From patchwork Mon Oct 18 18:04:50 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 12567563 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60993C433FE for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EBB9D60F24 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:49 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 mail.kernel.org EBB9D60F24 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-496-49aeeOQoNl6WOdhETRchqg-1; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:06:45 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 49aeeOQoNl6WOdhETRchqg-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8AFD680668D; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (colo-mx01.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.20]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 468993CC7; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.19.33]) by colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D95211806D03; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx01.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.1]) by lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id 19II6cS2016385 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:06:38 -0400 Received: by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) id 7934140CFD0B; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast04.extmail.prod.ext.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.55.20]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 73EC940CFD04 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-2.mimecast.com [207.211.31.81]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5A26E10665B9 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-125-39ZZH15-PUWMb1aRWU8cRA-1; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:06:34 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 39ZZH15-PUWMb1aRWU8cRA-1 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1FE2F61077; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:33 +0000 (UTC) From: Eric Biggers To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 11:04:50 -0700 Message-Id: <20211018180453.40441-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20211018180453.40441-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20211018180453.40441-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.11.54.1 X-loop: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Satya Tangirala , Chaitanya Kulkarni , Mike Snitzer , linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, "Martin K. Petersen" , Christoph Hellwig Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 1/4] blk-crypto-fallback: properly prefix function and struct names X-BeenThere: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: device-mapper development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com From: Eric Biggers For clarity, avoid using just the "blk_crypto_" prefix for functions and structs that are specific to blk-crypto-fallback. Instead, use "blk_crypto_fallback_". Some places already did this, but others didn't. This is also a prerequisite for using "struct blk_crypto_keyslot" to mean a generic blk-crypto keyslot (which is what it sounds like). Rename the fallback one to "struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot". No change in behavior. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- block/blk-crypto-fallback.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c b/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c index ec4c7823541c8..1bcc1a1514248 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static mempool_t *bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool; static DEFINE_MUTEX(tfms_init_lock); static bool tfms_inited[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX]; -static struct blk_crypto_keyslot { +static struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot { enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode; struct crypto_skcipher *tfms[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX]; } *blk_crypto_keyslots; @@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ static struct bio_set crypto_bio_split; */ static u8 blank_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; -static void blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot) +static void blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot) { - struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot]; + struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot]; enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = slotp->crypto_mode; int err; @@ -104,34 +104,34 @@ static void blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot) slotp->crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID; } -static int blk_crypto_keyslot_program(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key, - unsigned int slot) +static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key, + unsigned int slot) { - struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot]; + struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot]; const enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode; int err; if (crypto_mode != slotp->crypto_mode && slotp->crypto_mode != BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID) - blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(slot); + blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot); slotp->crypto_mode = crypto_mode; err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], key->raw, key->size); if (err) { - blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(slot); + blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot); return err; } return 0; } -static int blk_crypto_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key, - unsigned int slot) +static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key, + unsigned int slot) { - blk_crypto_evict_keyslot(slot); + blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot); return 0; } @@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ static int blk_crypto_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, * hardware. */ static const struct blk_ksm_ll_ops blk_crypto_ksm_ll_ops = { - .keyslot_program = blk_crypto_keyslot_program, - .keyslot_evict = blk_crypto_keyslot_evict, + .keyslot_program = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program, + .keyslot_evict = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict, }; static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio(struct bio *enc_bio) @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio(struct bio *enc_bio) bio_endio(src_bio); } -static struct bio *blk_crypto_clone_bio(struct bio *bio_src) +static struct bio *blk_crypto_fallback_clone_bio(struct bio *bio_src) { struct bvec_iter iter; struct bio_vec bv; @@ -187,12 +187,13 @@ static struct bio *blk_crypto_clone_bio(struct bio *bio_src) return bio; } -static bool blk_crypto_alloc_cipher_req(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot, - struct skcipher_request **ciph_req_ret, - struct crypto_wait *wait) +static bool +blk_crypto_fallback_alloc_cipher_req(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot, + struct skcipher_request **ciph_req_ret, + struct crypto_wait *wait) { struct skcipher_request *ciph_req; - const struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp; + const struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp; int keyslot_idx = blk_ksm_get_slot_idx(slot); slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[keyslot_idx]; @@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ static bool blk_crypto_alloc_cipher_req(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot, return true; } -static bool blk_crypto_split_bio_if_needed(struct bio **bio_ptr) +static bool blk_crypto_fallback_split_bio_if_needed(struct bio **bio_ptr) { struct bio *bio = *bio_ptr; unsigned int i = 0; @@ -277,7 +278,7 @@ static bool blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr) blk_status_t blk_st; /* Split the bio if it's too big for single page bvec */ - if (!blk_crypto_split_bio_if_needed(bio_ptr)) + if (!blk_crypto_fallback_split_bio_if_needed(bio_ptr)) return false; src_bio = *bio_ptr; @@ -285,7 +286,7 @@ static bool blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr) data_unit_size = bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size; /* Allocate bounce bio for encryption */ - enc_bio = blk_crypto_clone_bio(src_bio); + enc_bio = blk_crypto_fallback_clone_bio(src_bio); if (!enc_bio) { src_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; return false; @@ -302,7 +303,7 @@ static bool blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr) } /* and then allocate an skcipher_request for it */ - if (!blk_crypto_alloc_cipher_req(slot, &ciph_req, &wait)) { + if (!blk_crypto_fallback_alloc_cipher_req(slot, &ciph_req, &wait)) { src_bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; goto out_release_keyslot; } @@ -404,7 +405,7 @@ static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct work_struct *work) } /* and then allocate an skcipher_request for it */ - if (!blk_crypto_alloc_cipher_req(slot, &ciph_req, &wait)) { + if (!blk_crypto_fallback_alloc_cipher_req(slot, &ciph_req, &wait)) { bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; goto out; } @@ -474,9 +475,9 @@ static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_endio(struct bio *bio) * @bio_ptr: pointer to the bio to prepare * * If bio is doing a WRITE operation, this splits the bio into two parts if it's - * too big (see blk_crypto_split_bio_if_needed). It then allocates a bounce bio - * for the first part, encrypts it, and update bio_ptr to point to the bounce - * bio. + * too big (see blk_crypto_fallback_split_bio_if_needed()). It then allocates a + * bounce bio for the first part, encrypts it, and updates bio_ptr to point to + * the bounce bio. * * For a READ operation, we mark the bio for decryption by using bi_private and * bi_end_io. @@ -611,7 +612,7 @@ static int blk_crypto_fallback_init(void) int blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(enum blk_crypto_mode_num mode_num) { const char *cipher_str = blk_crypto_modes[mode_num].cipher_str; - struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp; + struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp; unsigned int i; int err = 0; From patchwork Mon Oct 18 18:04:51 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 12567619 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33474C433F5 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:09:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [216.205.24.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 82B8E60F48 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:09:28 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 mail.kernel.org 82B8E60F48 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-303-mBnhSYbpOQ-sxbCwxYNFhQ-1; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:09:24 -0400 X-MC-Unique: mBnhSYbpOQ-sxbCwxYNFhQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ED3518066EF; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:09:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (colo-mx01.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.20]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AF77F10016FC; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:09:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.19.33]) by colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 80DBE180BAD1; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:09:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.4]) by lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id 19II6h9h016429 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:06:44 -0400 Received: by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) id CC0302026D60; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast03.extmail.prod.ext.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.55.19]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C64792026D46 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-2.mimecast.com [207.211.31.81]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CDCF8A09A42 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-443-euLzaArxMSy04dxScbW54g-1; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:06:34 -0400 X-MC-Unique: euLzaArxMSy04dxScbW54g-1 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7307B61279; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:33 +0000 (UTC) From: Eric Biggers To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 11:04:51 -0700 Message-Id: <20211018180453.40441-3-ebiggers@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20211018180453.40441-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20211018180453.40441-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.4 X-loop: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Satya Tangirala , Ulf Hansson , Mike Snitzer , linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, "Martin K. Petersen" , Christoph Hellwig Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 2/4] blk-crypto: rename keyslot-manager files to blk-crypto-profile X-BeenThere: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: device-mapper development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com From: Eric Biggers In preparation for renaming struct blk_keyslot_manager to struct blk_crypto_profile, rename the keyslot-manager.h and keyslot-manager.c source files. Renaming these files separately before making a lot of changes to their contents makes it easier for git to understand that they were renamed. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson # For MMC Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- block/Makefile | 2 +- block/blk-crypto-fallback.c | 2 +- block/{keyslot-manager.c => blk-crypto-profile.c} | 2 +- block/blk-crypto.c | 2 +- drivers/md/dm-core.h | 2 +- drivers/md/dm.c | 2 +- drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h | 2 +- include/linux/{keyslot-manager.h => blk-crypto-profile.h} | 0 include/linux/mmc/host.h | 2 +- 10 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) rename block/{keyslot-manager.c => blk-crypto-profile.c} (99%) rename include/linux/{keyslot-manager.h => blk-crypto-profile.h} (100%) diff --git a/block/Makefile b/block/Makefile index 74df168729ecb..602f7f47b7b6d 100644 --- a/block/Makefile +++ b/block/Makefile @@ -36,6 +36,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS) += blk-mq-debugfs.o obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS_ZONED)+= blk-mq-debugfs-zoned.o obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_SED_OPAL) += sed-opal.o obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_PM) += blk-pm.o -obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION) += keyslot-manager.o blk-crypto.o +obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION) += blk-crypto.o blk-crypto-profile.o obj-$(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK) += blk-crypto-fallback.o obj-$(CONFIG_BLOCK_HOLDER_DEPRECATED) += holder.o diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c b/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c index 1bcc1a1514248..08bfea292c754 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c @@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include -#include #include #include #include diff --git a/block/keyslot-manager.c b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c similarity index 99% rename from block/keyslot-manager.c rename to block/blk-crypto-profile.c index 1792159d12d18..1a235fa3c3e82 100644 --- a/block/keyslot-manager.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto: " fmt -#include +#include #include #include #include diff --git a/block/blk-crypto.c b/block/blk-crypto.c index 8f53f4a1f9e2d..76ce7a5d2676b 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include #include -#include +#include #include #include diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-core.h b/drivers/md/dm-core.h index 55dccdfbcb22e..841ed87999e79 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-core.h +++ b/drivers/md/dm-core.