From patchwork Wed Jan 27 19:06:13 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 12050801 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66029C433E6 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:09:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28BB864D9E for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:09:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1344222AbhA0TIz (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:08:55 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([96.44.175.130]:58772 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344219AbhA0TIw (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:08:52 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60CD6128091F; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:08:12 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1611774492; bh=YHt4RAsYu1QQnSDnLJUdyiRZsRAbCnUy9STr4RulVHQ=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=vrzJMioulwHAWnVCSNYmJqVq6Vu62B4xgqpKainEYLSPtN1fuLfN3IHbUgUqKlz3S YcMoJT1skWK4L4b1jHqeBCuPuvB7BrAHFWBbwpQY8vQMonzyqeXuCmgFsViYBuhCVK HKeBRt1YjnE7upanc3jckoTWMqBcKmpcx1Htm5T8= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Y1lO1iGujHmF; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:08:12 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E547F128091E; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:08:11 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v15 1/5] lib: add ASN.1 encoder Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:06:13 -0800 Message-Id: <20210127190617.17564-2-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org We have a need in the TPM2 trusted keys to return the ASN.1 form of the TPM key blob so it can be operated on by tools outside of the kernel. The specific tools are the openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and the Intel tpm2-tss-engine. To do that, we have to be able to read and write the same binary key format the tools use. The current ASN.1 decoder does fine for reading, but we need pieces of an ASN.1 encoder to write the key blob in binary compatible form. For backwards compatibility, the trusted key reader code will still accept the two TPM2B quantities that it uses today, but the writer will only output the ASN.1 form. The current implementation only encodes the ASN.1 bits we actually need. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: David Howells Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: updated API to use indefinite length, and made symbol exports gpl v3: add data length error handling v4: use end_data instead of data_len pointer v5: mention tools and space out code v7: reverse christmas tree variable definitions and better spacing v9: update comments, remove indefinite length, make encoder config dependent v15: add review and tested --- include/linux/asn1_encoder.h | 32 +++ lib/Kconfig | 3 + lib/Makefile | 1 + lib/asn1_encoder.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 490 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_encoder.h create mode 100644 lib/asn1_encoder.c diff --git a/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..08cd0c2ad34f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H +#define _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define asn1_oid_len(oid) (sizeof(oid)/sizeof(u32)) +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + s64 integer); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 oid[], int oid_len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 tag, const unsigned char *string, int len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *string, u32 len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *seq, int len); +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + bool val); + +#endif diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig index 46806332a8cc..a5bd3a86226f 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig +++ b/lib/Kconfig @@ -692,3 +692,6 @@ config GENERIC_LIB_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED config PLDMFW bool default n + +config ASN1_ENCODER + tristate diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index afeff05fa8c5..b9a975daed16 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST) += interval_tree_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/ diff --git a/lib/asn1_encoder.c b/lib/asn1_encoder.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..41e71aae3ef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/asn1_encoder.c @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Simple encoder primitives for ASN.1 BER/DER/CER + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * asn1_encode_integer() - encode positive integer to ASN.1 + * @data: pointer to the pointer to the data + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @integer: integer to be encoded + * + * This is a simplified encoder: it only currently does + * positive integers, but it should be simple enough to add the + * negative case if a use comes along. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + s64 integer) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + unsigned char *d = &data[2]; + bool found = false; + int i; + + if (WARN(integer < 0, + "BUG: integer encode only supports positive integers")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* need at least 3 bytes for tag, length and integer encoding */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* remaining length where at d (the start of the integer encoding) */ + data_len -= 2; + + data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, INT); + if (integer == 0) { + *d++ = 0; + goto out; + } + + for (i = sizeof(integer); i > 0 ; i--) { + int byte = integer >> (8 * (i - 1)); + + if (!found && byte == 0) + continue; + + /* + * for a positive number the first byte must have bit + * 7 clear in two's complement (otherwise it's a + * negative number) so prepend a leading zero if + * that's not the case + */ + if (!found && (byte & 0x80)) { + /* + * no check needed here, we already know we + * have len >= 1 + */ + *d++ = 0; + data_len--; + } + + found = true; + if (data_len == 0) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *d++ = byte; + data_len--; + } + + out: + data[1] = d - data - 2; + + return d; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_integer); + +/* calculate the base 128 digit values setting the top bit of the first octet */ +static int asn1_encode_oid_digit(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, u32 oid) +{ + unsigned char *data = *_data; + int start = 7 + 7 + 7 + 7; + int ret = 0; + + if (*data_len < 1) + return -EINVAL; + + /* quick case */ + if (oid == 0) { + *data++ = 0x80; + (*data_len)--; + goto out; + } + + while (oid >> start == 0) + start -= 7; + + while (start > 0 && *data_len > 0) { + u8 byte; + + byte = oid >> start; + oid = oid - (byte << start); + start -= 7; + byte |= 0x80; + *data++ = byte; + (*data_len)--; + } + + if (*data_len > 0) { + *data++ = oid; + (*data_len)--; + } else { + ret = -EINVAL; + } + + out: + *_data = data; + return ret; +} + +/** + * asn1_encode_oid() - encode an oid to ASN.1 + * @data: position to begin encoding at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @oid: array of oids + * @oid_len: length of oid array + * + * this encodes an OID up to ASN.1 when presented as an array of OID values + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 oid[], int oid_len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + unsigned char *d = data + 2; + int i, ret; + + if (WARN(oid_len < 2, "OID must have at least two elements")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (WARN(oid_len > 32, "OID is too large")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + + /* need at least 3 bytes for