From patchwork Tue Nov 16 03:35:41 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "brian m. carlson" X-Patchwork-Id: 12621275 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F407DC433EF for ; Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:36:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD44261B96 for ; Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:36:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231225AbhKPDjm (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Nov 2021 22:39:42 -0500 Received: from ring.crustytoothpaste.net ([172.105.110.227]:43240 "EHLO ring.crustytoothpaste.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231444AbhKPDir (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Nov 2021 22:38:47 -0500 Received: from camp.crustytoothpaste.net (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:b056:101:a6ae:7d13:8741:9028]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ring.crustytoothpaste.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DE3575D467 for ; Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:35:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=crustytoothpaste.net; s=default; t=1637033748; bh=sb7EXVGpsYnRDDzmh4zXfnu6Yd14/KM7U4GhOQsnjvs=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Reply-To:Subject: Date:To:CC:Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:In-Reply-To: References:Content-Type:Content-Disposition; b=PrWwg14Fv8X+qkHYX7dN4PKf8qYLoUZZP9HzMIYe9oxmQy+fDnJeAn3bfS8RL3GfN G8f4L9q4OvtzCugu8/C8UDrbF9/yH1Dxe7QM7PNTc14TXH0dVaBRNIppuFbT9x8fJP 59ht+uDBGw9Oo+QHNiWxLO2w4yEzIynQmqb8okb5/Is2Y7fmI5HpFNzYmi8VHkPMlc 2ApJnKiDxz9YIh+IpSMoQYfu5x/ShhW1ZVPgDM+rymMV1e/nzxrf1VkBWD0+zmwWPD oCljO+0P3HKo0oWheXiFElf4Hy3GCKJqcc+WgZ0pDYAOzPvkKDlSdfZzzgevE1oeAw k3plDEx/Y+5cxRDdsl8KyAy6eaMSTkgL7Bn5Q1o9qMnGv5sJhvhn4nxR7AVhCGzZD3 C+d2RpmiZ9SfyMKrZ4p4fAaI2wkPfBU5yyf2nIdEByyb612oaTob8psvlZkOkEtPfk 3UF6gWcXnjLRJt9RMnb6SMzJC6IYmFzSMHD7+8muB8hUOXnLV+7 From: "brian m. carlson" To: Subject: [PATCH 1/2] wrapper: add a helper to generate numbers from a CSPRNG Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:35:41 +0000 Message-Id: <20211116033542.3247094-2-sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.33.1.1089.g2158813163f In-Reply-To: <20211116033542.3247094-1-sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> References: <20211116033542.3247094-1-sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: git@vger.kernel.org There are many situations in which having access to a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) is helpful. In the future, we'll encounter one of these when dealing with temporary files. To make this possible, let's add a function which reads from a system CSPRNG and returns some bytes. Because this is a security sensitive interface, we take some precautions. We either succeed by filling the buffer completely as we requested, or we fail. We don't return partial data because the caller will almost never find that to be a useful behavior. The order of options is also important here. On systems with arc4random, which is most of the BSDs, we use that, since, except on MirBSD, it uses ChaCha20, which is extremely fast, and sits entirely in userspace, avoiding a system call. We then prefer getrandom over getentropy, because the former has been available longer on Linux, and finally, if none of those are available, we use /dev/urandom, because most Unix-like operating systems provide that API. We prefer options that don't involve device files when possible because those work in some restricted environments where device files may not be available. macOS appears to have arc4random but not the arc4random_buf function we want to use, so we let it use the fallback of /dev/urandom. Set the configuration variables appropriately for Linux and the other BSDs. We specifically only consider versions which receive publicly available security support; for example, getrandom(2) and getentropy(3) are only available in FreeBSD 12, which is the oldest version with current security support. For the same reason, we don't specify getrandom(2) on Linux, because CentOS 7 doesn't support it in glibc (although its kernel does) and we don't want to resort to making syscalls. Finally, add a self-test option here to make sure that our buffer handling is correct and we aren't truncating data. We simply read 64 KiB and then make sure we've seen each byte. The probability of this test failing spuriously is less than 10^-100. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson --- Makefile | 25 ++++++++++++ compat/winansi.c | 6 +++ config.mak.uname | 9 +++++ contrib/buildsystems/CMakeLists.txt | 2 +- git-compat-util.h | 16 ++++++++ t/helper/test-csprng.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ t/helper/test-tool.c | 1 + t/helper/test-tool.h | 1 + t/t0000-basic.sh | 4 ++ wrapper.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 182 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 t/helper/test-csprng.c diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 12be39ac49..1d17021f59 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -234,6 +234,14 @@ all:: # Define NO_TRUSTABLE_FILEMODE if your filesystem may claim to support # the executable mode bit, but doesn't really do so. # +# Define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM if your system has arc4random and arc4random_buf. +# +# Define HAVE_GETRANDOM if your system has getrandom. +# +# Define HAVE_GETENTROPY if your system has getentropy. +# +# Define HAVE_RTLGENRANDOM if your system has RtlGenRandom (Windows only). +# # Define NEEDS_MODE_TRANSLATION if your OS strays from the typical file type # bits in mode values (e.g. z/OS defines I_SFMT to 0xFF000000 as opposed to the # usual 0xF000). @@ -694,6 +702,7 @@ TEST_BUILTINS_OBJS += test-bloom.o TEST_BUILTINS_OBJS += test-chmtime.o TEST_BUILTINS_OBJS += test-config.o TEST_BUILTINS_OBJS += test-crontab.o +TEST_BUILTINS_OBJS += test-csprng.o TEST_BUILTINS_OBJS += test-ctype.o TEST_BUILTINS_OBJS += test-date.o TEST_BUILTINS_OBJS += test-delta.o @@ -1900,6 +1909,22 @@ ifdef HAVE_GETDELIM BASIC_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_GETDELIM endif +ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM + BASIC_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_ARC4RANDOM +endif + +ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM + BASIC_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_GETRANDOM +endif + +ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY + BASIC_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_GETENTROPY +endif + +ifdef HAVE_RTLGENRANDOM + BASIC_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_RTLGENRANDOM +endif + ifneq ($(PROCFS_EXECUTABLE_PATH),) procfs_executable_path_SQ = $(subst ','\'',$(PROCFS_EXECUTABLE_PATH)) BASIC_CFLAGS += '-DPROCFS_EXECUTABLE_PATH="$(procfs_executable_path_SQ)"' diff --git a/compat/winansi.c b/compat/winansi.c index c27b20a79d..0e5a9cc82e 100644 --- a/compat/winansi.c +++ b/compat/winansi.c @@ -3,6 +3,12 @@ */ #undef NOGDI + +/* + * Including the appropriate header file for RtlGenRandom causes MSVC to see a + * redefinition of types in an incompatible way when including headers below. + */ +#undef HAVE_RTLGENRANDOM #include "../git-compat-util.h" #include #include diff --git a/config.mak.uname b/config.mak.uname index 3236a4918a..5030d3c70b 100644 --- a/config.mak.uname +++ b/config.mak.uname @@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ ifeq ($(uname_S),FreeBSD) HAVE_PATHS_H = YesPlease HAVE_BSD_SYSCTL = YesPlease HAVE_BSD_KERN_PROC_SYSCTL = YesPlease + HAVE_ARC4RANDOM = YesPlease + HAVE_GETRANDOM = YesPlease + HAVE_GETENTROPY = YesPlease PAGER_ENV = LESS=FRX LV=-c MORE=FRX FREAD_READS_DIRECTORIES = UnfortunatelyYes FILENO_IS_A_MACRO = UnfortunatelyYes @@ -271,6 +274,8 @@ ifeq ($(uname_S),OpenBSD) HAVE_PATHS_H = YesPlease HAVE_BSD_SYSCTL = YesPlease HAVE_BSD_KERN_PROC_SYSCTL = YesPlease + HAVE_ARC4RANDOM = YesPlease + HAVE_GETENTROPY = YesPlease PROCFS_EXECUTABLE_PATH = /proc/curproc/file FREAD_READS_DIRECTORIES = UnfortunatelyYes FILENO_IS_A_MACRO = UnfortunatelyYes @@ -282,6 +287,7 @@ ifeq ($(uname_S),MirBSD) NEEDS_LIBICONV = YesPlease HAVE_PATHS_H = YesPlease HAVE_BSD_SYSCTL = YesPlease + HAVE_ARC4RANDOM = YesPlease endif ifeq ($(uname_S),NetBSD) ifeq ($(shell