From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:25 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189365 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 203DBC43461 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E162461242 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231246AbhDGUuW (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:22 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47225 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231235AbhDGUuV (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:21 -0400 IronPort-SDR: o9iS3LYnW4jzfaHn69oyET6Fkju5LohUkp5IUixVgf3uBXh8rmjqpEigypBVdEmHmnpzAqi58p AQ+jX9wB+EJg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660310" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660310" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:02 -0700 IronPort-SDR: Q57BLhvq1CltoDkXc9M4iUV/ETOZG3e1i+SzPAJrlstjlLEi0l1n8aZzAFmxYipQpjt66vn1hJ nyoaYkLLbY2g== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437329" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:49:59 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 01/11] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:25 +1200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Export the gva_to_gpa() helpers for use by SGX virtualization when executing ENCLS[ECREATE] and ENCLS[EINIT] on behalf of the guest. To execute ECREATE and EINIT, KVM must obtain the GPA of the target Secure Enclave Control Structure (SECS) in order to get its corresponding HVA. Because the SECS must reside in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), copying the SECS's data to a host-controlled buffer via existing exported helpers is not a viable option as the EPC is not readable or writable by the kernel. SGX virtualization will also use gva_to_gpa() to obtain HVAs for non-EPC pages in order to pass user pointers directly to ECREATE and EINIT, which avoids having to copy pages worth of data into the kernel. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 47e021bdcc94..d2da5abcf395 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5959,6 +5959,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, u32 access = (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0; return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read); gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_fetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, struct x86_exception *exception) @@ -5975,6 +5976,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, access |= PFERR_WRITE_MASK; return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write); /* uses this to access any guest's mapped memory without checking CPL */ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:26 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189367 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5CE3C43470 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4CD86120E for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231235AbhDGUuW (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:22 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47225 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229586AbhDGUuW (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:22 -0400 IronPort-SDR: xZA06MqwyggAm8PsvR9yRjvfJyzwEM1ATDt50CTBRFYaF3R+uFGobcaXQrpR9KT8mviRKJVlMl 0gIbea6J0bCQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660316" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660316" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:05 -0700 IronPort-SDR: tST8uTSrSo1cfrvapEv3ufbD0nrMqPAcYcbWxfyJvTW/RU3Gv/i0vlSZ6f46B9TWQICQMZe2Uv qityWXXQhqpg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437364" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:03 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 02/11] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:26 +1200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Page faults that are signaled by the SGX Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), as opposed to the traditional IA32/EPT page tables, set an SGX bit in the error code to indicate that the #PF was induced by SGX. KVM will need to emulate this behavior as part of its trap-and-execute scheme for virtualizing SGX Launch Control, e.g. to inject SGX-induced #PFs if EINIT faults in the host, and to support live migration. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 9bc091ecaaeb..8b1c13056768 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage; #define PFERR_RSVD_BIT 3 #define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4 #define PFERR_PK_BIT 5 +#define PFERR_SGX_BIT 15 #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT 32 #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT 33 @@ -236,6 +237,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage; #define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << PFERR_RSVD_BIT) #define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << PFERR_FETCH_BIT) #define PFERR_PK_MASK (1U << PFERR_PK_BIT) +#define PFERR_SGX_MASK (1U << PFERR_SGX_BIT) #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT) #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT) From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:27 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189369 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CD2B0C433B4 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A894D611CC for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231290AbhDGUuX (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:23 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47225 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231263AbhDGUuW (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:22 -0400 IronPort-SDR: uZ/X1RdOg/RExx/tth1haYunxcI3x8aLqwJGTBVq+DnG7hTkfe8gXlJ6CkFaVGiIFEFI3/uR8h G9IOPYUnmhlA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660329" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660329" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:09 -0700 IronPort-SDR: JL7khjHskQD1vwjYW+f0EZ8Sq46VG6eNK8k4SUttVoXD2kTHb0zrhqd+cl9YIeykNWyXYovWjS He+Q9knYj+JQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437384" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:06 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 03/11] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:27 +1200 Message-Id: <1b58bae463398c7f24d9e0a55c1af7cbf304366d.1617825858.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Introduce a scheme that allows KVM's CPUID magic to support features that are scattered in the kernel's feature words. To advertise and/or query guest support for CPUID-based features, KVM requires the bit number of an X86_FEATURE_* to match the bit number in its associated CPUID entry. For scattered features, this does not hold true. Add a framework to allow defining KVM-only words, stored in kvm_cpu_caps after the shared kernel caps, that can be used to gather the scattered feature bits by translating X86_FEATURE_* flags into their KVM-defined feature. Note, because reverse_cpuid_check() effectively forces kvm_cpu_caps lookups to be resolved at compile time, there is no runtime cost for translating from kernel-defined to kvm-defined features. More details here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/X/jxCOLG+HUO4QlZ@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 6bd2f8b830e4..a0e7be9ed449 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ * Unlike "struct cpuinfo_x86.x86_capability", kvm_cpu_caps doesn't need to be * aligned to sizeof(unsigned long) because it's not accessed via bitops. */ -u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly; +u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_caps); static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted) @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted) } #define F feature_bit +#define SF(name) (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_##name) ? F(name) : 0) static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find( struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u32 index) @@ -347,13 +348,13 @@ int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return r; } -static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask) +/* Mask kvm_cpu_caps for @leaf with the raw CPUID capabilities of this CPU. */ +static __always_inline void __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf) { const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(leaf * 32); struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entry; reverse_cpuid_check(leaf); - kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask; cpuid_count(cpuid.function, cpuid.index, &entry.eax, &entry.ebx, &entry.ecx, &entry.edx); @@ -361,6 +362,26 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask) kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= *__cpuid_entry_get_reg(&entry, cpuid.reg); } +static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask) +{ + /* Use the "init" variant for scattered leafs. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf >= NCAPINTS); + + kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask; + + __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf); +} + +static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_init(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask) +{ + /* Use the "mask" variant for hardwared-defined leafs. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf < NCAPINTS); + + kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] = mask; + + __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf); +} + void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) { unsigned int f_nx = is_efer_nx() ? F(NX) : 0; @@ -371,12 +392,13 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) unsigned int f_gbpages = 0; unsigned int f_lm = 0; #endif + memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps)); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)) > sizeof(boot_cpu_data.x86_capability)); memcpy(&kvm_cpu_caps, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability, - sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps)); + sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps))); kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_ECX, /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index 2a0c5064497f..8925a929186c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -7,7 +7,20 @@ #include #include -extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly; +/* + * Hardware-defined CPUID leafs that are scattered in the kernel, but need to + * be directly used by KVM. Note, these word values conflict with the kernel's + * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those. + */ +enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { + NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS, + + NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS, +}; + +#define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f) ((w)*32 + (f)) + +extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly; void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void); void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); @@ -100,6 +113,20 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf) BUILD_BUG_ON(reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf].function == 0); } +/* + * Translate feature bits that are scattered in the kernel's cpufeatures word + * into KVM feature words that align with hardware's definitions. + */ +static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature) +{ + return x86_feature; +} + +static __always_inline u32 __feature_leaf(int x86_feature) +{ + return __feature_translate(x86_feature) / 32; +} + /* * Retrieve the bit mask from an X86_FEATURE_* definition. Features contain * the hardware defined bit number (stored in bits 4:0) and a software defined @@ -108,6 +135,8 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf) */ static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature) { + x86_feature = __feature_translate(x86_feature); + reverse_cpuid_check(x86_feature / 32); return 1 << (x86_feature & 31); } @@ -116,7 +145,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature) static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned int x86_feature) { - unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32; + unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf); return reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf]; @@ -308,7 +337,7 @@ static inline bool cpuid_fault_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature) { - unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32; + unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf); kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature); @@ -316,7 +345,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature) static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature) { - unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32; + unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf); kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] |= __feature_bit(x86_feature); @@ -324,7 +353,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature) static __always_inline u32 kvm_cpu_cap_get(unsigned int x86_feature) { - unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32; + unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature); reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf); return kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] & __feature_bit(x86_feature); From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:28 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189371 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 27410C43600 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 03B9D61205 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231309AbhDGUuY (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:24 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47225 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231281AbhDGUuX (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:23 -0400 IronPort-SDR: zcOuT/vaQk7PAt3Nj12exx9c83Lcd5ERXwXv6FZJNJwZq6nO19guhfinp5ZUYEXKKmakqhVsSC /YTfk6GJSlhg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660354" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660354" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:12 -0700 IronPort-SDR: AHg3dJ6pVXpPBIgnkwu/ZyacU0lLDf6tNb/6iCexeG/Hpl3ZYCXDuVIgK4cfYI0BvIysF6lT4l LjiNc996Y5SA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437396" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:09 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 04/11] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:28 +1200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Define a new KVM-only feature word for advertising and querying SGX sub-features in CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX. Because SGX1 and SGX2 are scattered in the kernel's feature word, they need to be translated so that the bit numbers match those of hardware. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index 8925a929186c..a175ff75bbbe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -13,13 +13,18 @@ * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those. */ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { - NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS, + CPUID_12_EAX = NCAPINTS, + NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS, NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS, }; #define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f) ((w)*32 + (f)) +/* Intel-defined SGX sub-features, CPUID level 0x12 (EAX). */ +#define __X86_FEATURE_SGX1 X86_KVM_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 0) +#define __X86_FEATURE_SGX2 X86_KVM_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 1) + extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly; void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void); @@ -93,6 +98,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX}, [CPUID_7_EDX] = { 7, 0, CPUID_EDX}, [CPUID_7_1_EAX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EAX}, + [CPUID_12_EAX] = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX}, }; /* @@ -119,6 +125,11 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf) */ static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature) { + if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX1) + return __X86_FEATURE_SGX1; + else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX2) + return __X86_FEATURE_SGX2; + return x86_feature; } From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:29 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189373 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 90117C433B4 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 741DF61242 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231321AbhDGUu1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:27 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47225 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231335AbhDGUuZ (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:25 -0400 IronPort-SDR: CrTtRl0gJcrnAD/nrsJESHg+ynKlca8OQ0BwwbFJXLd9eB7mRWApofcPeniIdS3YM1i1aOQQ2Z wHk8sZ9vcj5w== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660362" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660362" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:15 -0700 IronPort-SDR: deKBYGsjRnsod4UX/PVA+klMBowR/q7U568SQT/u1OYiLluEW4DSkha9ZA9TAdg8lKlrbEVHuN tQiQBeF2eTZw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437408" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:12 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 05/11] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:29 +1200 Message-Id: <8f2873e6647163329f3e6891128eb47bf1176d87.1617825858.