From patchwork Mon Jun 14 20:16:18 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Richard Weinberger X-Patchwork-Id: 12319805 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.9 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,UNWANTED_LANGUAGE_BODY, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D01BC49EAF for ; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 20:24:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8BAC2613D9 for ; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 20:24:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235172AbhFNU0Y (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:26:24 -0400 Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([109.75.188.150]:59386 "EHLO lilium.sigma-star.at" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234933AbhFNU0W (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:26:22 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by lilium.sigma-star.at (Postfix) with ESMTP id 093011817A0CF; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:37 +0200 (CEST) Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (lilium.sigma-star.at [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10032) with ESMTP id 3etoU-Nb0K0y; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:35 +0200 (CEST) Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (lilium.sigma-star.at [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id YZRu3oErkG0w; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:35 +0200 (CEST) From: Richard Weinberger To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: Richard Weinberger , Ahmad Fatoum , David Gstir , David Howells , "David S. Miller" , Fabio Estevam , Herbert Xu , James Bottomley , James Morris , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jonathan Corbet , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , NXP Linux Team , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Sascha Hauer , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shawn Guo Subject: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware provided keys Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:18 +0200 Message-Id: <20210614201620.30451-2-richard@nod.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210614201620.30451-1-richard@nod.at> References: <20210614201620.30451-1-richard@nod.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org DCP is capable to performing AES with hardware-bound keys. These keys are not stored in main memory and are therefore not directly accessible by the operating system. So instead of feeding the key into DCP, we need to place a reference to such a key before initiating the crypto operation. Keys are referenced by a one byte identifiers. DCP supports 6 different keys: 4 slots in the secure memory area, a one time programmable key which can be burnt via on-chip fuses and an unique device key. Using these keys is restricted to in-kernel users that use them as building block for other crypto tools such as trusted keys. Allowing userspace (e.g. via AF_ALG) to use these keys to crypt or decrypt data is a security risk, because there is no access control mechanism. Cc: Ahmad Fatoum Cc: David Gstir Cc: David Howells Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Fabio Estevam Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: James Bottomley Cc: James Morris Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: NXP Linux Team Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Sascha Hauer Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Shawn Guo Co-developed-by: David Gstir Signed-off-by: David Gstir Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger --- drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/mxs-dcp.h | 19 +++++++ 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/mxs-dcp.h diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c index d6a7784d2988..c3e0c0ccbc20 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ struct dcp_async_ctx { struct crypto_skcipher *fallback; unsigned int key_len; uint8_t key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + bool refkey; }; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx { @@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_TERM (1 << 13) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_INIT (1 << 12) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY (1 << 11) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY (1 << 10) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT (1 << 8) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_INIT (1 << 9) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_HASH (1 << 6) @@ -168,6 +171,8 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_ECB (0 << 4) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_SELECT_AES128 (0 << 0) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT 8 + static int mxs_dcp_start_dma(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx) { struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp; @@ -219,15 +224,18 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp; struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan]; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + dma_addr_t src_phys, dst_phys, key_phys = {0}; + bool key_referenced = actx->refkey; int ret; - dma_addr_t key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, - 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - dma_addr_t src_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_in_buf, - DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); - dma_addr_t dst_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_out_buf, - DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + if (!key_referenced) { + key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, + 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + } + src_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_in_buf, DCP_BUF_SZ, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); + dst_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_out_buf, DCP_BUF_SZ, + DMA_FROM_DEVICE); if (actx->fill % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { dev_err(sdcp->dev, "Invalid block size!\n"); @@ -240,8 +248,13 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_INTERRUPT | MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_CIPHER; - /* Payload contains the key. */ - desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; + if (key_referenced) { + /* Set OTP key bit to select the key via KEY_SELECT. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY; + } else { + /* Payload contains the key. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; + } if (rctx->enc) desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT; @@ -255,6 +268,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, else desc->control1 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_CBC; + if (key_referenced) + desc->control1 |= sdcp->coh->aes_key[0] << MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT; + desc->next_cmd_addr = 0; desc->source = src_phys; desc->destination = dst_phys; @@ -265,8 +281,10 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, ret = mxs_dcp_start_dma(actx); aes_done_run: - dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); + if (!key_referenced) { + dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); + } dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, src_phys, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, dst_phys, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); @@ -454,7 +472,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_enqueue(struct skcipher_request *req, int enc, int ecb) struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); int ret; - if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) + if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && !actx->refkey)) return mxs_dcp_block_fallback(req, enc); rctx->enc = enc; @@ -501,6 +519,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, * there can still be an operation in progress. */ actx->key_len = len; + actx->refkey = false; if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) { memcpy(actx->key, key, len); return 0; @@ -517,6 +536,33 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, return crypto_skcipher_setkey(actx->fallback, key, len); } +static int mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct dcp_async_ctx *actx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + int ret = -EINVAL; + + if (len != DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE) + goto out; + + actx->key_len = len; + actx->refkey = true; + + switch (key[0]) { + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP: + memcpy(actx->key, key, len); + ret = 0; + } + +out: + return ret; +} + static int mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) { const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm)); @@ -540,6 +586,13 @@ static void mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) crypto_free_skcipher(actx->fallback); } +static int mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct dcp_aes_req_ctx)); + + return 0; +} + /* * Hashing (SHA1/SHA256) */ @@ -882,6 +935,39 @@ static struct skcipher_alg dcp_aes_algs[] = { .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .init = mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm, .exit = mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-paes-dcp", + .base.cra_priority = 401, + .base.cra_alignmask = 15, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey, + .encrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_encrypt, + .decrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_decrypt, + .init = mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-paes-dcp", + .base.cra_priority = 401, + .base.cra_alignmask = 15, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey, + .encrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_encrypt, + .decrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_decrypt, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .init = mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm, }, }; diff --git a/include/linux/mxs-dcp.h b/include/linux/mxs-dcp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..df6678ee10a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/mxs-dcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + * Authors: David Gstir + * Richard Weinberger + */ + +#ifndef MXS_DCP_H +#define MXS_DCP_H + +#define DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE 1 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0 0x00 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1 0x01 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2 0x02 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3 0x03 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE 0xfe +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP 0xff + +#endif /* MXS_DCP_H */ From patchwork Mon Jun 14 20:16:19 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Richard Weinberger X-Patchwork-Id: 12319807 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 46BC3C49EBA for ; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 20:24:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33C6460FEA for ; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 20:24:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235242AbhFNU0Y (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:26:24 -0400 Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([109.75.188.150]:59390 "EHLO lilium.sigma-star.at" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235059AbhFNU0W (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:26:22 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by lilium.sigma-star.at (Postfix) with ESMTP id E7ABA18190E47; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:37 +0200 (CEST) Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (lilium.sigma-star.at [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10032) with ESMTP id cl3Eqv11IA66; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:36 +0200 (CEST) Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (lilium.sigma-star.at [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id qged8d8IHPVl; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:36 +0200 (CEST) From: Richard Weinberger To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: Richard Weinberger , Ahmad Fatoum , David Gstir , David Howells , "David S. Miller" , Fabio Estevam , Herbert Xu , James Bottomley , James Morris , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jonathan Corbet , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , NXP Linux Team , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Sascha Hauer , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shawn Guo Subject: [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP DCP-based trusted keys Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:19 +0200 Message-Id: <20210614201620.30451-3-richard@nod.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210614201620.30451-1-richard@nod.at> References: <20210614201620.30451-1-richard@nod.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP. Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob mechanism just like CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and parsing the blob has to happen in software. We chose the following format for the blob: /* * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. * * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1 * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it. * * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + * AES_BLOCK_SIZE. */ struct dcp_blob_fmt { __u8 fmt_version; __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __le32 payload_len; __u8 payload[0]; } __packed; @payload is the key provided by trusted_key_ops->seal(). By default the UNIQUE device key is used, it is also possible to use the OTP key. While the UNIQUE device key should be unique it is not entirely clear whether this is the case due to unclear documentation. If someone wants to be sure they can burn their own unique key into the OTP fuse and set the use_otp_key module parameter. Cc: Ahmad Fatoum Cc: David Gstir Cc: David Howells Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Fabio Estevam Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: James Bottomley Cc: James Morris Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: NXP Linux Team Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Sascha Hauer Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Shawn Guo Co-developed-by: David Gstir Signed-off-by: David Gstir Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 + MAINTAINERS | 9 + include/keys/trusted_dcp.h | 13 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 325 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 354 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_dcp.