From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:13 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118631 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA300C432C3 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:21:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C670D65017 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:21:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230440AbhCEPUm (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:20:42 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2624 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230098AbhCEPUE (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:20:04 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.207]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWV80Jksz67vvy; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:14:08 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:54 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu , Subject: [PATCH v4 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:13 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-2-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC. Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files. More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error when no HMAC key has been loaded. This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 0de367aaa2d3..7ac5204c8d1f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) } /* - * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm + * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, @@ -530,7 +530,8 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; int rc; - if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || + !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) return 0; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:14 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118625 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A067C433E6 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:21:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 06A8D64F27 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:21:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230396AbhCEPUh (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:20:37 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2625 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229651AbhCEPUE (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:20:04 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWV848kcz67vwn; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:14:08 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:55 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v4 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:14 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-3-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: The public builtin keys do not need to be appraised by IMA as the restriction on the IMA/EVM trusted keyrings ensures that a key can be loaded only if it is signed with a key on the builtin or secondary keyrings. However, when evm_load_x509() is called, appraisal is already enabled and a valid IMA signature must be added to the EVM key to pass verification. Since the restriction is applied on both IMA and EVM trusted keyrings, it is safe to disable appraisal also when the EVM key is loaded. This patch calls evm_load_x509() inside ima_load_x509() if CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, which crosses the normal IMA and EVM boundary. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/iint.c | 4 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 1d20003243c3..c487e74a35fb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -200,7 +200,9 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void __init integrity_load_keys(void) { ima_load_x509(); - evm_load_x509(); + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509)) + evm_load_x509(); } static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 6e8742916d1d..5076a7d9d23e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH); + + /* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */ + evm_load_x509(); + ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; } #endif From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:15 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118623 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E40F5C433DB for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:21:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AAA8C65015 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:21:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230385AbhCEPUe (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:20:34 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2626 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230107AbhCEPUE (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:20:04 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.200]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWWv5vdlz67tVj; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:15:39 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:56 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu , Subject: [PATCH v4 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:15 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs. Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 5 +++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm index 3c477ba48a31..eb6d70fd6fa2 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm @@ -49,8 +49,9 @@ Description: modification of EVM-protected metadata and disable all further modification of policy - Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be - possible to enable metadata modification. + Note that once an HMAC key has been loaded, it will no longer + be possible to enable metadata modification and, if it is + already enabled, it will be disabled. Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index bbc85637e18b..197a4b83e534 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -81,10 +81,10 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, return -EINVAL; /* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if - * keys are loaded. + * an HMAC key is loaded. */ if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) && - ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) && + ((evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0) && !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) return -EPERM; From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:16 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118629 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3D82C43331 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:21:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8EE666509A for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:21:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230416AbhCEPUk (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:20:40 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2627 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229781AbhCEPUE (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:20:04 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.226]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWRs000Dz67tqR; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:12:08 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:56 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu , Casey Schaufler Subject: [PATCH v4 04/11] ima: Move ima_reset_appraise_flags() call to post hooks Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:16 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-5-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: ima_inode_setxattr() and ima_inode_removexattr() hooks are called before an operation is performed. Thus, ima_reset_appraise_flags() should not be called there, as flags might be unnecessarily reset if the operation is denied. This patch introduces the post hooks ima_inode_post_setxattr() and ima_inode_post_removexattr(), and adds the call to ima_reset_appraise_flags() in the new functions. Cc: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- fs/xattr.c | 2 ++ include/linux/ima.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/security.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index b3444e06cded..81847f132d26 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -502,6 +503,7 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); + ima_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 61d5723ec303..5e059da43857 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -171,7 +171,13 @@ extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +extern void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len); extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +extern void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name); #else static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { @@ -192,11 +198,23 @@ static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +static inline void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +} + static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { return 0; } + +static inline void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) +{ +} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 565e33ff19d0..1f029e4c8d7f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -577,21 +577,40 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (result == 1) { if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); result = 0; } return result; } +void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; + int result; + + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); + if (result == 1) + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), + xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); +} + int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); if (result == 1) { - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); result = 0; } return result; } + +void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +{ + int result; + + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + if (result == 1) + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); +} diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5ac96b16f8fa..efb1f874dc41 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1319,6 +1319,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); + ima_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); } From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:17 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118697 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4188FC4332E for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E02C6508F for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230424AbhCEPVk (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:40 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2630 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229669AbhCEPVN (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:13 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWTH3Gfzz67wCr; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:13:23 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:21:09 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v4 05/11] evm: Introduce evm_status_revalidate() Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:17 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-6-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set, EVM allows any operation on metadata. Its main purpose is to allow users to freely set metadata when it is protected by a portable signature, until an HMAC key is loaded. However, callers of evm_verifyxattr() are not notified about metadata changes and continue to rely on the last status returned by the function. For example IMA, since it caches the appraisal result, will not call again evm_verifyxattr() until the appraisal flags are cleared, and will grant access to the file even if there was a metadata operation that made the portable signature invalid. This patch introduces evm_status_revalidate(), which callers of evm_verifyxattr() can use in their xattr post hooks to determine whether re-validation is necessary and to do the proper actions. IMA calls it in its xattr post hooks to reset the appraisal flags, so that the EVM status is re-evaluated after a metadata operation. Lastly, this patch also adds a call to evm_reset_status() in evm_inode_post_setattr() to invalidate the cached EVM status after a setattr operation. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- include/linux/evm.h | 6 +++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++++--- 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 8302bc29bb35..e5b7bcb152b9 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, struct xattr *evm); +extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname); #else @@ -104,5 +105,10 @@ static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, return 0; } +static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_EVM */ #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 7ac5204c8d1f..998818283fda 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -425,6 +425,30 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +/** + * evm_status_revalidate - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary + * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name + * + * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the + * EVM status. + * + * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise. + */ +bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +{ + if (!evm_key_loaded()) + return false; + + /* evm_inode_post_setattr() passes NULL */ + if (!xattr_name) + return true; + + if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) + return false; + + return true; +} + /** * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -441,8 +465,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) - && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) + if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -462,7 +485,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -513,9 +536,11 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { - if (!evm_key_loaded()) + if (!evm_status_revalidate(NULL)) return; + evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 1f029e4c8d7f..d4b8db1acadd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -586,13 +586,15 @@ void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; + int digsig = 0; int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); } int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) @@ -611,6 +613,6 @@ void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); - if (result == 1) + if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); } From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:18 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118695 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11FF0C4332D for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E03926509B for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230165AbhCEPVj (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:39 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2631 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229562AbhCEPVN (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:13 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWTH3WgTz67wDF; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:13:23 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:21:09 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v4 06/11] evm: Ignore INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if conditions are safe Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:18 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-7-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: When a file is being created, LSMs can set the initial label with the inode_init_security hook. If no HMAC key is loaded, the new file will have LSM xattrs but not the HMAC. It is also possible that the file remains without protected xattrs after creation if no active LSM provided it. Unfortunately, EVM will deny any further metadata operation on new files, as evm_protect_xattr() will always return the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL error, or INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if no protected xattrs exist. This would limit the usability of EVM when only a public key is loaded, as commands such as cp or tar with the option to preserve xattrs won't work. This patch ignores these errors when they won't be an issue, if no HMAC key is loaded and cannot be loaded in the future (which can be enforced by setting the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 998818283fda..6556e8c22da9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -90,6 +90,24 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void) return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } +/* + * Ignoring INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS is safe if no HMAC key + * is loaded and the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag is set. + */ +static bool evm_ignore_error_safe(enum integrity_status evm_status) +{ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) + return false; + + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) + return false; + + if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_NOLABEL && evm_status != INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) + return false; + + return true; +} + static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); @@ -354,6 +372,8 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, -EPERM, 0); } out: + if (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status)) + return 0; if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -515,7 +535,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || - (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || + (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status))) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:19 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118699 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E410C43142 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2D076509A for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230403AbhCEPVk (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:40 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2632 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229992AbhCEPVN (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:13 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWTH3m0jz67wDL; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:13:23 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:21:10 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v4 07/11] evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:19 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-8-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: If files with portable signatures are copied from one location to another or are extracted from an archive, verification can temporarily fail until all xattrs/attrs are set in the destination. Only portable signatures may be moved or copied from one file to another, as they don't depend on system-specific information such as the inode generation. Instead portable signatures must include security.ima. Unlike other security.evm types, EVM portable signatures are also immutable. Thus, it wouldn't be a problem to allow xattr/attr operations when verification fails, as portable signatures will never be replaced with the HMAC on possibly corrupted xattrs/attrs. This patch first introduces a new integrity status called INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, that allows callers of evm_verify_current_integrity() to detect that a portable signature didn't pass verification and then adds an exception in evm_protect_xattr() and evm_inode_setattr() for this status and returns 0 instead of -EPERM. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/integrity.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++------ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index 2271939c5c31..2ea0f2f65ab6 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum integrity_status { INTEGRITY_PASS = 0, INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE, INTEGRITY_FAIL, + INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, INTEGRITY_NOLABEL, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS, INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN, diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 6556e8c22da9..eab536fa260f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ int evm_initialized; static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = { - "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" + "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label", + "no_xattrs", "unknown" }; int evm_hmac_attrs; @@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; struct evm_digest digest; struct inode *inode; - int rc, xattr_len; + int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0; if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) @@ -200,8 +201,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; break; - case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: + evm_immutable = 1; + fallthrough; + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */ if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -238,9 +241,12 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, break; } - if (rc) - evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ? - INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL; + if (rc) { + evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; + if (rc != -ENODATA) + evm_status = evm_immutable ? + INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE : INTEGRITY_FAIL; + } out: if (iint) iint->evm_status = evm_status; @@ -374,6 +380,14 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, out: if (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status)) return 0; + + /* + * Writing other xattrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable + * signatures are immutable and can never be updated. + */ + if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) + return 0; + if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -534,8 +548,13 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); + /* + * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures + * are immutable and can never be updated. + */ if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) || (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status))) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index d4b8db1acadd..24d59893aab0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -416,6 +416,8 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; + case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: + fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */ cause = "invalid-HMAC"; goto out; From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:20 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118693 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF93CC433E6 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B28D565013 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230406AbhCEPVj (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:39 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2629 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229589AbhCEPVN (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:13 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWTH414lz67wDM; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:13:23 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:21:10 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v4 08/11] evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:20 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-9-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: With the patch to allow xattr/attr operations if a portable signature verification fails, cp and tar can copy all xattrs/attrs so that at the end of the process verification succeeds. However, it might happen that the xattrs/attrs are already set to the correct value (taken at signing time) and signature verification succeeds before the copy has completed. For example, an archive might contains files owned by root and the archive is extracted by root. Then, since portable signatures are immutable, all subsequent operations fail (e.g. fchown()), even if the operation is legitimate (does not alter the current value). This patch avoids this problem by reporting successful operation to user space when that operation does not alter the current value of xattrs/attrs. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index eab536fa260f..a07516dcb920 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -328,6 +329,79 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } +/* + * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode mode + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @xattr_name: requested xattr + * @xattr_value: requested xattr value + * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length + * + * Check if passed ACL changes the inode mode, which is protected by EVM. + * + * Returns 1 if passed ACL causes inode mode change, 0 otherwise. + */ +static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + umode_t mode; + struct posix_acl *acl = NULL, *acl_res; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + int rc; + + /* UID/GID in ACL have been already converted from user to init ns */ + acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); + if (!acl) + return 1; + + acl_res = acl; + rc = posix_acl_update_mode(&init_user_ns, inode, &mode, &acl_res); + + posix_acl_release(acl); + + if (rc) + return 1; + + if (inode->i_mode != mode) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * evm_xattr_change - check if passed xattr value differs from current value + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @xattr_name: requested xattr + * @xattr_value: requested xattr value + * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length + * + * Check if passed xattr value differs from current value. + * + * Returns 1 if passed xattr value differs from current value, 0 otherwise. + */ +static int evm_xattr_change(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + char *xattr_data = NULL; + int rc = 0; + + if (posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) + return evm_xattr_acl_change(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); + + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data, + 0, GFP_NOFS); + if (rc < 0) + return 1; + + if (rc == xattr_value_len) + rc = memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc); + else + rc = 1; + + kfree(xattr_data); + return rc; +} + /* * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @@ -388,6 +462,10 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) return 0; + if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && + !evm_xattr_change(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len)) + return 0; + if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -527,6 +605,19 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } +static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; + + if ((!(ia_valid & ATTR_UID) || uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) && + (!(ia_valid & ATTR_GID) || gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid)) && + (!(ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) || attr->ia_mode == inode->i_mode)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + /** * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -557,6 +648,11 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) || (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status))) return 0; + + if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && + !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr)) + return 0; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:21 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118701 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40419C15500 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EB8B650A3 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:22:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230414AbhCEPVk (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:40 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2628 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229558AbhCEPVN (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:21:13 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.226]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWWc34G4z67vDP; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:15:24 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:21:11 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v4 09/11] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:21 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-10-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: System administrators can require that all accessed files have a signature by specifying appraise_type=imasig in a policy rule. Currently, IMA signatures satisfy this requirement. Appended signatures may also satisfy this requirement, but are not applicable as IMA signatures. IMA/appended signatures ensure data source authentication for file content and prevent any change. EVM signatures instead ensure data source authentication for file metadata. Given that the digest or signature of the file content must be included in the metadata, EVM signatures provide the same file data guarantees of IMA signatures, as well as providing file metadata guarantees. This patch lets systems protected with EVM signatures pass appraisal verification if the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy. This facilitates deployment in the scenarios where only EVM signatures are available. The patch makes the following changes: file xattr types: security.ima: IMA_XATTR_DIGEST/IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG security.evm: EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG execve(), mmap(), open() behavior (with appraise_type=imasig): before: denied (file without IMA signature, imasig requirement not met) after: allowed (file with EVM portable signature, imasig requirement met) open(O_WRONLY) behavior (without appraise_type=imasig): before: allowed (file without IMA signature, not immutable) after: denied (file with EVM portable signature, immutable) In addition, similarly to IMA signatures, this patch temporarily allows new files without or with incomplete metadata to be opened so that content can be written. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 24d59893aab0..538ccbf972c8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -242,12 +242,16 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, hash_start = 1; fallthrough; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: - if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { - *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; - *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; - break; + if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { + if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { + *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; + *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + break; + } + clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); + } else { + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } - clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= iint->ima_hash->length) /* @@ -417,6 +421,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */ cause = "invalid-HMAC"; @@ -461,9 +466,12 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } - /* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */ + /* + * Permit new files with file/EVM portable signatures, but + * without data. + */ if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE && - xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) { + test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) { status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } @@ -595,6 +603,8 @@ void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); } From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:22 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118703 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ECF7CC4332D for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:23:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D035B6509B for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:23:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229693AbhCEPWo (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:22:44 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2633 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229848AbhCEPWY (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:22:24 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.201]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWZj40t7z67ty2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:18:05 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:22:21 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v4 10/11] ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:22 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-11-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: With the patch to accept EVM portable signatures when the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy, appraisal can be successfully done even if the file does not have an IMA signature. However, remote attestation would not see that a different signature type was used, as only IMA signatures can be included in the measurement list. This patch solves the issue by introducing the new template field 'evmsig' to show EVM portable signatures and by including its value in the existing field 'sig' if the IMA signature is not found. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar --- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 4 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst index c5a8432972ef..9f3e86ab028a 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst @@ -70,9 +70,11 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5); - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig; - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations; - - 'sig': the file signature; + - 'sig': the file signature, or the EVM portable signature if the file + signature is not found; - 'modsig' the appended file signature; - 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations; + - 'evmsig': the EVM portable signature; Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors: diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index e22e510ae92d..90e8a8282927 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, {.field_id = "modsig", .field_init = ima_eventmodsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, + {.field_id = "evmsig", .field_init = ima_eventevmsig_init, + .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, }; /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index c022ee9e2a4e..4314d9a3514c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ */ #include "ima_template_lib.h" +#include static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo) { @@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) - return 0; + return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data); return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data); @@ -484,3 +485,33 @@ int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, return ima_write_template_field_data(data, data_len, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data); } + +/* + * ima_eventevmsig_init - include the EVM portable signature as part of the + * template data + */ +int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; + int rc = 0; + + if (!event_data->file) + return 0; + + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, file_dentry(event_data->file), + XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0, + GFP_NOFS); + if (rc <= 0) + return 0; + + if (xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { + kfree(xattr_data); + return 0; + } + + rc = ima_write_template_field_data((char *)xattr_data, rc, DATA_FMT_HEX, + field_data); + kfree(xattr_data); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h index 6b3b880637a0..f4b2a2056d1d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h @@ -46,4 +46,6 @@ int ima_eventbuf_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data); #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */ From patchwork Fri Mar 5 15:19:23 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 12118705 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24D56C43331 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:23:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04D5D65093 for ; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 15:23:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229832AbhCEPWn (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:22:43 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com ([185.176.79.56]:2634 "EHLO frasgout.his.huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229478AbhCEPWY (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Mar 2021 10:22:24 -0500 Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.206]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4DsWZk14q1z67tqN; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 23:18:06 +0800 (CST) Received: from fraphisprd00473.huawei.com (7.182.8.141) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.2106.2; Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:22:22 +0100 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , , Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v4 11/11] ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:23 +0100 Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-12-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [7.182.8.141] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml707-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.56) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: Files might come from a remote source and might have xattrs, including security.ima. It should not be IMA task to decide whether security.ima should be kept or not. This patch removes the removexattr() system call in ima_inode_post_setattr(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 538ccbf972c8..45e244fc2ef2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -532,8 +532,6 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, return; action = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); - if (!action) - __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA); iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) { set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);