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add support for handling VM-Exits that originate from a guest SGX enclave. In SGX, an "enclave" is a new CPL3-only execution environment, wherein the CPU and memory state is protected by hardware to make the state inaccesible to code running outside of the enclave. When exiting an enclave due to an asynchronous event (from the perspective of the enclave), e.g. exceptions, interrupts, and VM-Exits, the enclave's state is automatically saved and scrubbed (the CPU loads synthetic state), and then reloaded when re-entering the enclave. E.g. after an instruction based VM-Exit from an enclave, vmcs.GUEST_RIP will not contain the RIP of the enclave instruction that trigered VM-Exit, but will instead point to a RIP in the enclave's untrusted runtime (the guest userspace code that coordinates entry/exit to/from the enclave). To help a VMM recognize and handle exits from enclaves, SGX adds bits to existing VMCS fields, VM_EXIT_REASON.VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE and GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO.GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR. Define the new architectural bits, and add a boolean to struct vcpu_vmx to cache VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE. Clear the bit in exit_reason so that checks against exit_reason do not need to account for SGX, e.g. "if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)" continues to work. KVM is a largely a passive observer of the new bits, e.g. KVM needs to account for the bits when propagating information to a nested VMM, but otherwise doesn't need to act differently for the majority of VM-Exits from enclaves. The one scenario that is directly impacted is emulation, which is for all intents and purposes impossible[1] since KVM does not have access to the RIP or instruction stream that triggered the VM-Exit. The inability to emulate is a non-issue for KVM, as most instructions that might trigger VM-Exit unconditionally #UD in an enclave (before the VM-Exit check. For the few instruction that conditionally #UD, KVM either never sets the exiting control, e.g. PAUSE_EXITING[2], or sets it if and only if the feature is not exposed to the guest in order to inject a #UD, e.g. RDRAND_EXITING. But, because it is still possible for a guest to trigger emulation, e.g. MMIO, inject a #UD if KVM ever attempts emulation after a VM-Exit from an enclave. This is architecturally accurate for instruction VM-Exits, and for MMIO it's the least bad choice, e.g. it's preferable to killing the VM. In practice, only broken or particularly stupid guests should ever encounter this behavior. Add a WARN in skip_emulated_instruction to detect any attempt to modify the guest's RIP during an SGX enclave VM-Exit as all such flows should either be unreachable or must handle exits from enclaves before getting to skip_emulated_instruction. [1] Impossible for all practical purposes. Not truly impossible since KVM could implement some form of para-virtualization scheme. [2] PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING only affects CPL0 and enclaves exist only at CPL3, so we also don't need to worry about that interaction. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h index 358707f60d99..0ffaa3156a4e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h @@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ enum vmcs_field { #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS 0x00000002 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_SMI 0x00000004 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI 0x00000008 +#define GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR 0x00000010 /* GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE flags */ #define GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h index b8e650a985e3..946d761adbd3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #define VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY 0x80000000 +#define VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE 0x08000000 #define EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI 0 #define EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT 1 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index bcca0b80e0d0..28848e9f70e2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -4105,6 +4105,8 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, { /* update exit information fields: */ vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = vm_exit_reason; + if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode) + vmcs12->vm_exit_reason |= VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE; vmcs12->exit_qualification = exit_qualification; vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 32cf8287d4a7..9dd185a53a3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1570,12 +1570,25 @@ static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data) static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *insn, int insn_len) { + /* + * Emulation of instructions in SGX enclaves is impossible as RIP does + * not point tthe failing instruction, and even if it did, the code + * stream is inaccessible. Inject #UD instead of exiting to userspace + * so that guest userspace can't DoS the guest simply by triggering + * emulation (enclaves are CPL3 only). + */ + if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode) { + kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); + return false; + } return true; } static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { + union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason; unsigned long rip, orig_rip; + u32 instr_len; /* * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on @@ -1586,9 +1599,33 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value. */ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) || - to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { + exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { + instr_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN); + + /* + * Emulating an enclave's instructions isn't supported as KVM + * cannot access the enclave's memory or its true RIP, e.g. the + * vmcs.GUEST_RIP points at the exit point of the enclave, not + * the RIP that actually triggered the VM-Exit. But, because + * most instructions that cause VM-Exit will #UD in an enclave, + * most instruction-based VM-Exits simply do not occur. + * + * There are a few exceptions, notably the debug instructions + * INT1ICEBRK and INT3, as they are allowed in debug enclaves + * and generate #DB/#BP as expected, which KVM might intercept. + * But again, the CPU does the dirty work and saves an instr + * length of zero so VMMs don't shoot themselves in the foot. + * WARN if KVM tries to skip a non-zero length instruction on + * a VM-Exit from an enclave. + */ + if (!instr_len) + goto rip_updated; + + WARN(exit_reason.enclave_mode, + "KVM: skipping instruction after SGX enclave VM-Exit"); + orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); - rip = orig_rip + vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN); + rip = orig_rip + instr_len; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* * We need to mask out the high 32 bits of RIP if not in 64-bit @@ -1604,6 +1641,7 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return 0; } +rip_updated: /* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */ vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0); @@ -5384,6 +5422,9 @@ static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { gpa_t gpa; + if (!vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, NULL, 0)) + return 1; + /* * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an * nGPA here instead of the required GPA. From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:30 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189375 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A56DDC433ED for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 77D2661205 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231263AbhDGUuj (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:39 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47225 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231371AbhDGUu2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:28 -0400 IronPort-SDR: o+5qRBvM5G7avy4dKM7yxIQ+FuprrUr25MJPQfRfbJDpyRUgTZIgfq8oKL/nrPR4FMIax+DwzC bozkPoFDw48A== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660368" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660368" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:18 -0700 IronPort-SDR: lRta/eaXkrKwvtZhiO2DV+nNwRwHg3qDBctbqwi+YSXolHyzLXYFsj1Uoxuipfc2GrhR+p7sir 5aTRA478jIzQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437424" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:16 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 06/11] KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:30 +1200 Message-Id: <4be4b49f63a6c66911683d0f093ca5ef0d3996d5.1617825858.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Introduce sgx.c and sgx.h, along with the framework for handling ENCLS VM-Exits. Add a bool, enable_sgx, that will eventually be wired up to a module param to control whether or not SGX virtualization is enabled at runtime. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 15 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 9 +++++--- 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile index 1b4766fe1de2..87f514c36eae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_XEN) += xen.o kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o +kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += vmx/sgx.o + kvm-amd-y += svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f68adbe38750 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright(c) 2021 Intel Corporation. */ + +#include + +#include "cpuid.h" +#include "kvm_cache_regs.h" +#include "sgx.h" +#include "vmx.h" +#include "x86.h" + +bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; + +static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf) +{ + if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + return false; + + if (leaf >= ECREATE && leaf <= ETRACK) + return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX1); + + if (leaf >= EAUG && leaf <= EMODT) + return guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2); + + return false; +} + +static inline bool sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + const u64 bits = FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_LOCKED; + + return (to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control & bits) == bits; +} + +int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + u32 leaf = (u32)vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]; + + if (!encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(vcpu, leaf)) { + kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); + } else if (!sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu)) { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + } else { + WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf); + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN; + vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS; + return 0; + } + return 1; +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6e17ecd4aca3 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __KVM_X86_SGX_H +#define __KVM_X86_SGX_H + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM +extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; + +int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +#else +#define enable_sgx 0 +#endif + +#endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 9dd185a53a3e..ef668047a8f9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include "mmu.h" #include "nested.h" #include "pmu.h" +#include "sgx.h" #include "trace.h" #include "vmcs.h" #include "vmcs12.h" @@ -5673,16 +5674,18 @@ static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return 1; } +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { /* - * SGX virtualization is not yet supported. There is no software - * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD - * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS. + * SGX virtualization is disabled. There is no software enable bit for + * SGX, so KVM intercepts all ENCLS leafs and injects a #UD to prevent + * the guest from executing ENCLS (when SGX is supported by hardware). */ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); return 1; } +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM */ static int handle_bus_lock_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:31 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189377 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40ED3C433B4 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 131446120E for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231345AbhDGUuj (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:39 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47240 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231380AbhDGUub (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:31 -0400 IronPort-SDR: KrGEgrwS3JquugjLpi7GuZOISJETMYoC3a5HmNgeVndA5AvIJtmgjAUaDXhzlIjeyMk+bSqd81 FEnmYTRBydpw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660385" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660385" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:21 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 4IcC23NQLnt0eB7YN9Pksjfaq/fmFmoPih0H6YofrMy6zZLRk/ROc9uhvCv37qftUfwqduN0MA CYfhbMi9ZppA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437450" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:18 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 07/11] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:31 +1200 Message-Id: <963a2416333290e23773260d824a9e038aed5a53.1617825858.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add an ECREATE handler that will be used to intercept ECREATE for the purpose of enforcing and enclave's MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM, i.e. to allow userspace to restrict SGX features via CPUID. ECREATE will be intercepted when any of the aforementioned masks diverges from hardware in order to enforce the desired CPUID model, i.e. inject #GP if the guest attempts to set a bit that hasn't been enumerated as allowed-1 in CPUID. Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet supported. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 274 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 277 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 8b1c13056768..d6329ede0198 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1038,6 +1038,9 @@ struct kvm_arch { bool bus_lock_detection_enabled; + /* Guest can access the SGX PROVISIONKEY. */ + bool sgx_provisioning_allowed; + struct kvm_pmu_event_filter __rcu *pmu_event_filter; struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c index f68adbe38750..b74537be7fe8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -11,6 +11,278 @@ bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; +/* + * ENCLS's memory operands use a fixed segment (DS) and a fixed + * address size based on the mode. Related prefixes are ignored. + */ +static int sgx_get_encls_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long offset, + int size, int alignment, gva_t *gva) +{ + struct kvm_segment s; + bool fault; + + /* Skip vmcs.GUEST_DS retrieval for 64-bit mode to avoid VMREADs. */ + *gva = offset; + if (!is_long_mode(vcpu)) { + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, VCPU_SREG_DS); + *gva += s.base; + } + + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*gva, alignment)) { + fault = true; + } else if (likely(is_long_mode(vcpu))) { + fault = is_noncanonical_address(*gva, vcpu); + } else { + *gva &= 0xffffffff; + fault = (s.unusable) || + (s.type != 2 && s.type != 3) || + (*gva > s.limit) || + ((s.base != 0 || s.limit != 0xffffffff) && + (((u64)*gva + size - 1) > s.limit + 1)); + } + if (fault) + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return fault ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + +static void sgx_handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, + unsigned int size) +{ + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; + vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION; + vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2; + vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = addr; + vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = size; +} + +static int sgx_read_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long hva, void *data, + unsigned int size) +{ + if (__copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)hva, size)) { + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, hva, size); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_gva_to_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, bool write, + gpa_t *gpa) +{ + struct x86_exception ex; + + if (write) + *gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(vcpu, gva, &ex); + else + *gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(vcpu, gva, &ex); + + if (*gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA) { + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ex); + return -EFAULT; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_gpa_to_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long *hva) +{ + *hva = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, PFN_DOWN(gpa)); + if (kvm_is_error_hva(*hva)) { + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, gpa, 1); + return -EFAULT; + } + + *hva |= gpa & ~PAGE_MASK; + + return 0; +} + +static int sgx_inject_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, int trapnr) +{ + struct x86_exception ex; + + /* + * A non-EPCM #PF indicates a bad userspace HVA. This *should* check + * for PFEC.SGX and not assume any #PF on SGX2 originated in the EPC, + * but the error code isn't (yet) plumbed through the ENCLS helpers. + */ + if (trapnr == PF_VECTOR && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) { + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; + vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION; + vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* + * If the guest thinks it's running on SGX2 hardware, inject an SGX + * #PF if the fault matches an EPCM fault signature (#GP on SGX1, + * #PF on SGX2). The assumption is that EPCM faults are much more + * likely than a bad userspace address. + */ + if ((trapnr == PF_VECTOR || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) && + guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) { + memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex)); + ex.vector = PF_VECTOR; + ex.error_code = PFERR_PRESENT_MASK | PFERR_WRITE_MASK | + PFERR_SGX_MASK; + ex.address = gva; + ex.error_code_valid = true; + ex.nested_page_fault = false; + kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &ex); + } else { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + } + return 1; +} + +static int __handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, + unsigned long secs_hva, + gva_t secs_gva) +{ + struct sgx_secs *contents = (struct sgx_secs *)pageinfo->contents; + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *sgx_12_0, *sgx_12_1; + u64 attributes, xfrm, size; + u32 miscselect; + u8 max_size_log2; + int trapnr, ret; + + sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0); + sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1); + if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) { + vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR; + vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION; + vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0; + return 0; + } + + miscselect = contents->miscselect; + attributes = contents->attributes; + xfrm = contents->xfrm; + size = contents->size; + + /* Enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY. */ + if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed && + (attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) { + if (sgx_12_1->eax & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) + pr_warn_once("KVM: SGX PROVISIONKEY advertised but not allowed\n"); + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return 1; + } + + /* Enforce CPUID restrictions on MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM. */ + if ((u32)miscselect & ~sgx_12_0->ebx || + (u32)attributes & ~sgx_12_1->eax || + (u32)(attributes >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->ebx || + (u32)xfrm & ~sgx_12_1->ecx || + (u32)(xfrm >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->edx) { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return 1; + } + + /* Enforce CPUID restriction on max enclave size. */ + max_size_log2 = (attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ? sgx_12_0->edx >> 8 : + sgx_12_0->edx; + if (size >= BIT_ULL(max_size_log2)) + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + + /* + * sgx_virt_ecreate() returns: + * 1) 0: ECREATE was successful + * 2) -EFAULT: ECREATE was run but faulted, and trapnr was set to the + * exception number. + * 3) -EINVAL: access_ok() on @secs_hva fails. It's a kernel bug and + * sgx_virt_ecreate() aleady gave a warning. + */ + ret = sgx_virt_ecreate(pageinfo, (void __user *)secs_hva, &trapnr); + if (!ret) + return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); + if (ret == -EFAULT) + return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr); + + return ret; +} + +static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + gva_t pageinfo_gva, secs_gva; + gva_t metadata_gva, contents_gva; + gpa_t metadata_gpa, contents_gpa, secs_gpa; + unsigned long metadata_hva, contents_hva, secs_hva; + struct sgx_pageinfo pageinfo; + struct sgx_secs *contents; + struct x86_exception ex; + int r; + + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 32, 32, &pageinfo_gva) || + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva)) + return 1; + + /* + * Copy the PAGEINFO to local memory, its pointers need to be + * translated, i.e. we need to do a deep copy/translate. + */ + r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, &pageinfo, + sizeof(pageinfo), &ex); + if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) { + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ex); + return 1; + } else if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) { + sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, + sizeof(pageinfo)); + return 0; + } + + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.metadata, 64, 64, &metadata_gva) || + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.contents, 4096, 4096, + &contents_gva)) + return 1; + + /* + * Translate the SECINFO, SOURCE and SECS pointers from GVA to GPA. + * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF. + */ + if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, metadata_gva, false, &metadata_gpa) || + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, contents_gva, false, &contents_gpa) || + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa)) + return 1; + + /* + * ...and then to HVA. The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e. + * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time. Exit to + * userspace if a GPA is invalid. + */ + if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, metadata_gpa, &metadata_hva) || + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, contents_gpa, &contents_hva) || + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva)) + return 0; + + /* + * Copy contents into kernel memory to prevent TOCTOU attack. E.g. the + * guest could do ECREATE w/ SECS.SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY=0, and + * simultaneously set SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY to bypass the check to + * enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY. + */ + contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!contents) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Exit to userspace if copying from a host userspace address fails. */ + if (sgx_read_hva(vcpu, contents_hva, (void *)contents, PAGE_SIZE)) { + free_page((unsigned long)contents); + return 0; + } + + pageinfo.metadata = metadata_hva; + pageinfo.contents = (u64)contents; + + r = __handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu, &pageinfo, secs_hva, secs_gva); + + free_page((unsigned long)contents); + + return r; +} + static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf) { if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) @@ -41,6 +313,8 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } else if (!sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu)) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); } else { + if (leaf == ECREATE) + return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu); WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf); vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN; vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS; From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:32 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189379 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7DA1DC433B4 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 604FD61246 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231500AbhDGUun (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:43 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47246 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231420AbhDGUuf (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:35 -0400 IronPort-SDR: Bsid/O0GXGDJypJdoBBNx80eQOpEIg7Yu/x2MOCATKP9y6aDOIn7YshNIjsdv3TgWqMT2rCKI/ 6d8JjsLJiWQg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660391" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660391" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:24 -0700 IronPort-SDR: unI81cQmwBh6e//jtVLqA2sgPHfSEW3JQvxFclwTWPj1sWYj0ah3dRonNoYbbKOc5pKaTt1XR1 ZG+Mg3P2Dhpg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437465" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:21 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 08/11] KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:32 +1200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Emulate the four Launch Enclave public key hash MSRs (LE hash MSRs) that exist on CPUs that support SGX Launch Control (LC). SGX LC modifies the behavior of ENCLS[EINIT] to use the LE hash MSRs when verifying the key used to sign an enclave. On CPUs without LC support, the LE hash is hardwired into the CPU to an Intel controlled key (the Intel key is also the reset value of the LE hash MSRs). Track the guest's desired hash so that a future patch can stuff the hash into the hardware MSRs when executing EINIT on behalf of the guest, when those MSRs are writable in host. Note, KVM allows writes to the LE hash MSRs if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is unlocked. This is technically not architectural behavior, but it's roughly equivalent to the arch behavior of the MSRs being writable prior to activating SGX[1]. Emulating SGX activation is feasible, but adds no tangible benefits and would just create extra work for KVM and guest firmware. [1] SGX related bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL cannot be set until SGX is activated, e.g. by firmware. SGX activation is triggered by setting bit 0 in MSR 0x7a. Until SGX is activated, the LE hash MSRs are writable, e.g. to allow firmware to lock down the LE root key with a non-Intel value. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Co-developed-by: Kai Huang Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c index b74537be7fe8..fb729e5c6949 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; +/* Initial value of guest's virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs */ +static u64 sgx_pubkey_hash[4] __ro_after_init; + /* * ENCLS's memory operands use a fixed segment (DS) and a fixed * address size based on the mode. Related prefixes are ignored. @@ -322,3 +325,35 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } return 1; } + +void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) +{ + /* + * Use Intel's default value for Skylake hardware if Launch Control is + * not supported, i.e. Intel's hash is hardcoded into silicon, or if + * Launch Control is supported and enabled, i.e. mimic the reset value + * and let the guest write the MSRs at will. If Launch Control is + * supported but disabled, then use the current MSR values as the hash + * MSRs exist but are read-only (locked and not writable). + */ + if (!enable_sgx || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) || + rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0, &sgx_pubkey_hash[0])) { + sgx_pubkey_hash[0] = 0xa6053e051270b7acULL; + sgx_pubkey_hash[1] = 0x6cfbe8ba8b3b413dULL; + sgx_pubkey_hash[2] = 0xc4916d99f2b3735dULL; + sgx_pubkey_hash[3] = 0xd4f8c05909f9bb3bULL; + } else { + /* MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 is read above */ + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1, sgx_pubkey_hash[1]); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2, sgx_pubkey_hash[2]); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3, sgx_pubkey_hash[3]); + } +} + +void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + + memcpy(vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, sgx_pubkey_hash, + sizeof(sgx_pubkey_hash)); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h index 6e17ecd4aca3..6502fa52c7e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h @@ -8,8 +8,14 @@ extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void); +void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); #else #define enable_sgx 0 + +static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { } +static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } #endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index ef668047a8f9..070460df5c3b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1904,6 +1904,13 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL: msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control; break; + case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash + [msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0]; + break; case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu)) return 1; @@ -2198,6 +2205,15 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0) vmx_leave_nested(vcpu); break; + case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) || + ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) && + !