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index 7870e6460633f..4184fd8ccb084 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #define DM_MSG_PREFIX "core" diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c b/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c index 6419cfbb4ab78..628bbfaf83124 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ */ #include -#include +#include #include #include "cqhci-crypto.h" diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h index 41f6e06f91856..885fcf2e59224 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include #include "unipro.h" #include diff --git a/include/linux/keyslot-manager.h b/include/linux/blk-crypto-profile.h similarity index 100% rename from include/linux/keyslot-manager.h rename to include/linux/blk-crypto-profile.h diff --git a/include/linux/mmc/host.h b/include/linux/mmc/host.h index 0c0c9a0fdf578..725b1de417673 100644 --- a/include/linux/mmc/host.h +++ b/include/linux/mmc/host.h @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include struct mmc_ios { unsigned int clock; /* clock rate */ From patchwork Mon Oct 18 18:04:52 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 12567569 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 707BFC433EF for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:07:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [216.205.24.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D97C161077 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:07:02 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 mail.kernel.org D97C161077 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; 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Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:06:40 -0400 Received: by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) id AFB2940D1B9D; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast06.extmail.prod.ext.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.55.22]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8B1C40C1257 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-2.mimecast.com [205.139.110.61]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 84BCD18A01A5 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-176-gT_tt2JTN26PCn3TCIeA8Q-1; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:06:35 -0400 X-MC-Unique: gT_tt2JTN26PCn3TCIeA8Q-1 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C8959610C7; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:33 +0000 (UTC) From: Eric Biggers To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 11:04:52 -0700 Message-Id: <20211018180453.40441-4-ebiggers@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20211018180453.40441-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20211018180453.40441-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Mimecast-Bulk-Signature: yes X-Mimecast-Spam-Signature: bulk X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.11.54.2 X-loop: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Satya Tangirala , Ulf Hansson , linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Mike Snitzer , linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, "Martin K. Petersen" Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 3/4] blk-crypto: rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile X-BeenThere: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: device-mapper development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com From: Eric Biggers blk_keyslot_manager is misnamed because it doesn't necessarily manage keyslots. It actually does several different things: - Contains the crypto capabilities of the device. - Provides functions to control the inline encryption hardware. Originally these were just for programming/evicting keyslots; however, new functionality (hardware-wrapped keys) will require new functions here which are unrelated to keyslots. Moreover, device-mapper devices already (ab)use "keyslot_evict" to pass key eviction requests to their underlying devices even though device-mapper devices don't have any keyslots themselves (so it really should be "evict_key", not "keyslot_evict"). - Sometimes (but not always!) it manages keyslots. Originally it always did, but device-mapper devices don't have keyslots themselves, so they use a "passthrough keyslot manager" which doesn't actually manage keyslots. This hack works, but the terminology is unnatural. Also, some hardware doesn't have keyslots and thus also uses a "passthrough keyslot manager" (support for such hardware is yet to be upstreamed, but it will happen eventually). Let's stop having keyslot managers which don't actually manage keyslots. Instead, rename blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. This is a fairly big change, since for consistency it also has to update keyslot manager-related function names, variable names, and comments -- not just the actual struct name. However it's still a fairly straightforward change, as it doesn't change any actual functionality. Acked-by: Ulf Hansson # For MMC Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- block/blk-crypto-fallback.c | 71 ++-- block/blk-crypto-profile.c | 520 ++++++++++++++--------------- block/blk-crypto.c | 27 +- block/blk-integrity.c | 4 +- drivers/md/dm-core.h | 2 +- drivers/md/dm-table.c | 168 +++++----- drivers/md/dm.c | 8 +- drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c | 11 +- drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c | 31 +- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c | 32 +- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.h | 9 +- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h | 4 +- include/linux/blk-crypto-profile.h | 164 +++++---- include/linux/blk-mq.h | 2 +- include/linux/blkdev.h | 16 +- include/linux/device-mapper.h | 4 +- include/linux/mmc/host.h | 2 +- 18 files changed, 555 insertions(+), 522 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c b/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c index 08bfea292c754..c87aba8584c64 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot { struct crypto_skcipher *tfms[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX]; } *blk_crypto_keyslots; -static struct blk_keyslot_manager blk_crypto_ksm; +static struct blk_crypto_profile blk_crypto_fallback_profile; static struct workqueue_struct *blk_crypto_wq; static mempool_t *blk_crypto_bounce_page_pool; static struct bio_set crypto_bio_split; @@ -104,9 +104,10 @@ static void blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot) slotp->crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID; } -static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key, - unsigned int slot) +static int +blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key, + unsigned int slot) { struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot]; const enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = @@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, return 0; } -static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, +static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, unsigned int slot) { @@ -135,14 +136,9 @@ static int blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, return 0; } -/* - * The crypto API fallback KSM ops - only used for a bio when it specifies a - * blk_crypto_key that was not supported by the device's inline encryption - * hardware. - */ -static const struct blk_ksm_ll_ops blk_crypto_ksm_ll_ops = { - .keyslot_program = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program, - .keyslot_evict = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict, +static const struct blk_crypto_ll_ops blk_crypto_fallback_ll_ops = { + .keyslot_program = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program, + .keyslot_evict = blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_evict, }; static void blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_endio(struct bio *enc_bio) @@ -188,13 +184,13 @@ static struct bio *blk_crypto_fallback_clone_bio(struct bio *bio_src) } static bool -blk_crypto_fallback_alloc_cipher_req(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot, +blk_crypto_fallback_alloc_cipher_req(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot, struct skcipher_request **ciph_req_ret, struct crypto_wait *wait) { struct skcipher_request *ciph_req; const struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp; - int keyslot_idx = blk_ksm_get_slot_idx(slot); + int keyslot_idx = blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot); slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[keyslot_idx]; ciph_req = skcipher_request_alloc(slotp->tfms[slotp->crypto_mode], @@ -266,7 +262,7 @@ static bool blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr) { struct bio *src_bio, *enc_bio; struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc; - struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot; + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot; int data_unit_size; struct skcipher_request *ciph_req = NULL; DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); @@ -293,10 +289,11 @@ static bool blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr) } /* - * Use the crypto API fallback keyslot manager to get a crypto_skcipher - * for the algorithm and key specified for this bio. + * Get a blk-crypto-fallback keyslot that contains a crypto_skcipher for + * this bio's algorithm and key. */ - blk_st = blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(&blk_crypto_ksm, bc->bc_key, &slot); + blk_st = blk_crypto_get_keyslot(&blk_crypto_fallback_profile, + bc->bc_key, &slot); if (blk_st != BLK_STS_OK) { src_bio->bi_status = blk_st; goto out_put_enc_bio; @@ -364,7 +361,7 @@ static bool blk_crypto_fallback_encrypt_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr) out_free_ciph_req: skcipher_request_free(ciph_req); out_release_keyslot: - blk_ksm_put_slot(slot); + blk_crypto_put_keyslot(slot); out_put_enc_bio: if (enc_bio) bio_put(enc_bio); @@ -382,7 +379,7 @@ static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct work_struct *work) container_of(work, struct bio_fallback_crypt_ctx, work); struct bio *bio = f_ctx->bio; struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = &f_ctx->crypt_ctx; - struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot; + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot; struct skcipher_request *ciph_req = NULL; DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); u64 curr_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE]; @@ -395,10 +392,11 @@ static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct work_struct *work) blk_status_t blk_st; /* - * Use the crypto API fallback keyslot manager to get a crypto_skcipher - * for the algorithm and key specified for this bio. + * Get a blk-crypto-fallback keyslot that contains a crypto_skcipher for + * this bio's algorithm and key. */ - blk_st = blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(&blk_crypto_ksm, bc->bc_key, &slot); + blk_st = blk_crypto_get_keyslot(&blk_crypto_fallback_profile, + bc->bc_key, &slot); if (blk_st != BLK_STS_OK) { bio->bi_status = blk_st; goto out_no_keyslot; @@ -436,7 +434,7 @@ static void blk_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio(struct work_struct *work) out: skcipher_request_free(ciph_req); - blk_ksm_put_slot(slot); + blk_crypto_put_keyslot(slot); out_no_keyslot: mempool_free(f_ctx, bio_fallback_crypt_ctx_pool); bio_endio(bio); @@ -501,8 +499,8 @@ bool blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr) return false; } - if (!blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(&blk_crypto_ksm, - &bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg)) { + if (!__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(&blk_crypto_fallback_profile, + &bc->bc_key->crypto_cfg)) { bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_NOTSUPP; return false; } @@ -528,7 +526,7 @@ bool blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr) int blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key) { - return blk_ksm_evict_key(&blk_crypto_ksm, key); + return __blk_crypto_evict_key(&blk_crypto_fallback_profile, key); } static bool blk_crypto_fallback_inited; @@ -536,6 +534,7 @@ static int blk_crypto_fallback_init(void) { int i; int err; + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile = &blk_crypto_fallback_profile; if (blk_crypto_fallback_inited) return 0; @@ -546,24 +545,24 @@ static int blk_crypto_fallback_init(void) if (err) goto out; - err = blk_ksm_init(&blk_crypto_ksm, blk_crypto_num_keyslots); + err = blk_crypto_profile_init(profile, blk_crypto_num_keyslots); if (err) goto fail_free_bioset; err = -ENOMEM; - blk_crypto_ksm.ksm_ll_ops = blk_crypto_ksm_ll_ops; - blk_crypto_ksm.max_dun_bytes_supported = BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE; + profile->ll_ops = blk_crypto_fallback_ll_ops; + profile->max_dun_bytes_supported = BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE; /* All blk-crypto modes have a crypto API fallback. */ for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++) - blk_crypto_ksm.crypto_modes_supported[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF; - blk_crypto_ksm.crypto_modes_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID] = 0; + profile->modes_supported[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF; + profile->modes_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID] = 0; blk_crypto_wq = alloc_workqueue("blk_crypto_wq", WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, num_online_cpus()); if (!blk_crypto_wq) - goto fail_free_ksm; + goto fail_destroy_profile; blk_crypto_keyslots = kcalloc(blk_crypto_num_keyslots, sizeof(blk_crypto_keyslots[0]), @@ -597,8 +596,8 @@ static int blk_crypto_fallback_init(void) kfree(blk_crypto_keyslots); fail_free_wq: destroy_workqueue(blk_crypto_wq); -fail_free_ksm: - blk_ksm_destroy(&blk_crypto_ksm); +fail_destroy_profile: + blk_crypto_profile_destroy(profile); fail_free_bioset: bioset_exit(&crypto_bio_split); out: diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-profile.c b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c index 1a235fa3c3e82..605ba0626a5c0 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-profile.