From patchwork Fri Oct 28 22:45:34 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13024376 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F298FA3746 for ; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:48:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230178AbiJ1Wr6 (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:58 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54850 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229910AbiJ1Wrw (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:52 -0400 Received: from sin.source.kernel.org (sin.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:40e1:4800::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BF3CA1DE3EC; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:47:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by sin.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 96F1ECE2E9D; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 852E9C433C1; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1666997265; bh=VW5aZRk1huDTCtbCmGpJGoCeXgBsbnpg155mA0KV1kQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=NJVR/go3W3ypambxplTwMR8r3kzYCni6zocP1INmAZjYGixr6dL3t+Qr8Qp5FJ1Bl LflDOmWA5YjF+qr5w5oRGI8BzPlEflKtekKOWZn7JBXcYqkfF3k3ledDocHMCPZxxg DB1GEXpQMN+o3AjoORXxxk5EKsY+MBHdfF0FDLbcc6YCfxV7v3XiwhIRSIbqCJQptt f5e1ZBufyv+WX+gXPUU3SiqIgqMkvRfqoCqu9rBO2IHlU03PxplUXVPDDP83CnMCXs Qp9reaRQVs5CawVjuCbtltER+X3tvyT3KXgKuHCnoY1JhPSuzZHxnzBuMn6X+gbXAn YCdezFaDTNljQ== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 1/6] fsverity: support verification with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:45:34 -0700 Message-Id: <20221028224539.171818-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.0 In-Reply-To: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Add support for verifying data from verity files whose Merkle tree block size is less than the page size. The main use case for this is to allow a single Merkle tree block size to be used across all systems, so that only one set of fsverity file digests and signatures is needed. To do this, eliminate various assumptions that the Merkle tree block size and the page size are the same: - Make fsverity_verify_page() a wrapper around a new function fsverity_verify_blocks() which verifies one or more blocks in a page. - When a Merkle tree block is needed, get the corresponding page and only verify and use the needed portion. (The Merkle tree continues to be read and cached in page-sized chunks; that doesn't need to change.) - When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, use a bitmap fsverity_info::hash_block_verified to keep track of which Merkle tree blocks have been verified, as PageChecked cannot be used directly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 49 ++-- fs/verity/enable.c | 4 +- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 15 +- fs/verity/hash_algs.c | 24 +- fs/verity/open.c | 93 +++++-- fs/verity/verify.c | 325 +++++++++++++++++-------- include/linux/fsverity.h | 11 +- 7 files changed, 355 insertions(+), 166 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst index cb8e7573882a1..70da93595058a 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst @@ -571,47 +571,44 @@ For filesystems using Linux's pagecache, the ``->read_folio()`` and are marked Uptodate. Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be insufficient, since ``->read_iter()`` is not used for memory maps. -Therefore, fs/verity/ provides a function fsverity_verify_page() which -verifies a page that has been read into the pagecache of a verity -inode, but is still locked and not Uptodate, so it's not yet readable -by userspace. As needed to do the verification, -fsverity_verify_page() will call back into the filesystem to read -Merkle tree pages via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page(). - -fsverity_verify_page() returns false if verification failed; in this +Therefore, fs/verity/ provides the function fsverity_verify_blocks() +which verifies data that has been read into the pagecache of a verity +inode. The containing page must still be locked and not Uptodate, so +it's not yet readable by userspace. As needed to do the verification, +fsverity_verify_blocks() will call back into the filesystem to read +hash blocks via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page(). + +fsverity_verify_blocks() returns false if verification failed; in this case, the filesystem must not set the page Uptodate. Following this, as per the usual Linux pagecache behavior, attempts by userspace to read() from the part of the file containing the page will fail with EIO, and accesses to the page within a memory map will raise SIGBUS. -fsverity_verify_page() currently only supports the case where the -Merkle tree block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes). - -In principle, fsverity_verify_page() verifies the entire path in the -Merkle tree from the data page to the root hash. However, for -efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore, -fsverity_verify_page() only ascends the tree reading hash pages until -an already-verified hash page is seen, as indicated by the PageChecked -bit being set. It then verifies the path to that page. +In principle, verifying a data block requires verifying the entire +path in the Merkle tree from the data block to the root hash. +However, for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash blocks. +Therefore, fsverity_verify_blocks() only ascends the tree reading hash +blocks until an already-verified hash block is seen. It then verifies +the path to that block. This optimization, which is also used by dm-verity, results in excellent sequential read performance. This is because usually (e.g. -127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash page from the +127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash block from the bottom level of the tree will already be cached and checked from -reading a previous data page. However, random reads perform worse. +reading a previous data block. However, random reads perform worse. Block device based filesystems ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Block device based filesystems (e.g. ext4 and f2fs) in Linux also use the pagecache, so the above subsection applies too. However, they -also usually read many pages from a file at once, grouped into a +also usually read many data blocks from a file at once, grouped into a structure called a "bio". To make it easier for these types of filesystems to support fs-verity, fs/verity/ also provides a function -fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all pages in a bio. +fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all data blocks in a bio. ext4 and f2fs also support encryption. If a verity file is also -encrypted, the pages must be decrypted before being verified. To +encrypted, the data must be decrypted before being verified. To support this, these filesystems allocate a "post-read context" for each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``:: @@ -630,10 +627,10 @@ verification. Finally, pages where no decryption or verity error occurred are marked Uptodate, and the pages are unlocked. On many filesystems, files can contain holes. Normally, -``->readahead()`` simply zeroes holes and sets the corresponding pages -Uptodate; no bios are issued. To prevent this case from bypassing -fs-verity, these filesystems use fsverity_verify_page() to verify hole -pages. +``->readahead()`` simply zeroes hole blocks and considers the +corresponding data to be up-to-date; no bios are issued. To prevent +this case from bypassing fs-verity, filesystems use +fsverity_verify_blocks() to verify hole blocks. Filesystems also disable direct I/O on verity files, since otherwise direct I/O would bypass fs-verity. diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c index df6b499bf6a14..5eb2f1c5a7a57 100644 --- a/fs/verity/enable.c +++ b/fs/verity/enable.c @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ static int build_merkle_tree_level(struct file *filp, unsigned int level, } } - err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, src_page, - &pending_hashes[pending_size]); + err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, req, src_page, 0, + &pending_hashes[pending_size]); put_page(src_page); if (err) return err; diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h index dbe1ce5b450a8..f9fe1e7e2ba1e 100644 --- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h @@ -41,17 +41,19 @@ struct merkle_tree_params { unsigned int digest_size; /* same as hash_alg->digest_size */ unsigned int block_size; /* size of data and tree blocks */ unsigned int hashes_per_block; /* number of hashes per tree block */ + unsigned int blocks_per_page; /* PAGE_SIZE / block_size */ unsigned int log_blocksize; /* log2(block_size) */ unsigned int log_arity; /* log2(hashes_per_block) */ + unsigned int log_blocks_per_page; /* log2(blocks_per_page) */ unsigned int num_levels; /* number of levels in Merkle tree */ u64 tree_size; /* Merkle tree size in bytes */ - unsigned long level0_blocks; /* number of blocks in tree level 0 */ + unsigned long tree_pages; /* Merkle tree size in pages */ /* * Starting block index for each tree level, ordered from leaf level (0) * to root level ('num_levels - 1') */ - u64 level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; + unsigned long level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; }; /* @@ -68,9 +70,10 @@ struct fsverity_info { u8 root_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; u8 file_digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; const struct inode *inode; + unsigned long *hash_block_verified; + spinlock_t hash_page_init_lock; }; - #define FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE (FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE - \ sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor)) @@ -86,9 +89,9 @@ void fsverity_free_hash_request(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg, struct ahash_request *req); const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg, const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size); -int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, - const struct inode *inode, - struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out); +int fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, + const struct inode *inode, struct ahash_request *req, + struct page *page, unsigned int offset, u8 *out); int fsverity_hash_buffer(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg, const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out); void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void); diff --git a/fs/verity/hash_algs.c b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c index 71d0fccb6d4c4..4ac9c1b46ab6f 100644 --- a/fs/verity/hash_algs.c +++ b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c @@ -218,35 +218,33 @@ const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg, } /** - * fsverity_hash_page() - hash a single data or hash page + * fsverity_hash_block() - hash a single data or hash block * @params: the Merkle tree's parameters * @inode: inode for which the hashing is being done * @req: preallocated hash request - * @page: the page to hash + * @page: the page containing the block to hash + * @offset: the offset of the block within @page * @out: output digest, size 'params->digest_size' bytes * - * Hash a single data or hash block, assuming block_size == PAGE_SIZE. - * The hash is salted if a salt is specified in the Merkle tree parameters. + * Hash a single data or hash block. The hash is salted if a salt is specified + * in the Merkle tree parameters. * * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure */ -int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, - const struct inode *inode, - struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out) +int fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, + const struct inode *inode, struct ahash_request *req, + struct page *page, unsigned int offset, u8 *out) { struct scatterlist sg; DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); int err; - if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE)) - return -EINVAL; - sg_init_table(&sg, 1); - sg_set_page(&sg, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0); + sg_set_page(&sg, page, params->block_size, offset); ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, crypto_req_done, &wait); - ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, PAGE_SIZE); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, params->block_size); if (params->hashstate) { err = crypto_ahash_import(req, params->hashstate); @@ -262,7 +260,7 @@ int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait); if (err) - fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing page hash", err); + fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing block hash", err); return err; } diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c index 81ff94442f7b4..68cf031b93ab6 100644 --- a/fs/verity/open.c +++ b/fs/verity/open.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "fsverity_private.h" +#include #include static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep; @@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg; int err; u64 blocks; + u64 blocks_in_level[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; u64 offset; int level; @@ -54,7 +56,23 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, goto out_err; } - if (log_blocksize != PAGE_SHIFT) { + /* + * fs/verity/ directly assumes that the Merkle tree block size is a + * power of 2 less than or equal to PAGE_SIZE. Another restriction + * arises from the interaction between fs/verity/ and the filesystems + * themselves: filesystems expect to be able to verify a single + * filesystem block of data at a time. Therefore, the Merkle tree block + * size must also be less than or equal to the filesystem block size. + * + * The above are the only hard limitations, so in theory the Merkle tree + * block size could be as small as twice the digest size. However, + * that's not useful, and it would result in some unusually deep and + * large Merkle trees. So we currently require that the Merkle tree + * block size be at least 1024 bytes. That's small enough to test the + * sub-page block case on systems with 4K pages, but not too small. + */ + if (log_blocksize < 10 || log_blocksize > PAGE_SHIFT || + log_blocksize > inode->i_blkbits) { fsverity_warn(inode, "Unsupported log_blocksize: %u", log_blocksize); err = -EINVAL; @@ -62,6 +80,8 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, } params->log_blocksize = log_blocksize; params->block_size = 1 << log_blocksize; + params->log_blocks_per_page = PAGE_SHIFT - log_blocksize; + params->blocks_per_page = 1 << params->log_blocks_per_page; if (WARN_ON(!is_power_of_2(params->digest_size))) { err = -EINVAL; @@ -77,9 +97,9 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, params->log_arity = params->log_blocksize - ilog2(params->digest_size); params->hashes_per_block = 1 << params->log_arity; - pr_debug("Merkle tree uses %s with %u-byte blocks (%u hashes/block), salt=%*phN\n", + pr_debug("Merkle tree uses %s with %u-byte blocks (%u hashes/block, %u blocks/page), salt=%*phN\n", hash_alg->name, params->block_size, params->hashes_per_block, - (int)salt_size, salt); + params->blocks_per_page, (int)salt_size, salt); /* * Compute the number of levels in the Merkle tree and create a map from @@ -94,27 +114,44 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, while (blocks > 1) { if (params->num_levels >= FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS) { fsverity_err(inode, "Too many levels in Merkle tree"); - err = -EINVAL; + err = -EFBIG; goto out_err; } blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >> params->log_arity; - /* temporarily using level_start[] to store blocks in level */ - params->level_start[params->num_levels++] = blocks; + blocks_in_level[params->num_levels++] = blocks; } - params->level0_blocks = params->level_start[0]; /* Compute the starting block of each level */ offset = 0; for (level = (int)params->num_levels - 1; level >= 0; level--) { - blocks = params->level_start[level]; params->level_start[level] = offset; pr_debug("Level %d is %llu blocks starting at index %llu\n", - level, blocks, offset); - offset += blocks; + level, blocks_in_level[level], offset); + offset += blocks_in_level[level]; + } + + /* + * With block_size != PAGE_SIZE, an in-memory bitmap will need to be + * allocated to track the "verified" status of hash blocks. Don't allow + * this bitmap to get too large. For now, limit it to 1 MiB, which + * limits the file size to about 4.4 TB with SHA-256 and 4K blocks. + * + * Together with the fact that the data, and thus also the Merkle tree, + * cannot have more than ULONG_MAX pages, this implies that hash block + * indices can always fit in an 'unsigned long'. But to be safe, we + * explicitly check for that too. Note, this is only for hash block + * indices; data block indices might not fit in an 'unsigned long'. + */ + if ((params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE && offset > 1 << 23) || + offset > ULONG_MAX) { + fsverity_err(inode, "Too many blocks in Merkle tree"); + err = -EFBIG; + goto out_err; } params->tree_size = offset << log_blocksize; + params->tree_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(params->tree_size) >> PAGE_SHIFT; return 0; out_err: @@ -165,7 +202,7 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d initializing Merkle tree parameters", err); - goto out; + goto fail; } memcpy(vi->root_hash, desc->root_hash, vi->tree_params.digest_size); @@ -174,7 +211,7 