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED)))) + return 1; + vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash + [msr_index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0] = data; + break; case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: if (!msr_info->host_initiated) return 1; /* they are read-only */ @@ -7020,6 +7036,8 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) else memset(&vmx->nested.msrs, 0, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs)); + vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(vcpu); + vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1; vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull; @@ -7953,6 +7971,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) if (!enable_ept || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt()) pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM; + setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(); + if (nested) { nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config.nested, vmx_capability.ept); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 89da5e1251f1..d0bf078b1087 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -325,6 +325,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { */ u64 msr_ia32_feature_control; u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits; + /* SGX Launch Control public key hash */ + u64 msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash[4]; u64 ept_pointer; struct pt_desc pt_desc; From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:33 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189381 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92556C433ED for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 721A961154 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231462AbhDGUup (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:45 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47225 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231473AbhDGUuh (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:37 -0400 IronPort-SDR: DA904PgLv9Er+QnXglLgcz8rymUahmsdZ/2KabJxLO2WsXl0O7JvRAABcE2vfVVNH+mUbq6krD DM6j9mub9x8Q== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660402" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660402" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:27 -0700 IronPort-SDR: oXqkqZP1i5mwa/cqITz8R/4J5irpUtT/NZucD4UaX64tZcGIDBTm8B5Ok/VpBxsPU1AX8AAmjK URS95t97ECGg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437479" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:24 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 09/11] KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC) Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:33 +1200 Message-Id: <6bf731227ac8d75696fa974846c3c2c64eadae7b.1617825858.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add a VM-Exit handler to trap-and-execute EINIT when SGX LC is enabled in the host. When SGX LC is enabled, the host kernel may rewrite the hardware values at will, e.g. to launch enclaves with different signers, thus KVM needs to intercept EINIT to ensure it is executed with the correct LE hash (even if the guest sees a hardwired hash). Switching the LE hash MSRs on VM-Enter/VM-Exit is not a viable option as writing the MSRs is prohibitively expensive, e.g. on SKL hardware each WRMSR is ~400 cycles. And because EINIT takes tens of thousands of cycles to execute, the ~1500 cycle overhead to trap-and-execute EINIT is unlikely to be noticed by the guest, let alone impact its overall SGX performance. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c index fb729e5c6949..6c96f87710f8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -286,6 +286,67 @@ static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return r; } +static int handle_encls_einit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + unsigned long sig_hva, secs_hva, token_hva, rflags; + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + gva_t sig_gva, secs_gva, token_gva; + gpa_t sig_gpa, secs_gpa, token_gpa; + int ret, trapnr; + + if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 1808, 4096, &sig_gva) || + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva) || + sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rdx_read(vcpu), 304, 512, &token_gva)) + return 1; + + /* + * Translate the SIGSTRUCT, SECS and TOKEN pointers from GVA to GPA. + * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF. + */ + if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, sig_gva, false, &sig_gpa) || + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa) || + sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, token_gva, false, &token_gpa)) + return 1; + + /* + * ...and then to HVA. The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e. + * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time. Exit to + * userspace if a GPA is invalid. Note, all structures are aligned and + * cannot split pages. + */ + if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, sig_gpa, &sig_hva) || + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva) || + sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, token_gpa, &token_hva)) + return 0; + + ret = sgx_virt_einit((void __user *)sig_hva, (void __user *)token_hva, + (void __user *)secs_hva, + vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, &trapnr); + + if (ret == -EFAULT) + return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr); + + /* + * sgx_virt_einit() returns -EINVAL when access_ok() fails on + * @sig_hva, @token_hva or @secs_hva. It's unexpected and is kernel bug. + * Just return. + */ + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | + X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_SF | + X86_EFLAGS_OF); + if (ret) + rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_ZF; + else + rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_ZF; + vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags); + + kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret); + return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); +} + static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf) { if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) @@ -318,6 +379,8 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) } else { if (leaf == ECREATE) return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu); + if (leaf == EINIT) + return handle_encls_einit(vcpu); WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf); vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN; vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS; From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:34 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189383 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 72AA4C433B4 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C490611CC for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231349AbhDGUup (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:45 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47240 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231371AbhDGUuk (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:40 -0400 IronPort-SDR: /Zway/LccXXiNj+m4T18pfgzyYpntoA9fFDE79c33/z9xTgj132QyGF3fCptfrw2Qyl8bMdMeJ myEoK2jtZE4w== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660407" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660407" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:30 -0700 IronPort-SDR: v8qlpc7ZQX0K5L8/eucQFqlN1OScGbx4EN8bEiFN2JTpfOgBQ6eSgVLQKMHpaAjXA009qDM0F0 prxBbfzqJ/CA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437490" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:27 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 10/11] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:34 +1200 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU model exposed to the guest. Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel. When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an SGX-enabled guest. With the exception of the provision key, all SGX attribute bits may be exposed to the guest. Guest access to the provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a future patch. Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 26 +++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 13 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++- 8 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index a0e7be9ed449..a0d45607b702 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "cpuid.h" #include "lapic.h" #include "mmu.h" @@ -171,6 +172,21 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 = (best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & supported_xcr0; + /* + * Bits 127:0 of the allowed SECS.ATTRIBUTES (CPUID.0x12.0x1) enumerate + * the supported XSAVE Feature Request Mask (XFRM), i.e. the enclave's + * requested XCR0 value. The enclave's XFRM must be a subset of XCRO + * at the time of EENTER, thus adjust the allowed XFRM by the guest's + * supported XCR0. Similar to XCR0 handling, FP and SSE are forced to + * '1' even on CPUs that don't support XSAVE. + */ + best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0x1); + if (best) { + best->ecx &= vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 & 0xffffffff; + best->edx &= vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 >> 32; + best->ecx |= XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE; + } + kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu); vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu); @@ -429,7 +445,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) ); kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_0_EBX, - F(FSGSBASE) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) | + F(FSGSBASE) | F(SGX) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) | F(BMI2) | F(ERMS) | F(INVPCID) | F(RTM) | 0 /*MPX*/ | F(RDSEED) | F(ADX) | F(SMAP) | F(AVX512IFMA) | F(AVX512F) | F(AVX512PF) | F(AVX512ER) | F(AVX512CD) | F(CLFLUSHOPT) | F(CLWB) | F(AVX512DQ) | @@ -440,7 +456,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(AVX512VBMI) | F(LA57) | F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/ | F(RDPID) | F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) | F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) | - F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ + F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ | + F(SGX_LC) ); /* Set LA57 based on hardware capability. */ if (cpuid_ecx(7) & F(LA57)) @@ -479,6 +496,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | F(XSAVES) ); + kvm_cpu_cap_init(CPUID_12_EAX, + SF(SGX1) | SF(SGX2) + ); + kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0001_ECX, F(LAHF_LM) | F(CMP_LEGACY) | 0 /*SVM*/ | 0 /* ExtApicSpace */ | F(CR8_LEGACY) | F(ABM) | F(SSE4A) | F(MISALIGNSSE) | @@ -800,6 +821,38 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) entry->edx = 0; } break; + case 0x12: + /* Intel SGX */ + if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) { + entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0; + break; + } + + /* + * Index 0: Sub-features, MISCSELECT (a.k.a extended features) + * and max enclave sizes. The SGX sub-features and MISCSELECT + * are restricted by kernel and KVM capabilities (like most + * feature flags), while enclave size is unrestricted. + */ + cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_12_EAX); + entry->ebx &= SGX_MISC_EXINFO; + + entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1); + if (!entry) + goto out; + + /* + * Index 1: SECS.ATTRIBUTES. ATTRIBUTES are restricted a la + * feature flags. Advertise all supported flags, including + * privileged attributes that require explicit opt-in from + * userspace. ATTRIBUTES.XFRM is not adjusted as userspace is + * expected to derive it from supported XCR0. + */ + entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | + /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY | + SGX_ATTR_KSS; + entry->ebx &= 0; + break; /* Intel PT */ case 0x14: if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 28848e9f70e2..ba8b7755cd12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "mmu.h" #include "nested.h" #include "pmu.h" +#include "sgx.h" #include "trace.h" #include "vmx.h" #include "x86.h" @@ -2306,6 +2307,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST)) exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST; + if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING) + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, vmcs12); + secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, exec_control); } @@ -5707,6 +5711,20 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return false; } +static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + u32 encls_leaf; + + if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)) + return false; + + encls_leaf = kvm_rax_read(vcpu); + if (encls_leaf > 62) + encls_leaf = 63; + return vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap & BIT_ULL(encls_leaf); +} + static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_vmcs_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, gpa_t bitmap) { @@ -5803,9 +5821,6 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, case EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC: /* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */ return true; - case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS: - /* SGX is never exposed to L1 */ - return true; default: break; } @@ -5929,6 +5944,8 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, case EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE: return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE); + case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS: + return nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(vcpu, vmcs12); default: return true; } @@ -6504,6 +6521,9 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 ept_caps) msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES; + if (enable_sgx) + msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING; + /* miscellaneous data */ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, msrs->misc_low, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h index 197148d76b8f..184418baeb3c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h @@ -244,6 +244,11 @@ static inline bool nested_exit_on_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK; } +static inline bool nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING); +} + /* * if fixed0[i] == 1: val[i] must be 1 * if fixed1[i] == 0: val[i] must be 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c index 6c96f87710f8..546d18c94ac9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ #include "cpuid.h" #include "kvm_cache_regs.h" +#include "nested.h" #include "sgx.h" #include "vmx.h" #include "x86.h" -bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; +bool __read_mostly enable_sgx = 1; +module_param_named(sgx, enable_sgx, bool, 0444); /* Initial value of guest's virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs */ static u64 sgx_pubkey_hash[4] __ro_after_init; @@ -420,3 +422,79 @@ void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) memcpy(vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, sgx_pubkey_hash, sizeof(sgx_pubkey_hash)); } + +/* + * ECREATE must be intercepted to enforce MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM + * restrictions if the guest's allowed-1 settings diverge from hardware. + */ +static bool sgx_intercept_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *guest_cpuid; + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; + + if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed) + return true; + + guest_cpuid = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0); + if (!guest_cpuid) + return true; + + cpuid_count(0x12, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (guest_cpuid->ebx != ebx || guest_cpuid->edx != edx) + return true; + + guest_cpuid = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1); + if (!guest_cpuid) + return true; + + cpuid_count(0x12, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + if (guest_cpuid->eax != eax || guest_cpuid->ebx != ebx || + guest_cpuid->ecx != ecx || guest_cpuid->edx != edx) + return true; + + return false; +} + +void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + /* + * There is no software enable bit for SGX that is virtualized by + * hardware, e.g. there's no CR4.SGXE, so when SGX is disabled in the + * guest (either by the host or by the guest's BIOS) but enabled in the + * host, trap all ENCLS leafs and inject #UD/#GP as needed to emulate + * the expected system behavior for ENCLS. + */ + u64 bitmap = -1ull; + + /* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support SGX */ + if (!cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit()) + return; + + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX) && + sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu)) { + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX1)) { + bitmap &= ~GENMASK_ULL(ETRACK, ECREATE); + if (sgx_intercept_encls_ecreate(vcpu)) + bitmap |= (1 << ECREATE); + } + + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2)) + bitmap &= ~GENMASK_ULL(EMODT, EAUG); + + /* + * Trap and execute EINIT if launch control is enabled in the + * host using the guest's values for launch control MSRs, even + * if the guest's values are fixed to hardware default values. + * The MSRs are not loaded/saved on VM-Enter/VM-Exit as writing + * the MSRs is extraordinarily expensive. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) + bitmap |= (1 << EINIT); + + if (!vmcs12 && is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + if (vmcs12 && nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(vmcs12)) + bitmap |= vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap; + } + vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, bitmap); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h index 6502fa52c7e9..a400888b376d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ #include +#include "capabilities.h" +#include "vmx_ops.h" + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx; @@ -11,11 +14,21 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void); void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12); #else #define enable_sgx 0 static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { } static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { } + +static inline void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12) +{ + /* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support SGX */ + if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit()) + vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull); +} #endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c index c8e51c004f78..034adb6404dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = { FIELD64(VMREAD_BITMAP, vmread_bitmap), FIELD64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, vmwrite_bitmap), FIELD64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, xss_exit_bitmap), + FIELD64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, encls_exiting_bitmap), FIELD64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address), FIELD64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, vmcs_link_pointer), FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, guest_ia32_debugctl), diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h index 80232daf00ff..13494956d0e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h @@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 { u64 vm_function_control; u64 eptp_list_address; u64 pml_address; - u64 padding64[3]; /* room for future expansion */ + u64 encls_exiting_bitmap; + u64 padding64[2]; /* room for future expansion */ /* * To allow migration of L1 (complete with its L2 guests) between * machines of different natural widths (32 or 64 bit), we cannot have @@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void) CHECK_OFFSET(vm_function_control, 296); CHECK_OFFSET(eptp_list_address, 304); CHECK_OFFSET(pml_address, 312); + CHECK_OFFSET(encls_exiting_bitmap, 320); CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_guest_host_mask, 344); CHECK_OFFSET(cr4_guest_host_mask, 352); CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_read_shadow, 360); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 070460df5c3b..0c2394f9020a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -2204,6 +2204,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data; if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0) vmx_leave_nested(vcpu); + + /* SGX may be enabled/disabled by guest's firmware */ + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL); break; case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && @@ -4366,6 +4369,15 @@ static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled) exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION; + if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit() && nested) { + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |= + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING; + else + vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &= + ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING; + } + vmx->secondary_exec_control = exec_control; } @@ -4465,8 +4477,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1); } - if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit()) - vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull); + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, NULL); if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) { memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc)); @@ -7364,6 +7375,19 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx); + vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL); + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX)) + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED; + else + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED; + + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= + FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED; + else + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= + ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED; + /* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */ vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu); } @@ -7384,6 +7408,13 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void) if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT); + if (!enable_sgx) { + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX); + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC); + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX1); + kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX2); + } + if (vmx_umip_emulated()) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP); From patchwork Wed Apr 7 20:49:35 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Huang, Kai" X-Patchwork-Id: 12189385 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7664BC43460 for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 574D26120E for ; Wed, 7 Apr 2021 20:50:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231535AbhDGUur (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:47 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:47246 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231508AbhDGUun (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Apr 2021 16:50:43 -0400 IronPort-SDR: VCIlbXH3ibqG3q2yB4O1j3ZzlbN6mmITIj+b+A5UAvWy1liNCsbgfilHCVk8EMOr7KhIBAhd/z RJlkCiUq1ivA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9947"; a="278660421" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="278660421" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:33 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 7C2TD1WJHGa4ABbt3uxljRe8/MJRmva1RTbDpwgFTBKf4QhlbOpI05Lo9ql2aI02Ow4P1ckqp/ tsj1sRTJQ8ig== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.82,204,1613462400"; d="scan'208";a="415437507" Received: from tkokeray-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.254.113.100]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Apr 2021 13:50:30 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, jarkko@kernel.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, Andy Lutomirski , Kai Huang Subject: [PATCH v4 11/11] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 08:49:35 +1200 Message-Id: <78179bb5dfde6cff7b1e4df8ead5b3674018079b.1617825858.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org From: Sean Christopherson Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a file handle to a valid SGX attribute file. The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint. To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by default. Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Kai Huang --- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst index 38e327d4b479..ebb47e48d4f3 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst @@ -6230,6 +6230,29 @@ KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag is used to distinguish between them. This capability can be used to check / enable 2nd DAWR feature provided by POWER10 processor. +7.24 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE +---------------------- + +:Architectures: x86 +:Target: VM +:Parameters: args[0] is a file handle of a SGX attribute file in securityfs +:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if the file handle is invalid or if a requested + attribute is not supported by KVM. + +KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE enables a userspace VMM to grant a VM access to one or +more priveleged enclave attributes. args[0] must hold a file handle to a valid +SGX attribute file corresponding to an attribute that is supported/restricted +by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY). + +The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide +additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. use of the PROVISIONKEY +is restricted to deter malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to obtain a stable +system fingerprint. To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions +by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by +default. + +See Documentation/x86/sgx/2.Kernel-internals.rst for more details. + 8. Other capabilities. ====================== diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index a0d45607b702..6dc12d949f86 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) * expected to derive it from supported XCR0. */ entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | - /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY | + SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY | SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY | SGX_ATTR_KSS; entry->ebx &= 0; break; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index d2da5abcf395..81139e076380 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS @@ -3759,6 +3760,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR: case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER: case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID: +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM + case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: +#endif r = 1; break; #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XEN @@ -5345,6 +5349,23 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled = true; r = 0; break; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM + case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: { + unsigned long allowed_attributes = 0; + + r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]); + if (r) + break; + + /* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */ + if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) && + !(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) + kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true; + else + r = -EINVAL; + break; + } +#endif default: r = -EINVAL; break; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index f6afee209620..7d8927e474f8 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING 192 #define KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT 193 #define KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1 194 +#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 195 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING