From patchwork Thu Feb 25 20:58:40 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Howells X-Patchwork-Id: 12105007 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F2E9C43381 for ; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 21:03:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 423BE64EAF for ; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 21:03:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233502AbhBYVC0 (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Feb 2021 16:02:26 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([63.128.21.124]:36711 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234435AbhBYVAW (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Feb 2021 16:00:22 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1614286730; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=c1oYdg5SbZHW0wu7wO6T85aFLqKLaKkPd+ROH3B88Yc=; b=S+M32bXWV30dSBmuCKEuRtOTYhqKckOow69lfE6ZChnk4ez4yTo8C6Wy7xY+g5y4CYwslI fL/F/l9r8GdfDC17Ba9POYkTrzhCD71K9jBBkikLcg2E9EOdzrtnpa8POGrF1DrSShxtO9 mVBHnTFlg/TxLCUUo+mGx270T6IGADc= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-334-iqRUqijFPVC4zyfj029hUQ-1; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 15:58:44 -0500 X-MC-Unique: iqRUqijFPVC4zyfj029hUQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B09E107ACE4; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 20:58:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from warthog.procyon.org.uk (ovpn-119-68.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.119.68]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 516225447B; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 20:58:41 +0000 (UTC) Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. 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Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 1/4] certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries From: David Howells To: Eric Snowberg Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Randy Dunlap , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Arnd Bergmann , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , =?utf-8?q?Micka?= =?utf-8?q?=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 20:58:40 +0000 Message-ID: <161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <161428671215.677100.6372209948022011988.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <161428671215.677100.6372209948022011988.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.23 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.15 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Eric Snowberg This fixes CVE-2020-26541. The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries. Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are skipped. Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. [DH: Made the following changes: - Added to have a config option to enable the facility. This allows a Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is enabled. - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions. - Added kerneldoc comments.] Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Jarkko Sakkinen cc: Randy Dunlap cc: Mickaël Salaün cc: Arnd Bergmann cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2660556.1610545213@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ --- certs/Kconfig | 9 ++++ certs/blacklist.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++ certs/blacklist.h | 2 + certs/system_keyring.c | 6 +++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 15 +++++++ .../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 11 +++++ 6 files changed, 86 insertions(+) diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig index c94e93d8bccf..76e469b56a77 100644 --- a/certs/Kconfig +++ b/certs/Kconfig @@ -83,4 +83,13 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each should be a string of hex digits. +config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST + bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates" + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y + help + If set, this allows revocation certificates to be stored in the + blacklist keyring and implements a hook whereby a PKCS#7 message can + be checked to see if it matches such a certificate. + endmenu diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c index bffe4c6f4a9e..2b8644123d5f 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.c +++ b/certs/blacklist.c @@ -145,6 +145,49 @@ int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_binary_blacklisted); +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST +/** + * add_key_to_revocation_list - Add a revocation certificate to the blacklist + * @data: The data blob containing the certificate + * @size: The size of data blob + */ +int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size) +{ + key_ref_t key; + + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true), + "asymmetric", + NULL, + data, + size, + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); + + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); + return PTR_ERR(key); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked + * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check + */ +int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ + int ret; + + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); + + if (ret == 0) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + + return -ENOKEY; +} +#endif + /* * Initialise the blacklist */ diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h index 1efd6fa0dc60..51b320cf8574 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.h +++ b/certs/blacklist.h @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ #include +#include +#include extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[]; diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index 4b693da488f1..ed98754d5795 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -242,6 +242,12 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n"); goto error; } + + ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7); + if (ret != -ENOKEY) { + pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n"); + goto error; + } } ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys); if (ret < 0) { diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h index fb8b07daa9d1..875e002a4180 100644 --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted #endif +extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash); extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, @@ -49,6 +50,20 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST +extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size); +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); +#else +static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ + return -ENOKEY; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING extern struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring; diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c index c5ba695c10e3..5604bd57c990 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c @@ -55,6 +55,15 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source, uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4); } +/* + * Add an X509 cert to the revocation list. + */ +static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source, + const void *data, size_t len) +{ + add_key_to_revocation_list(data, len); +} + /* * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables. @@ -76,5 +85,7 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) return uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs; if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_sha256_guid) == 0) return uefi_blacklist_binary; + if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) + return uefi_revocation_list_x509; return 0; } From patchwork Thu Feb 25 20:58:48 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Howells X-Patchwork-Id: 12105005 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B867C433DB for ; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 21:03:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62A8564E85 for ; 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Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 2/4] certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function From: David Howells To: Eric Snowberg Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , dhowells@redhat.