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c @@ -4,26 +4,22 @@ */ /** - * DOC: The Keyslot Manager + * DOC: blk-crypto profiles * - * Many devices with inline encryption support have a limited number of "slots" - * into which encryption contexts may be programmed, and requests can be tagged - * with a slot number to specify the key to use for en/decryption. + * 'struct blk_crypto_profile' contains all generic inline encryption-related + * state for a particular inline encryption device. blk_crypto_profile serves + * as the way that drivers for inline encryption hardware expose their crypto + * capabilities and certain functions (e.g., functions to program and evict + * keys) to upper layers. Device drivers that want to support inline encryption + * construct a crypto profile, then associate it with the disk's request_queue. * - * As the number of slots is limited, and programming keys is expensive on - * many inline encryption hardware, we don't want to program the same key into - * multiple slots - if multiple requests are using the same key, we want to - * program just one slot with that key and use that slot for all requests. + * If the device has keyslots, then its blk_crypto_profile also handles managing + * these keyslots in a device-independent way, using the driver-provided + * functions to program and evict keys as needed. This includes keeping track + * of which key and how many I/O requests are using each keyslot, getting + * keyslots for I/O requests, and handling key eviction requests. * - * The keyslot manager manages these keyslots appropriately, and also acts as - * an abstraction between the inline encryption hardware and the upper layers. - * - * Lower layer devices will set up a keyslot manager in their request queue - * and tell it how to perform device specific operations like programming/ - * evicting keys from keyslots. - * - * Upper layers will call blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key() to program a - * key into some slot in the inline encryption hardware. + * For more information, see Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto: " fmt @@ -37,77 +33,75 @@ #include #include -struct blk_ksm_keyslot { +struct blk_crypto_keyslot { atomic_t slot_refs; struct list_head idle_slot_node; struct hlist_node hash_node; const struct blk_crypto_key *key; - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile; }; -static inline void blk_ksm_hw_enter(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) +static inline void blk_crypto_hw_enter(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile) { /* - * Calling into the driver requires ksm->lock held and the device + * Calling into the driver requires profile->lock held and the device * resumed. But we must resume the device first, since that can acquire - * and release ksm->lock via blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys(). + * and release profile->lock via blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). */ - if (ksm->dev) - pm_runtime_get_sync(ksm->dev); - down_write(&ksm->lock); + if (profile->dev) + pm_runtime_get_sync(profile->dev); + down_write(&profile->lock); } -static inline void blk_ksm_hw_exit(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) +static inline void blk_crypto_hw_exit(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile) { - up_write(&ksm->lock); - if (ksm->dev) - pm_runtime_put_sync(ksm->dev); -} - -static inline bool blk_ksm_is_passthrough(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) -{ - return ksm->num_slots == 0; + up_write(&profile->lock); + if (profile->dev) + pm_runtime_put_sync(profile->dev); } /** - * blk_ksm_init() - Initialize a keyslot manager - * @ksm: The keyslot_manager to initialize. - * @num_slots: The number of key slots to manage. + * blk_crypto_profile_init() - Initialize a blk_crypto_profile + * @profile: the blk_crypto_profile to initialize + * @num_slots: the number of keyslots * - * Allocate memory for keyslots and initialize a keyslot manager. Called by - * e.g. storage drivers to set up a keyslot manager in their request_queue. + * Storage drivers must call this when starting to set up a blk_crypto_profile, + * before filling in additional fields. * * Return: 0 on success, or else a negative error code. */ -int blk_ksm_init(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, unsigned int num_slots) +int blk_crypto_profile_init(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + unsigned int num_slots) { unsigned int slot; unsigned int i; unsigned int slot_hashtable_size; - memset(ksm, 0, sizeof(*ksm)); + memset(profile, 0, sizeof(*profile)); + init_rwsem(&profile->lock); if (num_slots == 0) - return -EINVAL; + return 0; - ksm->slots = kvcalloc(num_slots, sizeof(ksm->slots[0]), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ksm->slots) - return -ENOMEM; + /* Initialize keyslot management data. */ - ksm->num_slots = num_slots; + profile->slots = kvcalloc(num_slots, sizeof(profile->slots[0]), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!profile->slots) + return -ENOMEM; - init_rwsem(&ksm->lock); + profile->num_slots = num_slots; - init_waitqueue_head(&ksm->idle_slots_wait_queue); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ksm->idle_slots); + init_waitqueue_head(&profile->idle_slots_wait_queue); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&profile->idle_slots); for (slot = 0; slot < num_slots; slot++) { - ksm->slots[slot].ksm = ksm; - list_add_tail(&ksm->slots[slot].idle_slot_node, - &ksm->idle_slots); + profile->slots[slot].profile = profile; + list_add_tail(&profile->slots[slot].idle_slot_node, + &profile->idle_slots); } - spin_lock_init(&ksm->idle_slots_lock); + spin_lock_init(&profile->idle_slots_lock); slot_hashtable_size = roundup_pow_of_two(num_slots); /* @@ -117,74 +111,80 @@ int blk_ksm_init(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, unsigned int num_slots) if (slot_hashtable_size < 2) slot_hashtable_size = 2; - ksm->log_slot_ht_size = ilog2(slot_hashtable_size); - ksm->slot_hashtable = kvmalloc_array(slot_hashtable_size, - sizeof(ksm->slot_hashtable[0]), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ksm->slot_hashtable) - goto err_destroy_ksm; + profile->log_slot_ht_size = ilog2(slot_hashtable_size); + profile->slot_hashtable = + kvmalloc_array(slot_hashtable_size, + sizeof(profile->slot_hashtable[0]), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!profile->slot_hashtable) + goto err_destroy; for (i = 0; i < slot_hashtable_size; i++) - INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&ksm->slot_hashtable[i]); + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&profile->slot_hashtable[i]); return 0; -err_destroy_ksm: - blk_ksm_destroy(ksm); +err_destroy: + blk_crypto_profile_destroy(profile); return -ENOMEM; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_init); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_profile_init); -static void blk_ksm_destroy_callback(void *ksm) +static void blk_crypto_profile_destroy_callback(void *profile) { - blk_ksm_destroy(ksm); + blk_crypto_profile_destroy(profile); } /** - * devm_blk_ksm_init() - Resource-managed blk_ksm_init() - * @dev: The device which owns the blk_keyslot_manager. - * @ksm: The blk_keyslot_manager to initialize. - * @num_slots: The number of key slots to manage. + * devm_blk_crypto_profile_init() - Resource-managed blk_crypto_profile_init() + * @dev: the device which owns the blk_crypto_profile + * @profile: the blk_crypto_profile to initialize + * @num_slots: the number of keyslots * - * Like blk_ksm_init(), but causes blk_ksm_destroy() to be called automatically - * on driver detach. + * Like blk_crypto_profile_init(), but causes blk_crypto_profile_destroy() to be + * called automatically on driver detach. * * Return: 0 on success, or else a negative error code. */ -int devm_blk_ksm_init(struct device *dev, struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - unsigned int num_slots) +int devm_blk_crypto_profile_init(struct device *dev, + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + unsigned int num_slots) { - int err = blk_ksm_init(ksm, num_slots); + int err = blk_crypto_profile_init(profile, num_slots); if (err) return err; - return devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, blk_ksm_destroy_callback, ksm); + return devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, + blk_crypto_profile_destroy_callback, + profile); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(devm_blk_ksm_init); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(devm_blk_crypto_profile_init); static inline struct hlist_head * -blk_ksm_hash_bucket_for_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key) +blk_crypto_hash_bucket_for_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key) { - return &ksm->slot_hashtable[hash_ptr(key, ksm->log_slot_ht_size)]; + return &profile->slot_hashtable[ + hash_ptr(key, profile->log_slot_ht_size)]; } -static void blk_ksm_remove_slot_from_lru_list(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot) +static void +blk_crypto_remove_slot_from_lru_list(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot) { - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm = slot->ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile = slot->profile; unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&ksm->idle_slots_lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&profile->idle_slots_lock, flags); list_del(&slot->idle_slot_node); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ksm->idle_slots_lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&profile->idle_slots_lock, flags); } -static struct blk_ksm_keyslot *blk_ksm_find_keyslot( - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key) +static struct blk_crypto_keyslot * +blk_crypto_find_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key) { - const struct hlist_head *head = blk_ksm_hash_bucket_for_key(ksm, key); - struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slotp; + const struct hlist_head *head = + blk_crypto_hash_bucket_for_key(profile, key); + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slotp; hlist_for_each_entry(slotp, head, hash_node) { if (slotp->key == key) @@ -193,68 +193,79 @@ static struct blk_ksm_keyslot *blk_ksm_find_keyslot( return NULL; } -static struct blk_ksm_keyslot *blk_ksm_find_and_grab_keyslot( - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key) +static struct blk_crypto_keyslot * +blk_crypto_find_and_grab_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key) { - struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot; + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot; - slot = blk_ksm_find_keyslot(ksm, key); + slot = blk_crypto_find_keyslot(profile, key); if (!slot) return NULL; if (atomic_inc_return(&slot->slot_refs) == 1) { /* Took first reference to this slot; remove it from LRU list */ - blk_ksm_remove_slot_from_lru_list(slot); + blk_crypto_remove_slot_from_lru_list(slot); } return slot; } -unsigned int blk_ksm_get_slot_idx(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot) +/** + * blk_crypto_keyslot_index() - Get the index of a keyslot + * @slot: a keyslot that blk_crypto_get_keyslot() returned + * + * Return: the 0-based index of the keyslot within the device's keyslots. + */ +unsigned int blk_crypto_keyslot_index(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot) { - return slot - slot->ksm->slots; + return slot - slot->profile->slots; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_get_slot_idx); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_keyslot_index); /** - * blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key() - Program a key into a keyslot. - * @ksm: The keyslot manager to program the key into. - * @key: Pointer to the key object to program, including the raw key, crypto - * mode, and data unit size. - * @slot_ptr: A pointer to return the pointer of the allocated keyslot. + * blk_crypto_get_keyslot() - Get a keyslot for a key, if needed. + * @profile: the crypto profile of the device the key will be used on + * @key: the key that will be used + * @slot_ptr: If a keyslot is allocated, an opaque pointer to the keyslot struct + * will be stored here; otherwise NULL will be stored here. + * + * If the device has keyslots, this gets a keyslot that's been programmed with + * the specified key. If the key is already in a slot, this reuses it; + * otherwise this waits for a slot to become idle and programs the key into it. * - * Get a keyslot that's been programmed with the specified key. If one already - * exists, return it with incremented refcount. Otherwise, wait for a keyslot - * to become idle and program it. + * This must be paired with a call to blk_crypto_put_keyslot(). * - * Context: Process context. Takes and releases ksm->lock. - * Return: BLK_STS_OK on success (and keyslot is set to the pointer of the - * allocated keyslot), or some other blk_status_t otherwise (and - * keyslot is set to NULL). + * Context: Process context. Takes and releases profile->lock. + * Return: BLK_STS_OK on success, meaning that either a keyslot was allocated or + * one wasn't needed; or a blk_status_t error on failure. */ -blk_status_t blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key, - struct blk_ksm_keyslot **slot_ptr) +blk_status_t blk_crypto_get_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key, + struct blk_crypto_keyslot **slot_ptr) { - struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot; + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot; int slot_idx; int err; *slot_ptr = NULL; - if (blk_ksm_is_passthrough(ksm)) + /* + * If the device has no concept of "keyslots", then there is no need to + * get one. + */ + if (profile->num_slots == 0) return BLK_STS_OK; - down_read(&ksm->lock); - slot = blk_ksm_find_and_grab_keyslot(ksm, key); - up_read(&ksm->lock); + down_read(&profile->lock); + slot = blk_crypto_find_and_grab_keyslot(profile, key); + up_read(&profile->lock); if (slot) goto success; for (;;) { - blk_ksm_hw_enter(ksm); - slot = blk_ksm_find_and_grab_keyslot(ksm, key); + blk_crypto_hw_enter(profile); + slot = blk_crypto_find_and_grab_keyslot(profile, key); if (slot) { - blk_ksm_hw_exit(ksm); + blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); goto success; } @@ -262,22 +273,22 @@ blk_status_t blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, * If we're here, that means there wasn't a slot that was * already programmed with the key. So try to program it. */ - if (!list_empty(&ksm->idle_slots)) + if (!list_empty(&profile->idle_slots)) break; - blk_ksm_hw_exit(ksm); - wait_event(ksm->idle_slots_wait_queue, - !list_empty(&ksm->idle_slots)); + blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); + wait_event(profile->idle_slots_wait_queue, + !list_empty(&profile->idle_slots)); } - slot = list_first_entry(&ksm->idle_slots, struct blk_ksm_keyslot, + slot = list_first_entry(&profile->idle_slots, struct blk_crypto_keyslot, idle_slot_node); - slot_idx = blk_ksm_get_slot_idx(slot); + slot_idx = blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot); - err = ksm->ksm_ll_ops.keyslot_program(ksm, key, slot_idx); + err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_program(profile, key, slot_idx); if (err) { - wake_up(&ksm->idle_slots_wait_queue); - blk_ksm_hw_exit(ksm); + wake_up(&profile->idle_slots_wait_queue); + blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); return errno_to_blk_status(err); } @@ -285,97 +296,98 @@ blk_status_t blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, if (slot->key) hlist_del(&slot->hash_node); slot->key = key; - hlist_add_head(&slot->hash_node, blk_ksm_hash_bucket_for_key(ksm, key)); + hlist_add_head(&slot->hash_node, + blk_crypto_hash_bucket_for_key(profile, key)); atomic_set(&slot->slot_refs, 1); - blk_ksm_remove_slot_from_lru_list(slot); + blk_crypto_remove_slot_from_lru_list(slot); - blk_ksm_hw_exit(ksm); + blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); success: *slot_ptr = slot; return BLK_STS_OK; } /** - * blk_ksm_put_slot() - Release a reference to a slot - * @slot: The keyslot to release the reference of. + * blk_crypto_put_keyslot() - Release a reference to a keyslot + * @slot: The keyslot to release the reference of (may be NULL). * * Context: Any context. */ -void blk_ksm_put_slot(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot) +void blk_crypto_put_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot) { - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile; unsigned long flags; if (!slot) return; - ksm = slot->ksm; + profile = slot->profile; if (atomic_dec_and_lock_irqsave(&slot->slot_refs, - &ksm->idle_slots_lock, flags)) { - list_add_tail(&slot->idle_slot_node, &ksm->idle_slots); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ksm->idle_slots_lock, flags); - wake_up(&ksm->idle_slots_wait_queue); + &profile->idle_slots_lock, flags)) { + list_add_tail(&slot->idle_slot_node, &profile->idle_slots); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&profile->idle_slots_lock, flags); + wake_up(&profile->idle_slots_wait_queue); } } /** - * blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported() - Find out if a crypto configuration is - * supported by a ksm. - * @ksm: The keyslot manager to check - * @cfg: The crypto configuration to check for. - * - * Checks for crypto_mode/data unit size/dun bytes support. + * __blk_crypto_cfg_supported() - Check whether the given crypto profile + * supports the given crypto configuration. + * @profile: the crypto profile to check + * @cfg: the crypto configuration to check for * - * Return: Whether or not this ksm supports the specified crypto config. + * Return: %true if @profile supports the given @cfg. */ -bool blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg) +bool __blk_crypto_cfg_supported(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg) { - if (!ksm) + if (!profile) return false; - if (!(ksm->crypto_modes_supported[cfg->crypto_mode] & - cfg->data_unit_size)) + if (!