From patchwork Tue Apr 25 17:35:52 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13223598 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B534C6FD18 for ; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 17:38:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234617AbjDYRiL (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:38:11 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40554 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230429AbjDYRiG (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:38:06 -0400 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EAF008682; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 10:38:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.229]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Q5TVd3SvKz9ttD6; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 01:28:25 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S3; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 18:37:40 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jarkko@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, mykolal@fb.com, shuah@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [RFC][PATCH 1/6] KEYS: asymmetric: Introduce UMD-based asymmetric key parser Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 19:35:52 +0200 Message-Id: <20230425173557.724688-2-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S3 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3Zw1UKF1DKw15WrWxJrWfAFb_yoWkKF48pF WrWr18tFW8Kw1xK34rAr42gw1rtw1vyFWagw4Sqw13uasxXr4kG3yIyF45WFy7Jr1kJ34f trs8Xa4Utr1DtFDanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUPqb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUGw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUCVW8JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrVC2j2 WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE7xkE bVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCY1x0262kKe7 AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02 F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_GFv_Wr ylIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUCVW8JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7Cj xVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI 0_Jr0_Gr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVCY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x 07j4hFxUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQASBF1jj4x8MwAAsl X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Introduce a new parser for the asymmetric key type. The parser forwards the key payload to a User Mode Driver (UMD) handler, which replies with the data necessary to populate a public_key structure (blob, IDs and algorithm) and, possibly, with a key description. The parser then validates the response, fills the key payload fields from it, and sets the key description if provided. The main advantage of this approach is that potential risks of parsing data from the kernel are avoided, as the UMD handler does not have access to the kernel memory. If the UMD handler is corrupted, the damage is likely limited to user space. The parser sanitizes malicious data sent by the UMD. In addition, seccomp can further limit which system calls the UMD is authorized to invoke. The communication protocol between the parser and the UMD handler consists of two main structures: msg_in for the parser request, and msg_out for the UMD handler response. msg_in contains a buffer for a generic request, not only for parsing keys, and the type of command (CMD_KEY for key parsing). msg_out contains the result of the operation to communicate to the parser, and the specific structure umd_key_msg_out for storing the key payload fields and the key description. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 11 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 5 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 3 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h | 20 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_parser.c | 203 +++++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h | 52 ++++++ include/keys/asymmetric-type.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_parser.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 1ef3b46d6f6..5f627026476 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -85,4 +85,15 @@ config FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER +config UMD_KEY_PARSER + bool "UMD-based parser for the asymmetric key type" + depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + select USERMODE_DRIVER + help + This option introduces a new parser for the asymmetric key type. + The parser forwards the request to a User Mode Driver (UMD) handler, + which replies with the result. + + On success, the parser fills the key from the UMD handler response. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index 0d1fa1b692c..d8f266cdeeb 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -76,3 +76,8 @@ verify_signed_pefile-y := \ $(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h $(obj)/mscode.asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.c $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h + +# +# UMD asymmetric key parser +# +obj-$(CONFIG_UMD_KEY_PARSER) += umd_key_parser.o diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index 41a2f0eb4ce..f1752eb8ff8 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* * Clean up the key ID list */ -static void asymmetric_key_free_kids(struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids) +void asymmetric_key_free_kids(struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids) { int i; @@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_kids(struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids) kfree(kids); } } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_free_kids); /* * Clean up the preparse data diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7e641bbf884 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + * + * Header file of the UMD asymmetric key parser. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "umd_key_sig_umh.h" + +extern struct umd_mgmt key_ops; +extern const char *pub_key_algos[PUBKEY_ALGO__LAST]; + +int umd_get_kids(struct umd_asymmetric_key_ids *umd_kids, + struct asymmetric_key_id *id[3]); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_parser.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bd7d09d89f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_parser.c @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + * + * Implement the UMD asymmetric key parser. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "umd_key.h" + +const char *pub_key_algos[PUBKEY_ALGO__LAST] = { + [PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA] = "rsa", + [PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA] = "ecdsa", + [PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P192] = "ecdsa-nist-p192", + [PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P256] = "ecdsa-nist-p256", + [PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P384] = "ecdsa-nist-p384", +}; + +struct umd_mgmt key_ops = { + .info.driver_name = "umd_key_sig_umh", + .kmod = "umd_key_sig_user", + .lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(key_ops.lock), +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_ops); + +static struct public_key *get_public_key(struct msg_out *out) +{ + struct public_key *pub; + + if (out->key.pkey_algo >= PUBKEY_ALGO__LAST) { + pr_err("Unexpected key algo %d\n", out->key.pkey_algo); + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + if (!out->key.pub_key_len) { + pr_err("Unexpected zero-length for public key\n"); + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + if (out->key.pub_key_len > sizeof(out->key.pub_key)) { + pr_err("Public key length %ld greater than expected %ld\n", + out->key.pub_key_len, sizeof(out->key.pub_key)); + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + pub = kzalloc(sizeof(*pub), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pub) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + pub->id_type = "UMD"; + pub->pkey_algo = pub_key_algos[out->key.pkey_algo]; + + pub->key = kmemdup(out->key.pub_key, out->key.pub_key_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pub->key) { + kfree(pub); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } + + pub->keylen = out->key.pub_key_len; + return pub; +} + +int umd_get_kids(struct umd_asymmetric_key_ids *umd_kids, + struct asymmetric_key_id **id) +{ + int ret = 0, i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(umd_kids->kid1_len); i++) { + if (!umd_kids->kid1_len[i] && !umd_kids->kid2_len[i]) + continue; + + if (umd_kids->kid1_len[i] > sizeof(umd_kids->kid1[0])) { + pr_err("Key ID 1 length %ld greater than expected %ld\n", + umd_kids->kid1_len[i], + sizeof(umd_kids->kid1[0])); + ret = -EBADMSG; + break; + } + + if (umd_kids->kid2_len[i] > sizeof(umd_kids->kid2[0])) { + pr_err("Key ID 2 length %ld greater than expected %ld\n", + umd_kids->kid2_len[i], + sizeof(umd_kids->kid2[0])); + ret = -EBADMSG; + break; + } + + id[i] = asymmetric_key_generate_id(umd_kids->kid1[i], + umd_kids->kid1_len[i], + umd_kids->kid2[i], + umd_kids->kid2_len[i]); + if (!id[i]) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + break; + } + } + + if (ret) { + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + kfree(id[j]); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int umd_key_parse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct msg_in *in = NULL; + struct msg_out *out = NULL; + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = NULL; + struct public_key *pub = NULL; + int ret = -ENOMEM; + + in = kzalloc(sizeof(*in), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!in) + goto out; + + out = kzalloc(sizeof(*out), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!out) + goto out; + + in->cmd = CMD_KEY; + in->data_len = prep->datalen; + /* Truncate the input, there might be multiple keys in the same blob. */ + memcpy(in->data, prep->data, min(prep->datalen, sizeof(in->data))); + + out->ret = -EINVAL; + + ret = umd_mgmt_send_recv(&key_ops, in, sizeof(*in), out, sizeof(*out)); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (out->ret) { + ret = out->ret; + goto out; + } + + pub = get_public_key(out); + if (IS_ERR(pub)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(pub); + pub = NULL; + goto out; + } + + kids = kzalloc(sizeof(*kids), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kids) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ret = umd_get_kids(&out->key.kids, + (struct asymmetric_key_id **)kids->id); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (strlen(out->key.key_desc)) { + prep->description = kstrdup(out->key.key_desc, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!prep->description) + ret = -ENOMEM; + } + +out: + kfree(in); + kfree(out); + + if (ret) { + public_key_free(pub); + asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids); + return ret; + } + + /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ + __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); + prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype; + prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids; + prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = pub; + prep->quotalen = 100; + return 0; +} + +static struct asymmetric_key_parser umd_key_parser = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .name = "umd_key", + .parse = umd_key_parse +}; + +static int __init umd_key_init(void) +{ + return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&umd_key_parser); +} + +static void __exit umd_key_exit(void) +{ + unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&umd_key_parser); +} + +module_init(umd_key_init); +module_exit(umd_key_exit); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e01c9e341c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + * + * Header file for communication between the kernel and the UMD handler. + */ + +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 1024 +#define MAX_KEY_DESC_SIZE 256 +#define MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE 8192 +#define MAX_KID_SIZE 256 + +#ifndef __packed +#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) +#endif + +enum cmds { CMD_KEY, CMD__LAST }; + +/* Public key algorithms that the kernel supports. */ +enum pub_key_algos { PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, + PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P192, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P256, + PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P384, PUBKEY_ALGO__LAST }; + +struct msg_in { + enum cmds cmd; + size_t data_len; + unsigned char data[MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; +} __packed; + +struct umd_asymmetric_key_ids { + size_t kid1_len[3]; + unsigned char kid1[3][MAX_KID_SIZE]; + size_t kid2_len[3]; + unsigned char kid2[3][MAX_KID_SIZE]; +} __packed; + +struct umd_key_msg_out { + size_t pub_key_len; + unsigned char pub_key[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + enum pub_key_algos pkey_algo; + struct umd_asymmetric_key_ids kids; + char key_desc[MAX_KEY_DESC_SIZE]; +} __packed; + +struct msg_out { + int ret; + union { + struct umd_key_msg_out key; + }; +} __packed; diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h index 69a13e1e5b2..acbb8c805f6 100644 --- a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1, size_t len_1, const void *val_2, size_t len_2); +void asymmetric_key_free_kids(struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids); static inline const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key) { From patchwork Tue Apr 25 17:35:53 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13223599 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDF49C6FD18 for ; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 17:38:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230429AbjDYRi0 (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:38:26 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40946 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234621AbjDYRiY (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:38:24 -0400 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4A06A13F83; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 10:38:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.228]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Q5TVs3K0Qz9xFg5; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 01:28:37 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S4; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 18:37:52 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jarkko@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, mykolal@fb.com, shuah@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [RFC][PATCH 2/6] KEYS: asymmetric: Introduce UMD-based asymmetric key signature parser Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 19:35:53 +0200 Message-Id: <20230425173557.724688-3-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S4 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoWfJr18trW5Jr4kXw1rKF4xXrb_yoW8CF4DKo WfWr45G3W5tr1UCF4agw1kArs5ZFWDGa1UJw4rWF9IvFWqvw1kCrs5Ca47GrWSqwn8Krnx ZryrtryxJFW0g3Z3n29KB7ZKAUJUUUU8529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUO57kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2048vs2IY020E87I2jVAFwI0_Jr yl82xGYIkIc2x26xkF7I0E14v26ryj6s0DM28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4vEj48v e4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JFI_Gr1l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI 0_Gr1j6F4UJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVCY1x0267AK xVW8Jr0_Cr1UM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7 xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1Y6r17McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Y z7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1lc7CjxVAaw2 AFwI0_GFv_Wryl42xK82IYc2Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAq x4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s026x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26r4a6r W5MIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JFI_Gr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF 7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1lIxAIcVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14 v26r1j6r4UMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuY vjxUxiihUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQASBF1jj4x8MwABsk X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Like for keys, add a parser of asymmetric key signatures which forwards the request to a UMD handler (the same used for keys) and obtains from it the parsed fields (blob, public key algo, hash algo, signature encoding, and additional data required for the verification). Introduce an API for each phase of the signature verification: signature parsing, supplying/getting the data for the verification, calculating the digest, doing the actual signature verification and, finally, freeing the allocated memory. Extend the communication protocol with the UMD handler, by introducing the new specific structure umd_sig_msg_out, to be included in msg_out, and by introducing the new command CMD_SIG. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 11 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 5 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h | 8 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h | 21 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_sig_parser.c | 416 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/umd_sig.h | 71 ++++ 7 files changed, 532 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_sig_parser.c create mode 100644 include/crypto/umd_sig.h diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 782242fef7f..dd210bbcc2b 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -3205,6 +3205,7 @@ F: Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst F: crypto/asymmetric_keys/ F: include/crypto/pkcs7.h F: include/crypto/public_key.h +F: include/crypto/umd_sig.h F: include/linux/verification.h ASYNCHRONOUS TRANSFERS/TRANSFORMS (IOAT) API diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 5f627026476..d312feae88e 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -96,4 +96,15 @@ config UMD_KEY_PARSER On success, the parser fills the key from the UMD handler response. +config UMD_SIG_PARSER + bool "UMD-based parser for asymmetric key signatures" + depends on UMD_KEY_PARSER + help + This option introduces a new parser for asymmetric key signatures. + The parser forwards the request to a User Mode Driver (UMD) handler + (the same used for keys), which replies with the result. + + On success, the parser fills the signature from the UMD handler + response. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index d8f266cdeeb..060c699fbb2 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -81,3 +81,8 @@ $(obj)/mscode.asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.c $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h # UMD asymmetric key parser # obj-$(CONFIG_UMD_KEY_PARSER) += umd_key_parser.o + +# +# UMD signature parser +# +obj-$(CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER) += umd_sig_parser.o diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h index 7e641bbf884..91da42c5aa8 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key.h @@ -18,3 +18,11 @@ extern const char *pub_key_algos[PUBKEY_ALGO__LAST]; int umd_get_kids(struct umd_asymmetric_key_ids *umd_kids, struct asymmetric_key_id *id[3]); + +struct umd_sig_message { + struct public_key_signature *sig; + size_t data_len; + const void *data; + size_t sig_data_len; + const void *sig_data; +}; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h index e01c9e341c6..5f5ae81a9de 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh.h @@ -7,22 +7,29 @@ * Header file for communication between the kernel and the UMD handler. */ +#include + #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 1024 #define MAX_KEY_DESC_SIZE 256 #define MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE 8192 #define MAX_KID_SIZE 256 +#define MAX_SIG_SIZE MAX_KEY_SIZE +#define MAX_SIG_DATA_SIZE 1024 #ifndef __packed #define __packed __attribute__((packed)) #endif -enum cmds { CMD_KEY, CMD__LAST }; +enum cmds { CMD_KEY, CMD_SIG, CMD__LAST }; /* Public key algorithms that the kernel supports. */ enum pub_key_algos { PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P192, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P256, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA_NIST_P384, PUBKEY_ALGO__LAST }; +/* Signature encodings that the kernel supports. */ +enum sig_encodings { SIG_ENC_PKCS1, SIG_ENC_X962, SIG_ENC_RAW, SIG_ENC__LAST }; + struct msg_in { enum cmds cmd; size_t data_len; @@ -44,9 +51,21 @@ struct umd_key_msg_out { char key_desc[MAX_KEY_DESC_SIZE]; } __packed; +struct umd_sig_msg_out { + size_t sig_len; + unsigned char sig[MAX_SIG_SIZE]; + enum pub_key_algos pkey_algo; + enum hash_algo hash_algo; + enum sig_encodings enc; + struct umd_asymmetric_key_ids auth_ids; + size_t sig_data_len; + unsigned char sig_data[MAX_SIG_DATA_SIZE]; +} __packed; + struct msg_out { int ret; union { struct umd_key_msg_out key; + struct umd_sig_msg_out sig; }; } __packed; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_sig_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_sig_parser.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..03bc2310f89 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_sig_parser.c @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + * + * Implement the UMD asymmetric key signature parser. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "umd_key.h" + +const char *sig_encodings[SIG_ENC__LAST] = { + [SIG_ENC_PKCS1] = "pkcs1", + [SIG_ENC_X962] = "x962", + [SIG_ENC_RAW] = "raw", +}; + +static struct public_key_signature *get_sig(struct msg_out *out) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = NULL; + int ret; + + if (!out->sig.sig_len) { + pr_err("Unexpected zero-length for signature\n"); + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + if (out->sig.sig_len > sizeof(out->sig.sig)) { + pr_err("Signature length %ld greater than expected %ld\n", + out->sig.sig_len, sizeof(out->sig.sig)); + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + if (out->sig.pkey_algo >= PUBKEY_ALGO__LAST) { + pr_err("Unexpected key algo %d\n", out->sig.pkey_algo); + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + if (out->sig.hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST) { + pr_err("Unexpected hash algo %d\n", out->sig.hash_algo); + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + if (out->sig.enc >= SIG_ENC__LAST) { + pr_err("Unexpected signature encoding %d\n", out->sig.enc); + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); + } + + sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sig) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + sig->s = kmemdup(out->sig.sig, out->sig.sig_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sig->s) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + sig->s_size = out->sig.sig_len; + + ret = umd_get_kids(&out->sig.auth_ids, sig->auth_ids); + if (ret) + goto out; + + sig->pkey_algo = pub_key_algos[out->sig.pkey_algo]; + sig->hash_algo = hash_algo_name[out->sig.hash_algo]; + sig->digest_size = hash_digest_size[out->sig.hash_algo]; + sig->encoding = sig_encodings[out->sig.enc]; +out: + if (ret) { + public_key_signature_free(sig); + sig = ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + return sig; +} + +static int get_sig_data(struct msg_out *out, struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig) +{ + if (!out->sig.sig_data_len) + return 0; + + if (out->sig.sig_data_len > sizeof(out->sig.sig_data)) { + pr_err("Additional data length %ld greater than expected %ld\n", + out->sig.sig_data_len, sizeof(out->sig.sig_data)); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + umd_sig->sig_data = kmemdup(out->sig.sig_data, out->sig.sig_data_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!umd_sig->sig_data) + return -ENOMEM; + + umd_sig->sig_data_len = out->sig.sig_data_len; + return 0; +} + +/** + * umd_sig_parse_message - Parse a signature with a UMD handler + * @sig_data: Signature blob + * @sig_len: Length of signature blob + * + * Pass the signature blob to a UMD handler and fill a public_key_signature + * structure from the UMD handler response. + * + * Return: A umd_sig_message structure on success, an error pointer on error. + */ +struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig_parse_message(const u8 *sig_data, + size_t sig_len) +{ + struct msg_in *in = NULL; + struct msg_out *out = NULL; + struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig = NULL; + int ret = -ENOMEM; + + if (sig_len > sizeof(in->data)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + in = kzalloc(sizeof(*in), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!in) + goto out; + + out = kzalloc(sizeof(*out), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!out) + goto out; + + in->cmd = CMD_SIG; + in->data_len = sig_len; + memcpy(in->data, sig_data, sig_len); + + out->ret = -EINVAL; + + ret = umd_mgmt_send_recv(&key_ops, in, sizeof(*in), out, sizeof(*out)); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (out->ret) { + ret = out->ret; + goto out; + } + + umd_sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*umd_sig), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!umd_sig) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + umd_sig->sig = get_sig(out); + if (IS_ERR(umd_sig->sig)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(umd_sig->sig); + umd_sig->sig = NULL; + goto out; + } + + ret = get_sig_data(out, umd_sig); +out: + if (ret) { + if (umd_sig) { + public_key_signature_free(umd_sig->sig); + kfree(umd_sig); + } + + umd_sig = ERR_PTR(ret); + } + + kfree(in); + kfree(out); + return umd_sig; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(umd_sig_parse_message); + +/** + * umd_sig_supply_detached_data - Supply the data to verify a UMD-parsed sig + * @umd_sig: The UMD-parsed signature + * @data: The data to be verified + * @data_len: The amount of data + * + * Supply the detached data needed to verify a UMD-parsed signature. Note that + * no attempt to retain/pin the data is made. That is left to the caller. The + * data will not be modified by umd_sig_verify_message() and will not be freed + * when the UMD-parsed signature is freed. + * + * Return: Zero on success, -EINVAL if data are already supplied. + */ +int umd_sig_supply_detached_data(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + const void *data, size_t data_len) +{ + if (umd_sig->data) { + pr_debug("Data already supplied\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + umd_sig->data = data; + umd_sig->data_len = data_len; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(umd_sig_supply_detached_data); + +/** + * umd_sig_get_content_data - Get access to content data and additional data + * @umd_sig: The UMD-parsed signature + * @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data + * @_data_len: Place to return the data length + * @_headerlen: Size of the additional data + * + * Get access to the data associated to the UMD-parsed signature. This includes + * the content data eventually supplied by the caller of the UMD signatures API, + * and the additional data resulting from the signature parsing, appended at the + * end (the ordering can be configurable in the future). + * + * Data is allocated, to concatenate together the two data sources, and must be + * freed by the caller. It is presented in a way that is suitable for + * calculating the digest for verifying the signature. + * + * Return: Zero if the data and additional data can be provided, + * a negative value on error. + */ +int umd_sig_get_content_data(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + const void **_data, size_t *_data_len, + size_t *_headerlen) +{ + void *data; + + if (!umd_sig->data) + return -ENODATA; + + if (!_data) + goto skip_data; + + data = kmalloc(umd_sig->data_len + umd_sig->sig->data_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + memcpy(data, umd_sig->data, umd_sig->data_len); + memcpy(data + umd_sig->data_len, umd_sig->sig->data, + umd_sig->sig->data_size); + *_data = data; +skip_data: + if (_data_len) + *_data_len = umd_sig->data_len + umd_sig->sig->data_size; + if (_headerlen) + *_headerlen = umd_sig->sig->data_size; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(umd_sig_get_content_data); + +static int umd_sig_digest(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = umd_sig->sig; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + size_t desc_size; + int ret; + + /* The digest was calculated already. */ + if (sig->digest) + return 0; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + + ret = -ENOMEM; + sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sig->digest) + goto error_no_desc; + + desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) + goto error_no_desc; + + desc->tfm = tfm; + + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, umd_sig->data, umd_sig->data_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, umd_sig->sig_data, umd_sig->sig_data_len, + sig->digest); +error: + kfree(desc); +error_no_desc: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + return ret; +} + +/** + * umd_sig_get_digest - Obtain the digest and algorithm of the data to verify + * @umd_sig: The UMD-parsed signature + * @digest: The buffer the digest is written to + * @digest_len: The length of @digest + * @hash_algo: The algorithm the digest is calculated with + * + * Calculate the digest of data to verify with the UMD-parsed signature, if + * not calculated already. Pass the pointer of the digest from the + * public_key_signature structure, the length and the algorithm to the caller. + * + * Return: Zero on success, a negative