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, vi->file_digest); if (err) { fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing file digest", err); - goto out; + goto fail; } pr_debug("Computed file digest: %s:%*phN\n", vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, @@ -182,12 +219,35 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, err = fsverity_verify_signature(vi, desc->signature, le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size)); -out: - if (err) { - fsverity_free_info(vi); - vi = ERR_PTR(err); + if (err) + goto fail; + + if (vi->tree_params.block_size != PAGE_SIZE) { + /* + * When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use + * a bitmap to keep track of which hash blocks have been + * verified. This bitmap must contain one bit per hash block, + * including alignment to a page boundary at the end. + */ + unsigned long num_bits = + vi->tree_params.tree_pages << + vi->tree_params.log_blocks_per_page; + + vi->hash_block_verified = kvmalloc_array( + BITS_TO_LONGS(num_bits), sizeof(unsigned long), + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!vi->hash_block_verified) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + spin_lock_init(&vi->hash_page_init_lock); } + return vi; + +fail: + fsverity_free_info(vi); + return ERR_PTR(err); } void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi) @@ -214,6 +274,7 @@ void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi) if (!vi) return; kfree(vi->tree_params.hashstate); + kvfree(vi->hash_block_verified); kmem_cache_free(fsverity_info_cachep, vi); } diff --git a/fs/verity/verify.c b/fs/verity/verify.c index 961ba248021f9..e4534b49380be 100644 --- a/fs/verity/verify.c +++ b/fs/verity/verify.c @@ -13,32 +13,6 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue; -/** - * hash_at_level() - compute the location of the block's hash at the given level - * - * @params: (in) the Merkle tree parameters - * @dindex: (in) the index of the data block being verified - * @level: (in) the level of hash we want (0 is leaf level) - * @hindex: (out) the index of the hash block containing the wanted hash - * @hoffset: (out) the byte offset to the wanted hash within the hash block - */ -static void hash_at_level(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, - pgoff_t dindex, unsigned int level, pgoff_t *hindex, - unsigned int *hoffset) -{ - pgoff_t position; - - /* Offset of the hash within the level's region, in hashes */ - position = dindex >> (level * params->log_arity); - - /* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */ - *hindex = params->level_start[level] + (position >> params->log_arity); - - /* Offset of the wanted hash (in bytes) within the hash block */ - *hoffset = (position & ((1 << params->log_arity) - 1)) << - (params->log_blocksize - params->log_arity); -} - static inline int cmp_hashes(const struct fsverity_info *vi, const u8 *want_hash, const u8 *real_hash, pgoff_t index, int level) @@ -56,152 +30,308 @@ static inline int cmp_hashes(const struct fsverity_info *vi, return -EBADMSG; } +static bool data_is_zeroed(struct inode *inode, struct page *page, + unsigned int len, unsigned int offset) +{ + void *virt = kmap_local_page(page); + + if (memchr_inv(virt + offset, 0, len)) { + kunmap_local(virt); + fsverity_err(inode, "FILE CORRUPTED! Data past EOF is not zeroed"); + return false; + } + kunmap_local(virt); + return true; +} + /* - * Verify a single data page against the file's Merkle tree. + * Returns true if the hash block with index @hblock_idx in the tree, located in + * @hpage, has already been verified. + */ +static bool hash_block_verified(struct fsverity_info *vi, struct page *hpage, + unsigned long hblock_idx) +{ + bool verified; + unsigned int blocks_per_page; + unsigned int i; + + /* + * When the Merkle tree block size and page size are the same, then the + * ->hash_block_verified bitmap isn't allocated, and we use PG_checked + * to directly indicate whether the page's block has been verified. + * + * Using PG_checked also guarantees that we re-verify hash pages that + * get evicted and re-instantiated from the backing storage, as new + * pages always start out with PG_checked cleared. + */ + if (!vi->hash_block_verified) + return PageChecked(hpage); + + /* + * When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use a bitmap + * to indicate whether each hash block has been verified. + * + * However, we still need to ensure that hash pages that get evicted and + * re-instantiated from the backing storage are re-verified. To do + * this, we use PG_checked again, but now it doesn't really mean + * "checked". Instead, now it just serves as an indicator for whether + * the hash page is newly instantiated or not. + * + * The first thread that sees PG_checked=0 must clear the corresponding + * bitmap bits, then set PG_checked=1. This requires a spinlock. To + * avoid having to take this spinlock in the common case of + * PG_checked=1, we start with an opportunistic lockless read. + */ + if (PageChecked(hpage)) { + /* + * A read memory barrier is needed here to give ACQUIRE + * semantics to the above PageChecked() test. + */ + smp_rmb(); + return test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified); + } + spin_lock(&vi->hash_page_init_lock); + if (PageChecked(hpage)) { + verified = test_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified); + } else { + blocks_per_page = vi->tree_params.blocks_per_page; + hblock_idx = round_down(hblock_idx, blocks_per_page); + for (i = 0; i < blocks_per_page; i++) + clear_bit(hblock_idx + i, vi->hash_block_verified); + /* + * A write memory barrier is needed here to give RELEASE + * semantics to the below SetPageChecked() operation. + */ + smp_wmb(); + SetPageChecked(hpage); + verified = false; + } + spin_unlock(&vi->hash_page_init_lock); + return verified; +} + +/* + * Verify a single data block against the Merkle tree. * * In principle, we need to verify the entire path to the root node. However, - * for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore we need - * only ascend the tree until an already-verified page is seen, as indicated by - * the PageChecked bit being set; then verify the path to that page. + * for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash blocks. Therefore we need + * only ascend the tree until an already-verified hash block is seen, and then + * verify the path to that block. * - * This code currently only supports the case where the verity block size is - * equal to PAGE_SIZE. Doing otherwise would be possible but tricky, since we - * wouldn't be able to use the PageChecked bit. - * - * Note that multiple processes may race to verify a hash page and mark it - * Checked, but it doesn't matter; the result will be the same either way. - * - * Return: true if the page is valid, else false. + * Return: %true if the data block is valid, else %false. */ -static bool verify_page(struct inode *inode, const struct fsverity_info *vi, - struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page, - unsigned long level0_ra_pages) +static bool +verify_data_block(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi, + struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page, + unsigned int dblock_offset_in_page, + unsigned long max_ra_pages) { const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params; const unsigned int hsize = params->digest_size; - const pgoff_t index = data_page->index; + const u64 dblock_pos = ((u64)data_page->index << PAGE_SHIFT) + + dblock_offset_in_page; + const u64 dblock_idx = dblock_pos >> params->log_blocksize; int level; u8 _want_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; const u8 *want_hash; u8 real_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct page *hpages[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; - unsigned int hoffsets[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; + /* The hash blocks that are traversed, indexed by level */ + struct { + /* Page containing the hash block */ + struct page *page; + /* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */ + unsigned long index; + /* Byte offset of the hash block within @page */ + unsigned int offset_in_page; + /* Byte offset of the wanted hash within @page */ + unsigned int hoffset; + } hblocks[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; int err; - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(data_page) || PageUptodate(data_page))) - return false; - - pr_debug_ratelimited("Verifying data page %lu...