(profile->modes_supported[cfg->crypto_mode] & cfg->data_unit_size)) return false; - if (ksm->max_dun_bytes_supported < cfg->dun_bytes) + if (profile->max_dun_bytes_supported < cfg->dun_bytes) return false; return true; } /** - * blk_ksm_evict_key() - Evict a key from the lower layer device. - * @ksm: The keyslot manager to evict from - * @key: The key to evict + * __blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a key from a device. + * @profile: the crypto profile of the device + * @key: the key to evict. It must not still be used in any I/O. + * + * If the device has keyslots, this finds the keyslot (if any) that contains the + * specified key and calls the driver's keyslot_evict function to evict it. * - * Find the keyslot that the specified key was programmed into, and evict that - * slot from the lower layer device. The slot must not be in use by any - * in-flight IO when this function is called. + * Otherwise, this just calls the driver's keyslot_evict function if it is + * implemented, passing just the key (without any particular keyslot). This + * allows layered devices to evict the key from their underlying devices. * - * Context: Process context. Takes and releases ksm->lock. + * Context: Process context. Takes and releases profile->lock. * Return: 0 on success or if there's no keyslot with the specified key, -EBUSY * if the keyslot is still in use, or another -errno value on other * error. */ -int blk_ksm_evict_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key) +int __blk_crypto_evict_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key) { - struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot; + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot; int err = 0; - if (blk_ksm_is_passthrough(ksm)) { - if (ksm->ksm_ll_ops.keyslot_evict) { - blk_ksm_hw_enter(ksm); - err = ksm->ksm_ll_ops.keyslot_evict(ksm, key, -1); - blk_ksm_hw_exit(ksm); + if (profile->num_slots == 0) { + if (profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict) { + blk_crypto_hw_enter(profile); + err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict(profile, key, -1); + blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); return err; } return 0; } - blk_ksm_hw_enter(ksm); - slot = blk_ksm_find_keyslot(ksm, key); + blk_crypto_hw_enter(profile); + slot = blk_crypto_find_keyslot(profile, key); if (!slot) goto out_unlock; @@ -383,8 +395,8 @@ int blk_ksm_evict_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, err = -EBUSY; goto out_unlock; } - err = ksm->ksm_ll_ops.keyslot_evict(ksm, key, - blk_ksm_get_slot_idx(slot)); + err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict(profile, key, + blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)); if (err) goto out_unlock; @@ -392,81 +404,84 @@ int blk_ksm_evict_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, slot->key = NULL; err = 0; out_unlock: - blk_ksm_hw_exit(ksm); + blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); return err; } /** - * blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys() - Re-program all keyslots. - * @ksm: The keyslot manager + * blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() - Re-program all keyslots. + * @profile: The crypto profile * * Re-program all keyslots that are supposed to have a key programmed. This is * intended only for use by drivers for hardware that loses its keys on reset. * - * Context: Process context. Takes and releases ksm->lock. + * Context: Process context. Takes and releases profile->lock. */ -void blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) +void blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile) { unsigned int slot; - if (blk_ksm_is_passthrough(ksm)) + if (profile->num_slots == 0) return; /* This is for device initialization, so don't resume the device */ - down_write(&ksm->lock); - for (slot = 0; slot < ksm->num_slots; slot++) { - const struct blk_crypto_key *key = ksm->slots[slot].key; + down_write(&profile->lock); + for (slot = 0; slot < profile->num_slots; slot++) { + const struct blk_crypto_key *key = profile->slots[slot].key; int err; if (!key) continue; - err = ksm->ksm_ll_ops.keyslot_program(ksm, key, slot); + err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_program(profile, key, slot); WARN_ON(err); } - up_write(&ksm->lock); + up_write(&profile->lock); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys); -void blk_ksm_destroy(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) +void blk_crypto_profile_destroy(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile) { - if (!ksm) + if (!profile) return; - kvfree(ksm->slot_hashtable); - kvfree_sensitive(ksm->slots, sizeof(ksm->slots[0]) * ksm->num_slots); - memzero_explicit(ksm, sizeof(*ksm)); + kvfree(profile->slot_hashtable); + kvfree_sensitive(profile->slots, + sizeof(profile->slots[0]) * profile->num_slots); + memzero_explicit(profile, sizeof(*profile)); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_destroy); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_profile_destroy); -bool blk_ksm_register(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, struct request_queue *q) +bool blk_crypto_register(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + struct request_queue *q) { if (blk_integrity_queue_supports_integrity(q)) { pr_warn("Integrity and hardware inline encryption are not supported together. Disabling hardware inline encryption.\n"); return false; } - q->ksm = ksm; + q->crypto_profile = profile; return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_register); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_register); -void blk_ksm_unregister(struct request_queue *q) +void blk_crypto_unregister(struct request_queue *q) { - q->ksm = NULL; + q->crypto_profile = NULL; } /** - * blk_ksm_intersect_modes() - restrict supported modes by child device - * @parent: The keyslot manager for parent device - * @child: The keyslot manager for child device, or NULL + * blk_crypto_intersect_capabilities() - restrict supported crypto capabilities + * by child device + * @parent: the crypto profile for the parent device + * @child: the crypto profile for the child device, or NULL * - * Clear any crypto mode support bits in @parent that aren't set in @child. - * If @child is NULL, then all parent bits are cleared. + * This clears all crypto capabilities in @parent that aren't set in @child. If + * @child is NULL, then this clears all parent capabilities. * - * Only use this when setting up the keyslot manager for a layered device, - * before it's been exposed yet. + * Only use this when setting up the crypto profile for a layered device, before + * it's been exposed yet. */ -void blk_ksm_intersect_modes(struct blk_keyslot_manager *parent, - const struct blk_keyslot_manager *child) +void blk_crypto_intersect_capabilities(struct blk_crypto_profile *parent, + const struct blk_crypto_profile *child) { if (child) { unsigned int i; @@ -474,73 +489,63 @@ void blk_ksm_intersect_modes(struct blk_keyslot_manager *parent, parent->max_dun_bytes_supported = min(parent->max_dun_bytes_supported, child->max_dun_bytes_supported); - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(child->crypto_modes_supported); - i++) { - parent->crypto_modes_supported[i] &= - child->crypto_modes_supported[i]; - } + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(child->modes_supported); i++) + parent->modes_supported[i] &= child->modes_supported[i]; } else { parent->max_dun_bytes_supported = 0; - memset(parent->crypto_modes_supported, 0, - sizeof(parent->crypto_modes_supported)); + memset(parent->modes_supported, 0, + sizeof(parent->modes_supported)); } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_intersect_modes); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_intersect_capabilities); /** - * blk_ksm_is_superset() - Check if a KSM supports a superset of crypto modes - * and DUN bytes that another KSM supports. Here, - * "superset" refers to the mathematical meaning of the - * word - i.e. if two KSMs have the *same* capabilities, - * they *are* considered supersets of each other. - * @ksm_superset: The KSM that we want to verify is a superset - * @ksm_subset: The KSM that we want to verify is a subset + * blk_crypto_has_capabilities() - Check whether @target supports at least all + * the crypto capabilities that @reference does. + * @target: the target profile + * @reference: the reference profile * - * Return: True if @ksm_superset supports a superset of the crypto modes and DUN - * bytes that @ksm_subset supports. + * Return: %true if @target supports all the crypto capabilities of @reference. */ -bool blk_ksm_is_superset(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm_superset, - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm_subset) +bool blk_crypto_has_capabilities(const struct blk_crypto_profile *target, + const struct blk_crypto_profile *reference) { int i; - if (!ksm_subset) + if (!reference) return true; - if (!ksm_superset) + if (!target) return false; - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ksm_superset->crypto_modes_supported); i++) { - if (ksm_subset->crypto_modes_supported[i] & - (~ksm_superset->crypto_modes_supported[i])) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(target->modes_supported); i++) { + if (reference->modes_supported[i] & ~target->modes_supported[i]) return false; - } } - if (ksm_subset->max_dun_bytes_supported > - ksm_superset->max_dun_bytes_supported) { + if (reference->max_dun_bytes_supported > + target->max_dun_bytes_supported) return false; - } return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_is_superset); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_has_capabilities); /** - * blk_ksm_update_capabilities() - Update the restrictions of a KSM to those of - * another KSM - * @target_ksm: The KSM whose restrictions to update. - * @reference_ksm: The KSM to whose restrictions this function will update - * @target_ksm's restrictions to. + * blk_crypto_update_capabilities() - Update the capabilities of a crypto + * profile to match those of another crypto + * profile. + * @dst: The crypto profile whose capabilities to update. + * @src: The crypto profile whose capabilities this function will update @dst's + * capabilities to. * * Blk-crypto requires that crypto capabilities that were * advertised when a bio was created continue to be supported by the * device until that bio is ended. This is turn means that a device cannot * shrink its advertised crypto capabilities without any explicit * synchronization with upper layers. So if there's no such explicit - * synchronization, @reference_ksm must support all the crypto capabilities that - * @target_ksm does - * (i.e. we need blk_ksm_is_superset(@reference_ksm, @target_ksm) == true). + * synchronization, @src must support all the crypto capabilities that + * @dst does (i.e. we need blk_crypto_has_capabilities(@src, @dst)). * * Note also that as long as the crypto capabilities are being expanded, the * order of updates becoming visible is not important because it's alright @@ -549,31 +554,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_is_superset); * might result in blk-crypto-fallback being used if available, or the bio being * failed). */ -void blk_ksm_update_capabilities(struct blk_keyslot_manager *target_ksm, - struct blk_keyslot_manager *reference_ksm) +void blk_crypto_update_capabilities(struct blk_crypto_profile *dst, + const struct blk_crypto_profile *src) { - memcpy(target_ksm->crypto_modes_supported, - reference_ksm->crypto_modes_supported, - sizeof(target_ksm->crypto_modes_supported)); + memcpy(dst->modes_supported, src->modes_supported, + sizeof(dst->modes_supported)); - target_ksm->max_dun_bytes_supported = - reference_ksm->max_dun_bytes_supported; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_update_capabilities); - -/** - * blk_ksm_init_passthrough() - Init a passthrough keyslot manager - * @ksm: The keyslot manager to init - * - * Initialize a passthrough keyslot manager. - * Called by e.g. storage drivers to set up a keyslot manager in their - * request_queue, when the storage driver wants to manage its keys by itself. - * This is useful for inline encryption hardware that doesn't have the concept - * of keyslots, and for layered devices. - */ -void blk_ksm_init_passthrough(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) -{ - memset(ksm, 0, sizeof(*ksm)); - init_rwsem(&ksm->lock); + dst->max_dun_bytes_supported = src->max_dun_bytes_supported; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_ksm_init_passthrough); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_update_capabilities); diff --git a/block/blk-crypto.c b/block/blk-crypto.c index 76ce7a5d2676b..ec9efeeeca918 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto.c @@ -218,8 +218,9 @@ static bool bio_crypt_check_alignment(struct bio *bio) blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq) { - return blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(rq->q->ksm, rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key, - &rq->crypt_keyslot); + return blk_crypto_get_keyslot(rq->q->crypto_profile, + rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key, + &rq->crypt_keyslot); } /** @@ -233,7 +234,7 @@ blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq) */ void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) { - blk_ksm_put_slot(rq->crypt_keyslot); + blk_crypto_put_keyslot(rq->crypt_keyslot); mempool_free(rq->crypt_ctx, bio_crypt_ctx_pool); blk_crypto_rq_set_defaults(rq); } @@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ bool __blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr) { struct bio *bio = *bio_ptr; const struct blk_crypto_key *bc_key = bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_key; + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile; /* Error if bio has no data. */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!bio_has_data(bio))) { @@ -280,8 +282,8 @@ bool __blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr) * Success if device supports the encryption context, or if we succeeded * in falling back to the crypto API. */ - if (blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(bdev_get_queue(bio->bi_bdev)->ksm, - &bc_key->crypto_cfg)) + profile = bdev_get_queue(bio->bi_bdev)->crypto_profile; + if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(profile, &bc_key->crypto_cfg)) return true; if (blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(bio_ptr)) @@ -357,7 +359,7 @@ bool blk_crypto_config_supported(struct request_queue *q, const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg) { return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK) || - blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(q->ksm, cfg); + __blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, cfg); } /** @@ -378,7 +380,7 @@ bool blk_crypto_config_supported(struct request_queue *q, int blk_crypto_start_using_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key, struct request_queue *q) { - if (blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(q->ksm, &key->crypto_cfg)) + if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, &key->crypto_cfg)) return 0; return blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode); } @@ -394,18 +396,17 @@ int blk_crypto_start_using_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key, * evicted from any hardware that it might have been programmed into. The key * must not be in use by any in-flight IO when this function is called. * - * Return: 0 on success or if key is not present in the q's ksm, -err on error. + * Return: 0 on success or if the key wasn't in any keyslot; -errno on error. */ int blk_crypto_evict_key(struct request_queue *q, const struct blk_crypto_key *key) { - if (blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(q->ksm, &key->crypto_cfg)) - return blk_ksm_evict_key(q->ksm, key); + if (__blk_crypto_cfg_supported(q->crypto_profile, &key->crypto_cfg)) + return __blk_crypto_evict_key(q->crypto_profile, key); /* - * If the request queue's associated inline encryption hardware didn't - * have support for the key, then the key might have been programmed - * into the fallback keyslot manager, so try to evict from there. + * If the request_queue didn't support the key, then blk-crypto-fallback + * may have been used, so try to evict the key from blk-crypto-fallback. */ return blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(key); } diff --git a/block/blk-integrity.c b/block/blk-integrity.c index cef534a7cbc98..d670d54e5f7ac 100644 --- a/block/blk-integrity.c +++ b/block/blk-integrity.c @@ -409,9 +409,9 @@ void blk_integrity_register(struct gendisk *disk, struct blk_integrity *template blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_STABLE_WRITES, disk->queue); #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION - if (disk->queue->ksm) { + if (disk->queue->crypto_profile) { pr_warn("blk-integrity: Integrity and hardware inline encryption are not supported together. Disabling hardware inline encryption.