From patchwork Wed Jan 30 11:41:46 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10788369 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43BE71874 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 324D12E735 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 267E72E732; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:17 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 778C02E735 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727750AbfA3LnP (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 06:43:15 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-f65.google.com ([209.85.128.65]:36281 "EHLO mail-wm1-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728205AbfA3LnO (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 06:43:14 -0500 Received: by mail-wm1-f65.google.com with SMTP id p6so21199772wmc.1 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:13 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=qWCOjIpCOk81UALDGpP07aau3ZMFw3eCyGnAaDjo63o=; b=VaHsa1a16dnkQvcUofCyd/vzP2s+oP+DVkG1L8UynhPaXqurv1M69zkIoCMKxoV3T9 dIvI07ZobW1wAMmacVQwyYCcCx1W+UaxhhHcjjVxD1nCmhQZdj61NdtQT5iSCgvHuEI3 Gd5EsT32RbdXSI7DMmCWyOb8fR7p6nfuPUHJivqOJiwgZ/utnXvWHYmxBq7PFB5rTYCB +rGduVPGcb9nWNgxbYP3jGRR7+3aBv2AqkBzdcrcnnVnv/7synY+VGWmXx/+/DXhqA81 2tl24cpdASOdIJSYMDFvWwUVjEzb0MeAtUUxCBWxVxJfhRLAYf2zfDTPFrkXNU+QofSA LDsQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukc+dJA8eYSpfaP9X6kXZLOOjyTmNe/VLsyVJp96wlU1hXg9gYmx HN4eba9jGI8f/TXZB6TeGv0lxajKD2k= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN5t4b+/Gm3kYlGxNJVYZSxn2uP4Ep0vNW2epEJkRvCqvsCQKVc35UR4cmvaCTO9HMSq6WBDwA== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:c10f:: with SMTP id r15mr24911424wmf.27.1548848592279; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:12 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain.com (nat-pool-brq-t.redhat.com. [213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n124sm2417691wmd.15.2019.01.30.03.43.10 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:11 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tejun Heo , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v3 1/5] selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 12:41:46 +0100 Message-Id: <20190130114150.27807-2-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Since kernfs supports the security xattr handlers, we can simply use these to determine the inode's context, dropping the need to update it from kernfs explicitly using a security_inode_notifysecctx() call. We achieve this by setting a new sbsec flag SE_SBGENFS_XATTR to all mounts that are known to use kernfs under the hood and then fetching the xattrs after determining the fallback genfs sid in inode_doinit_with_dentry() when this flag is set. This will allow implementing full security xattr support in kernfs and removing the ...notifysecctx() call in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 159 +++++++++++++++------------- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 81e012c66d95..758a99d1086e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -793,11 +793,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; + + if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")) - sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR; if (!sbsec->behavior) { /* @@ -1392,6 +1394,71 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, return rc; } +static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, + u32 def_sid, u32 *sid) +{ +#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 + char *context = NULL; + unsigned int len = 0; + int rc; + + *sid = def_sid; + + if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) + return 0; + + len = INITCONTEXTLEN; + context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); + if (!context) + return -ENOMEM; + + context[len] = '\0'; + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); + if (rc == -ERANGE) { + kfree(context); + + /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + len = rc; + context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS); + if (!context) + return -ENOMEM; + + context[len] = '\0'; + rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, + context, len); + } + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(context); + if (rc != -ENODATA) { + pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", + __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); + return rc; + } + return 0; + } + + rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, + def_sid, GFP_NOFS); + if (rc) { + char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; + unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; + + if (rc == -EINVAL) { + pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n", + ino, dev, context); + } else { + pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", + __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); + } + } + kfree(context); + return 0; +} + /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) { @@ -1401,8 +1468,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent u16 sclass; struct dentry *dentry; #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 - char *context = NULL; - unsigned len = 0; int rc = 0; if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) @@ -1470,72 +1535,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; } - len = INITCONTEXTLEN; - context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); - if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - dput(dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] = '\0'; - rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); - if (rc == -ERANGE) { - kfree(context); - - /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ - rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); - if (rc < 0) { - dput(dentry); - goto out; - } - len = rc; - context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); - if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - dput(dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] = '\0'; - rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); - } + rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, + &sid); dput(dentry); - if (rc < 0) { - if (rc != -ENODATA) { - pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " - "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, - -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); - kfree(context); - goto