From patchwork Mon Jan 7 22:57:15 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Micah Morton X-Patchwork-Id: 10751277 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E7C471399 for ; Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:57:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3A8A28B01 for ; Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:57:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id C415C28B08; Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:57:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9C8CC28B01 for ; Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:57:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726714AbfAGW56 (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:57:58 -0500 Received: from mail-pf1-f198.google.com ([209.85.210.198]:42760 "EHLO mail-pf1-f198.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726668AbfAGW55 (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:57:57 -0500 Received: by mail-pf1-f198.google.com with SMTP id y88so1260636pfi.9 for ; Mon, 07 Jan 2019 14:57:56 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=NqRM1xmpUKjFQsQQpihoIYwFyEoeEjKN1mlP9zgpuag=; b=Ewy9Fsv5Vz5+OMpdGsPhmHSFxu4OMHwu6rjOT/NnQaRFjNoSDZkVmbEZZaKi/O0O4P xc96hCIPntvqv/dko30H7xbCepEA+jwLHXFLg9W0GEXslvYgFC98aNfItwfShTY34hHc YuEjuVIveVwUOvN8Ygrdy1zfYtoMByXA8pvN4= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=NqRM1xmpUKjFQsQQpihoIYwFyEoeEjKN1mlP9zgpuag=; b=f/6KYihOmSTkg2dDMTYI/8R3ATklE7pw80JrirKA0P+eR+81F9+Fx/rIVYXDZGk+fv t6JdtdK4TtXol/vr5dVLRySpSKPDhrTNeTKHiEX6IcwPCPDE+TtomRd6eQA5jRA+vWQW Rdicv3ZFb7OitB4wIsyhE5wUAuUlIzq2OW5xcIQXk2inpUZEc79937ihknQDDiZQJikE 5ZpjxEeNdm/7PB9fGPx7+CIQcE48H9aIUw7mAXnn5k1NtE31IlqVlegq1reFyO30bcMI vWf6M6Rh1kYz6BptTMo0nYnOahFZ6T+JcmnZ7givH/ZFnsdaFYcgJIuUlQEnQSJta1iO IuOQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukfhW+peiugZ8dIp9ARcCp2o2ZAc3xHva2K8ILI2YEqFIXh3fp/q VG8vRTm+6rmwRDxAp7ifkANkbPopHw4z5Qka X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN5S0wvfGGuz2eK79p7H4iNJ6fJsUGlrUZtfwcQgtA+my82r0awOpW5VkWRu7vv55hTkdn0AkIxtSKF8j718 X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:6ac6:: with SMTP id i6mr23899682plt.81.1546901875668; Mon, 07 Jan 2019 14:57:55 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 14:57:15 -0800 In-Reply-To: Message-Id: <20190107225715.182378-1-mortonm@chromium.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1.97.g81188d93c3-goog Subject: [PATCH v3] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable From: mortonm@chromium.org To: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: Micah Morton Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Micah Morton This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton --- Changes since the last patch: Changed the code to not remove the security_capable_noaudit function. To be clear, I prefer the v2 patch set (that indeed removes the function), since it is straightforward to call security_capable with the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT flag rather than calling security_capable_noaudit (and we don't really save any code churn by keeping the security_capable_noaudit function in). In any event, I'm including this version of the patch for completeness in the event people prefer leaving the function in the code. include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 +++++--- include/linux/security.h | 21 ++++++++++++++------- kernel/capability.c | 17 ++++++++++------- security/apparmor/capability.c | 14 +++++++------- security/apparmor/include/capability.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/ipc.c | 3 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ++-- security/commoncap.c | 17 +++++++++-------- security/security.c | 8 +++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++-------- security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index aaeb7fa24dc4..ef955a44a782 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ * @cred contains the credentials to use. * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in * @cap contains the capability . - * @audit contains whether to write an audit message or not + * @opts contains options for the capable check * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. * @syslog: * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing @@ -1446,8 +1446,10 @@ union security_list_options { const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); - int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit); + int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts); int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*syslog)(int type); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index d170a5b031f3..468cdbf30a23 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -54,9 +54,12 @@ struct xattr; struct xfrm_sec_ctx; struct mm_struct; +/* Default (no) options for the capable function */ +#define SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT 0x0 /* If capable should audit the security request */ -#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0 -#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1 +#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0x01 +/* If capable is being called by a setid function */ +#define SECURITY_CAP_INSETID 0x02 /* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */ #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1 @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ enum lsm_event { /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit); + int cap, unsigned int opts); extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz); extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); @@ -233,8 +236,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap); +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts); int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); @@ -492,9 +497,11 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new, } static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) { - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, opts); } static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 1e1c0236f55b..e697579ade8c 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, int ret; rcu_read_lock(); - ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); @@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } -static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) { int capable; @@ -372,8 +374,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) BUG(); } - capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) : - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap); + capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts); if (capable == 0) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return true; @@ -394,7 +395,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) */ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true); + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); @@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); */ bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false); + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); @@ -448,10 +449,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) return false; - if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) + if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0) return true; return false; @@ -500,6 +502,7 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) { int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */ const struct cred *cred; + rcu_read_lock(); cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred); if (cred) diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 253ef6e9d445..0f6dca54b66e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) * @cap: capability to test if allowed - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) * * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM */ -static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, - struct common_audit_data *sa) +static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, + unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa) { int error; @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, else error = -EPERM; - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { + if (opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) return error; /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it @@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, * aa_capable - test permission to use capability * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability to be tested - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated * * Look up capability in profile capability set. * * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code. */ -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) sa.u.cap = cap; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_capable(profile, cap, audit, &sa)); + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa)); return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h index e0304e2aeb7f..1b3663b6ab12 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct aa_caps { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[]; -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit); +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts); static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 527ea1557120..4a1da2313162 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; aad(sa)->peer = tracee; aad(sa)->request = 0; - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1); + aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 42446a216f3b..0bd817084fc1 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, } static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit) + int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit); + error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts); aa_put_label(label); return error; diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 232db019f051..3d8609192e17 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, - int cap, int audit) + int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; @@ -222,12 +222,11 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, */ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { - /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, - CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) + CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0) return 0; return 1; } @@ -1208,8 +1207,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ || (cap_capable(current_cred(), - current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ + current_cred()->user_ns, + CAP_SETPCAP, + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) != 0) /*[4]*/ /* * [1] no changing of bits that are locked * [2] no unlocking of locks @@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int cap_sys_admin = 0; - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; + return cap_sys_admin; } @@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ if (ret == 0) current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d670136dda2c..050351cec339 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -294,10 +294,12 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap) +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) { - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); } int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a67459eb62d5..a4b2e49213de 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, - int cap, int audit, bool initns) + int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct av_decision avd; @@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) { + if (!(opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT)) { int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); if (rc2) @@ -2316,9 +2316,9 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit) + int cap, unsigned int opts) { - return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns); + return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns); } static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) @@ -3245,11 +3245,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT; + unsigned int opts = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT; - if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit)) + if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts)) return false; - if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true)) + if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true)) return false; return true; } @@ -3649,7 +3649,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case KDSKBENT: case KDSKBSENT: error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true); + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT, true); break; /* default case assumes that the command will go diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 9a4c0ad46518..fac2a21aa7d4 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred) struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; int rc; - rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); if (rc) return false;