\n"); - blk_ksm_unregister(disk->queue); + blk_crypto_unregister(disk->queue); } #endif } diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-core.h b/drivers/md/dm-core.h index 841ed87999e79..b855fef4f38a6 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-core.h +++ b/drivers/md/dm-core.h @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ struct dm_table { struct dm_md_mempools *mempools; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile *crypto_profile; #endif }; diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-table.c b/drivers/md/dm-table.c index d95142102bd25..bcddc5effd155 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-table.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-table.c @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static void free_devices(struct list_head *devices, struct mapped_device *md) } } -static void dm_table_destroy_keyslot_manager(struct dm_table *t); +static void dm_table_destroy_crypto_profile(struct dm_table *t); void dm_table_destroy(struct dm_table *t) { @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ void dm_table_destroy(struct dm_table *t) dm_free_md_mempools(t->mempools); - dm_table_destroy_keyslot_manager(t); + dm_table_destroy_crypto_profile(t); kfree(t); } @@ -1186,8 +1186,8 @@ static int dm_table_register_integrity(struct dm_table *t) #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION -struct dm_keyslot_manager { - struct blk_keyslot_manager ksm; +struct dm_crypto_profile { + struct blk_crypto_profile profile; struct mapped_device *md; }; @@ -1213,13 +1213,11 @@ static int dm_keyslot_evict_callback(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev, * When an inline encryption key is evicted from a device-mapper device, evict * it from all the underlying devices. */ -static int dm_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, +static int dm_keyslot_evict(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, unsigned int slot) { - struct dm_keyslot_manager *dksm = container_of(ksm, - struct dm_keyslot_manager, - ksm); - struct mapped_device *md = dksm->md; + struct mapped_device *md = + container_of(profile, struct dm_crypto_profile, profile)->md; struct dm_keyslot_evict_args args = { key }; struct dm_table *t; int srcu_idx; @@ -1239,150 +1237,148 @@ static int dm_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, return args.err; } -static const struct blk_ksm_ll_ops dm_ksm_ll_ops = { - .keyslot_evict = dm_keyslot_evict, -}; - -static int device_intersect_crypto_modes(struct dm_target *ti, - struct dm_dev *dev, sector_t start, - sector_t len, void *data) +static int +device_intersect_crypto_capabilities(struct dm_target *ti, struct dm_dev *dev, + sector_t start, sector_t len, void *data) { - struct blk_keyslot_manager *parent = data; - struct blk_keyslot_manager *child = bdev_get_queue(dev->bdev)->ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile *parent = data; + struct blk_crypto_profile *child = + bdev_get_queue(dev->bdev)->crypto_profile; - blk_ksm_intersect_modes(parent, child); + blk_crypto_intersect_capabilities(parent, child); return 0; } -void dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) +void dm_destroy_crypto_profile(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile) { - struct dm_keyslot_manager *dksm = container_of(ksm, - struct dm_keyslot_manager, - ksm); + struct dm_crypto_profile *dmcp = container_of(profile, + struct dm_crypto_profile, + profile); - if (!ksm) + if (!profile) return; - blk_ksm_destroy(ksm); - kfree(dksm); + blk_crypto_profile_destroy(profile); + kfree(dmcp); } -static void dm_table_destroy_keyslot_manager(struct dm_table *t) +static void dm_table_destroy_crypto_profile(struct dm_table *t) { - dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(t->ksm); - t->ksm = NULL; + dm_destroy_crypto_profile(t->crypto_profile); + t->crypto_profile = NULL; } /* - * Constructs and initializes t->ksm with a keyslot manager that - * represents the common set of crypto capabilities of the devices - * described by the dm_table. However, if the constructed keyslot - * manager does not support a superset of the crypto capabilities - * supported by the current keyslot manager of the mapped_device, - * it returns an error instead, since we don't support restricting - * crypto capabilities on table changes. Finally, if the constructed - * keyslot manager doesn't actually support any crypto modes at all, - * it just returns NULL. + * Constructs and initializes t->crypto_profile with a crypto profile that + * represents the common set of crypto capabilities of the devices described by + * the dm_table. However, if the constructed crypto profile doesn't support all + * crypto capabilities that are supported by the current mapped_device, it + * returns an error instead, since we don't support removing crypto capabilities + * on table changes. Finally, if the constructed crypto profile is "empty" (has + * no crypto capabilities at all), it just sets t->crypto_profile to NULL. */ -static int dm_table_construct_keyslot_manager(struct dm_table *t) +static int dm_table_construct_crypto_profile(struct dm_table *t) { - struct dm_keyslot_manager *dksm; - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm; + struct dm_crypto_profile *dmcp; + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile; struct dm_target *ti; unsigned int i; - bool ksm_is_empty = true; + bool empty_profile = true; - dksm = kmalloc(sizeof(*dksm), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!dksm) + dmcp = kmalloc(sizeof(*dmcp), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dmcp) return -ENOMEM; - dksm->md = t->md; + dmcp->md = t->md; - ksm = &dksm->ksm; - blk_ksm_init_passthrough(ksm); - ksm->ksm_ll_ops = dm_ksm_ll_ops; - ksm->max_dun_bytes_supported = UINT_MAX; - memset(ksm->crypto_modes_supported, 0xFF, - sizeof(ksm->crypto_modes_supported)); + profile = &dmcp->profile; + blk_crypto_profile_init(profile, 0); + profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict = dm_keyslot_evict; + profile->max_dun_bytes_supported = UINT_MAX; + memset(profile->modes_supported, 0xFF, + sizeof(profile->modes_supported)); for (i = 0; i < dm_table_get_num_targets(t); i++) { ti = dm_table_get_target(t, i); if (!dm_target_passes_crypto(ti->type)) { - blk_ksm_intersect_modes(ksm, NULL); + blk_crypto_intersect_capabilities(profile, NULL); break; } if (!ti->type->iterate_devices) continue; - ti->type->iterate_devices(ti, device_intersect_crypto_modes, - ksm); + ti->type->iterate_devices(ti, + device_intersect_crypto_capabilities, + profile); } - if (t->md->queue && !blk_ksm_is_superset(ksm, t->md->queue->ksm)) { + if (t->md->queue && + !blk_crypto_has_capabilities(profile, + t->md->queue->crypto_profile)) { DMWARN("Inline encryption capabilities of new DM table were more restrictive than the old table's. This is not supported!"); - dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(ksm); + dm_destroy_crypto_profile(profile); return -EINVAL; } /* - * If the new KSM doesn't actually support any crypto modes, we may as - * well represent it with a NULL ksm. + * If the new profile doesn't actually support any crypto capabilities, + * we may as well represent it with a NULL profile. */ - ksm_is_empty = true; - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ksm->crypto_modes_supported); i++) { - if (ksm->crypto_modes_supported[i]) { - ksm_is_empty = false; + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(profile->modes_supported); i++) { + if (profile->modes_supported[i]) { + empty_profile = false; break; } } - if (ksm_is_empty) { - dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(ksm); - ksm = NULL; + if (empty_profile) { + dm_destroy_crypto_profile(profile); + profile = NULL; } /* - * t->ksm is only set temporarily while the table is being set - * up, and it gets set to NULL after the capabilities have - * been transferred to the request_queue. + * t->crypto_profile is only set temporarily while the table is being + * set up, and it gets set to NULL after the profile has been + * transferred to the request_queue. */ - t->ksm = ksm; + t->crypto_profile = profile; return 0; } -static void dm_update_keyslot_manager(struct request_queue *q, - struct dm_table *t) +static void dm_update_crypto_profile(struct request_queue *q, + struct dm_table *t) { - if (!t->ksm) + if (!t->crypto_profile) return; - /* Make the ksm less restrictive */ - if (!q->ksm) { - blk_ksm_register(t->ksm, q); + /* Make the crypto profile less restrictive. */ + if (!q->crypto_profile) { + blk_crypto_register(t->crypto_profile, q); } else { - blk_ksm_update_capabilities(q->ksm, t->ksm); - dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(t->ksm); + blk_crypto_update_capabilities(q->crypto_profile, + t->crypto_profile); + dm_destroy_crypto_profile(t->crypto_profile); } - t->ksm = NULL; + t->crypto_profile = NULL; } #else /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ -static int dm_table_construct_keyslot_manager(struct dm_table *t) +static int dm_table_construct_crypto_profile(struct dm_table *t) { return 0; } -void dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) +void dm_destroy_crypto_profile(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile) { } -static void dm_table_destroy_keyslot_manager(struct dm_table *t) +static void dm_table_destroy_crypto_profile(struct dm_table *t) { } -static void dm_update_keyslot_manager(struct request_queue *q, - struct dm_table *t) +static void dm_update_crypto_profile(struct request_queue *q, + struct dm_table *t) { } @@ -1414,9 +1410,9 @@ int dm_table_complete(struct dm_table *t) return r; } - r = dm_table_construct_keyslot_manager(t); + r = dm_table_construct_crypto_profile(t); if (r) { - DMERR("could not construct keyslot manager."); + DMERR("could not construct crypto profile."); return r; } @@ -2070,7 +2066,7 @@ int dm_table_set_restrictions(struct dm_table *t, struct request_queue *q, return r; } - dm_update_keyslot_manager(q, t); + dm_update_crypto_profile(q, t); disk_update_readahead(t->md->disk); return 0; diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index 4184fd8ccb084..8b91f4f0e0531 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -1663,14 +1663,14 @@ static const struct dax_operations dm_dax_ops; static void dm_wq_work(struct work_struct *work); #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION -static void dm_queue_destroy_keyslot_manager(struct request_queue *q) +static void dm_queue_destroy_crypto_profile(struct request_queue *q) { - dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(q->ksm); + dm_destroy_crypto_profile(q->crypto_profile); } #else /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ -static inline void dm_queue_destroy_keyslot_manager(struct request_queue *q) +static inline void dm_queue_destroy_crypto_profile(struct request_queue *q) { } #endif /* !CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ @@ -1696,7 +1696,7 @@ static void cleanup_mapped_device(struct mapped_device *md) dm_sysfs_exit(md); del_gendisk(md->disk); } - dm_queue_destroy_keyslot_manager(md->queue); + dm_queue_destroy_crypto_profile(md->queue); blk_cleanup_disk(md->disk); } diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c b/drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c index 67557808cada5..fec4fbf16a5b6 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c @@ -16,13 +16,13 @@ void mmc_crypto_set_initial_state(struct mmc_host *host) { /* Reset might clear all keys, so reprogram all the keys. */ if (host->caps2 & MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO) - blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys(&host->ksm); + blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(&host->crypto_profile); } void mmc_crypto_setup_queue(struct request_queue *q, struct mmc_host *host) { if (host->caps2 & MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO) - blk_ksm_register(&host->ksm, q); + blk_crypto_register(&host->crypto_profile, q); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmc_crypto_setup_queue); @@ -30,12 +30,15 @@ void mmc_crypto_prepare_req(struct mmc_queue_req *mqrq) { struct request *req = mmc_queue_req_to_req(mqrq); struct mmc_request *mrq = &mqrq->brq.mrq; + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *keyslot; if (!req->crypt_ctx) return; mrq->crypto_ctx = req->crypt_ctx; - if (req->crypt_keyslot) - mrq->crypto_key_slot = blk_ksm_get_slot_idx(req->crypt_keyslot); + + keyslot = req->crypt_keyslot; + if (keyslot) + mrq->crypto_key_slot = blk_crypto_keyslot_index(keyslot); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmc_crypto_prepare_req); diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c b/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c index 628bbfaf83124..d5f4b6972f63e 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c @@ -23,9 +23,10 @@ static const struct cqhci_crypto_alg_entry { }; static inline struct cqhci_host * -cqhci_host_from_ksm(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm) +cqhci_host_from_crypto_profile(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile) { - struct mmc_host *mmc = container_of(ksm, struct mmc_host, ksm); + struct mmc_host *mmc = + container_of(profile, struct mmc_host, crypto_profile); return mmc->cqe_private; } @@ -57,12 +58,12 @@ static int cqhci_crypto_program_key(struct cqhci_host *cq_host, return 0; } -static int cqhci_crypto_keyslot_program(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, +static int cqhci_crypto_keyslot_program(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, unsigned int slot) { - struct cqhci_host *cq_host = cqhci_host_from_ksm(ksm); + struct cqhci_host *cq_host = cqhci_host_from_crypto_profile(profile); const union cqhci_crypto_cap_entry *ccap_array = cq_host->crypto_cap_array; const struct cqhci_crypto_alg_entry *alg = @@ -115,11 +116,11 @@ static int cqhci_crypto_clear_keyslot(struct cqhci_host *cq_host, int slot) return cqhci_crypto_program_key(cq_host, &cfg, slot); } -static int cqhci_crypto_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, +static int cqhci_crypto_keyslot_evict(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, unsigned int slot) { - struct cqhci_host *cq_host = cqhci_host_from_ksm(ksm); + struct cqhci_host *cq_host = cqhci_host_from_crypto_profile(profile); return cqhci_crypto_clear_keyslot(cq_host, slot); } @@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ static int cqhci_crypto_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, * "enabled" when these are called, i.e. CQHCI_ENABLE might not be set in the * CQHCI_CFG register. But the hardware allows that. */ -static const struct blk_ksm_ll_ops cqhci_ksm_ops = { +static const struct blk_crypto_ll_ops cqhci_crypto_ops = { .keyslot_program = cqhci_crypto_keyslot_program, .keyslot_evict = cqhci_crypto_keyslot_evict, }; @@ -157,8 +158,8 @@ cqhci_find_blk_crypto_mode(union cqhci_crypto_cap_entry cap) * * If the driver previously set MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO and the CQE declares * CQHCI_CAP_CS, initialize the crypto support. This involves reading the - * crypto capability registers, initializing the keyslot manager, clearing all - * keyslots, and enabling 128-bit task descriptors. + * crypto capability registers, initializing the blk_crypto_profile, clearing + * all keyslots, and enabling 128-bit task descriptors. * * Return: 0 if crypto was initialized or isn't supported; whether * MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO remains set indicates which one of those cases it is. @@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ int cqhci_crypto_init(struct cqhci_host *cq_host) { struct mmc_host *mmc = cq_host->mmc; struct device *dev = mmc_dev(mmc); - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm = &mmc->ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile = &mmc->crypto_profile; unsigned int num_keyslots; unsigned int cap_idx; enum blk_crypto_mode_num blk_mode_num; @@ -199,15 +200,15 @@ int cqhci_crypto_init(struct cqhci_host *cq_host) */ num_keyslots = cq_host->crypto_capabilities.config_count + 1; - err = devm_blk_ksm_init(dev, ksm, num_keyslots); + err = devm_blk_crypto_profile_init(dev, profile, num_keyslots); if (err) goto out; - ksm->ksm_ll_ops = cqhci_ksm_ops; - ksm->dev = dev; + profile->ll_ops = cqhci_crypto_ops; + profile->dev = dev; /* Unfortunately, CQHCI crypto only supports 32 DUN bits. */ - ksm->max_dun_bytes_supported = 4; + profile->max_dun_bytes_supported = 4; /* * Cache all the crypto capabilities and advertise the supported crypto @@ -223,7 +224,7 @@ int cqhci_crypto_init(struct cqhci_host *cq_host) cq_host->crypto_cap_array[cap_idx]); if (blk_mode_num == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID) continue; - ksm->crypto_modes_supported[blk_mode_num] |= + profile->modes_supported[blk_mode_num] |= cq_host->crypto_cap_array[cap_idx].sdus_mask * 512; } diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c index d70cdcd35e435..67402baf6faee 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c @@ -48,11 +48,12 @@ static int ufshcd_program_key(struct ufs_hba *hba, return err; } -static int ufshcd_crypto_keyslot_program(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, +static int ufshcd_crypto_keyslot_program(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, unsigned int slot) { - struct ufs_hba *hba = container_of(ksm, struct ufs_hba, ksm); + struct ufs_hba *hba = + container_of(profile, struct ufs_hba, crypto_profile); const union ufs_crypto_cap_entry *ccap_array = hba->crypto_cap_array; const struct ufs_crypto_alg_entry *alg = &ufs_crypto_algs[key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode]; @@ -105,11 +106,12 @@ static int ufshcd_clear_keyslot(struct ufs_hba *hba, int slot) return ufshcd_program_key(hba, &cfg, slot); } -static int ufshcd_crypto_keyslot_evict(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, +static int ufshcd_crypto_keyslot_evict(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, unsigned int slot) { - struct ufs_hba *hba = container_of(ksm, struct ufs_hba, ksm); + struct ufs_hba *hba = + container_of(profile, struct ufs_hba, crypto_profile); return ufshcd_clear_keyslot(hba, slot); } @@ -120,11 +122,11 @@ bool ufshcd_crypto_enable(struct ufs_hba *hba) return false; /* Reset might clear all keys, so reprogram all the keys. */ - blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys(&hba->ksm); + blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(&hba->crypto_profile); return true; } -static const struct blk_ksm_ll_ops ufshcd_ksm_ops = { +static const struct blk_crypto_ll_ops ufshcd_crypto_ops = { .keyslot_program = ufshcd_crypto_keyslot_program, .keyslot_evict = ufshcd_crypto_keyslot_evict, }; @@ -179,15 +181,16 @@ int ufshcd_hba_init_crypto_capabilities(struct ufs_hba *hba) } /* The actual number of configurations supported is (CFGC+1) */ - err = devm_blk_ksm_init(hba->dev, &hba->ksm, - hba->crypto_capabilities.config_count + 1); + err = devm_blk_crypto_profile_init( + hba->dev, &hba->crypto_profile, + hba->crypto_capabilities.config_count + 1); if (err) goto out; - hba->ksm.ksm_ll_ops = ufshcd_ksm_ops; + hba->crypto_profile.ll_ops = ufshcd_crypto_ops; /* UFS only supports 8 bytes for any DUN */ - hba->ksm.max_dun_bytes_supported = 8; - hba->ksm.dev = hba->dev; + hba->crypto_profile.max_dun_bytes_supported = 8; + hba->crypto_profile.dev = hba->dev; /* * Cache all the UFS crypto capabilities and advertise the supported @@ -202,7 +205,7 @@ int ufshcd_hba_init_crypto_capabilities(struct ufs_hba *hba) blk_mode_num = ufshcd_find_blk_crypto_mode( hba->crypto_cap_array[cap_idx]); if (blk_mode_num != BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID) - hba->ksm.crypto_modes_supported[blk_mode_num] |= + hba->crypto_profile.modes_supported[blk_mode_num] |= hba->crypto_cap_array[cap_idx].sdus_mask * 512; } @@ -230,9 +233,8 @@ void ufshcd_init_crypto(struct ufs_hba *hba) ufshcd_clear_keyslot(hba, slot); } -void ufshcd_crypto_setup_rq_keyslot_manager(struct ufs_hba *hba, - struct request_queue *q) +void ufshcd_crypto_register(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct request_queue *q) { if (hba->caps & UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO) - blk_ksm_register(&hba->ksm, q); + blk_crypto_register(&hba->crypto_profile, q); } diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.h b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.h index 78a58e788dff9..e18c012768732 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.h @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static inline void ufshcd_prepare_lrbp_crypto(struct request *rq, return; } - lrbp->crypto_key_slot = blk_ksm_get_slot_idx(rq->crypt_keyslot); + lrbp->crypto_key_slot = blk_crypto_keyslot_index(rq->crypt_keyslot); lrbp->data_unit_num = rq->crypt_ctx->bc_dun[0]; } @@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ int ufshcd_hba_init_crypto_capabilities(struct ufs_hba *hba); void ufshcd_init_crypto(struct ufs_hba *hba); -void ufshcd_crypto_setup_rq_keyslot_manager(struct ufs_hba *hba, - struct request_queue *q); +void ufshcd_crypto_register(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct request_queue *q); #else /* CONFIG_SCSI_UFS_CRYPTO */ @@ -64,8 +63,8 @@ static inline int ufshcd_hba_init_crypto_capabilities(struct ufs_hba *hba) static inline void ufshcd_init_crypto(struct ufs_hba *hba) { } -static inline void ufshcd_crypto_setup_rq_keyslot_manager(struct ufs_hba *hba, - struct request_queue *q) { } +static inline void ufshcd_crypto_register(struct ufs_hba *hba, + struct request_queue *q) { } #endif /* CONFIG_SCSI_UFS_CRYPTO */ diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index 95be7ecdfe10b..bf81da2ecf98c 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -4986,7 +4986,7 @@ static int ufshcd_slave_configure(struct scsi_device *sdev) else if (ufshcd_is_rpm_autosuspend_allowed(hba)) sdev->rpm_autosuspend = 1; - ufshcd_crypto_setup_rq_keyslot_manager(hba, q); + ufshcd_crypto_register(hba, q); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h index 885fcf2e59224..62bdc412d38ac 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h @@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ struct ufs_hba_monitor { * @crypto_capabilities: Content of crypto capabilities register (0x100) * @crypto_cap_array: Array of crypto capabilities * @crypto_cfg_register: Start of the crypto cfg array - * @ksm: the keyslot manager tied to this hba + * @crypto_profile: the crypto profile of this hba (if applicable) */ struct ufs_hba { void __iomem *mmio_base; @@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ struct ufs_hba { union ufs_crypto_capabilities crypto_capabilities; union ufs_crypto_cap_entry *crypto_cap_array; u32 crypto_cfg_register; - struct blk_keyslot_manager ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile crypto_profile; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS struct dentry *debugfs_root; diff --git a/include/linux/blk-crypto-profile.h b/include/linux/blk-crypto-profile.h index a27605e2f8260..bbab65bd54288 100644 --- a/include/linux/blk-crypto-profile.h +++ b/include/linux/blk-crypto-profile.h @@ -3,67 +3,113 @@ * Copyright 2019 Google LLC */ -#ifndef __LINUX_KEYSLOT_MANAGER_H -#define __LINUX_KEYSLOT_MANAGER_H +#ifndef __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROFILE_H +#define __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROFILE_H #include #include -struct blk_keyslot_manager; +struct blk_crypto_profile; /** - * struct blk_ksm_ll_ops - functions to manage keyslots in hardware - * @keyslot_program: Program the specified key into the specified slot in the - * inline encryption hardware. - * @keyslot_evict: Evict key from the specified keyslot in the hardware. - * The key is provided so that e.g. dm layers can evict - * keys from the devices that they map over. - * Returns 0 on success, -errno otherwise. + * struct blk_crypto_ll_ops - functions to control inline encryption hardware * - * This structure should be provided by storage device drivers when they set up - * a keyslot manager - this structure holds the function ptrs that the keyslot - * manager will use to manipulate keyslots in the hardware. + * Low-level operations for controlling inline encryption hardware. This + * interface must be implemented by storage drivers that support inline + * encryption. All functions may sleep, are serialized by profile->lock, and + * are never called while profile->dev (if set) is runtime-suspended. */ -struct blk_ksm_ll_ops { - int (*keyslot_program)(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, +struct blk_crypto_ll_ops { + + /** + * @keyslot_program: Program a key into the inline encryption hardware. + * + * Program @key into the specified @slot in the inline encryption + * hardware, overwriting any key that the keyslot may already contain. + * The keyslot is guaranteed to not be in-use by any I/O. + * + * This is required if the device has keyslots. Otherwise (i.e. if the + * device is a layered device, or if the device is real hardware that + * simply doesn't have the concept of keyslots) it is never called. + * + * Must return 0 on success, or -errno on failure. + */ + int (*keyslot_program)(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, unsigned int slot); - int (*keyslot_evict)(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, + + /** + * @keyslot_evict: Evict a key from the inline encryption hardware. + * + * If the device has keyslots, this function must evict the key from the + * specified @slot. The slot will contain @key, but there should be no + * need for the @key argument to be used as @slot should be sufficient. + * The keyslot is guaranteed to not be in-use by any I/O. + * + * If the device doesn't have keyslots itself, this function must evict + * @key from any underlying devices. @slot won't be valid in this case. + * + * If there are no keyslots and no underlying devices, this function + * isn't required. + * + * Must return 0 on success, or -errno on failure. + */ + int (*keyslot_evict)(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, unsigned int slot); }; -struct blk_keyslot_manager { - /* - * The struct blk_ksm_ll_ops that this keyslot manager will use - * to perform operations like programming and evicting keys on the - * device +/** + * struct blk_crypto_profile - inline encryption profile for a device + * + * This struct contains a storage device's inline encryption capabilities (e.g. + * the supported crypto algorithms), driver-provided functions to control the + * inline encryption hardware (e.g. programming and evicting keys), and optional + * device-independent keyslot management data. + */ +struct blk_crypto_profile { + + /* public: Drivers must initialize the following fields. */ + + /** + * @ll_ops: Driver-provided functions to control the inline encryption + * hardware, e.g. program and evict keys. */ - struct blk_ksm_ll_ops ksm_ll_ops; + struct blk_crypto_ll_ops ll_ops; - /* - * The maximum number of bytes supported for specifying the data unit - * number. + /** + * @max_dun_bytes_supported: The maximum number of bytes supported for + * specifying the data unit number (DUN). Specifically, the range of + * supported DUNs is 0 through (1 << (8 * max_dun_bytes_supported)) - 1. */ unsigned int max_dun_bytes_supported; - /* - * Array of size BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX of bitmasks that represents - * whether a crypto mode and data unit size are supported. The i'th - * bit of crypto_mode_supported[crypto_mode] is set iff a data unit - * size of (1 << i) is supported. We only support data unit sizes - * that are powers of 2. + /** + * @modes_supported: Array of bitmasks that specifies whether each + * combination of crypto mode and data unit size is supported. + * Specifically, the i'th bit of modes_supported[crypto_mode] is set if + * crypto_mode can be used with a data unit size of (1 << i). Note that + * only data unit sizes that are powers of 2 can be supported. */ - unsigned int crypto_modes_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX]; + unsigned int modes_supported[BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX]; - /* Device for runtime power management (NULL if none) */ + /** + * @dev: An optional device for runtime power management. If the driver + * provides this device, it will be runtime-resumed before any function + * in @ll_ops is called and will remain resumed during the call. + */ struct device *dev; - /* Here onwards are *private* fields for internal keyslot manager use */ + /* private: The following fields shouldn't be accessed by drivers. */ + /* Number of keyslots, or 0 if not applicable */ unsigned int num_slots; - /* Protects programming and evicting keys from the device */ + /* + * Serializes all calls to functions in @ll_ops as well as all changes + * to @slot_hashtable. This can also be taken in read mode to look up + * keyslots while ensuring that they can't be changed concurrently. + */ struct rw_semaphore lock; /* List of idle slots, with least recently used slot at front */ @@ -80,41 +126,41 @@ struct blk_keyslot_manager { unsigned int log_slot_ht_size; /* Per-keyslot data */ - struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slots; + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slots; }; -int blk_ksm_init(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, unsigned int num_slots); - -int devm_blk_ksm_init(struct device *dev, struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - unsigned int num_slots); +int blk_crypto_profile_init(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + unsigned int num_slots); -blk_status_t blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key, - struct blk_ksm_keyslot **slot_ptr); +int devm_blk_crypto_profile_init(struct device *dev, + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + unsigned int num_slots); -unsigned int blk_ksm_get_slot_idx(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot); +unsigned int blk_crypto_keyslot_index(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot); -void blk_ksm_put_slot(struct blk_ksm_keyslot *slot); +blk_status_t blk_crypto_get_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key, + struct blk_crypto_keyslot **slot_ptr); -bool blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg); +void blk_crypto_put_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot); -int blk_ksm_evict_key(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - const struct blk_crypto_key *key); +bool __blk_crypto_cfg_supported(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg); -void blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm); +int __blk_crypto_evict_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + const struct blk_crypto_key *key); -void blk_ksm_destroy(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm); +void blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile); -void blk_ksm_intersect_modes(struct blk_keyslot_manager *parent, - const struct blk_keyslot_manager *child); +void blk_crypto_profile_destroy(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile); -void blk_ksm_init_passthrough(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm); +void blk_crypto_intersect_capabilities(struct blk_crypto_profile *parent, + const struct blk_crypto_profile *child); -bool blk_ksm_is_superset(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm_superset, - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm_subset); +bool blk_crypto_has_capabilities(const struct blk_crypto_profile *target, + const struct blk_crypto_profile *reference); -void blk_ksm_update_capabilities(struct blk_keyslot_manager *target_ksm, - struct blk_keyslot_manager *reference_ksm); +void blk_crypto_update_capabilities(struct blk_crypto_profile *dst, + const struct blk_crypto_profile *src); -#endif /* __LINUX_KEYSLOT_MANAGER_H */ +#endif /* __LINUX_BLK_CRYPTO_PROFILE_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/blk-mq.h b/include/linux/blk-mq.h index 656fe34bdb6cd..12ddc6e44bc37 100644 --- a/include/linux/blk-mq.h +++ b/include/linux/blk-mq.h @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ struct request { #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION struct bio_crypt_ctx *crypt_ctx; - struct blk_ksm_keyslot *crypt_keyslot; + struct blk_crypto_keyslot *crypt_keyslot; #endif unsigned short write_hint; diff --git a/include/linux/blkdev.h b/include/linux/blkdev.h index abe721591e80a..aeb83bcf4e31f 100644 --- a/include/linux/blkdev.h +++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct pr_ops; struct rq_qos; struct blk_queue_stats; struct blk_stat_callback; -struct blk_keyslot_manager; +struct