From patchwork Wed Apr 21 17:14:45 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 12216629 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 49E6FC43603 for ; Wed, 21 Apr 2021 17:15:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 075C5613C9 for ; Wed, 21 Apr 2021 17:14:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S244460AbhDURPb (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Apr 2021 13:15:31 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([216.205.24.124]:29738 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S241923AbhDURP1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 21 Apr 2021 13:15:27 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1619025293; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=CH/H9EMCPzTVO17F0AhVsjZvQyeIY3RFQ1xi2LaIF3U=; b=Rk5tbT+OUvf4fsiy5qTM0F+z1UIX5mOSKkkDLE3YUtPW6bORuAo6gWjw1j7TM8+nWkF+mX NXP6Ksnl3fRbsDXOZ+2UcqevzSdHmf9UU3WtLJIYBxH1K+dC2OcIkCBVv0tuypwG+Ij4zg WOFfU5dgUniOck9NcRFfkNx+Anr/zKY= Received: from mail-ed1-f69.google.com (mail-ed1-f69.google.com [209.85.208.69]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-381-RDkSorbBMvmLdCPFQWxjrQ-1; Wed, 21 Apr 2021 13:14:52 -0400 X-MC-Unique: RDkSorbBMvmLdCPFQWxjrQ-1 Received: by mail-ed1-f69.google.com with SMTP id w14-20020aa7da4e0000b02903834aeed684so13626965eds.13 for ; Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:14:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=CH/H9EMCPzTVO17F0AhVsjZvQyeIY3RFQ1xi2LaIF3U=; b=KpcgKQe0ORM0mvh4Mxd/QdeO63ZUN/cwsuM5yfDgoXVTr5TBGUbOgYje2lkWLLulGr kMdTizivIDtKforWPsZUJMkyfvzfbwOEy60EPDLTgD28RBMnee+oc4+NfIxa1AEpiUle vZsecfzukeGRICw4QbkJzxFhXPpVgoif9wNOFdcTNzC2eQ1JgobHBY83KhUUzSKTvvYg 4Fl+ZolFYnzN934Ki5faECXUHgnFL1AjkANmPQHBZ7e7cmY/Z9TAnraw/hOWY16Vcwvz O/0HGl2nDz5YgKhXbEch2WGH+eDIPivTFNFfP3yAxGCRY9aClkmra9jQPbBH2qX1z1v0 dleA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531Ik+x7mn45Mm+XmBb0aPFI55zwSTSDSOw0nBR3bIODoQHLBrhV j/zeMFNQ/2otO4wuH8H/CbkGlMaZKmp/jpGP3hOKXLxrM6UTOQ9qNb0YvUf69s596rubQL1mW5g R+ZpvpKGHEbu7OeeZs7ofl/c+Vz8xP/GGjVKagvMhsaM6Nh0O2nB6/qNDKsw7oOU3Mt4NBw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:cc48:: with SMTP id mm8mr35075134ejb.58.1619025290702; Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:14:50 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzfY4E6B1rqiCEVZTtJIhVGRKBMsxhaixFISYRx97QdosCAdLI1H8CPlvqMBiK9Dx8yD8FXlw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:cc48:: with SMTP id mm8mr35075104ejb.58.1619025290485; Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:14:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a02:8308:b105:dd00:277b:6436:24db:9466]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id i1sm22905edt.33.2021.04.21.10.14.49 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:14:49 -0700 (PDT) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Lokesh Gidra , Stephen Smalley Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/2] LSM,anon_inodes: explicitly distinguish anon inode types Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 19:14:45 +0200 Message-Id: <20210421171446.785507-2-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20210421171446.785507-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20210421171446.785507-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Add an enum to that allows LSMs to reliably distinguish types of anon inodes created via anon_inode_getfd_secure() and require callers of this function to pass the type as an argument. For the single current user of this function (userfaultfd), add the corresponding type and pass it in its anon_inode_getfd_secure() call. While the "name" argument can be used to distinguish different types as well, some users of anon_inode_getfd() put some additional information here (e.g. KVM anon inodes), so using an explicit numeric identifier is preferred to parsing this information from strings. The new type information will be used by SELinux in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- fs/anon_inodes.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/userfaultfd.c | 6 +++-- include/linux/anon_inodes.h | 4 +++- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++- include/linux/security.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 3 ++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + 7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/anon_inodes.c b/fs/anon_inodes.c index a280156138ed..0c8e77b69893 100644 --- a/fs/anon_inodes.c +++ b/fs/anon_inodes.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ static struct file_system_type anon_inode_fs_type = { }; static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode( + enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, const char *name, const struct inode *context_inode) { @@ -67,7 +68,8 @@ static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode( if (IS_ERR(inode)) return inode; inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE; - error = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &qname, context_inode); + error = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, type, &qname, + context_inode); if (error) { iput(inode); return ERR_PTR(error); @@ -75,11 +77,11 @@ static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode( return inode; } -static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name, +static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, + const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags, - const struct inode *context_inode, - bool secure) + const struct inode *context_inode) { struct inode *inode; struct file *file; @@ -87,8 +89,8 @@ static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name, if (fops->owner && !try_module_get(fops->owner)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); - if (secure) { - inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(name, context_inode); + if (type != LSM_ANON_INODE_NONE) { + inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(type, name, context_inode); if (IS_ERR(inode)) { file = ERR_CAST(inode); goto err; @@ -144,15 +146,16 @@ struct file *anon_inode_getfile(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags) { - return __anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags, NULL, false); + return __anon_inode_getfile(LSM_ANON_INODE_NONE, name, fops, priv, + flags, NULL); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfile); -static