From patchwork Wed Mar 8 19:36:42 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13166343 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63E25C7618A for ; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229904AbjCHTjm (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Mar 2023 14:39:42 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36710 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229747AbjCHTjk (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Mar 2023 14:39:40 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1898524CB9; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:39:39 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CDEECB81133; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 43E51C4339B; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1678304376; bh=7dr9+DjhjafLBUoTUZ0wTXvTwv6zLvDMtQOWv5BZ7AE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=qzDnR7DtfGVr+41MGbk5kRmsxP9YrUOju1pjAJRJlwkjJaK9Nr/V7r/qjiLS2Jkqi WfEeuT2Lat8AfMPGd0VlyJ7o2NdFhkA9UZQ2wecZuG8I/bAPedgC9DzCSdd/ymmmet kKw0tcIFnWlScxJOft5PA7PmedMemCl3jWybyLEUiZIwWRdRHaXqXohXC7Wi2LExGE CqJKLPH6QAWn180Hn4/0PkxRB0ZokCz+nnRzqEHwZYo6OULl76+rxZVUv+z3sXcxwY 8AtGlQY2WMw2GksV4HPMZRRtJAP3jM9ZUHKBrUmGiwayC88Jvz/dZNSQOVZn8a4ZYl /NBp0SVmeINCQ== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Nathan Huckleberry , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:36:42 -0800 Message-Id: <20230308193645.114069-2-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Once all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call blk_crypto_evict_key(). However, the block layer currently doesn't call blk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens after upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has completed. This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key() can see 'slot_refs != 0' without there being an actual bug. This makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the 'WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)' and return without doing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). (This is a very rare bug and has only been seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.) There are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before bio_endio() is called on the request's last bio, or make __blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs. Let's go with the first solution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via WARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use. Fixes: a892c8d52c02 ("block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Nathan Huckleberry Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig --- block/blk-crypto-internal.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- block/blk-crypto.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ block/blk-merge.c | 2 ++ block/blk-mq.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-internal.h b/block/blk-crypto-internal.h index a8cdaf26851e..4f1de2495f0c 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-internal.h +++ b/block/blk-crypto-internal.h @@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(struct request *rq) return rq->crypt_ctx; } +static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(struct request *rq) +{ + return rq->crypt_keyslot; +} + blk_status_t blk_crypto_get_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, struct blk_crypto_keyslot **slot_ptr); @@ -119,6 +124,11 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(struct request *rq) return false; } +static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(struct request *rq) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ void __bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes); @@ -153,14 +163,21 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr) return true; } -blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq); -static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq) +blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq); +static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq) { if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq)) - return __blk_crypto_init_request(rq); + return __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); return BLK_STS_OK; } +void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq); +static inline void blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq) +{ + if (blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(rq)) + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq); +} + void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq); static inline void blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) { @@ -199,7 +216,7 @@ static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request(struct request *rq) { if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq)) - return blk_crypto_init_request(rq); + return blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); return BLK_STS_OK; } diff --git a/block/blk-crypto.c b/block/blk-crypto.c index 45378586151f..d0c7feb447e9 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto.c @@ -224,27 +224,27 @@ static bool bio_crypt_check_alignment(struct bio *bio) return true; } -blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq) +blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq) { return blk_crypto_get_keyslot(rq->q->crypto_profile, rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key, &rq->crypt_keyslot); } -/** - * __blk_crypto_free_request - Uninitialize the crypto fields of a request. - * - * @rq: The request whose crypto fields to uninitialize. - * - * Completely uninitializes the crypto fields of a request. If a keyslot has - * been programmed into some inline encryption hardware, that