + mk->mk_ctfm = allocate_skcipher_for_mode(mode, raw_key, inode); + if (IS_ERR(mk->mk_ctfm)) { + err = PTR_ERR(mk->mk_ctfm); + mk->mk_ctfm = NULL; + goto err_free_mk; + } + memcpy(mk->mk_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, + FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); + memcpy(mk->mk_raw, raw_key, mode->keysize); + + return find_or_insert_master_key(mk, raw_key, mode, ci); + +err_free_mk: + free_master_key(mk); + return ERR_PTR(err); } static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt) @@ -275,11 +421,66 @@ void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void) crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm); } +/* + * Given the encryption mode and key (normally the derived key, but for + * FS_POLICY_FLAGS_DIRECT mode it's the master key), set up the inode's + * symmetric cipher transform object(s). + */ +static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci, + struct fscrypt_mode *mode, + const u8 *raw_key, const struct inode *inode) +{ + struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; + struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm; + int err; + + if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAGS_DIRECT) { + mk = fscrypt_get_master_key(ci, mode, raw_key, inode); + if (IS_ERR(mk)) + return PTR_ERR(mk); + ctfm = mk->mk_ctfm; + } else { + mk = NULL; + ctfm = allocate_skcipher_for_mode(mode, raw_key, inode); + if (IS_ERR(ctfm)) + return PTR_ERR(ctfm); + } + ci->ci_master_key = mk; + ci->ci_ctfm = ctfm; + + if (mode->uses_essiv && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) { + WARN_ON(mode->uses_long_ivs); + BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(union fscrypt_iv, short_iv) != + AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + err = init_essiv_generator(ci, raw_key, mode->keysize); + if (err) { + fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb, + "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d", + inode->i_ino, err); + return err; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci) +{ + if (!ci) + return; + + if (ci->ci_master_key) { + put_master_key(ci->ci_master_key); + } else { + crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm); + crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm); + } + kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci); +} + int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) { struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info; struct fscrypt_context ctx; - struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm; struct fscrypt_mode *mode; u8 *raw_key = NULL; int res; @@ -312,23 +513,23 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) if (ctx.flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID) return -EINVAL; - crypt_info = kmem_cache_alloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); + crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); if (!crypt_info) return -ENOMEM; crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags; crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode; crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode; - crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL; - crypt_info->ci_essiv_tfm = NULL; - memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor, - sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key)); + memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor, + FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); + memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE); mode = select_encryption_mode(crypt_info, inode); if (IS_ERR(mode)) { res = PTR_ERR(mode); goto out; } + crypt_info->ci_mode = mode; /* * This cannot be a stack buffer because it is passed to the scatterlist @@ -339,47 +540,14 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) if (!raw_key) goto out; - res = find_and_derive_key(inode, &ctx, raw_key, mode->keysize); + res = find_and_derive_key(inode, &ctx, raw_key, mode); if (res) goto out; - ctfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(mode->cipher_str, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(ctfm)) { - res = PTR_ERR(ctfm); - fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb, - "error allocating '%s' transform for inode %lu: %d", - mode->cipher_str, inode->i_ino, res); - goto out; - } - if (unlikely(!mode->logged_impl_name)) { - /* - * fscrypt performance can vary greatly depending on which - * crypto algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug - * performance problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name the - * first time a mode is used. Note that multiple threads can - * race here, but it doesn't really matter. - */ - mode->logged_impl_name = true; - pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n", - mode->friendly_name, - crypto_skcipher_alg(ctfm)->base.cra_driver_name); - } - crypt_info->ci_ctfm = ctfm; - crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY); - res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctfm, raw_key, mode->keysize); + res = setup_crypto_transform(crypt_info, mode, raw_key, inode); if (res) goto out; - if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && - crypt_info->ci_data_mode == FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC) { - res = init_essiv_generator(crypt_info, raw_key, mode->keysize); - if (res) { - fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb, - "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d", - inode->i_ino, res); - goto out; - } - } if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL) crypt_info = NULL; out: diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index c6d431a5cce9..f490de921ce8 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child) child_ci = child->i_crypt_info; if (parent_ci && child_ci) { - return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key, child_ci->ci_master_key, + return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, + child_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 && (parent_ci->ci_data_mode == child_ci->ci_data_mode) && (parent_ci->ci_filename_mode == @@ -254,7 +255,7 @@ int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child, ctx.contents_encryption_mode = ci->ci_data_mode; ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode; ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags; - memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key, + memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE); get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h index a441ea1bfe6d..8a49e971146d 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h @@ -269,7 +269,8 @@ struct fsxattr { #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_16 0x02 #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 0x03 #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK 0x03 -#define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID 0x03 +#define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_DIRECT 0x04 /* use master key directly */ +#define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID 0x07 /* Encryption algorithms */ #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID 0 @@ -281,6 +282,7 @@ struct fsxattr { #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS 6 #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_XTS 7 /* Removed, do not use. */ #define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_SPECK128_256_CTS 8 /* Removed, do not use. */ +#define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM 9 struct fscrypt_policy { __u8 version;