expr "$(uname_R)" : '[01]\.'),2) @@ -293,6 +299,7 @@ ifeq ($(uname_S),NetBSD) HAVE_PATHS_H = YesPlease HAVE_BSD_SYSCTL = YesPlease HAVE_BSD_KERN_PROC_SYSCTL = YesPlease + HAVE_ARC4RANDOM = YesPlease PROCFS_EXECUTABLE_PATH = /proc/curproc/exe endif ifeq ($(uname_S),AIX) @@ -422,6 +429,7 @@ ifeq ($(uname_S),Windows) NO_STRTOUMAX = YesPlease NO_MKDTEMP = YesPlease NO_INTTYPES_H = YesPlease + HAVE_RTLGENRANDOM = YesPlease # VS2015 with UCRT claims that snprintf and friends are C99 compliant, # so we don't need this: # @@ -624,6 +632,7 @@ ifeq ($(uname_S),MINGW) NO_POSIX_GOODIES = UnfortunatelyYes DEFAULT_HELP_FORMAT = html HAVE_PLATFORM_PROCINFO = YesPlease + HAVE_RTLGENRANDOM = YesPlease BASIC_LDFLAGS += -municode COMPAT_CFLAGS += -DNOGDI -Icompat -Icompat/win32 COMPAT_CFLAGS += -DSTRIP_EXTENSION=\".exe\" diff --git a/contrib/buildsystems/CMakeLists.txt b/contrib/buildsystems/CMakeLists.txt index fd1399c440..134e00bde3 100644 --- a/contrib/buildsystems/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/contrib/buildsystems/CMakeLists.txt @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ if(CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME STREQUAL "Windows") _CONSOLE DETECT_MSYS_TTY STRIP_EXTENSION=".exe" NO_SYMLINK_HEAD UNRELIABLE_FSTAT NOGDI OBJECT_CREATION_MODE=1 __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO=0 USE_NED_ALLOCATOR OVERRIDE_STRDUP MMAP_PREVENTS_DELETE USE_WIN32_MMAP - UNICODE _UNICODE HAVE_WPGMPTR ENSURE_MSYSTEM_IS_SET) + UNICODE _UNICODE HAVE_WPGMPTR ENSURE_MSYSTEM_IS_SET HAVE_RTLGENRANDOM) list(APPEND compat_SOURCES compat/mingw.c compat/winansi.c compat/win32/path-utils.c compat/win32/pthread.c compat/win32mmap.c compat/win32/syslog.c compat/win32/trace2_win32_process_info.c compat/win32/dirent.c diff --git a/git-compat-util.h b/git-compat-util.h index d70ce14286..f2cff656e7 100644 --- a/git-compat-util.h +++ b/git-compat-util.h @@ -165,6 +165,12 @@ #endif #include #define GIT_WINDOWS_NATIVE +#ifdef HAVE_RTLGENRANDOM +/* This is required to get access to RtlGenRandom. */ +#define SystemFunction036 NTAPI SystemFunction036 +#include +#undef SystemFunction036 +#endif #endif #include @@ -235,6 +241,9 @@ #else #include #endif +#ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM +#include +#endif #ifdef NO_INTPTR_T /* * On I16LP32, ILP32 and LP64 "long" is the safe bet, however @@ -1381,4 +1390,11 @@ static inline void *container_of_or_null_offset(void *ptr, size_t offset) void sleep_millisec(int millisec); +/* + * Generate len bytes from the system cryptographically secure PRNG. + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on error, setting errno. The inability to + * satisfy the full request is an error. + */ +int csprng_bytes(void *buf, size_t len); + #endif diff --git a/t/helper/test-csprng.c b/t/helper/test-csprng.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..196c14e44f --- /dev/null +++ b/t/helper/test-csprng.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +#include "test-tool.h" +#include "git-compat-util.h" + +/* + * Check that we read each byte value at least once when reading 64 KiB from the + * CSPRNG. This is not to test the quality of the CSPRNG, but to test our + * buffer handling of it. + * + * The probability of this failing by random is less than 10^-100. + */ +static int selftest(void) +{ + int buckets[256] = { 0 }; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned long count = 64 * 1024; + int i; + + while (count) { + if (csprng_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) { + perror("failed to read"); + return 3; + } + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) + buckets[buf[i]]++; + count -= sizeof(buf); + } + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(buckets); i++) + if (!buckets[i]) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed to find any bytes with value %02x\n", i); + return 4; + } + return 0; +} + +int cmd__csprng(int argc, const char **argv) +{ + unsigned long count; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + + if (argc > 2) { + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [--selftest | ]\n", argv[0]); + return 2; + } + + if (!strcmp(argv[1], "--selftest")) { + return selftest(); + } + + count = (argc == 2) ? strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0) : -1L; + + while (count) { + unsigned long chunk = count < sizeof(buf) ? count : sizeof(buf); + if (csprng_bytes(buf, chunk) < 0) { + perror("failed to read"); + return 5; + } + if (fwrite(buf, chunk, 1, stdout) != chunk) + return 1; + count -= chunk; + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/t/helper/test-tool.c b/t/helper/test-tool.c index 3ce5585e53..fc0fb86c1b 100644 --- a/t/helper/test-tool.c +++ b/t/helper/test-tool.