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index cb89dbdedc46..d8b2aa94a566 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5639,6 +5639,7 @@ sources: - "tpm" - "tee" + - "dcp" If not specified then it defaults to iterating through the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the first trust source as a backend which is initialized diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index b706dd20ff2b..779cac00827c 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10099,6 +10099,15 @@ F: include/keys/trusted-type.h F: include/keys/trusted_tpm.h F: security/keys/trusted-keys/ +KEYS-TRUSTED-DCP +M: David Gstir +M: Richard Weinberger +L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org +L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +F: include/keys/trusted_dcp.h +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c + KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE M: Sumit Garg L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7b2a1275c527 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + * Authors: David Gstir + * Richard Weinberger + */ + +#ifndef TRUSTED_DCP_H +#define TRUSTED_DCP_H + +extern struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index feb8b6c3cc79..992b591692dc 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o trusted-y += tpm2key.asn1.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TEE) += trusted_tee.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP) += trusted_dcp.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index d5c891d8d353..66b631ffe876 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)"); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or dcp)"); static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) @@ -33,6 +34,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TEE) { "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops }, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP) + { "dcp", &dcp_trusted_key_ops }, +#endif }; DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..02db5dc261c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + * Authors: David Gstir + * Richard Weinberger + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 +#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 + +/** + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. + * + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1. + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, + * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in + * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, + * GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it. + * + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + + * DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN. + */ +struct dcp_blob_fmt { + __u8 fmt_version; + __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __le32 payload_len; + __u8 payload[0]; +} __packed; + +static bool use_otp_key; +module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for sealing"); + +static bool skip_zk_test; +module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed"); + +static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len) +{ + return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN; +} + +static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool is_encrypt) +{ + int res = 0; + struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; + u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE]; + + if (!use_otp_key) + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE; + else + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + res = PTR_ERR(tfm); + pr_err("Unable to request DCP pAES-ECB cipher: %i\n", res); + tfm = NULL; + goto out; + } + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); + if (!req) { + res = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key)); + if (res < 0) + goto out; + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128, + NULL); + + if (is_encrypt) + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait); + else + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait); + +out: + skcipher_request_free(req); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); + + return res; +} + +static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce, + bool is_encrypt) +{ + struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL; + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; + struct crypto_aead *aead; + int ret; + + aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(aead); + pr_err("Unable to request AES-GCM cipher: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret); + goto free_aead; + } + + aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!aead_req) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_aead; + } + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len); + if (is_encrypt) { + /* + * If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag. + */ + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN); + } else { + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len); + } + + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce); + aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, + NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0); + + if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_req; + } + + if (is_encrypt) + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); + else + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); + +free_req: + aead_request_free(aead_req); +free_aead: + crypto_free_aead(aead); +out: + return ret; +} + +static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key) +{ + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false); +} + +static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key) +{ + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true); +} + +static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; + int blen, ret; + + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); + if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) { + ret = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION; + get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + + ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key, + b->nonce, true); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + b->payload_len = cpu_to_le32(p->key_len); + p->blob_len = blen; + ret = 0; +out: + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; + int blen, ret; + + if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) { + pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n", + b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len); + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); + if (blen != p->blob_len) { + pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen, + p->blob_len); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN, + b->blob_key, b->nonce, false); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; +out: + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + get_random_bytes(key, key_len); + + return key_len; +} + +static int test_for_zero_key(void) +{ + static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x6f}; + void *buf = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (skip_zk_test) + goto out; + + buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) { + pr_err("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + } +out: + kfree(buf); + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (use_otp_key) + pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n"); + + ret = test_for_zero_key(); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret); + + return -EINVAL; + } + + return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +static void trusted_dcp_exit(void) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops = { + .exit = trusted_dcp_exit, + .init = trusted_dcp_init, + .seal = trusted_dcp_seal, + .unseal = trusted_dcp_unseal, + .get_random = trusted_dcp_get_random, + .migratable = 0, +}; From patchwork Mon Jun 14 20:16:20 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Richard Weinberger X-Patchwork-Id: 12319803 X-Patchwork-Delegate: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F909C2B9F4 for ; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 20:24:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8166061246 for ; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 20:24:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235145AbhFNU0W (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:26:22 -0400 Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([109.75.188.150]:59380 "EHLO lilium.sigma-star.at" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234848AbhFNU0W (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:26:22 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 455 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:26:18 EDT Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by lilium.sigma-star.at (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C89818190E4A; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:38 +0200 (CEST) Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (lilium.sigma-star.at [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10032) with ESMTP id EytU5U21JfDt; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:37 +0200 (CEST) Received: from lilium.sigma-star.at ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (lilium.sigma-star.at [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id Yxr3TtJK9DNP; Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:37 +0200 (CEST) From: Richard Weinberger To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Gstir , Ahmad Fatoum , David Howells , "David S. Miller" , Fabio Estevam , Herbert Xu , James Bottomley , James Morris , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jonathan Corbet , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , NXP Linux Team , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Richard Weinberger , Sascha Hauer , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shawn Guo Subject: [PATCH 3/3] doc: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new trust source Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 22:16:20 +0200 Message-Id: <20210614201620.30451-4-richard@nod.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210614201620.30451-1-richard@nod.at> References: <20210614201620.30451-1-richard@nod.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org From: David Gstir Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new trust source: - Describe security properties of DCP trust source - Describe key usage - Document blob format Cc: Ahmad Fatoum Cc: David Gstir Cc: David Howells Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: Fabio Estevam Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: James Bottomley Cc: James Morris Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: NXP Linux Team Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Sascha Hauer Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Shawn Guo Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: David Gstir --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 84 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index 80d5a5af62a1..e8413122e4bc 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ safe. Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip fuses and is accessible to TEE only. + (3) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt in + the on-chip fuses and is accessbile to the DCP encryption engine only. + * Execution isolation (1) TPM @@ -46,6 +51,12 @@ safe. Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process. + (3) DCP + + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space. + * Optional binding to platform integrity state (1) TPM @@ -63,6 +74,11 @@ safe. Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can be extended with TEE based measured boot process. + (3) DCP + + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for + platform integrity. + * Interfaces and APIs (1) TPM @@ -74,10 +90,14 @@ safe. TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``. + (3) DCP + + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. * Threat model - The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given + The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM, TEE or DCP for a given purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data. @@ -103,6 +123,14 @@ access control policy within the trust source. from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources. + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface, + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled + to back the kernel RNG. + + Encrypted Keys -------------- @@ -188,6 +216,19 @@ Usage:: specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). +Trusted Keys usage: DCP +----------------------- + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format +specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key length for new keys is +always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + Encrypted Keys usage -------------------- @@ -370,3 +411,44 @@ string length. privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed string length. + +DCP Blob Format +--------------- + +The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its +AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing. +To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define +our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing +key stored in the key blob. + +Whenever a new tusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit +blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to +encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. + +The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES +encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce, +BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together +with a version number, payload length and authentication tag:: + + /* + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. + * + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1 + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, + * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in + * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, + * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it. + * + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + + * AES_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ + struct dcp_blob_fmt { + __u8 fmt_version; + __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __le32 payload_len; + __u8 payload[0]; + } __packed;