value otherwise. + */ +int umd_sig_get_digest(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, const u8 **digest, + u32 *digest_len, enum hash_algo *hash_algo) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = umd_sig->sig; + int i, ret; + + ret = umd_sig_digest(umd_sig); + if (ret) + return ret; + + *digest = sig->digest; + *digest_len = sig->digest_size; + + i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, sig->hash_algo); + if (i >= 0) + *hash_algo = i; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(umd_sig_get_digest); + +static struct key *get_key(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, struct key *keyring) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = umd_sig->sig; + struct key *key; + + key = find_asymmetric_key(keyring, sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], + sig->auth_ids[2], true); + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_debug("Public key not found (#%*phN, #%*phN, #%*phN)\n", + sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sig->auth_ids[0]->data, + sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data, + sig->auth_ids[2]->len, sig->auth_ids[2]->data); + + switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { + /* Hide some search errors */ + case -EACCES: + case -ENOTDIR: + case -EAGAIN: + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + default: + return ERR_CAST(key); + } + } + + return key; +} + +/** + * umd_sig_verify_message - Verify the UMD-parsed signature + * @umd_sig: The UMD-parsed signature + * @keyring: Keyring containing the key for signature verification + * + * Calculate the digest, search the key for signature verification, and verify + * the signature. + * + * Return: Zero if the signature is valid, a negative value otherwise. + */ +int umd_sig_verify_message(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, struct key *keyring) +{ + const struct public_key *pub; + struct key *key; + int ret; + + ret = umd_sig_digest(umd_sig); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + key = get_key(umd_sig, keyring); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return PTR_ERR(key); + + pub = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; + + if (strcmp(pub->pkey_algo, umd_sig->sig->pkey_algo) != 0 && + (strncmp(pub->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 || + strcmp(umd_sig->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0)) { + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto out; + } + + ret = verify_signature(key, umd_sig->sig); +out: + key_put(key); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(umd_sig_verify_message); + +/** + * umd_sig_free_message - Free the memory allocated + * @umd_sig: The UMD-parsed signature + * + * Free the memory allocated for the verification of the UMD-parsed signature. + */ +void umd_sig_free_message(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig) +{ + if (!umd_sig) + return; + + kfree(umd_sig->sig_data); + public_key_signature_free(umd_sig->sig); + kfree(umd_sig); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(umd_sig_free_message); diff --git a/include/crypto/umd_sig.h b/include/crypto/umd_sig.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..89b6646a4aa --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/umd_sig.h @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + * + * Header of the UMD asymmetric key signature parser. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_UMD_SIG_H +#define _CRYPTO_UMD_SIG_H + +#include +#include +#include + +struct key; +struct umd_sig_message; + +#ifdef CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER +extern struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig_parse_message(const u8 *sig_data, + size_t sig_len); +extern int umd_sig_supply_detached_data(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + const void *data, size_t data_len); +extern int umd_sig_get_content_data(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + const void **_data, size_t *_data_len, + size_t *_headerlen); +extern int umd_sig_get_digest(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, const u8 **buf, + u32 *len, enum hash_algo *hash_algo); +extern int umd_sig_verify_message(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + struct key *keyring); +extern void umd_sig_free_message(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig); +#else +static inline struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig_parse_message(const u8 *sig_data, + size_t sig_len) +{ + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); +} + +static inline int umd_sig_supply_detached_data(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + const void *data, size_t data_len) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int umd_sig_get_content_data(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + const void **_data, + size_t *_data_len, + size_t *_headerlen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int umd_sig_get_digest(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, const u8 **buf, + u32 *len, enum hash_algo *hash_algo) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int umd_sig_verify_message(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + struct key *keyring) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline void umd_sig_free_message(struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig) +{ +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER */ +#endif /* _CRYPTO_UMD_SIG_H */ From patchwork Tue Apr 25 17:35:54 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13223600 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28637C77B61 for ; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 17:38:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234781AbjDYRis (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:38:48 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41440 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234621AbjDYRir (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:38:47 -0400 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1C5A2CC2E; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 10:38:28 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.228]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Q5TW52wVDz9xFHM; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 01:28:49 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S5; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 18:38:04 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jarkko@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, mykolal@fb.com, shuah@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [RFC][PATCH 3/6] verification: Introduce verify_umd_signature() and verify_umd_message_sig() Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 19:35:54 +0200 Message-Id: <20230425173557.724688-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S5 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3Gr4fKr18ZF18XFW3ZryDAwb_yoWxtrWfpF nY9r1FvFy3Jwn7AasxKa17Zw4fWrn5J347G3sFy3WxXFn7J3ZrKrs0gF4Y9rW5C34UJryY 9rZFqFy3Wwn8Aw7anT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUPqb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUWw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrVC2j2 WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE7xkE bVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCY1x0262kKe7 AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02 F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_GFv_Wr ylIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7Cj xVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI 0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVCY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x 07j4T5LUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgASBF1jj4iAGAAAs1 X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Introduce verify_umd_signature() and verify_umd_message_sig(), to verify UMD-parsed signatures from detached data. It aims to be used by kernel subsystems wishing to verify the authenticity of system data, with system-defined keyrings as trust anchor. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- certs/system_keyring.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/verification.h | 48 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 173 insertions(+) diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index a7a49b17ceb..d4c0de4dceb 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys; #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING @@ -339,6 +340,130 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature); +#ifdef CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER +/** + * verify_umd_message_sig - Verify a UMD-parsed signature on system data. + * @data: The data to be verified (must be provided) + * @len: Size of @data + * @umd_sig: The UMD-parsed signature + * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, + * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys) + * (void *)2UL for platform keys) + * @usage: The use to which the key is being put + * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content + * @ctx: Context for callback + * + * Verify the UMD-parsed signature of the supplied system data, against a + * key (if found) in the supplied trusted keyring. + * + * Return: Zero on successful verification, a negative value otherwise. + */ +int verify_umd_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, + struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx) +{ + int ret; + + /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */ + if (data && umd_sig_supply_detached_data(umd_sig, data, len)) { + pr_err("Failed to supply data for UMD-parsed signature\n"); + ret = -EBADMSG; + goto error; + } + + if (!trusted_keys) { + trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; + } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys; +#else + trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; +#endif + } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) { +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys; +#else + trusted_keys = NULL; +#endif + if (!trusted_keys) { + ret = -ENOKEY; + pr_devel("Platform keyring is not available\n"); + goto error; + } + } + + ret = umd_sig_verify_message(umd_sig, trusted_keys); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + if (view_content) { + size_t sig_data_len; + + ret = umd_sig_get_content_data(umd_sig, &data, &len, + &sig_data_len); + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret == -ENODATA) + pr_devel("UMD-parsed signature does not contain data\n"); + goto error; + } + + ret = view_content(ctx, data, len, sig_data_len); + kfree(data); + } +error: + pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_umd_message_sig); + +/** + * verify_umd_signature - Verify a UMD-parsed signature on system data. + * @data: The data to be verified (must be provided) + * @len: Size of @data + * @raw_umd_sig: The raw signature to be parsed with UMD + * @raw_umd_sig_len: The size of @raw_umd_sig + * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, + * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys) + * (void *)2UL for platform keys) + * @usage: The use to which the key is being put + * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content + * @ctx: Context for callback + * + * Verify the UMD-parsed signature of the supplied system data, against a + * key (if found) in the supplied trusted keyring. + * + * Return: Zero on successful verification, a negative value otherwise. + */ +int verify_umd_signature(const void *data, size_t len, + const void *raw_umd_sig, size_t raw_umd_sig_len, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx) +{ + struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig; + int ret; + + umd_sig = umd_sig_parse_message(raw_umd_sig, raw_umd_sig_len); + if (IS_ERR(umd_sig)) + return PTR_ERR(umd_sig); + + ret = verify_umd_message_sig(data, len, umd_sig, trusted_keys, usage, + view_content, ctx); + + umd_sig_free_message(umd_sig); + pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_umd_signature); +#endif /* CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER */ #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index f34e50ebcf6..2e44ea17f23 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR]; struct key; struct pkcs7_message; +struct umd_sig_message; extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, @@ -62,6 +63,53 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, size_t asn1hdrlen), void *ctx); +#ifdef CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER +extern int verify_umd_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, + struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, + size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx); +extern int verify_umd_signature(const void *data, size_t len, + const void *raw_pgp, size_t pgp_len, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx); +#else +static inline int verify_umd_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, + struct umd_sig_message *umd_sig, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, + size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int verify_umd_signature(const void *data, size_t len, + const void *raw_umd_sig, + size_t raw_umd_sig_len, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, + size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER */ + #ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, struct key *trusted_keys, From patchwork Tue Apr 25 17:35:55 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13223601 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A4E6C77B61 for ; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 17:39:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234803AbjDYRjJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:39:09 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41796 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234762AbjDYRjH (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:39:07 -0400 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2B9B114F5F; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 10:38:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.227]) by frasgout11.