tag, length and OID encoding */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OID); + *d++ = oid[0] * 40 + oid[1]; + + data_len -= 3; + + ret = 0; + + for (i = 2; i < oid_len; i++) { + ret = asn1_encode_oid_digit(&d, &data_len, oid[i]); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + data[1] = d - data - 2; + + return d; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_oid); + +/** + * asn1_encode_length() - encode a length to follow an ASN.1 tag + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @data_len: pointer to remaning length (adjusted by routine) + * @len: length to encode + * + * This routine can encode lengths up to 65535 using the ASN.1 rules. + * It will accept a negative length and place a zero length tag + * instead (to keep the ASN.1 valid). This convention allows other + * encoder primitives to accept negative lengths as singalling the + * sequence will be re-encoded when the length is known. + */ +static int asn1_encode_length(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, int len) +{ + if (*data_len < 1) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len < 0) { + *((*data)++) = 0; + (*data_len)--; + return 0; + } + + if (len <= 0x7f) { + *((*data)++) = len; + (*data_len)--; + return 0; + } + + if (*data_len < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len <= 0xff) { + *((*data)++) = 0x81; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 2; + return 0; + } + + if (*data_len < 3) + return -EINVAL; + + if (len <= 0xffff) { + *((*data)++) = 0x82; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 3; + return 0; + } + + if (WARN(len > 0xffffff, "ASN.1 length can't be > 0xffffff")) + return -EINVAL; + + if (*data_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + *((*data)++) = 0x83; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 16) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + *((*data)++) = len & 0xff; + *data_len -= 4; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * asn1_encode_tag() - add a tag for optional or explicit value + * @data: pointer to place tag at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @tag: tag to be placed + * @string: the data to be tagged + * @len: the length of the data to be tagged + * + * Note this currently only handles short form tags < 31. + * + * Standard usage is to pass in a @tag, @string and @length and the + * @string will be ASN.1 encoded with @tag and placed into @data. If + * the encoding would put data past @end_data then an error is + * returned, otherwise a pointer to a position one beyond the encoding + * is returned. + * + * To encode in place pass a NULL @string and -1 for @len and the + * maximum allowable beginning and end of the data; all this will do + * is add the current maximum length and update the data pointer to + * the place where the tag contents should be placed is returned. The + * data should be copied in by the calling routine which should then + * repeat the prior statement but now with the known length. In order + * to avoid having to keep both before and after pointers, the repeat + * expects to be called with @data pointing to where the first encode + * returned it and still NULL for @string but the real length in @len. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + u32 tag, const unsigned char *string, int len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (WARN(tag > 30, "ASN.1 tag can't be > 30")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (!string && WARN(len > 127, + "BUG: recode tag is too big (>127)")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + if (!string && len > 0) { + /* + * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the + * tag and install a dummy length because the real + * data_len should be NULL + */ + data -= 2; + data_len = 2; + } + + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tagn(CONT, CONS, tag); + data_len--; + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (!string) + return data; + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, string, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_tag); + +/** + * asn1_encode_octet_string() - encode an ASN.1 OCTET STRING + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @string: string to be encoded + * @len: length of string + * + * Note ASN.1 octet strings may contain zeros, so the length is obligatory. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *string, u32 len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* need minimum of 2 bytes for tag and length of zero length string */ + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OTS); + data_len--; + + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, string, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_octet_string); + +/** + * asn1_encode_sequence() - wrap a byte stream in an ASN.1 SEQUENCE + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @seq: data to be encoded as a sequence + * @len: length of the data to be encoded as a sequence + * + * Fill in a sequence. To encode in place, pass NULL for @seq and -1 + * for @len; then call again once the length is known (still with NULL + * for @seq). In order to avoid having to keep both before and after + * pointers, the repeat expects to be called with @data pointing to + * where the first encode placed it. + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + const unsigned char *seq, int len) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + int ret; + + if (!seq && WARN(len > 127, + "BUG: recode sequence is too big (>127)")) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + if (!seq && len >= 0) { + /* + * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the + * sequence and install a dummy length because the + * real length should be NULL + */ + data -= 2; + data_len = 2; + } + + if (data_len < 2) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, CONS, SEQ); + data_len--; + + ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + + if (!seq) + return data; + + if (data_len < len) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + memcpy(data, seq, len); + data += len; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_sequence); + +/** + * asn1_encode_boolean() - encode a boolean value to ASN.1 + * @data: pointer to encode at + * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data + * @val: the boolean true/false value + */ +unsigned char * +asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data, + bool val) +{ + int data_len = end_data - data; + + if (IS_ERR(data)) + return data; + + /* booleans are 3 bytes: tag, length == 1 and value == 0 or 1 */ + if (data_len < 3) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, BOOL); + data_len--; + + asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, 1); + + if (val) + *(data++) = 1; + else + *(data++) = 0; + + return data; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_boolean); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); From patchwork Wed Jan 27 19:06:14 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 12050803 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E05E4C433E6 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:11:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA9B564DA0 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:11:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1344399AbhA0TKx (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:10:53 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48708 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344393AbhA0TKp (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:10:45 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [IPv6:2607:fcd0:100:8a00::2]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4BCA9C061573; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:10:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0ACA31280055; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:10:05 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1611774605; bh=ck2ZIwBvUdlkG2aSWZp5Jzk7xWAy/yINKGxE2dUpmBo=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=NXJnu5ElRUEYIDHF8z8K6xVFCi5Imn0tfxlxHsaoJnkxpZJUpyKfMMW2jMgSrgmLx K6yaJRvamxia4nmoqrA5PGU40oebzDDA+X+a1kJ0L6y/8c9wLRo+SHOh0wlxCiAezz XEBOVZhaj5ANWqe+zsCQP3UgRUFgdV0yRs0oKI60= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id SSGBFrG3RKpe; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:10:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98F531280054; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:10:04 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v15 2/5] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:06:14 -0800 Message-Id: <20210127190617.17564-3-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The TCG has defined an OID prefix "2.23.133.10.1" for the various TPM key uses. We've defined three of the available numbers: 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a TPM2_Load() operation. 