blk_crypto_profile; /* Must be consistent with blk_mq_poll_stats_bkt() */ #define BLK_MQ_POLL_STATS_BKTS 16 @@ -224,8 +224,7 @@ struct request_queue { unsigned int dma_alignment; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION - /* Inline crypto capabilities */ - struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile *crypto_profile; #endif unsigned int rq_timeout; @@ -1144,19 +1143,20 @@ int kblockd_mod_delayed_work_on(int cpu, struct delayed_work *dwork, unsigned lo #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION -bool blk_ksm_register(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, struct request_queue *q); +bool blk_crypto_register(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + struct request_queue *q); -void blk_ksm_unregister(struct request_queue *q); +void blk_crypto_unregister(struct request_queue *q); #else /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ -static inline bool blk_ksm_register(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm, - struct request_queue *q) +static inline bool blk_crypto_register(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, + struct request_queue *q) { return true; } -static inline void blk_ksm_unregister(struct request_queue *q) { } +static inline void blk_crypto_unregister(struct request_queue *q) { } #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ diff --git a/include/linux/device-mapper.h b/include/linux/device-mapper.h index 114553b487ef4..a7df155ea49b8 100644 --- a/include/linux/device-mapper.h +++ b/include/linux/device-mapper.h @@ -576,9 +576,9 @@ struct dm_table *dm_swap_table(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_table *t); /* - * Table keyslot manager functions + * Table blk_crypto_profile functions */ -void dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(struct blk_keyslot_manager *ksm); +void dm_destroy_crypto_profile(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile); /*----------------------------------------------------------------- * Macros. diff --git a/include/linux/mmc/host.h b/include/linux/mmc/host.h index 725b1de417673..52eae8c45b8d6 100644 --- a/include/linux/mmc/host.h +++ b/include/linux/mmc/host.h @@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ struct mmc_host { /* Inline encryption support */ #ifdef CONFIG_MMC_CRYPTO - struct blk_keyslot_manager ksm; + struct blk_crypto_profile crypto_profile; #endif /* Host Software Queue support */ From patchwork Mon Oct 18 18:04:53 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 12567567 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F295C433F5 for ; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [216.205.24.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B200860F59 for ; 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Mon, 18 Oct 2021 14:06:36 -0400 X-MC-Unique: DU6C3IVwPECYerKXHaVxcA-1 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3609F6115A; Mon, 18 Oct 2021 18:06:34 +0000 (UTC) From: Eric Biggers To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 11:04:53 -0700 Message-Id: <20211018180453.40441-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20211018180453.40441-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20211018180453.40441-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.11.54.1 X-loop: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Satya Tangirala , linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Mike Snitzer , linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, "Martin K. Petersen" Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 4/4] blk-crypto: update inline encryption documentation X-BeenThere: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: device-mapper development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.16 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com From: Eric Biggers Rework most of inline-encryption.rst to be easier to follow, to correct some information, to add some important details and remove some unimportant details, and to take into account the renaming from blk_keyslot_manager to blk_crypto_profile. Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst | 451 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 245 insertions(+), 206 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst b/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst index 7f9b40d6b416b..71d1044617a91 100644 --- a/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst @@ -7,230 +7,269 @@ Inline Encryption Background ========== -Inline encryption hardware sits logically between memory and the disk, and can -en/decrypt data as it goes in/out of the disk. Inline encryption hardware has a -fixed number of "keyslots" - slots into which encryption contexts (i.e. the -encryption key, encryption algorithm, data unit size) can be programmed by the -kernel at any time. Each request sent to the disk can be tagged with the index -of a keyslot (and also a data unit number to act as an encryption tweak), and -the inline encryption hardware will en/decrypt the data in the request with the -encryption context programmed into that keyslot. This is very different from -full disk encryption solutions like self encrypting drives/TCG OPAL/ATA -Security standards, since with inline encryption, any block on disk could be -encrypted with any encryption context the kernel chooses. - +Inline encryption hardware sits logically between memory and disk, and can +en/decrypt data as it goes in/out of the disk. For each I/O request, software +can control exactly how the inline encryption hardware will en/decrypt the data +in terms of key, algorithm, data unit size (the granularity of en/decryption), +and data unit number (a value that determines the initialization vector(s)). + +Some inline encryption hardware accepts all encryption parameters including raw +keys directly in low-level I/O requests. However, most inline encryption +hardware instead has a fixed number of "keyslots" and requires that the key, +algorithm, and data unit size first be programmed into a keyslot. Each +low-level I/O request then just contains a keyslot index and data unit number. + +Note that inline encryption hardware is very different from traditional crypto +accelerators, which are supported through the kernel crypto API. Traditional +crypto accelerators operate on memory regions, whereas inline encryption +hardware operates on I/O requests. Thus, inline encryption hardware needs to be +managed by the block layer, not the kernel crypto API. + +Inline encryption hardware is also very different from "self-encrypting drives", +such as those based on the TCG Opal or ATA Security standards. Self-encrypting +drives don't provide fine-grained control of encryption and provide no way to +verify the correctness of the resulting ciphertext. Inline encryption hardware +provides fine-grained control of encryption, including the choice of key and +initialization vector for each sector, and can be tested for correctness. Objective ========= -We want to support inline encryption (IE) in the kernel. -To allow for testing, we also want a crypto API fallback when actual -IE hardware is absent. We also want IE to work with layered devices -like dm and loopback (i.e. we want to be able to use the IE hardware -of the underlying devices if present, or else fall back to crypto API -en/decryption). - +We want to support inline encryption in the kernel. To make testing easier, we +also want support for falling back to the kernel crypto API when actual inline +encryption hardware is absent. We also want inline encryption to work with +layered devices like device-mapper and loopback (i.e. we want to be able to use +the inline encryption hardware of the underlying devices if present, or else +fall back to crypto API en/decryption). Constraints and notes ===================== -- IE hardware has a limited number of "keyslots" that can be programmed - with an encryption context (key, algorithm, data unit size, etc.) at any time. - One can specify a keyslot in a data request made to the device, and the - device will en/decrypt the data using the encryption context programmed into - that specified keyslot. When possible, we want to make multiple requests with - the same encryption context share the same keyslot. - -- We need a way for upper layers like filesystems to specify an encryption - context to use for en/decrypting a struct bio, and a device driver (like UFS) - needs to be able to use that encryption context when it processes the bio. - -- We need a way for device drivers to expose their inline encryption - capabilities in a unified way to the upper layers. - - -Design -====== - -We add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio that can -represent an encryption context, because we need to be able to pass this -encryption context from the upper layers (like the fs layer) to the -device driver to act upon. - -While IE hardware works on the notion of keyslots, the FS layer has no -knowledge of keyslots - it simply wants to specify an encryption context to -use while en/decrypting a bio. - -We introduce a keyslot manager (KSM) that handles the translation from -encryption contexts specified by the FS to keyslots on the IE hardware. -This KSM also serves as the way IE hardware can expose its capabilities to -upper layers. The generic mode of operation is: each device driver that wants -to support IE will construct a KSM and set it up in its struct request_queue. -Upper layers that want to use IE on this device can then use this KSM in -the device's struct request_queue to translate an encryption context into -a keyslot. The presence of the KSM in the request queue shall be used to mean -that the device supports IE. - -The KSM uses refcounts to track which keyslots are idle (either they have no -encryption context programmed, or there are no in-flight struct bios -referencing that keyslot). When a new encryption context needs a keyslot, it -tries to find a keyslot that has already been programmed with the same -encryption context, and if there is no such keyslot, it evicts the least -recently used idle keyslot and programs the new encryption context into that -one. If no idle keyslots are available, then the caller will sleep until there -is at least one. - - -blk-mq changes, other block layer changes and blk-crypto-fallback -================================================================= - -We add a pointer to a ``bi_crypt_context`` and ``keyslot`` to -struct request. These will be referred to as the ``crypto fields`` -for the request. This ``keyslot`` is the keyslot into which the -``bi_crypt_context`` has been programmed in the KSM of the ``request_queue`` -that this request is being sent to. - -We introduce ``block/blk-crypto-fallback.c``, which allows upper layers to remain -blissfully unaware of whether or not real inline encryption hardware is present -underneath. When a bio is submitted with a target ``request_queue`` that doesn't -support the encryption context specified with the bio, the block layer will -en/decrypt the bio with the blk-crypto-fallback. - -If the bio is a ``WRITE`` bio, a bounce bio is allocated, and the data in the bio -is encrypted stored in the bounce bio - blk-mq will then proceed to process the -bounce bio as if it were not encrypted at all (except when blk-integrity is -concerned). ``blk-crypto-fallback`` sets the bounce bio's ``bi_end_io`` to an -internal function that cleans up the bounce bio and ends the original bio. - -If the bio is a ``READ`` bio, the bio's ``bi_end_io`` (and also ``bi_private``) -is saved and overwritten by ``blk-crypto-fallback`` to -``bio_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio``. The bio's ``bi_crypt_context`` is also -overwritten with ``NULL``, so that to the rest of the stack, the bio looks -as if it was a regular bio that never had an encryption context specified. -``bio_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio`` will decrypt the bio, restore the original -``bi_end_io`` (and also ``bi_private``) and end the bio again. - -Regardless of whether real inline encryption hardware is used or the +- We need a way for upper layers (e.g. filesystems) to specify an encryption + context to use for en/decrypting a bio, and device drivers (e.g. UFSHCD) need + to be able to use that encryption context when they process the request. + Encryption contexts also introduce constraints on bio merging; the block layer + needs to be aware of these constraints. + +- Different inline encryption hardware has different supported algorithms, + supported data unit sizes, maximum data unit numbers, etc. We call these + properties the "crypto capabilities". We need a way for device drivers to + advertise crypto capabilities to upper layers in a generic way. + +- Inline encryption hardware usually (but not always) requires that keys be + programmed into keyslots before being used. Since programming keyslots may be + slow and there may not be very many keyslots, we shouldn't just program the + key for every I/O request, but rather keep track of which keys are in the + keyslots and reuse an already-programmed keyslot when possible. + +- Upper layers typically define a specific end-of-life for crypto keys, e.g. + when an encrypted directory is locked or when a crypto mapping is torn down. + At these times, keys are wiped from memory. We must provide a way for upper + layers to also evict keys from any keyslots they are present in. + +- When possible, device-mapper devices must be able to pass through the inline + encryption support of their underlying devices. However, it doesn't make + sense for device-mapper devices to have keyslots themselves. + +Basic design +============ + +We introduce ``struct blk_crypto_key`` to represent an inline encryption key and +how it will be used. This includes the actual bytes of the key; the size of the +key; the algorithm and data unit size the key will be used with; and the number +of bytes needed to represent the maximum data unit number the key will be used +with. + +We introduce ``struct bio_crypt_ctx`` to represent an encryption context. It +contains a data unit number and a pointer to a blk_crypto_key. We add pointers +to a bio_crypt_ctx to ``struct bio`` and ``struct request``; this allows users +of the block layer (e.g. filesystems) to provide an encryption context when +creating a bio and have it be passed down the stack for processing by the block +layer and device drivers. Note that the encryption context doesn't explicitly +say whether to encrypt or decrypt, as that is implicit from the direction of the +bio; WRITE means encrypt, and READ means decrypt. + +We also introduce ``struct blk_crypto_profile`` to contain all generic inline +encryption-related state for a particular inline encryption device. The +blk_crypto_profile serves as the way that drivers for inline encryption hardware +advertise their crypto capabilities and provide certain functions (e.g., +functions to program and evict keys) to upper layers. Each device driver that +wants to support inline encryption will construct a blk_crypto_profile, then +associate it with the disk's request_queue. + +The blk_crypto_profile also manages the hardware's keyslots, when applicable. +This happens in the block layer, so that users of the block layer can just +specify encryption contexts and don't need to know about keyslots at all, nor do +device drivers need to care about most details of keyslot management. + +Specifically, for each keyslot, the block layer (via the blk_crypto_profile) +keeps track of which blk_crypto_key that keyslot contains (if any), and how many +in-flight I/O requests are using it. When the block layer creates a +``struct request`` for a bio that has an encryption context, it grabs a keyslot +that already contains the key if possible. Otherwise it waits for an idle +keyslot (a keyslot that isn't in-use by any I/O), then programs the key into the +least-recently-used idle keyslot using the function the device driver provided. +In both cases, the resulting keyslot is stored in the ``crypt_keyslot`` field of +the request, where it is then accessible to device drivers and is released after +the request completes. + +``struct request`` also contains a pointer to the original bio_crypt_ctx. +Requests can be built from multiple bios, and the block layer must take the +encryption