int __anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, +static int __anon_inode_getfd(enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, + const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags, - const struct inode *context_inode, - bool secure) + const struct inode *context_inode) { int error, fd; struct file *file; @@ -162,8 +165,8 @@ static int __anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, return error; fd = error; - file = __anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags, context_inode, - secure); + file = __anon_inode_getfile(type, name, fops, priv, flags, + context_inode); if (IS_ERR(file)) { error = PTR_ERR(file); goto err_put_unused_fd; @@ -197,7 +200,8 @@ err_put_unused_fd: int anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags) { - return __anon_inode_getfd(name, fops, priv, flags, NULL, false); + return __anon_inode_getfd(LSM_ANON_INODE_NONE, name, fops, priv, + flags, NULL); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfd); @@ -207,7 +211,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfd); * the inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook. This allows the inode to have its * own security context and for a LSM to reject creation of the inode. * - * @name: [in] name of the "class" of the new file + * @type: [in] type of the file recognizable by LSMs + * @name: [in] name of the "class" of the new file (may be more specific + * than @type) * @fops: [in] file operations for the new file * @priv: [in] private data for the new file (will be file's private_data) * @flags: [in] flags @@ -217,11 +223,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfd); * The LSM may use @context_inode in inode_init_security_anon(), but a * reference to it is not held. */ -int anon_inode_getfd_secure(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, +int anon_inode_getfd_secure(enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, const char *name, + const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags, const struct inode *context_inode) { - return __anon_inode_getfd(name, fops, priv, flags, context_inode, true); + /* The caller must pass a valid type! */ + if (WARN_ON(type <= LSM_ANON_INODE_NONE || type > LSM_ANON_INODE_MAX)) + return -EINVAL; + return __anon_inode_getfd(type, name, fops, priv, flags, context_inode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_getfd_secure); diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index 0be8cdd4425a..003f65d752c4 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -985,7 +985,8 @@ static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *new, { int fd; - fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new, + fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure(LSM_ANON_INODE_USERFAULTFD, + "[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new, O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode); if (fd < 0) return fd; @@ -2000,7 +2001,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags) /* prevent the mm struct to be freed */ mmgrab(ctx->mm); - fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx, + fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure(LSM_ANON_INODE_USERFAULTFD, + "[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx, O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL); if (fd < 0) { mmdrop(ctx->mm); diff --git a/include/linux/anon_inodes.h b/include/linux/anon_inodes.h index 71881a2b6f78..37137e994ceb 100644 --- a/include/linux/anon_inodes.h +++ b/include/linux/anon_inodes.h @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_ANON_INODES_H #define _LINUX_ANON_INODES_H +#include + struct file_operations; struct inode; @@ -17,7 +19,7 @@ struct file *anon_inode_getfile(const char *name, void *priv, int flags); int anon_inode_getfd(const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags); -int anon_inode_getfd_secure(const char *name, +int anon_inode_getfd_secure(enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, const char *name, const struct file_operations *fops, void *priv, int flags, const struct inode *context_inode); diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 61f04f7dc1a4..ba03a7d0bf1a 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, void **value, size_t *len) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode, - const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) + enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, const struct qstr *name, + const struct inode *context_inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 9aeda3f9e838..7c5117676f29 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -79,6 +79,23 @@ enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, }; +/* + * Types of anonymous inodes that may be interesting to LSMs. + * Passed to anon_inode_getfd_secure() and + * security_inode_init_security_anon(). + */ +enum lsm_anon_inode_type { + /* anon inodes invisible to the LSMs */ + LSM_ANON_INODE_NONE = 0, + /* userfaultfd anon inodes */ + LSM_ANON_INODE_USERFAULTFD, + /* (add new types above this line) */ + + __LSM_ANON_INODE_MAX, + /* max value used for asserts */ + LSM_ANON_INODE_MAX = __LSM_ANON_INODE_MAX - 1, +}; + /* * These are reasons that can be passed to the security_locked_down() * LSM hook. Lockdown reasons that protect kernel integrity (ie, the @@ -329,6 +346,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data); int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode); int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, @@ -759,6 +777,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, } static inline int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 94383f83ba42..3786932c576c 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1067,10 +1067,11 @@ out: EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) { - return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name, + return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, type, name, context_inode); } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 92f909a2e8f7..dc57ba21d8ff 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3048,6 +3048,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, + enum lsm_anon_inode_type type, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) { From patchwork Wed Apr 21 17:14:46 