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a TPM2_Import() operation. Both loadable and importable keys are specific to a given TPM, the difference is that a loadable key is wrapped with the symmetric secret, so must have been created by the TPM itself. An importable key is wrapped with a DH shared secret, and may be created without access to the TPM provided you know the public part of the parent key. 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128 bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before use. The ASN.1 binary key form starts of with this OID as the first element of a sequence, giving the binary form a unique recognizable identity marker regardless of encoding. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: David Howells --- v3: correct OID_TPMImportableKey name v7: add ack v9: add review --- include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h index 4462ed2c18cd..d06988d1565e 100644 --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h @@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ enum OID { OID_SM2_with_SM3, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.501 */ OID_sm3WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.504 */ + /* TCG defined OIDS for TPM based keys */ + OID_TPMLoadableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.3 */ + OID_TPMImportableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.4 */ + OID_TPMSealedData, /* 2.23.133.10.1.5 */ + OID__NR }; From patchwork Wed Jan 27 19:06:15 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 12050811 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C01FC433E0 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:12:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F81560C40 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:12:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1344400AbhA0TMa (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:12:30 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49118 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344301AbhA0TM3 (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:12:29 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [IPv6:2607:fcd0:100:8a00::2]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C2C99C061573; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:11:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69231128007F; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:11:48 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1611774708; bh=IPuB5LDNeZ2PnKWugPXQMSaR2DE66JKC2AI7Dpr8z+M=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fD8zi/i/HxgrEo4II81RxybRpv9NkdW6laL1aw82kNfQaIzUf/9m1P8DFiX8WgHg/ kLRMPLHEB68+thZjkCZFzzMesB/FbJwjHOKtOnNLeGQHetvDlRnas++hTUNiD9AGbT x/XqPQ52WLbx2fzr+3MD197rw4hyZffPYpdB+wMM= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id JiZAaC3_GLnw; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:11:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD0E01280054; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:11:47 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:06:15 -0800 Message-Id: <20210127190617.17564-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new directly supplied password: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator for which form is input. Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips") Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v6: change comment, eliminate else clauses and add fixes tag v7: fixes before signoff v12: fix mismerge from v6 to make processing continue after blobauth v14: add tested by Merge with auth fix --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 ++++--- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index a94c03a61d8f..b2ed3481c6a0 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint16_t keytype; uint32_t keyhandle; unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t blobauth_len; unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; uint32_t pcrinfo_len; unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 74d82093cbaa..f81637521a04 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -781,13 +781,33 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_blobauth: - if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (res < 0) - return -EINVAL; + /* + * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes passed in as + * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple + * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) + */ + opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); + + if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; + break; + } + + if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { + memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + opt->blobauth_len); + break; + } + + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from == '0') pay->migratable = 0; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 38bb33333cdf..6c6dd88d7bf6 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -91,10 +91,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len + 1); + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); + if (options->blobauth_len) + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); @@ -258,7 +260,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL /* nonce */, 0, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, options->blobauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + options->blobauth_len); rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); if (rc > 0) From patchwork Wed Jan 27 19:06:16 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 12050813 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 21ABDC433DB for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:15:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8DF464DBF for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:15:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231735AbhA0TPg (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:15:36 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([96.44.175.130]:59958 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231367AbhA0TPd (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:15:33 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EBFF128007F; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:14:51 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1611774891; bh=z+VQWukb0sjcFe611qTpe5zRLTDkVlwnxwq+zT4qDTo=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Ga7LDmv4HNte8SIVZDO/I8uH8va7xfK3116kOBKd6GbU4WTKycSQEcXrxhJDqAEs7 3Dc/t2Yl6ggGLqMUObT9EuBFlZWH2E/QADSXgd5sUeXwZoZ6lRXCg/ykTRtTN6lo9G 