keyslot is - * released. The rq->crypt_ctx is also freed. - */ -void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) +void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq) { blk_crypto_put_keyslot(rq->crypt_keyslot); + rq->crypt_keyslot = NULL; +} + +void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) +{ + /* The keyslot, if one was needed, should have been released earlier. */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->crypt_keyslot)) + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq); + mempool_free(rq->crypt_ctx, bio_crypt_ctx_pool); - blk_crypto_rq_set_defaults(rq); + rq->crypt_ctx = NULL; } /** diff --git a/block/blk-merge.c b/block/blk-merge.c index 6460abdb2426..65e75efa9bd3 100644 --- a/block/blk-merge.c +++ b/block/blk-merge.c @@ -867,6 +867,8 @@ static struct request *attempt_merge(struct request_queue *q, if (!blk_discard_mergable(req)) elv_merge_requests(q, req, next); + blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(next); + /* * 'next' is going away, so update stats accordingly */ diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c index d0cb2ef18fe2..49825538d932 100644 --- a/block/blk-mq.c +++ b/block/blk-mq.c @@ -840,6 +840,12 @@ static void blk_complete_request(struct request *req) req->q->integrity.profile->complete_fn(req, total_bytes); #endif + /* + * Upper layers may call blk_crypto_evict_key() anytime after the last + * bio_endio(). Therefore, the keyslot must be released before that. + */ + blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(req); + blk_account_io_completion(req, total_bytes); do { @@ -905,6 +911,13 @@ bool blk_update_request(struct request *req, blk_status_t error, req->q->integrity.profile->complete_fn(req, nr_bytes); #endif + /* + * Upper layers may call blk_crypto_evict_key() anytime after the last + * bio_endio(). Therefore, the keyslot must be released before that. + */ + if (blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(req) && nr_bytes >= blk_rq_bytes(req)) + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(req); + if (unlikely(error && !blk_rq_is_passthrough(req) && !(req->rq_flags & RQF_QUIET)) && !test_bit(GD_DEAD, &req->q->disk->state)) { @@ -2967,7 +2980,7 @@ void blk_mq_submit_bio(struct bio *bio) blk_mq_bio_to_request(rq, bio, nr_segs); - ret = blk_crypto_init_request(rq); + ret = blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); if (ret != BLK_STS_OK) { bio->bi_status = ret; bio_endio(bio); From patchwork Wed Mar 8 19:36:43 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13166341 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA415C74A4B for ; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229732AbjCHTjk (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Mar 2023 14:39:40 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36694 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229707AbjCHTjj (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Mar 2023 14:39:39 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B161C7C3C7; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:39:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4D8CA61938; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 90D60C433D2; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1678304376; bh=bbb+45XrVULPTKf/JqPwmrPjLg03mNEHizYqoAVoe1I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=aEc4Lbjtd0ge0AydvT2tB0mTOToL+HIr1wjag7UXlEzHxFjBDwEK4yFzn9T9uD9Xz ASSdEnK5QRT4Jf1ngG102uNYYxpQGcYanKxYuUxWn3i5qrI5gwL7rW4/eI6sIPBr38 ijwfqKMfEhTyv7557LiY+cOe4cbxXUeH9RHjtj8gKZVaGvETgnAA8zU4PJK5dL5dpP /a588v2OAURbEyRRB5DdrWRmzncO7k2zlCpUtU77pZME2Eplt5tCNVDu9+QJkJ/lc7 uJR/M2RGpmdFXGy7TnPbgAMT9qXbmbg3NY/vcjr1lx3lHMiol7RudAoY3LoQ3KR0qx 7cSiwtLBbjFeg== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Nathan Huckleberry , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:36:43 -0800 Message-Id: <20230308193645.114069-3-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a bug) or that ->keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns an error while leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures. However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value of blk_crypto_evict_key(). These two assumptions don't match, and the result is that there can be a use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn't* happen; we're just talking about what happens if they do anyway.) Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the keyslot management structures even on failure. Fixes: 1b2628397058 ("block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Nathan Huckleberry Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- block/blk-crypto-profile.c | 50 +++++++++++++++----------------------- block/blk-crypto.c | 23 +++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-profile.c b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c index 0307fb0d95d3..1b20ead59f39 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-profile.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c @@ -354,22 +354,10 @@ bool __blk_crypto_cfg_supported(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, return true; } -/** - * __blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a key from a device. - * @profile: the crypto profile of the device - * @key: the key to evict. It must not still be used in any I/O. - * - * If the device has keyslots, this finds the keyslot (if any) that contains the - * specified key and calls the driver's keyslot_evict function to evict it. - * - * Otherwise, this just calls the driver's keyslot_evict function if it is - * implemented, passing just the key (without any particular keyslot). This - * allows layered devices to evict the key from their underlying devices. - * - * Context: Process context. Takes and releases profile->lock. - * Return: 0 on success or if there's no keyslot with the specified key, -EBUSY - * if the keyslot is still in use, or another -errno value on other - * error. +/* + * This is an internal function that evicts a key from an inline encryption + * device that can be either a real device or the blk-crypto-fallback "device". + * It is used only by blk_crypto_evict_key(); see that function for details. */ int __blk_crypto_evict_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key) @@ -389,22 +377,22 @@ int __blk_crypto_evict_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, blk_crypto_hw_enter(profile); slot = blk_crypto_find_keyslot(profile, key); - if (!slot) - goto out_unlock; - - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)) { - err = -EBUSY; - goto out_unlock; + if (slot) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)) { + /* BUG: key is still in use by I/O */ + err = -EBUSY; + } else { + err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict( + profile, key, + blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)); + } + /* + * Callers may free the key even on error, so unlink the key + * from the hash table and clear slot->key even on error. + */ + hlist_del(&slot->hash_node); + slot->key = NULL; } - err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict(profile, key, - blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)); - if (err) - goto out_unlock; - - hlist_del(&slot->hash_node); - slot->key = NULL; - err = 0; -out_unlock: blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); return err; } diff --git a/block/blk-crypto.c b/block/blk-crypto.c index d0c7feb447e9..4e26fac64199 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto.c @@ -399,17 +399,22 @@ int blk_crypto_start_using_key(struct block_device *bdev, } /** - * blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a key from any inline encryption hardware - * it may have been programmed into - * @bdev: The block_device who's associated inline encryption hardware this key - * might have been programmed into - * @key: The key to evict + * blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a blk_crypto_key from a block_device + * @bdev: a block_device on which I/O using the key may have been done + * @key: the key to evict * - * Upper layers (filesystems) must call this function to ensure that a key is - * evicted from any hardware that it might have been programmed into. The key - * must not be in use by any in-flight IO when this function is called. + * For a given block_device, this function removes the given blk_crypto_key from + * the keyslot management structures and evicts it from any underlying hardware + * keyslot(s) or blk-crypto-fallback keyslot it may have been programmed into. * - * Return: 0 on success or if the key wasn't in any keyslot; -errno on error. + * Upper layers must call this before freeing the blk_crypto_key. It must be + * called for every block_device the key may have been used on. The key must no + * longer be in use by any I/O when this function is called. + * + * Context: May sleep. + * Return: 0 on success or if the key wasn't in any keyslot; -errno if the key + * failed to be evicted from a keyslot or is still in-use. Even on + * "failure", the key is removed from the keyslot management structures. */ int blk_crypto_evict_key(struct block_device *bdev, const struct blk_crypto_key *key) From patchwork Wed Mar 8 19:36:44 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13166344 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34A30C7618B for ; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229976AbjCHTjm (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Mar 2023 14:39:42 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36714 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229707AbjCHTjk (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Mar 2023 14:39:40 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A6C8C838A9; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:39:39 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 69FE6B81269; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DCEF5C4339C; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1678304377; bh=vEKYcc/LTBd9qDV4oAD0WbQzxrfB47Q4z7AN/AsRbpY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=RIDAcnzmSNMdM77xUUJI93gQ+oCUgHyITXqF1NGtAayyh0/1I6FQwiXIEYDjA1Ob6 B8KIq7GS4CMFxLhsIYkeao9xHWM5vZ4of9CbhICNIj5P+rQQVWW9GwPHpMyNji5TO7 MyWbLw/QdzwsxT72NNx/WFJZkyVMb3IPo+DWToYpvMTPno9TvbWrmU+6xFbQUAZgnZ iwMZse34Nlaez7z1vBXHbm/rJidsX7h6XqncKDUYf8MsicCVy6DZXySTs8Dh5SpY/s f94/Bg2zvjE8YJYmITG6wGTyNwwyHdeaIUOdyh7yfRDraCngbZ3wbvQ5pEIXATaWGc MyeExzdwtiGZw== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Nathan Huckleberry Subject: [PATCH v2 3/4] blk-crypto: remove blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request() Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:36:44 -0800 Message-Id: <20230308193645.114069-4-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request() is the same as blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(), so just use that directly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst | 3 +-- block/blk-crypto-internal.h | 15 --------------- block/blk-mq.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst b/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst index f9bf18ea6509..90b733422ed4 100644 --- a/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst +++ b/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst @@ -270,8 +270,7 @@ Request queue based layered devices like dm-rq that wish to support inline encryption need to create their own blk_crypto_profile for their request_queue, and expose whatever functionality they choose. When a layered device wants to pass a clone of that request to another request_queue, blk-crypto will -initialize and prepare the clone as necessary; see -``blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request()``. +initialize and prepare the clone as necessary. Interaction between inline encryption and blk integrity ======================================================= diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-internal.h b/block/blk-crypto-internal.h index 4f1de2495f0c..93a141979694 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-internal.h +++ b/block/blk-crypto-internal.h @@ -205,21 +205,6 @@ static inline int blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio, return 0; } -/** - * blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request - Prepare a cloned request to be inserted - * into a request queue. - * @rq: the request being queued - * - * Return: BLK_STS_OK on success, nonzero on error. - */ -static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request(struct request *rq) -{ - - if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq)) - return blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); - return BLK_STS_OK; -} - #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK int blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(enum blk_crypto_mode_num mode_num); diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c index 49825538d932..5e819de2f5e7 100644 --- a/block/blk-mq.c +++ b/block/blk-mq.c @@ -3049,7 +3049,7 @@ blk_status_t blk_insert_cloned_request(struct request *rq) if (q->disk && should_fail_request(q->disk->part0, blk_rq_bytes(rq))) return BLK_STS_IOERR; - if (blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request(rq)) + if (blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq)) return BLK_STS_IOERR; blk_account_io_start(rq); From patchwork Wed Mar 8 19:36:45 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Eric Biggers X-Patchwork-Id: 13166342 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 369FBC74A5B for ; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229751AbjCHTjk (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Mar 2023 14:39:40 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36696 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229580AbjCHTjj (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Mar 2023 14:39:39 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 093AB7D091; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:39:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A5C361939; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2CC25C433A0; Wed, 8 Mar 2023 19:39:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1678304377; bh=jUFFwIrjwlkdx2u75JjBew7+G5pN2IhZ8ExoTUl0X5o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gk17Dxws07+M1VsKyVxeKzfhatrISPPml9Ha1FomdjF03NnY60rQ4WDwbmBE8j0az IRr/CEb8wexZ+rRaF9josTKFvBPh4hbbU+Lp4mDzCtdSKJM0PaXmwGGVkFO2EUTOZe O6G3Qk/WMfEnJcXLyBR4f01d3x7a8tCiuMLYgPlZrVbHfan5yOQTdPpZkZQD64elA9 utcFMDkNcz40H46FVoft9WWtuGs+GBkgijIMk5I8oWsD0VZuY79IQHujWPV5xvihJP gQSEsQDJVPLHfJpp2D5l/jsy1/HMMxdsHMaSR9wt1JNURrAlm8DsNBPbKLlr+jVvYi +jYpK7uRSac4g== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, Nathan Huckleberry Subject: [PATCH v2 4/4] blk-crypto: drop the NULL check from blk_crypto_put_keyslot() Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 11:36:45 -0800 Message-Id: <20230308193645.114069-5-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.2 In-Reply-To: <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Biggers Now that all callers of blk_crypto_put_keyslot() check for NULL before calling it, there is no need for blk_crypto_put_keyslot() to do the NULL check itself. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig --- block/blk-crypto-profile.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-profile.c b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c index 1b20ead59f39..6c16edfa0dee 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-profile.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c @@ -227,14 +227,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_keyslot_index); * @profile: the crypto profile of the device the key will be used on * @key: the key that will be used * @slot_ptr: If a keyslot is allocated, an opaque pointer to the keyslot struct - * will be stored here; otherwise NULL will be stored here. + * will be stored here. blk_crypto_put_keyslot() must be called + * later to release it. Otherwise, NULL will be stored here. * * If the device has keyslots, this gets a keyslot that's been programmed with * the specified key. If the key is already in a slot, this reuses it; * otherwise this waits for a slot to become idle and programs the key into it. * - * This must be paired with a call to blk_crypto_put_keyslot(). - * * Context: Process context. Takes and releases profile->lock. * Return: BLK_STS_OK on success, meaning that either a keyslot was allocated or * one wasn't needed; or a blk_status_t error on failure. @@ -312,20 +311,15 @@ blk_status_t blk_crypto_get_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, /** * blk_crypto_put_keyslot() - Release a reference to a keyslot - * @slot: The keyslot to release the reference of (may be NULL). + * @slot: The keyslot to release the reference of * * Context: Any context. */ void blk_crypto_put_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_keyslot *slot) { - struct blk_crypto_profile *profile; + struct blk_crypto_profile *profile = slot->profile; unsigned long flags; - if (!slot) - return; - - profile = slot->profile; - if (atomic_dec_and_lock_irqsave(&slot->slot_refs, &profile->idle_slots_lock, flags)) { list_add_tail(&slot->idle_slot_node, &profile->idle_slots);