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 12216633 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2B829C43616 for ; 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Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:14:51 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyN2tOLiqStlOemoPihxz37Wt/OP+d1rIvEkhFqaa2GTQP9HkpW/vJH8NQfFid5RullHfwiDQ== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:c893:: with SMTP id p19mr32667724eds.256.1619025291553; Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:14:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a02:8308:b105:dd00:277b:6436:24db:9466]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id i1sm22905edt.33.2021.04.21.10.14.50 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:14:50 -0700 (PDT) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Lokesh Gidra , Stephen Smalley Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/2] selinux: add capability to map anon inode types to separate classes Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 19:14:46 +0200 Message-Id: <20210421171446.785507-3-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20210421171446.785507-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20210421171446.785507-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org Unfortunately, the approach chosen in commit 29cd6591ab6f ("selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes") to use a single class for all anon inodes and let the policy distinguish between them using named transitions turned out to have a rather unfortunate drawback. For example, suppose we have two types of anon inodes, "A" and "B", and we want to allow a set of domains (represented by an attribute "attr_x") certain set of permissions on anon inodes of type "A" that were created by the same domain, but at the same time disallow this set to access anon inodes of type "B" entirely. Since all inodes share the same class and we want to distinguish both the inode types and the domains that created them, we have no choice than to create separate types for the cartesian product of (domains that belong to attr_x) x ("A", "B") and add all the necessary allow and transition rules for each domain individually. This makes it very impractical to write sane policies for anon inodes in the future, as more anon inode types are added. Therefore, this patch implements an alternative approach that assigns a separate class to each type of anon inode. This allows the example above to be implemented without any transition rules and with just a single allow rule: allow attr_x self:A { ... }; In order to not break possible existing users of the already merged original approach, this patch also adds a new policy capability "extended_anon_inode_class" that needs to be set by the policy to enable the new behavior. I decided to keep the named transition mechanism in the new variant, since there might eventually be some extra information in the anon inode name that could be used in transitions. One minor annoyance is that the kernel still expects the policy to provide both classes (anon_inode and userfaultfd) regardless of the capability setting and if one of them is not defined in the policy, the kernel will print a warning when loading the policy. However, it doesn't seem worth to work around that in the kernel, as the policy can provide just the definition of the unused class(es) (and permissions) to avoid this warning. Keeping the legacy anon_inode class with some fallback rules may also be desirable to keep the policy compatible with kernels that only support anon_inode. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 ++ security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 7 ++++++ 5 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index dc57ba21d8ff..20a8d7d17936 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3079,7 +3079,32 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass; isec->sid = context_isec->sid; } else { - isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE; + /* + * If the check below fails: + * 1. Add the corresponding security class to + * security/selinux/include/classmap.h + * 2. Map the new LSM_ANON_INODE_* value to the class in + * the switch statement below. + * 3. Update the RHS of the comparison in the BUILD_BUG_ON(). + * 4. CC selinux@vger.kernel.org and + * linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org when submitting + * the patch or in case of any questions. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(LSM_ANON_INODE_MAX > LSM_ANON_INODE_USERFAULTFD); + + if (selinux_policycap_extended_anon_inode()) { + switch (type) { + case LSM_ANON_INODE_USERFAULTFD: + isec->sclass = SECCLASS_USERFAULTFD; + break; + default: + pr_err("SELinux: got invalid anon inode type: %d", + (int)type); + return -EINVAL; + } + } else { + isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE; + } rc = security_transition_sid( &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index ba2e01a6955c..e4308cad6407 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -251,6 +251,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "integrity", "confidentiality", NULL } }, { "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, + { "userfaultfd", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { NULL } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h index 2ec038efbb03..969804bd6dab 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum { POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION, POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS, + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTENDED_ANON_INODE_CLASS, __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX }; #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h index b89289f092c9..78651990425e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = { "always_check_network", "cgroup_seclabel", "nnp_nosuid_transition", - "genfs_seclabel_symlinks" + "genfs_seclabel_symlinks", + "extended_anon_inode_class", }; #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 7130c9648ad1..4fb75101aca4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_extended_anon_inode(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTENDED_ANON_INODE_CLASS]); +} + int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state); int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len,