3F0pmnJy75FTEAbxFCeSA96HLfr0JeXaqQErqMq8= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AuttxmllFF9G; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:14:51 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 306C1128005D; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:14:51 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v15 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:06:16 -0800 Message-Id: <20210127190617.17564-5-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: Updated encode API, added length checks v5: correct export format after doing interoperability checks v7: use prefix tpm2_key_ instead of tpmkey_ for functions v8: resplit commit v9: select ASN1_ENCODER v11: add ASN.1 format description v13: fix ASN.1 compiler dependency v14: select OID_REGISTRY add tested by v15: signed blob len --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 58 +++++ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 4 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 11 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 210 +++++++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 1da879a68640..549aa1308949 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -207,3 +207,61 @@ about the usage can be found in the file Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload. + + +TPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format +------------------------ + +The TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable, +even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1 +format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and +policy:: + + TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL + parent INTEGER + pubkey OCTET STRING + privkey OCTET STRING + } + +type is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID +is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable +binary pattern at offset 3 in the key. The OIDs currently made +available are:: + + 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually + RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a + TPM2_Load() operation. + + 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually + RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a + TPM2_Import() operation. + + 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128 + bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually + represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before + use. + +The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID. + +emptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization "". If it +is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization +phrase. This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether +to prompt for a password. + +parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space, +like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key. Userspace programmes +also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space. If +this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the +TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile +object and used as the parent. The current kernel code only supports +the 0x81 MSO form. + +pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the +initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet +string length. + +privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the +initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed +string length. diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index b2ed3481c6a0..b2d87ad21714 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { unsigned int key_len; unsigned int blob_len; unsigned char migratable; + unsigned char old_format; unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1]; unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; }; diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 83bc23409164..f0912692469b 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select ASN1_ENCODER + select OID_REGISTRY + select ASN1 help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 7b73cebbb378..f87c43f306d5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o -trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o + +$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h +trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3f6a9d01d1e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +--- +--- ASN.1 for for TPM 2.0 keys +--- + +TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}), + emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, + parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}), + pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}), + privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv}) + } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index f81637521a04..ad6cd0000d8e 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } - if (!options->keyhandle) { + if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 6c6dd88d7bf6..b8ef087528e9 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation */ +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -12,6 +14,10 @@ #include #include +#include + +#include "tpm2key.asn1.h" + static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, @@ -20,6 +26,165 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, }; +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 }; + +static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 *src, u32 len) +{ + const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; + u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + u8 *work = scratch, *work1; + u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE; + u8 *priv, *pub; + u16 priv_len, pub_len; + + priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + priv = src; + + src += priv_len; + + pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; + pub = src; + + if (!scratch) + return -ENOMEM; + + work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, + asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); + + if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { + unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; + /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ + w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) + return PTR_ERR(w); + work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool); + } + + /* + * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length + * + * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never + * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on + */ + if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) + return -EINVAL; + + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); + work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); + + work1 = payload->blob; + work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), + scratch, work - scratch); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) + return PTR_ERR(work1); + + return work1 - payload->blob; +} + +struct tpm2_key_context { + u32 parent; + const u8 *pub; + u32 pub_len; + const u8 *priv; + u32 priv_len; +}; + +static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 **buf) +{ + int ret; + struct tpm2_key_context ctx; + u8 *blob; + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob, + payload->blob_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!blob) + return -ENOMEM; + + *buf = blob; + options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + + memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); + blob += ctx.priv_len; + + memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len); + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + const u8 *v = value; + int i; + + ctx->parent = 0; + for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) { + ctx->parent <<= 