\n", index); + if (unlikely(dblock_pos >= inode->i_size)) { + /* + * This can happen in the data page spanning EOF when the Merkle + * tree block size is less than the page size. The Merkle tree + * doesn't cover data blocks fully past EOF. But the entire + * page spanning EOF can be visible to userspace via a mmap, and + * any part past EOF should be all zeroes. Therefore, we need + * to verify that any data blocks fully past EOF are all zeroes. + */ + return data_is_zeroed(inode, data_page, params->block_size, + dblock_offset_in_page); + } /* - * Starting at the leaf level, ascend the tree saving hash pages along - * the way until we find a verified hash page, indicated by PageChecked; - * or until we reach the root. + * Starting at the leaf level, ascend the tree saving hash blocks along + * the way until we find a hash block that has already been verified, or + * until we reach the root. */ for (level = 0; level < params->num_levels; level++) { - pgoff_t hindex; + u64 hidx; + unsigned long hblock_idx; + pgoff_t hpage_idx; + unsigned int hblock_offset_in_page; unsigned int hoffset; struct page *hpage; - hash_at_level(params, index, level, &hindex, &hoffset); + /* Offset of the hash within the level's region, in hashes */ + hidx = dblock_idx >> (level * params->log_arity); + + /* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */ + hblock_idx = params->level_start[level] + + (hidx >> params->log_arity); + + /* Index of the hash page in the tree overall */ + hpage_idx = hblock_idx >> params->log_blocks_per_page; + + /* Byte offset of the hash block within the page */ + hblock_offset_in_page = + (hblock_idx & (params->blocks_per_page - 1)) << + params->log_blocksize; + + /* Byte offset of the hash within the page */ + hoffset = hblock_offset_in_page + + ((hidx & (params->hashes_per_block - 1)) << + (params->log_blocksize - params->log_arity)); - pr_debug_ratelimited("Level %d: hindex=%lu, hoffset=%u\n", - level, hindex, hoffset); + pr_debug_ratelimited("Level %d: hpage_idx=%lu, hoffset=%u\n", + level, hpage_idx, hoffset); - hpage = inode->i_sb->s_vop->read_merkle_tree_page(inode, hindex, - level == 0 ? level0_ra_pages : 0); + hpage = inode->i_sb->s_vop->read_merkle_tree_page(inode, + hpage_idx, level == 0 ? min(max_ra_pages, + params->tree_pages - hpage_idx) : 0); if (IS_ERR(hpage)) { err = PTR_ERR(hpage); fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d reading Merkle tree page %lu", - err, hindex); + err, hpage_idx); goto out; } - - if (PageChecked(hpage)) { + if (hash_block_verified(vi, hpage, hblock_idx)) { memcpy_from_page(_want_hash, hpage, hoffset, hsize); want_hash = _want_hash; put_page(hpage); - pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page already checked, want %s:%*phN\n", + pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash block already verified, want %s:%*phN\n", params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash); goto descend; } - pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page not yet checked\n"); - hpages[level] = hpage; - hoffsets[level] = hoffset; + pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash block not yet verified\n"); + hblocks[level].page = hpage; + hblocks[level].index = hblock_idx; + hblocks[level].offset_in_page = hblock_offset_in_page; + hblocks[level].hoffset = hoffset; } want_hash = vi->root_hash; pr_debug("Want root hash: %s:%*phN\n", params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash); descend: - /* Descend the tree verifying hash pages */ + /* Descend the tree verifying hash blocks. */ for (; level > 0; level--) { - struct page *hpage = hpages[level - 1]; - unsigned int hoffset = hoffsets[level - 1]; - - err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, hpage, real_hash); + struct page *hpage = hblocks[level - 1].page; + unsigned long hblock_idx = hblocks[level - 1].index; + unsigned int hblock_offset_in_page = + hblocks[level - 1].offset_in_page; + unsigned int hoffset = hblocks[level - 1].hoffset; + + err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, req, hpage, + hblock_offset_in_page, real_hash); if (err) goto out; - err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, index, level - 1); + err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, data_page->index, + level - 1); if (err) goto out; - SetPageChecked(hpage); + /* + * Mark the hash block as verified. This must be atomic and + * idempotent, as the same hash block might be verified by + * multiple threads concurrently. + */ + if (vi->hash_block_verified) + set_bit(hblock_idx, vi->hash_block_verified); + else + SetPageChecked(hpage); memcpy_from_page(_want_hash, hpage, hoffset, hsize); want_hash = _want_hash; put_page(hpage); - pr_debug("Verified hash page at level %d, now want %s:%*phN\n", + pr_debug("Verified hash block at level %d, now want %s:%*phN\n", level - 1, params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash); } - /* Finally, verify the data page */ - err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, data_page, real_hash); + /* Finally, verify the data block. */ + err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, req, data_page, + dblock_offset_in_page, real_hash); if (err) goto out; - err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, index, -1); + err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, data_page->index, -1); out: for (; level > 0; level--) - put_page(hpages[level - 1]); + put_page(hblocks[level - 1].page); return err == 0; } +static bool +verify_data_blocks(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi, + struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page, + unsigned int len, unsigned int offset, + unsigned long max_ra_pages) +{ + const unsigned int block_size = vi->tree_params.block_size; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offset, block_size))) + return false; + + do { + if (!verify_data_block(inode, vi, req, data_page, offset, + max_ra_pages)) + return false; + offset += block_size; + len -= block_size; + } while (len); + return true; +} + /** - * fsverity_verify_page() - verify a data page - * @page: the page to verity + * fsverity_verify_blocks() - verify data in a page + * @page: the page containing the data to verify + * @len: the length of the data to verify in the page + * @offset: the offset of the data to verify in the page * - * Verify a page that has just been read from a verity file. The page must be a - * pagecache page that is still locked and not yet uptodate. + * Verify data that has just been read from a verity file. The data must be + * located in a pagecache page that is still locked and not yet uptodate. The + * length and offset of the data must be Merkle tree block size aligned. * - * Return: true if the page is valid, else false. + * Return: %true if the data is valid, else %false. */ -bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page) +bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offset) { struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host; - const struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info; + struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info; struct ahash_request *req; bool valid; /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, GFP_NOFS); - valid = verify_page(inode, vi, req, page, 0); + valid = verify_data_blocks(inode, vi, req, page, len, offset, 0); fsverity_free_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, req); return valid; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_page); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_blocks); #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK /** * fsverity_verify_bio() - verify a 'read' bio that has just completed * @bio: the bio to verify * - * Verify a set of pages that have just been read from a verity file. The pages - * must be pagecache pages that are still locked and not yet uptodate. If a - * page fails verification, then bio->bi_status is set to an error status. + * Verify the bio's data against the file's Merkle tree. All bio data segments + * must be aligned to the file's Merkle tree block size. If any data fails + * verification, then bio->bi_status is set to an error status. * * This is a helper function for use by the ->readahead() method of filesystems * that issue bios to read data directly into the page cache. Filesystems that @@ -212,15 +342,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_page); void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio) { struct inode *inode = bio_first_page_all(bio)->mapping->host; - const struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info; - const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params; + struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info; struct ahash_request *req; struct bio_vec *bv; struct bvec_iter_all iter_all; unsigned long max_ra_pages = 0; /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ - req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(params->hash_alg, GFP_NOFS); + req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, GFP_NOFS); if (bio->bi_opf & REQ_RAHEAD) { /* @@ -232,24 +361,18 @@ void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio) * This improves sequential read performance, as it greatly * reduces the number of I/O requests made to the Merkle tree. */ - bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) - max_ra_pages++; - max_ra_pages /= 4; + max_ra_pages = bio->bi_iter.bi_size >> (PAGE_SHIFT + 2); } bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) { - struct page *page = bv->bv_page; - unsigned long level0_index = page->index >> params->log_arity; - unsigned long level0_ra_pages = - min(max_ra_pages, params->level0_blocks - level0_index); - - if (!verify_page(inode, vi, req, page, level0_ra_pages)) { + if (!verify_data_blocks(inode, vi, req, bv->bv_page, bv->bv_len, + bv->bv_offset, max_ra_pages)) { bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR; break; } } - fsverity_free_hash_request(params->hash_alg, req); + fsverity_free_hash_request(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, req); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_bio); #endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */ diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h index 40f14e5fed9de..4583ea089abde 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h @@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg); /* verify.c */ -bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page); +bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offset); void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio); void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work); @@ -218,7 +219,8 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, /* verify.c */ -static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page) +static inline bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len, + unsigned int offset) { WARN_ON(1); return false; @@ -236,6 +238,11 @@ static inline void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work) #endif /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY */ +static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page) +{ + return fsverity_verify_blocks(page, PAGE_SIZE, 0); +} + /** * fsverity_active() - do reads from the inode need to go through fs-verity? * @inode: inode to check From patchwork Fri Oct 28 22:45:35 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13024375 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38512FA374B for ; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230165AbiJ1Wr5 (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:57 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54834 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230063AbiJ1Wru (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:50 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 313E81D5577; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:47:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5B195B82CF7; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D6067C433B5; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1666997266; bh=dJGMEBZvXfrxKJhTn/rgkA4g++Q/5P+YzBK/5zdwN3k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=p3XIXAPZJZBSD9HswYfHAQrVD9ahA4Y2ogpcufpijOz5QfbCoW1wLRfaz7P4LCaL9 LG0yCTtdf7r5Q3XtmckEKCl1ypZbahib8m35UQ0FdroDjHLz4rw8+scw6QAhwZbN5d gUYSpYal6Uc5+ZQDxu6kWzhVPu2eEn/kTdznK6CUMH5oSaLohBZIYq+uBFHo3y3uCt H3UnGzzlNa92wZDf3C0EU8bukjvDZDUziMQgp21UVm6E3rNf8n/jCo5XOxLUYnzDJW 6lbNAVZl6K0/ReJGIfqcem2RAWBTaoqLjvKeAn16VB+adiQCc+f6wiVG8lV99kTbXE ZAkTxVa29eSdw== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 2/6] fsverity: support enabling with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:45:35 -0700 Message-Id: <20221028224539.171818-3-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.0 In-Reply-To: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Make FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY support values of fsverity_enable_arg::block_size other than PAGE_SIZE. To make this possible, rework build_merkle_tree(), which was reading data and hash pages from the file and assuming that they were the same thing as "blocks". For reading the data blocks, just replace the direct pagecache access with __kernel_read(), to naturally read one block at a time. (A disadvantage of the above is that we lose the two optimizations of hashing the pagecache pages in-place and forcing the maximum readahead. That shouldn't be very important, though.) The hash block reads are a bit more difficult to handle, as the only way to do them is through fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page(). Instead, let's switch to the single-pass tree construction algorithm that fsverity-utils uses. This eliminates the need to read back any hash blocks while the tree is being built, at the small cost of an extra block-sized memory buffer per Merkle tree level. Taken together, the above two changes result in page-size independent code that is also a bit simpler than what we had before. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 21 +- fs/verity/enable.c | 268 ++++++++++++------------- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 2 +- fs/verity/hash_algs.c | 24 ++- fs/verity/open.c | 8 +- include/linux/fsverity.h | 3 +- 6 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 166 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst index 70da93595058a..4c202e0dee102 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst @@ -118,10 +118,11 @@ as follows: - ``hash_algorithm`` must be the identifier for the hash algorithm to use for the Merkle tree, such as FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256. See ``include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h`` for the list of possible values. -- ``block_size`` must be the Merkle tree block size. Currently, this - must be equal to the system page size, which is usually 4096 bytes. - Other sizes may be supported in the future. This value is not - necessarily the same as the filesystem block size. +- ``block_size`` is the Merkle tree block size, in bytes. In Linux + v6.2 and later, this can be any power of 2 between (inclusively) + 1024 and the minimum of the system page size and the filesystem + block size. In earlier versions, the system page size was the only + allowed value. - ``salt_size`` is the size of the salt in bytes, or 0 if no salt is provided. The salt is a value that is prepended to every hashed block; it can be used to personalize the hashing for a particular @@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: - ``EBUSY``: this ioctl is already running on the file - ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled - ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory +- ``EFBIG``: the file is too large to enable verity on - ``EINTR``: the operation was interrupted by a fatal signal - ``EINVAL``: unsupported version, hash algorithm, or block size; or reserved bits are set; or the file descriptor refers to neither a @@ -518,9 +520,7 @@ support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data. -Currently, ext4 verity only supports the case where the Merkle tree -block size, filesystem block size, and page size are all the same. It -also only supports extent-based files. +ext4 only allows verity on extent-based files. f2fs ---- @@ -538,11 +538,10 @@ Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. See explanation for ext4 above. Moreover, f2fs supports at most 4096 bytes of xattr entries per inode -which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block. +which usually wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block. -Currently, f2fs verity only supports a Merkle tree block size of 4096. -Also, f2fs doesn't support enabling verity on files that currently -have atomic or volatile writes pending. +f2fs doesn't support enabling verity on files that currently have +atomic or volatile writes pending. btrfs ----- diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c index 5eb2f1c5a7a57..51adda7f0080d 100644 --- a/fs/verity/enable.c +++ b/fs/verity/enable.c @@ -7,135 +7,36 @@ #include "fsverity_private.h" -#include -#include #include #include #include #include -/* - * Read a file data page for Merkle tree construction. Do aggressive readahead, - * since we're sequentially reading the entire file. - */ -static struct page *read_file_data_page(struct file *file, pgoff_t index, - struct file_ra_state *ra, - unsigned long remaining_pages) -{ - DEFINE_READAHEAD(ractl, file, ra, file->f_mapping, index); - struct folio *folio; - - folio = __filemap_get_folio(ractl.mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED, 0); - if (!folio || !folio_test_uptodate(folio)) { - if (folio) - folio_put(folio); - else - page_cache_sync_ra(&ractl, remaining_pages); - folio = read_cache_folio(ractl.mapping, index, NULL, file); - if (IS_ERR(folio)) - return &folio->page; - } - if (folio_test_readahead(folio)) - page_cache_async_ra(&ractl, folio, remaining_pages); - return folio_file_page(folio, index); -} +struct block_buffer { + u32 filled; + u8 *data; +}; -static int build_merkle_tree_level(struct file *filp, unsigned int level, - u64 num_blocks_to_hash, - const struct merkle_tree_params *params, - u8 *pending_hashes, - struct ahash_request *req) +/* Hash a block, writing the result to the next level's pending block buffer. */ +static int hash_one_block(struct inode *inode, + const struct merkle_tree_params *params, + struct ahash_request *req, struct block_buffer *cur) { - struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); - const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop; - struct file_ra_state ra = { 0 }; - unsigned int pending_size = 0; - u64 dst_block_num; - u64 i; + struct block_buffer *next = cur + 1; int err; - if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE)) /* checked earlier too */ - return -EINVAL; - - if (level < params->num_levels) { - dst_block_num = params->level_start[level]; - } else { - if (WARN_ON(num_blocks_to_hash != 1)) - return -EINVAL; - dst_block_num = 0; /* unused */ - } - - file_ra_state_init(&ra, filp->f_mapping); - - for (i = 0; i < num_blocks_to_hash; i++) { - struct page *src_page; - - if ((pgoff_t)i % 10000 == 0 || i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash) - pr_debug("Hashing block %llu of %llu for level %u\n", - i + 1, num_blocks_to_hash, level); - - if (level == 0) { - /* Leaf: hashing a data block */ - src_page = read_file_data_page(filp, i, &ra, - num_blocks_to_hash - i); - if (IS_ERR(src_page)) { - err = PTR_ERR(src_page); - fsverity_err(inode, - "Error %d reading data page %llu", - err, i); - return err; - } - } else { - unsigned long num_ra_pages = - min_t(unsigned long, num_blocks_to_hash - i, - inode->i_sb->s_bdi->io_pages); - - /* Non-leaf: hashing hash block from level below */ - src_page = vops->read_merkle_tree_page(inode, - params->level_start[level - 1] + i, - num_ra_pages); - if (IS_ERR(src_page)) { - err = PTR_ERR(src_page); - fsverity_err(inode, - "Error %d reading Merkle tree page %llu", - err, params->level_start[level - 1] + i); - return err; - } - } - - err = fsverity_hash_block(params, inode, req, src_page, 0, - &pending_hashes[pending_size]); - put_page(src_page); - if (err) - return err; - pending_size += params->digest_size; + /* Zero-pad the block if it's shorter than the block size. */ + memset(&cur->data[cur->filled], 0, params->block_size - cur->filled); - if (level == params->num_levels) /* Root hash? */ - return 0; - - if (pending_size + params->digest_size > params->block_size || - i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash) { - /* Flush the pending hash block */ - memset(&pending_hashes[pending_size], 0, - params->block_size - pending_size); - err = vops->write_merkle_tree_block(inode, - pending_hashes, - dst_block_num, - params->log_blocksize); - if (err) { - fsverity_err(inode, - "Error %d writing Merkle tree block %llu", - err, dst_block_num); - return err; - } - dst_block_num++; - pending_size = 0; - } - - if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) - return -EINTR; - cond_resched(); + err = fsverity_hash_buffer(params->hashstate, req, + cur->data, params->block_size, + &next->data[next->filled]); + if (err) { + fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing block hash", err); + return err; } + next->filled += params->digest_size; + cur->filled = 0; return 0; } @@ -152,13 +53,18 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp, u8 *root_hash) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp); - u8 *pending_hashes; + const u64 data_size = inode->i_size; + const int num_levels = params->num_levels; + const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop; struct ahash_request *req; - u64 blocks; - unsigned int level; - int err = -ENOMEM; + struct block_buffer _buffers[1 + FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS + 1] = {}; + struct block_buffer *buffers = &_buffers[1]; + unsigned long level_offset[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; + int level; + u64 offset; + int err; - if (inode->i_size == 0) { + if (data_size == 0) { /* Empty file is a special case; root hash is all 0's */ memset(root_hash, 0, params->digest_size); return 0; @@ -167,29 +73,111 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp, /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(params->hash_alg, GFP_KERNEL); - pending_hashes = kmalloc(params->block_size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!pending_hashes) - goto out; - /* - * Build each level of the Merkle tree, starting at the leaf level - * (level 0) and ascending to the root node (level 'num_levels - 1'). - * Then at the end (level 'num_levels'), calculate the root hash. + * Allocate the block buffers. Buffer "-1" is for data blocks. + * Buffers 0 <= level < num_levels are for the actual tree levels. + * Buffer 'num_levels' is for the root hash. */ - blocks = ((u64)inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >> - params->log_blocksize; - for (level = 0; level <= params->num_levels; level++) { - err = build_merkle_tree_level(filp, level, blocks, params, - pending_hashes, req); + for (level = -1; level < num_levels; level++) { + buffers[level].data = kzalloc(params->block_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buffers[level].data) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + } + buffers[num_levels].data = root_hash; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(level_offset) != sizeof(params->level_start)); + memcpy(level_offset, params->level_start, sizeof(level_offset)); + + /* Hash each data block, also hashing the tree blocks as they fill up */ + for (offset = 0; offset < data_size; offset += params->block_size) { + u64 dblock_idx = offset >> params->log_blocksize; + ssize_t bytes_read; + loff_t pos = offset; + + if ((unsigned long)dblock_idx % 10000 == 0) { + pr_debug("Hashing data block %llu of %llu\n", + dblock_idx, + (data_size + params->block_size - 1) >> + params->log_blocksize); + } + + buffers[-1].filled = min_t(u64, params->block_size, + data_size - offset); + bytes_read = __kernel_read(filp, buffers[-1].data, + buffers[-1].filled, &pos); + if (bytes_read < 0) { + err = bytes_read; + fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d reading file data", err); + goto out; + } + if (bytes_read != buffers[-1].filled) { + err = -EINVAL; + fsverity_err(inode, "Short read of file data"); + goto out; + } + err = hash_one_block(inode, params, req, &buffers[-1]); if (err) goto out; - blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >> - params->log_arity; + for (level = 0; level < num_levels; level++) { + if (buffers[level].filled + + params->digest_size <= params->block_size) { + /* Level's next hash block isn't full yet */ + break; + } + /* Level's next hash block is full */ + + err = hash_one_block(inode, params, req, + &buffers[level]); + if (err) + goto out; + err = vops->write_merkle_tree_block(inode, + buffers[level].data, + level_offset[level], + params->log_blocksize); + if (err) { + fsverity_err(inode, + "Error %d writing Merkle tree block %lu", + err, level_offset[level]); + goto out; + } + level_offset[level]++; + } + if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) { + err = -EINTR; + goto out; + } + cond_resched(); + } + /* Finish all nonempty pending tree blocks. */ + for (level = 0; level < num_levels; level++) { + if (buffers[level].filled != 0) { + err = hash_one_block(inode, params, req, + &buffers[level]); + if (err) + goto out; + err = vops->write_merkle_tree_block(inode, + buffers[level].data, + level_offset[level], + params->log_blocksize); + if (err) { + fsverity_err(inode, + "Error %d writing Merkle tree block %lu", + err, level_offset[level]); + goto out; + } + } + } + /* The root hash was filled by the last call to hash_one_block(). */ + if (WARN_ON(buffers[num_levels].filled != params->digest_size)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; } - memcpy(root_hash, pending_hashes, params->digest_size); err = 0; out: - kfree(pending_hashes); + for (level = -1; level < num_levels; level++) + kfree(buffers[level].data); fsverity_free_hash_request(params->hash_alg, req); return err; } @@ -352,7 +340,7 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg) memchr_inv(arg.__reserved2, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved2))) return -EINVAL; - if (arg.block_size != PAGE_SIZE) + if (!is_power_of_2(arg.block_size)) return -EINVAL; if (arg.salt_size > sizeof_field(struct fsverity_descriptor, salt)) diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h index f9fe1e7e2ba1e..d8b0eafb35fc9 100644 --- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg, int fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, const struct inode *inode, struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, unsigned int offset, u8 *out); -int fsverity_hash_buffer(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg, +int fsverity_hash_buffer(const u8 *initial_state, struct ahash_request *req, const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out); void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void); diff --git a/fs/verity/hash_algs.c b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c index 4ac9c1b46ab6f..0bb57f9dbd41c 100644 --- a/fs/verity/hash_algs.c +++ b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c @@ -266,37 +266,39 @@ int fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params, /** * fsverity_hash_buffer() - hash some data - * @alg: the hash algorithm to use + * @initial_state: optional salted initial hash state + * @req: preallocated hash request * @data: the data to hash * @size: size of data to hash, in bytes * @out: output digest, size 'alg->digest_size' bytes * * Hash some data which is located in physically contiguous memory (i.e. memory - * allocated by kmalloc(), not by vmalloc()). No salt is used. + * allocated by kmalloc(), not by vmalloc()). * * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure */ -int fsverity_hash_buffer(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg, +int fsverity_hash_buffer(const u8 *initial_state, struct ahash_request *req, const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out) { - struct ahash_request *req; struct scatterlist sg; DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); int err; - /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ - req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(alg, GFP_KERNEL); - sg_init_one(&sg, data, size); ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, crypto_req_done, &wait); ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, size); - err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait); - - fsverity_free_hash_request(alg, req); - return err; + if (initial_state) { + err = crypto_ahash_import(req, initial_state); + if (err) + return err; + err = crypto_ahash_finup(req); + } else { + err = crypto_ahash_digest(req); + } + return crypto_wait_req(err, &wait); } void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void) diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c index 68cf031b93ab6..d367bd91fe586 100644 --- a/fs/verity/open.c +++ b/fs/verity/open.c @@ -168,13 +168,19 @@ static int compute_file_digest(struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg, struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, u8 *file_digest) { + struct ahash_request *req; __le32 sig_size = desc->sig_size; int err; + /* This allocation never fails, since it's mempool-backed. */ + req = fsverity_alloc_hash_request(hash_alg, GFP_KERNEL); + desc->sig_size = 0; - err = fsverity_hash_buffer(hash_alg, desc, sizeof(*desc), file_digest); + err = fsverity_hash_buffer(NULL, req, desc, sizeof(*desc), file_digest); desc->sig_size = sig_size; + fsverity_free_hash_request(hash_alg, req); + return err; } diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h index 4583ea089abde..093fe7ab454ef 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h @@ -93,8 +93,7 @@ struct fsverity_operations { * isn't already cached. Implementations may ignore this * argument; it's only a performance optimization. * - * This can be called at any time on an open verity file, as well as - * between ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity(). It may be + * This can be called at any time on an open verity file. It may be * called by multiple processes concurrently, even with the same page. * * Note that this must retrieve a *page*, not necessarily a *block*. From patchwork Fri Oct 28 22:45:36 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13024370 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9ECEFA3743 for ; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230000AbiJ1Wrt (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:49 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54804 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229501AbiJ1Wrs (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:48 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 618DB199F45; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:47:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E53F062A9A; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2D9EEC43470; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1666997266; bh=bqK81I/T6k3G4i3s/QXoplbiUG5b/2q9qN47fUeLeWQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=iw9YE3wb75BUEOFeFHw5T2uj6gkdp+UdqpvS6EZgDy36esM9mRbr6PCr9iHEOp1yy EcNOS70sj+GbP1Coa89lWAZsPe7RubuqyUm37SNUfCiQtTCwaw1OTs493O4AxwlW2u 7ANrvU1NFT3nO6/TiQDMlRZ4EtiZvNfLBI8rIT6y4ADKJRJycR3DKWLtD+Ongrpes3 vBXcQMu8t5B/k5SHqyr3KxngyzSBzqhOk7Sb2qAh6CJf5ua1uVSxp8i8nE4Ea/UEuI XLWPs0uSmdY6a8BxGO5Iz6XFwo+5VkXnIUEhpwOIfy3TzZUvmM4cASyjOIPh+3navN UIT4TNd6qrKUw== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 3/6] ext4: simplify ext4_readpage_limit() Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:45:36 -0700 Message-Id: <20221028224539.171818-4-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.0 In-Reply-To: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Now that the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY has changed to not involve reading back Merkle tree blocks that were previously written, there is no need for ext4_readpage_limit() to allow for this case. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/ext4/readpage.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/readpage.c b/fs/ext4/readpage.c index e604ea4e102b7..babaa7160c556 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/readpage.c +++ b/fs/ext4/readpage.c @@ -211,8 +211,7 @@ static void ext4_set_bio_post_read_ctx(struct bio *bio, static inline loff_t ext4_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && - (IS_VERITY(inode) || ext4_verity_in_progress(inode))) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode)) return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes; return i_size_read(inode); From patchwork Fri Oct 28 22:45:37 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13024371 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD4E6C38A02 for ; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230054AbiJ1Wru (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:50 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54810 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229865AbiJ1Wrs (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:48 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C44C1D5577; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:47:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3A2DC62AC6; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7725FC433D7; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1666997266; bh=dww3jMfExZYI3+AnfNuHM0Y6uGBj2gMQ2ravFPSVqjs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=XvQn1NDObN19qBWP3mpa0+u7/7HbCKclZoicti51G4EhI/VjutqKu+W47r8aGnNDw VDqucnU2mmifjxOuLM2wv0ULHhvgSlms4ObUrd8vh3Jjm35sjjAAHNkB2r3C3qCbtE G2xzbnmMENq7BBcIoRGVMt63yKk17oVh2qjg3WdCmDOL/0LZdiA60vOgIwW0+6aFXf orx4F00eJOfjTvxThWGV8s3AHFP9LWU+fb/8nSFNqvQBSOnAQC19XhOcpZu1DWR2nG 1H3hFoyxW4yU2rZ3nt1ydZeVw0hxS5sBLTBF21BGyc028/DvyfyxFYtRXh68HF2kFX yvnJXTm2z2zwA== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 4/6] f2fs: simplify f2fs_readpage_limit() Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:45:37 -0700 Message-Id: <20221028224539.171818-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.0 In-Reply-To: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Now that the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY has changed to not involve reading back Merkle tree blocks that were previously written, there is no need for f2fs_readpage_limit() to allow for this case. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/f2fs/data.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c index b72c893b5374f..1b507fa183957 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c @@ -2043,8 +2043,7 @@ int f2fs_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, static inline loff_t f2fs_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && - (IS_VERITY(inode) || f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode))) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode)) return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes; return i_size_read(inode); From patchwork Fri Oct 28 22:45:38 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13024372 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C8FBFA374D for ; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230099AbiJ1Wrw (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:52 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54816 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229910AbiJ1Wrs (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:48 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E99331DE3EC; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:47:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 859D162AC8; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C1B18C4347C; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1666997266; bh=TIPDTx2LUw4vx8E38rt9OO0EAC7WyDogJc0vLXFp3gY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=prnT5TA3ENz77NTNdV+c9bCieHMI/QrZSKTizjWQ916UJ5X+s6Hlh7fbZl1PMmUgL QkTU8Z3btWM3HLzOSZUqqqdDaXKhHD0o5Nd1YZJ2npy4WCgiK8CAcBkqej4hle22sH 44SNdI2+T0ES5EaHJpEqv6+BoLJ57ZeFnNegqpzzb98VrADluq9B6Ri5kihaeVwaV+ 9/CuWdrJARI/nCuTkX8vmeL4XFs3c7/1I4KxtxKFOCPGQvjzR0b2s08P8TdYnePpMC dQ5Z5aX/75R806VvVd0wU4GyDfweo1mAQ+zFAordRj1+Ca/upMrLi8CCY0yaNIEB0j Cgr3K4lrGKwFA== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fs/buffer.c: support fsverity in block_read_full_folio() Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:45:38 -0700 Message-Id: <20221028224539.171818-6-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.0 In-Reply-To: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers After each filesystem block (as represented by a buffer_head) has been read from disk by block_read_full_folio(), verify it if needed. The verification is done on the fsverity_read_workqueue. Also allow reads of verity metadata past i_size, as required by ext4. This is needed to support fsverity on ext4 filesystems where the filesystem block size is less than the page size. The new code is compiled away when CONFIG_FS_VERITY=n. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/buffer.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c index d9c6d1fbb6dde..bea0f63031129 100644 --- a/fs/buffer.c +++ b/fs/buffer.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "internal.h" @@ -295,20 +296,51 @@ static void end_buffer_async_read(struct buffer_head *bh, int uptodate) return; } -struct decrypt_bh_ctx { +struct postprocess_bh_ctx { struct work_struct work; struct buffer_head *bh; }; +static void verify_bh(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx = + container_of(work, struct postprocess_bh_ctx, work); + struct buffer_head *bh = ctx->bh; + bool valid; + + valid = fsverity_verify_blocks(bh->b_page, bh->b_size, bh_offset(bh)); + end_buffer_async_read(bh, valid); + kfree(ctx); +} + +static bool need_fsverity(struct buffer_head *bh) +{ + struct inode *inode = bh->b_page->mapping->host; + + return fsverity_active(inode) && + /* needed by ext4 */ + bh->b_page->index < DIV_ROUND_UP(inode->i_size, PAGE_SIZE); +} + static void decrypt_bh(struct work_struct *work) { - struct decrypt_bh_ctx *ctx = - container_of(work, struct decrypt_bh_ctx, work); + struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx = + container_of(work, struct postprocess_bh_ctx, work); struct buffer_head *bh = ctx->bh; int err; err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(bh->b_page, bh->b_size, bh_offset(bh)); + if (err == 0 && need_fsverity(bh)) { + /* + * We use different work queues for decryption and for verity + * because verity may require reading metadata pages that need + * decryption, and we shouldn't recurse to the same workqueue. + */ + INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, verify_bh); + fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(&ctx->work); + return; + } end_buffer_async_read(bh, err == 0); kfree(ctx); } @@ -319,15 +351,24 @@ static void decrypt_bh(struct work_struct *work) */ static void end_buffer_async_read_io(struct buffer_head *bh, int uptodate) { - /* Decrypt if needed */ - if (uptodate && - fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(bh->b_page->mapping->host)) { - struct decrypt_bh_ctx *ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_ATOMIC); + struct inode *inode = bh->b_page->mapping->host; + bool decrypt = fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(inode); + bool verify = need_fsverity(bh); + + /* Decrypt (with fscrypt) and/or verify (with fsverity) if needed. */ + if (uptodate && (decrypt || verify)) { + struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx = + kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_ATOMIC); if (ctx) { - INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, decrypt_bh); ctx->bh = bh; - fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(&ctx->work); + if (decrypt) { + INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, decrypt_bh); + fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(&ctx->work); + } else { + INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, verify_bh); + fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(&ctx->work); + } return; } uptodate = 0; @@ -2245,6 +2286,11 @@ int block_read_full_folio(struct folio *folio, get_block_t *get_block) int nr, i; int fully_mapped = 1; bool page_error = false; + loff_t limit = i_size_read(inode); + + /* This is needed for ext4. */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode)) + limit = inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes; VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_test_large(folio), folio); @@ -2253,7 +2299,7 @@ int block_read_full_folio(struct folio *folio, get_block_t *get_block) bbits = block_size_bits(blocksize); iblock = (sector_t)folio->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - bbits); - lblock = (i_size_read(inode)+blocksize-1) >> bbits; + lblock = (limit+blocksize-1) >> bbits; bh = head; nr = 0; i = 0; From patchwork Fri Oct 28 22:45:39 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13024374 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 159ADFA3747 for ; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230122AbiJ1Wrx (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:53 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54818 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229993AbiJ1Wrt (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:47:49 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3CD231E1975; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:47:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CD66A62ACA; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 172DFC43140; Fri, 28 Oct 2022 22:47:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1666997267; bh=TLSDtgBK8VwfTvMigEag46MpMj/1E/6Gz70hTRHuF58=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=nL7PsiwDTtGmgJRb1Ml4ZRkAUzl+Hn3bfm/T0QY0nf+V+2s6Lx9cwZRmeec8RdnnT zwd9cZifwQnY0jQBYPGOoJHmnWUnRfYM/nr+n56j5/lB3wpWBX+o/1Taw+KkU9c+Ae MFdnQQBtHyumLYjJl/7OltHD/Cmg5KDUk4pvinxrIgG1dTwRVti2uT5mS1wsOH8/co f4is+iamKC+Lg6cGTQYgM52bmWLhNBlJza7rslc/b6yY45Yh8KV8fXTMk4j/+aiYCA uUKGlXNMteCmwTJijTox6n6z8DHJQymzTS6D/zt2pucmwZZ8GgV1NtTy+RamhQoJ2X 91SGzr7N3zDHQ== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 6/6] ext4: allow verity with fs block size < PAGE_SIZE Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:45:39 -0700 Message-Id: <20221028224539.171818-7-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.0 In-Reply-To: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20221028224539.171818-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Now that the needed changes have been made to fs/buffer.c, ext4 is ready to support the verity feature when the filesystem block size is less than the page size. So remove the mount-time check that prevented this. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 8 +++++--- fs/ext4/super.c | 5 ----- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst index 4c202e0dee102..46c344eb41635 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst @@ -497,9 +497,11 @@ To create verity files on an ext4 filesystem, the filesystem must have been formatted with ``-O verity`` or had ``tune2fs -O verity`` run on it. "verity" is an RO_COMPAT filesystem feature, so once set, old kernels will only be able to mount the filesystem readonly, and old -versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem. Moreover, -currently ext4 only supports mounting a filesystem with the "verity" -feature when its block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes). +versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem. + +Originally, an ext4 filesystem with the "verity" feature could only be +mounted when its block size was equal to the system page size +(typically 4096 bytes). In Linux v6.2, this limitation was removed. ext4 sets the EXT4_VERITY_FL on-disk inode flag on verity files. It can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be cleared. diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 989365b878a67..3e6037a744585 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5339,11 +5339,6 @@ static int __ext4_fill_super(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb) } } - if (ext4_has_feature_verity(sb) && sb->s_blocksize != PAGE_SIZE) { - ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported blocksize for fs-verity"); - goto failed_mount_wq; - } - /* * Get the # of file system overhead blocks from the * superblock if present.