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static struct test_cmd cmds[] = { { "chmtime", cmd__chmtime }, { "config", cmd__config }, { "crontab", cmd__crontab }, + { "csprng", cmd__csprng }, { "ctype", cmd__ctype }, { "date", cmd__date }, { "delta", cmd__delta }, diff --git a/t/helper/test-tool.h b/t/helper/test-tool.h index 9f0f522850..077d9bfcca 100644 --- a/t/helper/test-tool.h +++ b/t/helper/test-tool.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ int cmd__bloom(int argc, const char **argv); int cmd__chmtime(int argc, const char **argv); int cmd__config(int argc, const char **argv); int cmd__crontab(int argc, const char **argv); +int cmd__csprng(int argc, const char **argv); int cmd__ctype(int argc, const char **argv); int cmd__date(int argc, const char **argv); int cmd__delta(int argc, const char **argv); diff --git a/t/t0000-basic.sh b/t/t0000-basic.sh index b007f0efef..9647ec9629 100755 --- a/t/t0000-basic.sh +++ b/t/t0000-basic.sh @@ -1131,4 +1131,8 @@ test_expect_success 'test_must_fail rejects a non-git command with env' ' grep -F "test_must_fail: only '"'"'git'"'"' is allowed" err ' +test_expect_success 'CSPRNG handling functions correctly' ' + test-tool csprng --selftest +' + test_done diff --git a/wrapper.c b/wrapper.c index 36e12119d7..0046f32e46 100644 --- a/wrapper.c +++ b/wrapper.c @@ -702,3 +702,59 @@ int open_nofollow(const char *path, int flags) return open(path, flags); #endif } + +int csprng_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) + arc4random_buf(buf, len); + return 0; +#elif defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) + ssize_t res; + char *p = buf; + while (len) { + res = getrandom(p, len, 0); + if (res < 0) + return -1; + len -= res; + p += res; + } + return 0; +#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) + int res; + char *p = buf; + while (len) { + /* getentropy has a maximum size of 256 bytes. */ + size_t chunk = len < 256 ? len : 256; + res = getentropy(p, chunk); + if (res < 0) + return -1; + len -= chunk; + p += chunk; + } + return 0; +#elif defined(HAVE_RTLGENRANDOM) + if (!RtlGenRandom(buf, len)) + return -1; + return 0; +#else + ssize_t res; + char *p = buf; + int fd, err; + fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + while (len) { + res = xread(fd, p, len); + if (res < 0) { + err = errno; + close(fd); + errno = err; + return -1; + } + len -= res; + p += res; + } + close(fd); + return 0; +#endif +} From patchwork Tue Nov 16 03:35:42 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "brian m. carlson" X-Patchwork-Id: 12621273 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 505CCC433F5 for ; Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:36:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3084360EE2 for ; Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:36:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231137AbhKPDjj (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Nov 2021 22:39:39 -0500 Received: from ring.crustytoothpaste.net ([172.105.110.227]:43242 "EHLO ring.crustytoothpaste.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231418AbhKPDir (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Nov 2021 22:38:47 -0500 Received: from camp.crustytoothpaste.net (unknown [IPv6:2001:470:b056:101:a6ae:7d13:8741:9028]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ring.crustytoothpaste.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0425E5D46A for ; Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:35:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=crustytoothpaste.net; s=default; t=1637033749; bh=2JeXvsnncHOXu0NMBnx+8WStbxyQQ4O7ysUd30OUcV0=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Reply-To:Subject: Date:To:CC:Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:In-Reply-To: References:Content-Type:Content-Disposition; b=nxF4XLEffHXAoeUVxLzC7SiVx3F7qEnm0E1jtjRnnkc5kT9jEa+Bu0eTwhTywFEmr F1xkmHwDxjWKp63oTEr5ErF+1XXic+oONsoeJIcsGgGMeqsNlU00UbVpNvl3Moq3GJ ytCB6mIDAnI1OWKmE+XC22HgbFa42P2XHa/UNbyHZkksouFiVb33T3t54dEtFZfiMs 9/owZYu5Tt+uCZDbcn6bjseyhEshfanTvXCNoVgWuJxTYj3J16FrrC/0icLrdiTs6J Fbov1Mjr235pJjsGifaLhdJZAWw55ttdsn6ZM/PKdIYA+u9PjzNf8VjovmJIv4yc95 UQ3AJArG1L9ThMYV581tPjt4EM6x6WIswBZ+kcRUniiWKz3UgPQu9OEi6JeCM6Bk+b Hq2LPJ5dCIMDfU1iK6Z36JdhG2QqsJs/lLKEVeZpDuKf8pR8jmlGYNz3fkgCqbPnAj cLwsGBvYdg07y+pdRX+NFBxFGJ6h7pl0bDzbUpjialgzXsai5Ra From: "brian m. carlson" To: Subject: [PATCH 2/2] wrapper: use a CSPRNG to generate random file names Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:35:42 +0000 Message-Id: <20211116033542.3247094-3-sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.33.1.1089.g2158813163f In-Reply-To: <20211116033542.3247094-1-sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> References: <20211116033542.3247094-1-sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: git@vger.kernel.org The current way we generate random file names is by taking the seconds and microseconds, plus the PID, and mixing them together, then encoding them. If this fails, we increment the value by 7777, and try again up to TMP_MAX times. Unfortunately, this is not the best idea from a security perspective. If we're writing into TMPDIR, an attacker can guess these values easily and prevent us from creating any temporary files at all by creating them all first. POSIX only requires TMP_MAX to be 25, so this is achievable in some contexts, even if unlikely to occur in practice. Fortunately, we can simply solve this by using the system cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) to generate a random 64-bit value, and use that as before. Note that there is still a small bias here, but because a six-character sequence chosen out of 62 characters provides about 36 bits of entropy, the bias here is less than 2^-28, which is acceptable, especially considering we'll retry several times. Note that the use of a CSPRNG in generating temporary file names is also used in many libcs. glibc recently changed from an approach similar to ours to using a CSPRNG, and FreeBSD and OpenBSD also use a CSPRNG in this case. Even if the likelihood of an attack is low, we should still be at least as responsible in creating temporary files as libc is. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson --- wrapper.c | 15 ++++----------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/wrapper.c b/wrapper.c index 0046f32e46..0cdb5b18ff 100644 --- a/wrapper.c +++ b/wrapper.c @@ -463,8 +463,6 @@ int git_mkstemps_mode(char *pattern, int suffix_len, int mode) static const int num_letters = ARRAY_SIZE(letters) - 1; static const char x_pattern[] = "XXXXXX"; static const int num_x = ARRAY_SIZE(x_pattern) - 1; - uint64_t value; - struct timeval tv; char *filename_template; size_t len; int fd, count; @@ -485,12 +483,13 @@ int git_mkstemps_mode(char *pattern, int suffix_len, int mode) * Replace pattern's XXXXXX characters with randomness. * Try TMP_MAX different filenames. */ - gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); - value = ((uint64_t)tv.tv_usec << 16) ^ tv.tv_sec ^ getpid(); filename_template = &pattern[len - num_x - suffix_len]; for (count = 0; count < TMP_MAX; ++count) { - uint64_t v = value; int i; + uint64_t v; + if (csprng_bytes(&v, sizeof(v)) < 0) + return -1; + /* Fill in the random bits. */ for (i = 0; i < num_x; i++) { filename_template[i] = letters[v % num_letters]; @@ -506,12 +505,6 @@ int git_mkstemps_mode(char *pattern, int suffix_len, int mode) */ if (errno != EEXIST) break; - /* - * This is a random value. It is only necessary that - * the next TMP_MAX values generated by adding 7777 to - * VALUE are different with (module 2^32). - */ - value += 7777; } /* We return the null string if we can't find a unique file name. */ pattern[0] = '\0';