out; - } - /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ - sid = sbsec->def_sid; - rc = 0; - } else { - rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, - context, rc, &sid, - sbsec->def_sid, - GFP_NOFS); - if (rc) { - char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; - unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; - - if (rc == -EINVAL) { - if (printk_ratelimit()) - pr_notice("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " - "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " - "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); - } else { - pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " - "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", - __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); - } - kfree(context); - /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ - rc = 0; - break; - } - } - kfree(context); + if (rc) + goto out; break; case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: sid = task_sid; @@ -1586,9 +1590,20 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); - dput(dentry); - if (rc) + if (rc) { + dput(dentry); goto out; + } + + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) { + rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, + sid, &sid); + if (rc) { + dput(dentry); + goto out; + } + } + dput(dentry); } break; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index f68fb25b5702..6e5928f951da 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100 #define SE_SBPROC 0x0200 #define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400 +#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800 #define CONTEXT_STR "context=" #define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext=" From patchwork Wed Jan 30 11:41:47 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10788371 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E48036C2 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D164B2E733 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id C59952E737; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:17 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E9502E72F for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730719AbfA3LnQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 06:43:16 -0500 Received: from mail-wr1-f65.google.com ([209.85.221.65]:37941 "EHLO mail-wr1-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727142AbfA3LnQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 06:43:16 -0500 Received: by mail-wr1-f65.google.com with SMTP id v13so25649726wrw.5 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:14 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=6QMYjOe+pf/wWcR8iZ9VPRtgN1hVQge8pFTdDf7ePKo=; b=RBO7dGsAqkSUZHRRVnNa38qNMmf7P9Hbi3GFK7FD/JTlQdcxCG7pJ/jNIH0kqP0Y6T Toizn7gDr2JaGPhQm44kEs9gpGrti8rYDUF0vXFwYTEv2hrA64LscbqHjnCyiw9tDaTw n3cMPIQ7qiyWey+zBUB8T2etf1iAVpQuq4ekWP5ulI2ysc1aWUaPXRHWZqlA36N00fL8 trTKieBFe+yLqGbOJs50cQ1giwDH41dCN9m/aG6ehmh90VcxD3E8y49YoeCcnRvdQ1kg NXmdG/pY8S1JvQxG0fzmk0PJzXrV9OACfXEshLjrCEcMjjmcNCvrMsd7wr90HNqBz69B 4ajA== X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukfb1oZJEznwLs+oodrIiR6fi0mRZXGYbZxaiflz99zPiRGvRFLa YfKaWoOMXu0VFcxy1mgJvqm0cg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN69KDNmjBQjx8LgivYYomnQy9N+emyo00ziVbtLMgVudDM3ScZEgUTdte7K3TUttnctcS1GtQ== X-Received: by 2002:a5d:50c5:: with SMTP id f5mr28572245wrt.37.1548848593664; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain.com (nat-pool-brq-t.redhat.com. [213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n124sm2417691wmd.15.2019.01.30.03.43.12 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:12 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tejun Heo , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v3 2/5] kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 12:41:47 +0100 Message-Id: <20190130114150.27807-3-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Replace the special handling of security xattrs with simple_xattrs, as is already done for the trusted xattrs. This simplifies the code and allows LSMs to use more than just a single xattr to do their business. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 7 ++- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 100 +++++++++++++++--------------------- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 5 +- 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c index 4ca0b5c18192..ad7e3356bcc5 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c @@ -532,11 +532,10 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn) kfree_const(kn->name); if (kn->iattr) { - if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) - security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata, - kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len); - simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs); + simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs_trusted); + simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs_security); } + kfree(kn->iattr); spin_lock(&kernfs_idr_lock); idr_remove(&root->ino_idr, kn->id.ino); diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c index 80cebcd94c90..f0e2cb4379c0 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c @@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn) iattrs->ia_mtime = iattrs->ia_atime; iattrs->ia_ctime = iattrs->ia_atime; - simple_xattrs_init(&kn->iattr->xattrs); + simple_xattrs_init(&kn->iattr->xattrs_trusted); + simple_xattrs_init(&kn->iattr->xattrs_security); out_unlock: ret = kn->iattr; mutex_unlock(&iattr_mutex); @@ -135,33 +136,31 @@ out: return error; } -static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata, - u32 *secdata_len) -{ - void *old_secdata; - size_t old_secdata_len; - - old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata; - old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len; - - attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata; - attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len; - - *secdata = old_secdata; - *secdata_len = old_secdata_len; - return 0; -} - ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size) { struct kernfs_node *kn = kernfs_dentry_node(dentry); + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; + ssize_t ret, length = 0; attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); if (!attrs) return -ENOMEM; - return simple_xattr_list(d_inode(dentry), &attrs->xattrs, buf, size); + ret = simple_xattr_list(inode, &attrs->xattrs_trusted, buf, size); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + length += ret; + + buf += ret; + size -= ret; + + ret = simple_xattr_list(inode, &attrs->xattrs_security, buf, size); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + length += ret; + + return length; } static inline void set_default_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) @@ -186,15 +185,12 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode) struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr; inode->i_mode = kn->mode; - if (attrs) { + if (attrs) /* * kernfs_node has non-default attributes get them from * persistent copy in kernfs_node. */ set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr); - security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata, - attrs->ia_secdata_len); - } if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR) set_nlink(inode, kn->dir.subdirs + 2); @@ -305,19 +301,29 @@ int kernfs_iop_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return generic_permission(inode, mask); } +static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler; +static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_security_xattr_handler; + static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size) { - const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix); struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; + struct simple_xattrs *xattrs; attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); if (!attrs) return -ENOMEM; - return simple_xattr_get(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size); + if (handler == &kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler) + xattrs = &attrs->xattrs_trusted; + else if (handler == &kernfs_security_xattr_handler) + xattrs = &attrs->xattrs_security; + else + return -EINVAL; + + return simple_xattr_get(xattrs, suffix, value, size); } static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, @@ -325,15 +331,22 @@ static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, const char *suffix, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix); struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; + struct simple_xattrs *xattrs; attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); if (!attrs) return -ENOMEM; - return simple_xattr_set(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size, flags); + if (handler == &kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler) + xattrs = &attrs->xattrs_trusted; + else if (handler == &kernfs_security_xattr_handler) + xattrs = &attrs->xattrs_security; + else + return -EINVAL; + + return simple_xattr_set(xattrs, suffix, value, size, flags); } static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = { @@ -342,41 +355,10 @@ static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = { .set = kernfs_xattr_set, }; -static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, - struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, - const char *suffix, const void *value, - size_t size, int flags) -{ - struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private; - struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; - void *secdata; - u32 secdata_len = 0; - int error; - - attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); - if (!attrs) - return -ENOMEM; - - error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags); - if (error) - return error; - error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len); - if (error) - return error; - - mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex); - error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len); - mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex); - - if (secdata) - security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len); - return error; -} - static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_security_xattr_handler = { .prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, .get = kernfs_xattr_get, - .set = kernfs_security_xattr_set, + .set = kernfs_xattr_set, }; const struct xattr_handler *kernfs_xattr_handlers[] = { diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h index 3d83b114bb08..93bf1dcd0306 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h @@ -20,10 +20,9 @@ struct kernfs_iattrs { struct iattr ia_iattr; - void *ia_secdata; - u32 ia_secdata_len; - struct simple_xattrs xattrs; + struct simple_xattrs xattrs_trusted; + struct simple_xattrs xattrs_security; }; /* +1 to avoid triggering overflow warning when negating it */ From patchwork Wed Jan 30 11:41:48 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10788375 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34CD01390 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22EF42E72F for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 172E22E733; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:19 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9113A2E72F for ; 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[213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n124sm2417691wmd.15.2019.01.30.03.43.13 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:14 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tejun Heo , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v3 3/5] LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 12:41:48 +0100 Message-Id: <20190130114150.27807-4-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an associated inode at the moment of creation). The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic for handling the creation of new nodes. The interface of the new hook provides the following to the LSM: * a qstr containing the name of the new node * initial inode attributes (struct iattr + simple_xattrs) of the new node * inode attributes of the parent node (directory) Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/security.c | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 9a0bdf91e646..7a7ea511cc61 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -429,6 +429,19 @@ * to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading * and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter. * + * Security hooks for kernfs node operations + * + * @kernfs_init_security + * Initialize the security context of a newlycreated kernfs node based + * on its own and its parent's attributes. The security context should + * be stored in the simple_xattrs structure as an extended attribute. + * + * @qstr contains the last path component of the new node. + * @iattr contains the inode attributes of the new node. + * @secattr is the list of security xattrs of the new node. + * @dir_iattr contains the inode attributes of the parent node. + * @dir_secattr is the list of security xattrs of the parent node. + * * Security hooks for file operations * * @file_permission: @@ -1558,6 +1571,12 @@ union security_list_options { int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name); + int (*kernfs_init_security)(const struct qstr *qstr, + struct iattr *iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *secattr, + struct iattr *dir_iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr); + int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask); int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file); void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file); @@ -1858,6 +1877,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct hlist_head inode_getsecid; struct hlist_head inode_copy_up; struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr; + struct hlist_head kernfs_init_security; struct hlist_head file_permission; struct hlist_head file_alloc_security; struct hlist_head file_free_security; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index dbfb5a66babb..92234c19727f 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct fown_struct; struct file_operations; struct msg_msg; struct xattr; +struct simple_xattrs; struct xfrm_sec_ctx; struct mm_struct; @@ -291,6 +292,10 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name); +int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, struct iattr *iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *secattr, + struct iattr *dir_iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr); int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask); int security_file_alloc(struct file *file); void security_file_free(struct file *file); @@ -783,6 +788,14 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } +static inline int security_kernfs_init_security( + const struct qstr *qstr, struct iattr *iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *secattr, struct iattr *dir_iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f1b8d2587639..3a79e0b53833 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -892,6 +892,15 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); +int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, struct iattr *iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *secattr, + struct iattr *dir_iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr) +{ + return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, qstr, iattr, secattr, + dir_iattr, dir_secattr); +} + int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { int ret; From patchwork Wed Jan 30 11:41:49 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10788385 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A9691390 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A8312E72F for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 6EB052E735; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0BCE92E72F for ; 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[213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n124sm2417691wmd.15.2019.01.30.03.43.15 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:16 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tejun Heo , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v3 4/5] selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 12:41:49 +0100 Message-Id: <20190130114150.27807-5-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the actual inodes later by other hooks. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 758a99d1086e..1f2239c191bd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3354,6 +3354,65 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +/* kernfs node operations */ + +int selinux_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, struct iattr *iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *secattr, + struct iattr *dir_iattr, + struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr) +{ + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; + int rc; + char *context; + + rc = simple_xattr_get(dir_secattr, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, NULL, 0); + if (rc == -ENODATA) + return 0; + else if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + clen = (u32)rc; + context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!context) + return -ENOMEM; + + rc = simple_xattr_get(dir_secattr, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context, clen); + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(context); + return rc; + } + + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, + GFP_KERNEL); + kfree(context); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (tsec->create_sid) { + newsid = tsec->create_sid; + } else { + u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(iattr->ia_mode); + + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, + parent_sid, secclass, qstr, + &newsid); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, + &context, &clen); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = simple_xattr_set(secattr, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context, clen, + XATTR_CREATE); + kfree(context); + return rc; +} + + /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -6800,6 +6859,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security), From patchwork Wed Jan 30 11:41:50 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ondrej Mosnacek X-Patchwork-Id: 10788391 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EED5A159A for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDB402E72F for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id D19512E733; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:23 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6096F2E732 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:43:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728404AbfA3LnW (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 06:43:22 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-f66.google.com ([209.85.128.66]:53423 "EHLO mail-wm1-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730682AbfA3LnU (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 06:43:20 -0500 Received: by mail-wm1-f66.google.com with SMTP id d15so21295359wmb.3 for ; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:18 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=3PwjwnLNTsMD005MExgPvqEqo3DYQCBut/K5wBI3Tz8=; b=aEiCgTTpwIYndw87o0ydVJriIRgPyAwHUzYXMEkMjWqbvhpJUtxzoBa02wUf2NgIJI 6qKkVlcJlLNTGPjf2ZftkqZGCJ5q81EWD0cJsDXqshA49RXTw2Lfuun55W7d3kJED0E5 96jXnjInpk8ZMcd52O1k6vFqRaXJliHqf3c9uWKmOvXgOJ8BT5/5A9DjNtPrD6uKNoYv nb2Rg/6VMgHpE9PQ31bNSffzsdd/RInhPaSGSK2GqogCmpDYQsZEyfWjE8u1GUwhIbNR eizLEF5kqv75DGqqLjQ+WIVjuMKQ6Nl+c3Euu+clBGLzVhGwho8JKZEACxRckcwhsD2G THVQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukdhhj4baVv3MS4kFnKrpcyPAjcvdzUsxG2WBNCjr/A0RSqvUppp PwVWX1gb7B9dX7HMrluKTnK8vw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN4ZPi6grMG89IFL02CrFMuQ3SqhpDmbRacbmnfLWoV8glMov7YCQ0T1J87BtJRffLdoAmmzMQ== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:6442:: with SMTP id y63mr23812533wmb.143.1548848597859; Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:17 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain.com (nat-pool-brq-t.redhat.com. [213.175.37.10]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n124sm2417691wmd.15.2019.01.30.03.43.16 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 03:43:17 -0800 (PST) From: Ondrej Mosnacek To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Tejun Heo , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Ondrej Mosnacek Subject: [PATCH v3 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 12:41:50 +0100 Message-Id: <20190130114150.27807-6-omosnace@redhat.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> References: <20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Use the new security_kernfs_init_security() hook to allow LSMs to possibly assign a non-default security context to a newly created kernfs node based on the attributes of the new node and also its parent node. This fixes an issue with cgroupfs under SELinux, where newly created cgroup subdirectories/files would not inherit its parent's context if it had been set explicitly to a non-default value (other than the genfs context specified by the policy). This can be reproduced as follows (on Fedora/RHEL): # mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test # # Need permissive to change the label under Fedora policy: # setenforce 0 # chcon -t container_file_t /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.threads drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 init.scope drwxr-xr-x. 26 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:21 system.slice drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 test drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 user.slice # mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir Actual result: # ls -ldZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir Expected result: # ls -ldZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root unconfined_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/39 Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 2 +- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c index ad7e3356bcc5..797199a748d7 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "kernfs-internal.h" @@ -616,7 +617,31 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_node_from_dentry(struct dentry *dentry) return NULL; } +static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct kernfs_node *parent, + struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ + struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, *pattrs; + struct qstr q; + + attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn); + if (!attrs) + return -ENOMEM; + + pattrs = kernfs_iattrs(parent); + if (!pattrs) + return -ENOMEM; + + q.name = kn->name; + q.hash_len = hashlen_string(parent, kn->name); + + return security_kernfs_init_security(&q, &attrs->ia_iattr, + &attrs->xattrs_security, + &pattrs->ia_iattr, + &pattrs->xattrs_security); +} + static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, + struct kernfs_node *parent, const char *name, umode_t mode, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, unsigned flags) @@ -673,6 +698,12 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, goto err_out3; } + if (parent) { + ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); + if (ret) + goto err_out3; + } + return kn; err_out3: @@ -691,7 +722,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_node *parent, { struct kernfs_node *kn; - kn = __kernfs_new_node(kernfs_root(parent), + kn = __kernfs_new_node(kernfs_root(parent), parent, name, mode, uid, gid, flags); if (kn) { kernfs_get(parent); @@ -961,7 +992,7 @@ struct kernfs_root *kernfs_create_root(struct kernfs_syscall_ops *scops, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root->supers); root->next_generation = 1; - kn = __kernfs_new_node(root, "", S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, + kn = __kernfs_new_node(root, NULL, "", S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, KERNFS_DIR); if (!kn) { diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c index f0e2cb4379c0..645c404b8644 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations kernfs_iops = { .listxattr = kernfs_iop_listxattr, }; -static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn) +struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn) { static DEFINE_MUTEX(iattr_mutex); struct kernfs_iattrs *ret; diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h index 93bf1dcd0306..90215f8e503a 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ int kernfs_iop_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags); ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size); int __kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, const struct iattr *iattr); +struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn); /* * dir.c