context into account when trying to merge bios and requests. For two +bios/requests to be merged, they must have compatible encryption contexts: both +unencrypted, or both encrypted with the same key and contiguous data unit +numbers. Only the encryption context for the first bio in a request is +retained, since the remaining bios have been verified to be merge-compatible +with the first bio. + +To make it possible for inline encryption to work with request_queue based +layered devices, when a request is cloned, its encryption context is cloned as +well. When the cloned request is submitted, it is then processed as usual; this +includes getting a keyslot from the clone's target device if needed. + +blk-crypto-fallback +=================== + +It is desirable for the inline encryption support of upper layers (e.g. +filesystems) to be testable without real inline encryption hardware, and +likewise for the block layer's keyslot management logic. It is also desirable +to allow upper layers to just always use inline encryption rather than have to +implement encryption in multiple ways. + +Therefore, we also introduce *blk-crypto-fallback*, which is an implementation +of inline encryption using the kernel crypto API. blk-crypto-fallback is built +into the block layer, so it works on any block device without any special setup. +Essentially, when a bio with an encryption context is submitted to a +request_queue that doesn't support that encryption context, the block layer will +handle en/decryption of the bio using blk-crypto-fallback. + +For encryption, the data cannot be encrypted in-place, as callers usually rely +on it being unmodified. Instead, blk-crypto-fallback allocates bounce pages, +fills a new bio with those bounce pages, encrypts the data into those bounce +pages, and submits that "bounce" bio. When the bounce bio completes, +blk-crypto-fallback completes the original bio. If the original bio is too +large, multiple bounce bios may be required; see the code for details. + +For decryption, blk-crypto-fallback "wraps" the bio's completion callback +(``bi_complete``) and private data (``bi_private``) with its own, unsets the +bio's encryption context, then submits the bio. If the read completes +successfully, blk-crypto-fallback restores the bio's original completion +callback and private data, then decrypts the bio's data in-place using the +kernel crypto API. Decryption happens from a workqueue, as it may sleep. +Afterwards, blk-crypto-fallback completes the bio. + +In both cases, the bios that blk-crypto-fallback submits no longer have an +encryption context. Therefore, lower layers only see standard unencrypted I/O. + +blk-crypto-fallback also defines its own blk_crypto_profile and has its own +"keyslots"; its keyslots contain ``struct crypto_skcipher`` objects. The reason +for this is twofold. First, it allows the keyslot management logic to be tested +without actual inline encryption hardware. Second, similar to actual inline +encryption hardware, the crypto API doesn't accept keys directly in requests but +rather requires that keys be set ahead of time, and setting keys can be +expensive; moreover, allocating a crypto_skcipher can't happen on the I/O path +at all due to the locks it takes. Therefore, the concept of keyslots still +makes sense for blk-crypto-fallback. + +Note that regardless of whether real inline encryption hardware or blk-crypto-fallback is used, the ciphertext written to disk (and hence the -on-disk format of data) will be the same (assuming the hardware's implementation -of the algorithm being used adheres to spec and functions correctly). - -If a ``request queue``'s inline encryption hardware claimed to support the -encryption context specified with a bio, then it will not be handled by the -``blk-crypto-fallback``. We will eventually reach a point in blk-mq when a -struct request needs to be allocated for that bio. At that point, -blk-mq tries to program the encryption context into the ``request_queue``'s -keyslot_manager, and obtain a keyslot, which it stores in its newly added -``keyslot`` field. This keyslot is released when the request is completed. - -When the first bio is added to a request, ``blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep`` is called, -which sets the request's ``crypt_ctx`` to a copy of the bio's -``bi_crypt_context``. bio_crypt_do_front_merge is called whenever a subsequent -bio is merged to the front of the request, which updates the ``crypt_ctx`` of -the request so that it matches the newly merged bio's ``bi_crypt_context``. In particular, the request keeps a copy of the ``bi_crypt_context`` of the first -bio in its bio-list (blk-mq needs to be careful to maintain this invariant -during bio and request merges). - -To make it possible for inline encryption to work with request queue based -layered devices, when a request is cloned, its ``crypto fields`` are cloned as -well. When the cloned request is submitted, blk-mq programs the -``bi_crypt_context`` of the request into the clone's request_queue's keyslot -manager, and stores the returned keyslot in the clone's ``keyslot``. +on-disk format of data) will be the same (assuming that both the inline +encryption hardware's implementation and the kernel crypto API's implementation +of the algorithm being used adhere to spec and function correctly). +blk-crypto-fallback is optional and is controlled by the +``CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK`` kernel configuration option. API presented to users of the block layer ========================================= -``struct blk_crypto_key`` represents a crypto key (the raw key, size of the -key, the crypto algorithm to use, the data unit size to use, and the number of -bytes required to represent data unit numbers that will be specified with the -``bi_crypt_context``). - -``blk_crypto_init_key`` allows upper layers to initialize such a -``blk_crypto_key``. - -``bio_crypt_set_ctx`` should be called on any bio that a user of -the block layer wants en/decrypted via inline encryption (or the -blk-crypto-fallback, if hardware support isn't available for the desired -crypto configuration). This function takes the ``blk_crypto_key`` and the -data unit number (DUN) to use when en/decrypting the bio. - -``blk_crypto_config_supported`` allows upper layers to query whether or not the -an encryption context passed to request queue can be handled by blk-crypto -(either by real inline encryption hardware, or by the blk-crypto-fallback). -This is useful e.g. when blk-crypto-fallback is disabled, and the upper layer -wants to use an algorithm that may not supported by hardware - this function -lets the upper layer know ahead of time that the algorithm isn't supported, -and the upper layer can fallback to something else if appropriate. - -``blk_crypto_start_using_key`` - Upper layers must call this function on -``blk_crypto_key`` and a ``request_queue`` before using the key with any bio -headed for that ``request_queue``. This function ensures that either the -hardware supports the key's crypto settings, or the crypto API fallback has -transforms for the needed mode allocated and ready to go. Note that this -function may allocate an ``skcipher``, and must not be called from the data -path, since allocating ``skciphers`` from the data path can deadlock. - -``blk_crypto_evict_key`` *must* be called by upper layers before a -``blk_crypto_key`` is freed. Further, it *must* only be called only once -there are no more in-flight requests that use that ``blk_crypto_key``. -``blk_crypto_evict_key`` will ensure that a key is removed from any keyslots in -inline encryption hardware that the key might have been programmed into (or the blk-crypto-fallback). +``blk_crypto_config_supported()`` allows users to check ahead of time whether +inline encryption with particular crypto settings will work on a particular +request_queue -- either via hardware or via blk-crypto-fallback. This function +takes in a ``struct blk_crypto_config`` which is like blk_crypto_key, but omits +the actual bytes of the key and instead just contains the algorithm, data unit +size, etc. This function can be useful if blk-crypto-fallback is disabled. + +``blk_crypto_init_key()`` allows users to initialize a blk_crypto_key. + +Users must call ``blk_crypto_start_using_key()`` before actually starting to use +a blk_crypto_key on a request_queue (even if ``blk_crypto_config_supported()`` +was called earlier). This is needed to initialize blk-crypto-fallback if it +will be needed. This must not be called from the data path, as this may have to +allocate resources, which may deadlock in that case. + +Next, to attach an encryption context to a bio, users should call +``bio_crypt_set_ctx()``. This function allocates a bio_crypt_ctx and attaches +it to a bio, given the blk_crypto_key and the data unit number that will be used +for en/decryption. Users don't need to worry about freeing the bio_crypt_ctx +later, as that happens automatically when the bio is freed or reset. + +Finally, when done using inline encryption with a blk_crypto_key on a +request_queue, users must call ``blk_crypto_evict_key()``. This ensures that +the key is evicted from all keyslots it may be programmed into and unlinked from +any kernel data structures it may be linked into. + +In summary, for users of the block layer, the lifecycle of a blk_crypto_key is +as follows: + +1. ``blk_crypto_config_supported()`` (optional) +2. ``blk_crypto_init_key()`` +3. ``blk_crypto_start_using_key()`` +4. ``bio_crypt_set_ctx()`` (potentially many times) +5. ``blk_crypto_evict_key()`` (after all I/O has completed) +6. Zeroize the blk_crypto_key (this has no dedicated function) + +If a blk_crypto_key is being used on multiple request_queues, then +``blk_crypto_config_supported()`` (if used), ``blk_crypto_start_using_key()``, +and ``blk_crypto_evict_key()`` must be called on each request_queue. API presented to device drivers =============================== -A :c:type:``struct blk_keyslot_manager`` should be set up by device drivers in -the ``request_queue`` of the device. The device driver needs to call -``blk_ksm_init`` (or its resource-managed variant ``devm_blk_ksm_init``) on the -``blk_keyslot_manager``, while specifying the number of keyslots supported by -the hardware. - -The device driver also needs to tell the KSM how to actually manipulate the -IE hardware in the device to do things like programming the crypto key into -the IE hardware into a particular keyslot. All this is achieved through the -struct blk_ksm_ll_ops field in the KSM that the device driver -must fill up after initing the ``blk_keyslot_manager``. - -The KSM also handles runtime power management for the device when applicable -(e.g. when it wants to program a crypto key into the IE hardware, the device -must be runtime powered on) - so the device driver must also set the ``dev`` -field in the ksm to point to the `struct device` for the KSM to use for runtime -power management. - -``blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys`` can be called by device drivers if the device -needs each and every of its keyslots to be reprogrammed with the key it -"should have" at the point in time when the function is called. This is useful -e.g. if a device loses all its keys on runtime power down/up. - -If the driver used ``blk_ksm_init`` instead of ``devm_blk_ksm_init``, then -``blk_ksm_destroy`` should be called to free up all resources used by a -``blk_keyslot_manager`` once it is no longer needed. +A device driver that wants to support inline encryption must set up a +blk_crypto_profile in the request_queue of its device. To do this, it first +must call ``blk_crypto_profile_init()`` (or its resource-managed variant +``devm_blk_crypto_profile_init()``), providing the number of keyslots. + +Next, it must advertise its crypto capabilities by setting fields in the +blk_crypto_profile, e.g. ``modes_supported`` and ``max_dun_bytes_supported``. + +It then must set function pointers in the ``ll_ops`` field of the +blk_crypto_profile to tell upper layers how to control the inline encryption +hardware, e.g. how to program and evict keyslots. Most drivers will need to +implement ``keyslot_program`` and ``keyslot_evict``. For details, see the +comments for ``struct blk_crypto_ll_ops``. + +Once the driver registers a blk_crypto_profile with a request_queue, I/O +requests the driver receives via that queue may have an encryption context. All +encryption contexts will be compatible with the crypto capabilities declared in +the blk_crypto_profile, so drivers don't need to worry about handling +unsupported requests. Also, if a nonzero number of keyslots was declared in the +blk_crypto_profile, then all I/O requests that have an encryption context will +also have a keyslot which was already programmed with the appropriate key. + +If the driver implements runtime suspend and its blk_crypto_ll_ops don't work +while the device is runtime-suspended, then the driver must also set the ``dev`` +field of the blk_crypto_profile to point to the ``struct device`` that will be +resumed before any of the low-level operations are called. + +If there are situations where the inline encryption hardware loses the contents +of its keyslots, e.g. device resets, the driver must handle reprogramming the +keyslots. To do this, the driver may call ``blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys()``. + +Finally, if the driver used ``blk_crypto_profile_init()`` instead of +``devm_blk_crypto_profile_init()``, then it is responsible for calling +``blk_crypto_profile_destroy()`` when the crypto profile is no longer needed. Layered Devices =============== -Request queue based layered devices like dm-rq that wish to support IE need to -create their own keyslot manager for their request queue, and expose whatever -functionality they choose. When a layered device wants to pass a clone of that -request to another ``request_queue``, blk-crypto will initialize and prepare the -clone as necessary - see ``blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request`` in -``blk-crypto.c``. - - -Future Optimizations for layered devices -======================================== - -Creating a keyslot manager for a layered device uses up memory for each -keyslot, and in general, a layered device merely passes the request on to a -"child" device, so the keyslots in the layered device itself are completely -unused, and don't need any refcounting or keyslot programming. We can instead -define a new type of KSM; the "passthrough KSM", that layered devices can use -to advertise an unlimited number of keyslots, and support for any encryption -algorithms they choose, while not actually using any memory for each keyslot. -Another use case for the "passthrough KSM" is for IE devices that do not have a -limited number of keyslots. - +Request queue based layered devices like dm-rq that wish to support inline +encryption need to create their own blk_crypto_profile for their request_queue, +and expose whatever functionality they choose. When a layered device wants to +pass a clone of that request to another request_queue, blk-crypto will +initialize and prepare the clone as necessary; see +``blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request()``. Interaction between inline encryption and blk integrity ======================================================= @@ -257,7 +296,7 @@ Because there isn't any real hardware yet, it seems prudent to assume that hardware implementations might not implement both features together correctly, and disallow the combination for now. Whenever a device supports integrity, the kernel will pretend that the device does not support hardware inline encryption -(by essentially setting the keyslot manager in the request_queue of the device -to NULL). When the crypto API fallback is enabled, this means that all bios with -and encryption context will use the fallback, and IO will complete as usual. -When the fallback is disabled, a bio with an encryption context will be failed. +(by setting the blk_crypto_profile in the request_queue of the device to NULL). +When the crypto API fallback is enabled, this means that all bios with and +encryption context will use the fallback, and IO will complete as usual. When +the fallback is disabled, a bio with an encryption context will be failed.