From patchwork Fri Aug 19 15:39:22 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 12948890 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D55B2C32774 for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 15:40:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1349872AbiHSPj7 (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Aug 2022 11:39:59 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36324 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1349506AbiHSPjv (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Aug 2022 11:39:51 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C398565E5; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 08:39:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7189FB8280F; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 15:39:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CD584C4314B; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 15:39:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1660923588; bh=ADw06pRCuPZeTUd/Uq+mdKxMJyGKpyXRKWJnc9JYbVQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=GObXdGItgM49Vv4iy/DHgcbZGw0WwMWQdLdayWxyiCuT+akEZOMkmlnab6U4FUD3X qakePs4Bcn4dsM3GualuVlIHuFHskTCXt1NxRIobF1kwJ2pIrdQd5s1ZqxQiy9wY7c CcM6nBx/bpFz0WiMRfqGhRbgippJfbOBWsalV79o= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Michal Suchanek , Coiby Xu , Mimi Zohar Subject: [PATCH 5.19 6/7] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2022 17:39:22 +0200 Message-Id: <20220819153711.785888674@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.2 In-Reply-To: <20220819153711.552247994@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220819153711.552247994@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Coiby Xu commit c903dae8941deb55043ee46ded29e84e97cd84bb upstream. commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify") adds platform keyring support on x86 kexec but not arm64. The code in bzImage64_verify_sig uses the keys on the .builtin_trusted_keys, .machine, if configured and enabled, .secondary_trusted_keys, also if configured, and .platform keyrings to verify the signed kernel image as PE file. Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 20 +------------------- include/linux/kexec.h | 7 +++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -528,28 +527,11 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loade return 0; } -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG -static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) -{ - int ret; - - ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); - if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) { - ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); - } - return ret; -} -#endif - const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops = { .probe = bzImage64_probe, .load = bzImage64_load, .cleanup = bzImage64_cleanup, #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - .verify_sig = bzImage64_verify_sig, + .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig, #endif }; --- a/include/linux/kexec.h +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include +#include /* Location of a reserved region to hold the crash kernel. */ @@ -212,6 +213,12 @@ static inline void *arch_kexec_kernel_im } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION +int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len); +#endif +#endif + extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf); int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf); --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struc } #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION +int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) +{ + int ret; + + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); + if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) { + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); + } + return ret; +} +#endif + static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len) { From patchwork Fri Aug 19 15:39:23 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Patchwork-Id: 12948891 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8323C32771 for ; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 15:40:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1349882AbiHSPkB (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Aug 2022 11:40:01 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36384 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1349862AbiHSPjz (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Aug 2022 11:39:55 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 097EFD5981; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 08:39:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B3D33B8280F; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 15:39:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 05DD3C433C1; Fri, 19 Aug 2022 15:39:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1660923591; bh=q01TiepYCgbd3YDF3Teq86Su7fa1NExU5eO/8Pw2Xpc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=X+dEgBBtmB7vhjo6RS6FqZ+Eojdbk9m/Dqt2/HbxYNf35l+rLuTmI2Lv0ksFWswxB O5Z2BxWA5E53k5cbW70k5OmQY+Y8exw4B43RdncEIqglaHsfMJSXNO7+vZh3nvIY1T GuufNQZ1CyfSQfyEA5eYZ8TQSonvhbYDrO8ndxvg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Baoquan He , kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Michal Suchanek , Will Deacon , Coiby Xu , Mimi Zohar Subject: [PATCH 5.19 7/7] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2022 17:39:23 +0200 Message-Id: <20220819153711.815836041@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.2 In-Reply-To: <20220819153711.552247994@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220819153711.552247994@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Coiby Xu commit 0d519cadf75184a24313568e7f489a7fc9b1be3b upstream. Currently, when loading a kernel image via the kexec_file_load() system call, arm64 can only use the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring to verify a signature whereas x86 can use three more keyrings i.e. .secondary_trusted_keys, .machine and .platform keyrings. For example, one resulting problem is kexec'ing a kernel image would be rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7". This patch set enables arm64 to make use of the same keyrings as x86 to verify the signature kexec'ed kernel image. Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 105e10e2cf1c: kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 34d5960af253: kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 83b7bb2d49ae: kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Acked-by: Baoquan He Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +---------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *i return NULL; } -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG -static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) -{ - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); -} -#endif - const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = { .probe = image_probe, .load = image_load, #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - .verify_sig = image_verify_sig, + .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig, #endif };