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 20:58:48 +0000 Message-ID: <161428672825.677100.7545516389752262918.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <161428671215.677100.6372209948022011988.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <161428671215.677100.6372209948022011988.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.23 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.11 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Eric Snowberg Move functionality within load_system_certificate_list to a common function, so it can be reused in the future. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: David Howells Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200930201508.35113-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 --- certs/Makefile | 2 +- certs/common.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ certs/common.h | 9 ++++++++ certs/system_keyring.c | 49 +++--------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) create mode 100644 certs/common.c create mode 100644 certs/common.h diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile index f4c25b67aad9..f4b90bad8690 100644 --- a/certs/Makefile +++ b/certs/Makefile @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Makefile for the linux kernel signature checking certificates. # -obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o common.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"") obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o diff --git a/certs/common.c b/certs/common.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..83800f51a1a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +#include +#include + +int load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[], + const unsigned long list_size, + const struct key *keyring) +{ + key_ref_t key; + const u8 *p, *end; + size_t plen; + + p = cert_list; + end = p + list_size; + while (p < end) { + /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more + * than 256 bytes in size. + */ + if (end - p < 4) + goto dodgy_cert; + if (p[0] != 0x30 && + p[1] != 0x82) + goto dodgy_cert; + plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + plen += 4; + if (plen > end - p) + goto dodgy_cert; + + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), + "asymmetric", + NULL, + p, + plen, + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | + KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN | + KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", + PTR_ERR(key)); + } else { + pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", + key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); + key_ref_put(key); + } + p += plen; + } + + return 0; + +dodgy_cert: + pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/certs/common.h b/certs/common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..abdb5795936b --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ + +#ifndef _CERT_COMMON_H +#define _CERT_COMMON_H + +int load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[], const unsigned long list_size, + const struct key *keyring); + +#endif diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index ed98754d5795..0c9a4795e847 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include "common.h" static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys; #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING @@ -137,54 +138,10 @@ device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init); */ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void) { - key_ref_t key; - const u8 *p, *end; - size_t plen; - pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n"); - p = system_certificate_list; - end = p + system_certificate_list_size; - while (p < end) { - /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more - * than 256 bytes in size. - */ - if (end - p < 4) - goto dodgy_cert; - if (p[0] != 0x30 && - p[1] != 0x82) - goto dodgy_cert; - plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; - plen += 4; - if (plen > end - p) - goto dodgy_cert; - - key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(builtin_trusted_keys, 1), - "asymmetric", - NULL, - p, - plen, - ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | - KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | - KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN | - KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION); - if (IS_ERR(key)) { - pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", - PTR_ERR(key)); - } else { - pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", - key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); - key_ref_put(key); - } - p += plen; - } - - return 0; - -dodgy_cert: - pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n"); - return 0; + return load_certificate_list(system_certificate_list, system_certificate_list_size, + builtin_trusted_keys); } late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list); From patchwork Thu Feb 25 20:58:55 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Howells X-Patchwork-Id: 12105009 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CCBECC4332B for ; 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Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 3/4] certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs From: David Howells To: Eric Snowberg Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , dhowells@redhat.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 20:58:55 +0000 Message-ID: <161428673564.677100.4112098280028451629.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <161428671215.677100.6372209948022011988.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <161428671215.677100.6372209948022011988.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.23 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Eric Snowberg Add a new Kconfig option called SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS. If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formated file containing X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist keyring. [DH: Changed this to make the new Kconfig option depend on the option to enable the facility.] Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: David Howells Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200930201508.35113-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 --- certs/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++ certs/Makefile | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- certs/blacklist.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ certs/revocation_certificates.S | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ scripts/Makefile | 1 + 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 certs/revocation_certificates.S diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig index 76e469b56a77..ab88d2a7f3c7 100644 --- a/certs/Kconfig +++ b/certs/Kconfig @@ -92,4 +92,12 @@ config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST blacklist keyring and implements a hook whereby a PKCS#7 message can be checked to see if it matches such a certificate. +config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS + string "X.509 certificates to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring" + depends on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST + help + If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formatted file + containing X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist + keyring. + endmenu diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile index f4b90bad8690..e3f4926fd21e 100644 --- a/certs/Makefile +++ b/certs/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o common.o -obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o revocation_certificates.o common.