8; + ctx->parent |= v[i]; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + + if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) { + char buffer[50]; + + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n", + buffer); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->pub = value; + ctx->pub_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + +int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->priv = value; + ctx->priv_len = vlen; + + return 0; +} + /** * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. * @@ -63,7 +228,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options) { - unsigned int blob_len; + int blob_len = 0; struct tpm_buf buf; u32 hash; int i; @@ -79,6 +244,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) return -EINVAL; + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -146,8 +314,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); - payload->blob_len = blob_len; + blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, + &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], + blob_len); out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); @@ -158,6 +327,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, else rc = -EPERM; } + if (blob_len < 0) + return blob_len; + + payload->blob_len = blob_len; return rc; } @@ -184,13 +357,34 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; + u8 *blob; int rc; - private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); - if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) + rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); + if (rc) { + /* old form */ + blob = payload->blob; + payload->old_format = 1; + } + + /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + + /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ + if (payload->blob_len < 4) + return -EINVAL; + + private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob); + + /* must be big enough for following public_len */ + if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len)) + return -E2BIG; + + public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len); + if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; - public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -206,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->keyauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { rc = -E2BIG; @@ -219,6 +413,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); out: + if (blob != payload->blob) + kfree(blob); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); if (rc > 0) From patchwork Wed Jan 27 19:06:17 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 12050823 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0CEB6C433E0 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:17:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B423E64DA3 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 19:17:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231139AbhA0TRN (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:17:13 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50124 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231130AbhA0TRK (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jan 2021 14:17:10 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [IPv6:2607:fcd0:100:8a00::2]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C4F3C061573; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:16:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 222FC128043E; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:16:30 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1611774990; bh=manDTqzsIFGWjGCEd9IW/zEZEI9+dK1VIDb+7rfMVBM=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=t3glW1fDcVrC7jUmPhZk6aiREJaC1qR4YlKc+QqjhDjf2ggIvZwGYh3uP+B79uk/d OL0Csxo2zXLJBMALX88/feH1OpRNoYcReCVYGhrDkexlpwDAtc+wE3JzpzJla17yXD CRcPpmn1sggggDHb1soEJWXGAIbOSuhOqgtsV5SE= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ffSmx6MLL289; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:16:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8C6312803A7; Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:16:29 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells Subject: [PATCH v15 5/5] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:06:17 -0800 Message-Id: <20210127190617.17564-6-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> References: <20210127190617.17564-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't load. Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from the last byte of old format keys. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: added length checks to untrusted payload v8: recover patch v14: add tested by --- include/linux/tpm.h | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index c4ca52138e8b..f1e32bc7d618 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ struct tpm_buf { }; enum tpm2_object_attributes { + TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM = BIT(1), + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT = BIT(4), TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), }; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index b8ef087528e9..5d4e1f3ebb19 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, int blob_len = 0; struct tpm_buf buf; u32 hash; + u32 flags; int i; int rc; @@ -259,31 +260,32 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); if (options->blobauth_len) tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); - tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); /* public */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + /* key properties */ + flags = 0; + flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; + flags |= payload->migratable ? (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | + TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT) : 0; + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags); + /* policy */ - if (options->policydigest_len) { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + if (options->policydigest_len) tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - } /* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); @@ -357,8 +359,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; - u8 *blob; + u8 *blob, *pub; int rc; + u32 attrs; rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); if (rc) { @@ -385,6 +388,16 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; + pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2; + /* key attributes are always at offset 4 */ + attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4); + + if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) == + (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) + payload->migratable = 0; + else + payload->migratable = 1; + blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) return -E2BIG; @@ -465,7 +478,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (!rc) { data_len = be16_to_cpup( (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); - if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { + if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { rc = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -476,9 +489,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; - memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); - payload->key_len = data_len - 1; - payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + if (payload->old_format) { + /* migratable flag is at the end of the key */ + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); + payload->key_len = data_len - 1; + payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + } else { + /* + * migratable flag already collected from key + * attributes + */ + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len); + payload->key_len = data_len; + } } out: