From patchwork Tue Mar 8 11:28:31 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 12773539 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A05FC4332F for ; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232182AbiCHLaU (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Mar 2022 06:30:20 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52346 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1344841AbiCHLaR (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Mar 2022 06:30:17 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3608C37BE8; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 03:29:20 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AA31BB81752; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 22B53C340EC; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1646738957; bh=aNy6hu47F0HY+IsRTnwsy1/gwrBD0sBaHYzkZ0C0zfg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=sWs2atuZwSihcX9Dy7w5encgCdyhpdbOegWQykbW4luZFEKIbFy86FaRrHEBusMEh 0oXAF1kxbHkUygisJQxlslivtXff8+bOoWpn+KlMQHEBqGNCHdxYxCYg7M9p6s3QwP 6Bs7VnLmco7h+VzS7jatw86hXzY5r+Jabjgq9Vm+uZUrMqOs8K/jvizmOXUGI520T5 UHixmt47amntsk5Jgt6T6H3TeAxv7EX1XlCmvX2TRxtiDn8aNXdGPzgMgHUrzpRCIE U6fm/dlXYjLtMFfJBUF1/eePdZnqbXBj69Y/LMRFun9WfVyWrrOhHEmlI3eVc2CaSy iIBCMGnqmnGyw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen , Nathaniel McCallum , Reinette Chatre , Alexander Viro , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: [PATCH RFC v3 1/3] mm: Add f_op->populate() for populating memory outside of core mm Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 13:28:31 +0200 Message-Id: <20220308112833.262805-2-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220308112833.262805-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20220308112833.262805-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org SGX memory is managed outside the core mm. It doesn't have a 'struct page' and get_user_pages() doesn't work on it. Its VMAs are marked with VM_IO. So, none of the existing methods for avoiding page faults work on SGX memory. Add f_op->populate() to overcome this issue: int (*populate)(struct file *, unsigned long start, unsigned long end); Then in populate_vma_page_range(), allow it to be used in the place of get_user_pages() for memory that falls outside of its scope. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v5: * In v4, one diff was left out of staging area in __mm_populate(). It was unintentional to remove the conditional statement. v4: * Reimplement based on Dave's suggestion: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/c3083144-bfc1-3260-164c-e59b2d110df8@intel.com/ * Copy the text from the suggestion as part of the commit message (and cover letter). v3: - if (!ret && do_populate && file->f_op->populate) + if (!ret && do_populate && file->f_op->populate && + !!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))) (reported by Matthew Wilcox) v2: - if (!ret && do_populate) + if (!ret && do_populate && file->f_op->populate) (reported by Jan Harkes) --- include/linux/fs.h | 1 + mm/gup.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index e2d892b201b0..54151af88ee0 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -1993,6 +1993,7 @@ struct file_operations { long (*unlocked_ioctl) (struct file *, unsigned int, unsigned long); long (*compat_ioctl) (struct file *, unsigned int, unsigned long); int (*mmap) (struct file *, struct vm_area_struct *); + int (*populate)(struct file *, unsigned long start, unsigned long end); unsigned long mmap_supported_flags; int (*open) (struct inode *, struct file *); int (*flush) (struct file *, fl_owner_t id); diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index a9d4d724aef7..1f3a1d0b6e0d 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -1519,8 +1519,11 @@ long populate_vma_page_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, * We made sure addr is within a VMA, so the following will * not result in a stack expansion that recurses back here. */ - return __get_user_pages(mm, start, nr_pages, gup_flags, - NULL, NULL, locked); + if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP)) && vma->vm_file->f_op->populate) + return vma->vm_file->f_op->populate(vma->vm_file, start, end); + else + return __get_user_pages(mm, start, nr_pages, gup_flags, + NULL, NULL, locked); } /* @@ -1598,6 +1601,7 @@ int __mm_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long len, int ignore_errors) struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL; int locked = 0; long ret = 0; + bool is_io; end = start + len; @@ -1619,7 +1623,8 @@ int __mm_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long len, int ignore_errors) * range with the first VMA. Also, skip undesirable VMA types. */ nend = min(end, vma->vm_end); - if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP)) + is_io = !!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP)); + if (is_io && !(is_io && vma->vm_file->f_op->populate)) continue; if (nstart < vma->vm_start) nstart = vma->vm_start; From patchwork Tue Mar 8 11:28:32 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 12773540 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6F29C433FE for ; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346408AbiCHLaV (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Mar 2022 06:30:21 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52384 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1346045AbiCHLaT (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Mar 2022 06:30:19 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B81DA37A85; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 03:29:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6FFF6B81868; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C37F2C340EC; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:19 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1646738960; bh=/ZE7KoA/CEZ9Cv7O8oC7vdpXC4AHqtlt9/5UjASb5C4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ioqBWh4cSnOzOuU/9i+dFIwPdadEchN5jfsV5HRU/gWchDvncPXRTmAmSzVJXdw5O RoLFK2P19uEyhLKCfnixFaexLkC+Aydq48DpprBuvJQD4nBAFziEHmpdQSmlr4PIv0 +VtEcq0JXvhDGfSj2qVlfSiZ3vqlTVaTjl2WPyCCtgjkLGzx5bMQoTDpswmK/NcK6d 5AQdd+yq25X0/zaixvd5ZjqiBPm5aDu4We+yervOrsFRD1P18uNk9m2Q5dWmJgJZYf +BpmyvP4E1BewqQdsRwWdJ46umflBSh0rzaNrw7wwvZ6jhmqsXcIkSnTP2KYAn6aLb /4td00AFAKcfw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen , Nathaniel McCallum , Reinette Chatre , Alexander Viro , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: [PATCH RFC v3 2/3] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc() Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 13:28:32 +0200 Message-Id: <20220308112833.262805-3-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220308112833.262805-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20220308112833.262805-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Move sgx_encl_page_alloc() to encl.c and export it so that it can be used in the implementation for MAP_POPULATE, which requires to allocate new enclave pages. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 38 --------------------------------- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index f24a41d3ec70..0256918b2c2f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -913,6 +913,44 @@ int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, return ret; } +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags) +{ + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + unsigned long prot; + + encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!encl_page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; + encl_page->encl = encl; + + prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | + _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); + + /* + * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO + * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided + * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. + */ + if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) + prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + + /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ + encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); + + /* + * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same + * as the maximum protection bits. + */ + encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits; + + return encl_page; +} + /** * sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave * @encl: the enclave diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index 1b6ce1da7c92..3df0d3faf3a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index, void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write); int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm, struct sgx_encl_page *page); +struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, + unsigned long offset, + u64 secinfo_flags); void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr); struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void); unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index d8c3c07badb3..3e3ca27a6f72 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -169,44 +169,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg) return ret; } -static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl, - unsigned long offset, - u64 secinfo_flags) -{ - struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; - unsigned long prot; - - encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!encl_page) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - - encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset; - encl_page->encl = encl; - - prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) | - _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC); - - /* - * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO - * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided - * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions. - */ - if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS) - prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; - - /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */ - encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0); - - /* - * At time of allocation, the runtime protection bits are the same - * as the maximum protection bits. - */ - encl_page->vm_run_prot_bits = encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits; - - return encl_page; -} - static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) { u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK; From patchwork Tue Mar 8 11:28:33 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 12773541 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB0C7C433FE for ; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346510AbiCHLaZ (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Mar 2022 06:30:25 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52456 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1346466AbiCHLaV (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Mar 2022 06:30:21 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6FC2C3A5D1; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 03:29:25 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 23956B81752; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 928A8C340EC; Tue, 8 Mar 2022 11:29:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1646738962; bh=Cgl0qA66PzKkXnlxny3eTwo2XWjpLBhZQNxtn6qkKoU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=VubbAgcJ5C1kTfkMRe5DOVPs3CVCfg5RBHj6uVzV5thQwyrl70oV606uxiFAsxiea YBDSE79E1vqFWdsRxSTTPj5n6v3BmmsbgXT5uccdWArP4L34OGL6S6Gmmg1V7xOPkt byS9Zoc7bJ9Wj4lrQuwQ4XfqdCKK1ERpX0cB3UVTfGxz7k16Xm5gEtDDC2JIdQNt8W BCz70rcPSZ0Kwf/Nk7mm+kOeNmWViJhxHwV5fNYK5V0AHESKLyztFG8Uidv3uZWyn7 Nl8DsM47fYJdtBjIh2G/TtktzsxvgSyYyya+rZrc7STHiBlTYT4PAHkawU6Z0L7+wM JnU6eOwA4GSnQ== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen , Nathaniel McCallum , Reinette Chatre , Alexander Viro , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Jarkko Sakkinen Subject: [PATCH RFC v3 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement EAUG population with MAP_POPULATE Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 13:28:33 +0200 Message-Id: <20220308112833.262805-4-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.35.1 In-Reply-To: <20220308112833.262805-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20220308112833.262805-1-jarkko@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands pre-allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized. SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG] for adding pages to an initialized enclave. Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave with mmap() by populating pages with EAUG. Use f_ops->populate() callback to achieve this behaviour. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 128 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c index aa9b8b868867..848938334e8a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include "driver.h" #include "encl.h" +#include "encls.h" u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask; u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~0x3; @@ -101,6 +102,132 @@ static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) return 0; } +static int sgx_encl_augment_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long offset) +{ + struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo = {0}; + struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page; + struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page; + struct sgx_va_page *va_page; + u64 secinfo_flags; + int ret; + + /* + * Ignore internal permission checking for dynamically added pages. + * They matter only for data added during the pre-initialization phase. + * The enclave decides the permissions by the means of EACCEPT, + * EACCEPTCOPY and EMODPE. + */ + secinfo_flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X; + encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo_flags); + if (IS_ERR(encl_page)) + return PTR_ERR(encl_page); + + epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true); + if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(epc_page); + goto err_alloc_epc_page; + } + + va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl); + if (IS_ERR(va_page)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(va_page); + goto err_grow; + } + + mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + + /* + * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock. Ditto for + * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path. + */ + if (va_page) + list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); + + /* + * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e. + * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited + * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs). + */ + ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc), + encl_page, GFP_KERNEL); + + /* + * If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while + * running without encl->lock + */ + if (ret) + goto err_xa_insert; + + pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page); + pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK; + pginfo.metadata = 0; + + ret = __eaug(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page)); + if (ret) + goto err_eaug; + + encl_page->encl = encl; + encl_page->epc_page = epc_page; + encl_page->type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG; + encl->secs_child_cnt++; + + sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page); + + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + + return 0; + +err_eaug: + xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc)); + +err_xa_insert: + sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page); + mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); + +err_grow: + sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page); + +err_alloc_epc_page: + kfree(encl_page); + + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; +} + +/* + * Add new pages to the enclave sequentially with ENCLS[EAUG]. Note that + * sgx_mmap() validates that the given VMA is within the enclave range. Calling + * here sgx_encl_may_map() second time would too time consuming. + */ +static int sgx_populate(struct file *file, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) +{ + struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data; + unsigned long length = end - start; + unsigned long pos; + int ret; + + /* EAUG works only for initialized enclaves. */ + if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (pos = 0 ; pos < length; pos += PAGE_SIZE) { + if (signal_pending(current)) { + if (!pos) + ret = -ERESTARTSYS; + + break; + } + + if (need_resched()) + cond_resched(); + + ret = sgx_encl_augment_page(encl, start + pos); + if (ret) + break; + } + + return ret; +} + static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, @@ -133,6 +260,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = { .compat_ioctl = sgx_compat_ioctl, #endif .mmap = sgx_mmap, + .populate = sgx_populate, .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area, };