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"") obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o else @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREF $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS)) endif # CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING -clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list +clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list x509_revocation_list ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) ############################################################################### @@ -104,3 +104,17 @@ targets += signing_key.x509 $(obj)/signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert $(X509_DEP) FORCE $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)) endif # CONFIG_MODULE_SIG + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING),y) + +$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS)) + +$(obj)/revocation_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_revocation_list + +quiet_cmd_extract_certs = EXTRACT_CERTS $(patsubst "%",%,$(2)) + cmd_extract_certs = scripts/extract-cert $(2) $@ + +targets += x509_revocation_list +$(obj)/x509_revocation_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS_FILENAME) FORCE + $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS)) +endif diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c index 2b8644123d5f..723b19c96256 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.c +++ b/certs/blacklist.c @@ -17,9 +17,13 @@ #include #include #include "blacklist.h" +#include "common.h" static struct key *blacklist_keyring; +extern __initconst const u8 revocation_certificate_list[]; +extern __initconst const unsigned long revocation_certificate_list_size; + /* * The description must be a type prefix, a colon and then an even number of * hex digits. The hash is kept in the description. @@ -220,3 +224,16 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void) * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. */ device_initcall(blacklist_init); + +/* + * Load the compiled-in list of revocation X.509 certificates. + */ +static __init int load_revocation_certificate_list(void) +{ + if (revocation_certificate_list_size) + pr_notice("Loading compiled-in revocation X.509 certificates\n"); + + return load_certificate_list(revocation_certificate_list, revocation_certificate_list_size, + blacklist_keyring); +} +late_initcall(load_revocation_certificate_list); diff --git a/certs/revocation_certificates.S b/certs/revocation_certificates.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f21aae8a8f0e --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/revocation_certificates.S @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#include +#include + + __INITRODATA + + .align 8 + .globl revocation_certificate_list +revocation_certificate_list: +__revocation_list_start: + .incbin "certs/x509_revocation_list" +__revocation_list_end: + + .align 8 + .globl revocation_certificate_list_size +revocation_certificate_list_size: +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + .quad __revocation_list_end - __revocation_list_start +#else + .long __revocation_list_end - __revocation_list_start +#endif diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile index b5418ec587fb..983b785f13cb 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile +++ b/scripts/Makefile @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ hostprogs-always-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler hostprogs-always-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += sign-file hostprogs-always-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert hostprogs-always-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert + hostprogs-always-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += extract-cert HOSTCFLAGS_sorttable.o = -I$(srctree)/tools/include HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -I$(srctree)/include From patchwork Thu Feb 25 20:59:03 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Howells X-Patchwork-Id: 12105011 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC2B4C433E0 for ; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 21:04:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9950D64DA3 for ; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 21:04:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232770AbhBYVDp (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Feb 2021 16:03:45 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([63.128.21.124]:29404 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234891AbhBYVAw (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Feb 2021 16:00:52 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1614286751; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=GaPCWMrUePGJJoknBQo5jOHASSWRrtnBlimP7nH0gxY=; b=b9YxEr+Ow3KZSWJmp8RX9bxq8MpbmRZV5l5m0zeEyaPKAuEv1jr5Ty0KY58IJE0EpGR+0C Z4ojbHzDWwGnMhKKnbb2TJozWswQwe9XpRfgxqwi41DtPHuuwM2KRjyHanrH7ncigNhSvg oNVuBCl+7gR96MrjKFCr2HPcVJE4PI0= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-200-ep0hnRerPpOGyC-8WdqOGQ-1; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 15:59:06 -0500 X-MC-Unique: ep0hnRerPpOGyC-8WdqOGQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 69ABE19611A8; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 20:59:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from warthog.procyon.org.uk (ovpn-119-68.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.119.68]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A59660BF3; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 20:59:03 +0000 (UTC) Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. 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Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 4/4] integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring From: David Howells To: Eric Snowberg Cc: James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , dhowells@redhat.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 20:59:03 +0000 Message-ID: <161428674320.677100.12637282414018170743.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <161428671215.677100.6372209948022011988.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <161428671215.677100.6372209948022011988.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.23 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.12 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Eric Snowberg During boot the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, is loaded into the blacklist keyring. Systems booted with shim have an equivalent Forbidden Signature Database called mokx. Currently mokx is only used by shim and grub, the contents are ignored by the kernel. Add the ability to load mokx into the blacklist keyring during boot. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg Suggested-by: James Bottomley Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c33c8e3839a41e9654f41cc92c7231104931b1d7.camel@HansenPartnership.com/ --- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index ee4b4c666854..f290f78c3f30 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -132,8 +132,9 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void) static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) { efi_guid_t secure_var = EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; - void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; - unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0; + efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mokx = NULL; + unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0; efi_status_t status; int rc = 0; @@ -175,6 +176,21 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) kfree(dbx); } + mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status); + if (!mokx) { + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) + pr_debug("mokx variable wasn't found\n"); + else + pr_info("Couldn't get mokx list\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListXRT", + mokx, mokxsize, + get_handler_for_dbx); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse mokx signatures %d\n", rc); + kfree(mokx); + } + /* Load the MokListRT certs */ rc = load_moklist_certs();