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Q5TWG6w3Cz9xFQD; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 01:28:58 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S6; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 18:38:16 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jarkko@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, mykolal@fb.com, shuah@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [RFC][PATCH 4/6] bpf: Introduce bpf_verify_umd_signature() kfunc Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 19:35:55 +0200 Message-Id: <20230425173557.724688-5-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S6 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxCr4UJFWkuFW5uryUWryfZwb_yoWrWr1rpF W8Krsavry8Jrs7Ja4rJa1fZF4FkF4vqw17G3sFk3s7uFn5Xr13Z348KF4UG3s0k348trWD ZrWIqw45u3W7GaUanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUPlb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCY1x0262 kKe7AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s02 6c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_GF v_WrylIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvE c7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aV AFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVCY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZF pf9x07jxwIDUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQASBF1jj4x8NAAAsi X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Introduce the bpf_verify_umd_signature() kfunc, to verify UMD-parsed signatures. The parameters and usage are the same as for bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index e8da032bb6f..c9cae337596 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_user_key(u32 serial, u64 flags) * The key pointer is marked as invalid, to prevent bpf_key_put() from * attempting to decrement the key reference count on that pointer. The key * pointer set in such way is currently understood only by - * verify_pkcs7_signature(). + * verify_pkcs7_signature() and verify_umd_signature(). * * Set *id* to one of the values defined in include/linux/verification.h: * 0 for the primary keyring (immutable keyring of system keys); @@ -1317,6 +1317,27 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *bkey) } #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION +static int validate_key(struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (trusted_keyring->has_ref) { + /* + * Do the permission check deferred in bpf_lookup_user_key(). + * See bpf_lookup_user_key() for more details. + * + * A call to key_task_permission() here would be redundant, as + * it is already done by keyring_search() called by + * find_asymmetric_key(). + */ + ret = key_validate(trusted_keyring->key); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} + /** * bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature - verify a PKCS#7 signature * @data_ptr: data to verify @@ -1334,19 +1355,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *data_ptr, { int ret; - if (trusted_keyring->has_ref) { - /* - * Do the permission check deferred in bpf_lookup_user_key(). - * See bpf_lookup_user_key() for more details. - * - * A call to key_task_permission() here would be redundant, as - * it is already done by keyring_search() called by - * find_asymmetric_key(). - */ - ret = key_validate(trusted_keyring->key); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - } + ret = validate_key(trusted_keyring); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; return verify_pkcs7_signature(data_ptr->data, bpf_dynptr_get_size(data_ptr), @@ -1356,6 +1367,35 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *data_ptr, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); } + +/** + * bpf_verify_umd_signature - Verify a UMD-parsed signature + * @data_ptr: Data to verify + * @sig_ptr: Signature of the data + * @trusted_keyring: Keyring with keys trusted for signature verification + * + * Verify the UMD-parsed signature *sig_ptr* against the supplied *data_ptr* + * with keys in a keyring referenced by *trusted_keyring*. + * + * Return: 0 on success, a negative value on error. + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_verify_umd_signature(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *data_ptr, + struct bpf_dynptr_kern *sig_ptr, + struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) +{ + int ret; + + ret = validate_key(trusted_keyring); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + return verify_umd_signature(data_ptr->data, + bpf_dynptr_get_size(data_ptr), + sig_ptr->data, bpf_dynptr_get_size(sig_ptr), + trusted_keyring->key, + VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, + NULL); +} #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ __diag_pop(); @@ -1366,6 +1406,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_lookup_system_key, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_key_put, KF_RELEASE) #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature, KF_SLEEPABLE) +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_verify_umd_signature, KF_SLEEPABLE) #endif BTF_SET8_END(key_sig_kfunc_set) From patchwork Tue Apr 25 17:35:56 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13223626 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C139FC77B73 for ; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 17:39:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234857AbjDYRjV (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:39:21 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41952 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234829AbjDYRjU (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:39:20 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 61 seconds by postgrey-1.37 at lindbergh.monkeyblade.net; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 10:38:53 PDT Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 004FA14466; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 10:38:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.227]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Q5TWY16Slz9v7QZ; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 01:29:13 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S7; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 18:38:28 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jarkko@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, mykolal@fb.com, shuah@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [RFC][PATCH 5/6] selftests/bpf: Prepare a test for UMD-parsed signatures Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 19:35:56 +0200 Message-Id: <20230425173557.724688-6-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S7 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoW3tr4DZrWUGw4Dtw1DGr45ZFb_yoW8JFyUuo Z3K347K3W3Kr1UC347X3WUCFyruryxK3s5Zws5Z3ZFq342kryUAr1kGw1fX3429w4F934r WFn3Aw1DZr9rtrnxn29KB7ZKAUJUUUU8529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUOo7kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2048vs2IY020E87I2jVAFwI0_JF 0E3s1l82xGYIkIc2x26xkF7I0E14v26ryj6s0DM28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4vE j48ve4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Gr0_Xr1l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxV AFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVCY1x02 67AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F4 0Ex7xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1Y6r17McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC 6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1lc7CjxV Aaw2AFwI0_GFv_Wryl42xK82IYc2Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2Iq xVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s026x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26r 4a6rW5MIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Gr0_Xr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY 6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1lIxAIcVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2js IE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIF yTuYvjxUI1v3UUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQASBF1jj4x8NAABsj X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Reuse the existing test for PKCS#7 signatures, to test also UMD-parsed signatures. Don't enable the test just yet, as the test would fail without a UMD parser for PGP keys and signatures. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- ...ify_pkcs7_sig.c => verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c} | 109 ++++++++++++++---- ...kcs7_sig.c => test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c} | 18 ++- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh | 82 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) rename tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/{verify_pkcs7_sig.c => verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c} (75%) rename tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/{test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c => test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c} (82%) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c similarity index 75% rename from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c rename to tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c index dd7f2bc7004..94d78146989 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ #include #include -#include "test_verify_pkcs7_sig.skel.h" +#include "test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.skel.h" #define MAX_DATA_SIZE (1024 * 1024) #define MAX_SIG_SIZE 1024 @@ -29,6 +29,24 @@ /* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */ #define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n" +#define PKEY_ID_PGP 0 +#define PKEY_ID_X509 1 +#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2 + +static char *key_types_str[PKEY_ID_PKCS7 + 1] = { + [PKEY_ID_PGP] = "pgp", + [PKEY_ID_X509] = "x509", + [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] = "pkcs7", +}; + +enum algos { ALGO_RSA, ALGO_ECDSA_P256, ALGO_ECDSA_P384, ALGO__LAST }; + +static char *algos_str[ALGO_ECDSA_P384 + 1] = { + [ALGO_RSA] = "rsa", + [ALGO_ECDSA_P256] = "ecdsa_p256", + [ALGO_ECDSA_P384] = "ecdsa_p384", +}; + /* * Module signature information block. * @@ -74,13 +92,15 @@ static int libbpf_print_cb(enum libbpf_print_level level, const char *fmt, return 0; } -static int _run_setup_process(const char *setup_dir, const char *cmd) +static int _run_setup_process(const char *setup_dir, const char *cmd, + __u8 key_type, __u8 pkey_algo) { int child_pid, child_status; child_pid = fork(); if (child_pid == 0) { - execlp("./verify_sig_setup.sh", "./verify_sig_setup.sh", cmd, + execlp("./verify_sig_setup.sh", "./verify_sig_setup.sh", + cmd, key_types_str[key_type], algos_str[pkey_algo] ?: "", setup_dir, NULL); exit(errno); @@ -92,7 +112,8 @@ static int _run_setup_process(const char *setup_dir, const char *cmd) return -EINVAL; } -static int populate_data_item_str(const char *tmp_dir, struct data *data_item) +static int populate_data_item_str(const char *tmp_dir, __u8 key_type, + struct data *data_item) { struct stat st; char data_template[] = "/tmp/dataXXXXXX"; @@ -123,10 +144,26 @@ static int populate_data_item_str(const char *tmp_dir, struct data *data_item) } if (child_pid == 0) { - snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/signing_key.pem", tmp_dir); - - return execlp("./sign-file", "./sign-file", "-d", "sha256", - path, path, data_template, NULL); + if (key_type == PKEY_ID_PKCS7) { + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/signing_key.pem", + tmp_dir); + + return execlp("./sign-file", "./sign-file", "-d", + "sha256", path, path, data_template, + NULL); + } else { + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.gpg", data_template); + + return execlp("gpg", "gpg", "--no-options", + "--no-auto-check-trustdb", + "--no-permission-warning", + "--default-key", "eBPF_UMD_Test", + "--sign", "-o", path, "--batch", "--yes", + "--compress-algo=none", "-b", + "--passphrase", "abc", + "--pinentry-mode", "loopback", "-q", + data_template, NULL); + } } waitpid(child_pid, &child_status, 0); @@ -135,7 +172,10 @@ static int populate_data_item_str(const char *tmp_dir, struct data *data_item) if (ret) goto out; - snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.p7s", data_template); + if (key_type == PKEY_ID_PKCS7) + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.p7s", data_template); + else + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s.gpg", data_template); ret = stat(path, &st); if (ret == -1) { @@ -254,12 +294,12 @@ static int populate_data_item_mod(struct data *data_item) return ret; } -void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void) +static void test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig(__u8 key_type, __u8 pkey_algo) { libbpf_print_fn_t old_print_cb; char tmp_dir_template[] = "/tmp/verify_sigXXXXXX"; char *tmp_dir; - struct test_verify_pkcs7_sig *skel = NULL; + struct test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig *skel = NULL; struct bpf_map *map; struct data data; int ret, zero = 0; @@ -272,37 +312,38 @@ void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void) if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(tmp_dir, "mkdtemp")) return; - ret = _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "setup"); + ret = _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "setup", key_type, pkey_algo); if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "_run_setup_process")) goto close_prog; - skel = test_verify_pkcs7_sig__open(); - if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_verify_pkcs7_sig__open")) + skel = test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig__open(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig__open")) goto close_prog; old_print_cb = libbpf_set_print(libbpf_print_cb); - ret = test_verify_pkcs7_sig__load(skel); + ret = test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig__load(skel); libbpf_set_print(old_print_cb); if (ret < 0 && kfunc_not_supported) { printf( - "%s:SKIP:bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() kfunc not supported\n", + "%s:SKIP:bpf_verify_*_signature() kfunc not supported\n", __func__); test__skip(); goto close_prog; } - if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "test_verify_pkcs7_sig__load")) + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig__load")) goto close_prog; - ret = test_verify_pkcs7_sig__attach(skel); - if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "test_verify_pkcs7_sig__attach")) + ret = test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig__attach(skel); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig__attach")) goto close_prog; map = bpf_object__find_map_by_name(skel->obj, "data_input"); if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(map, "data_input not found")) goto close_prog; + skel->bss->key_type = key_type; skel->bss->monitored_pid = getpid(); /* Test without data and signature. */ @@ -313,7 +354,7 @@ void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void) goto close_prog; /* Test successful signature verification with session keyring. */ - ret = populate_data_item_str(tmp_dir, &data); + ret = populate_data_item_str(tmp_dir, key_type, &data); if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "populate_data_item_str")) goto close_prog; @@ -363,9 +404,13 @@ void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void) if (!ASSERT_LT(ret, 0, "bpf_map_update_elem data_input")) goto close_prog; - ret = populate_data_item_mod(&data); - if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "populate_data_item_mod")) - goto close_prog; + data.data_len = 0; + + if (key_type == PKEY_ID_PKCS7) { + ret = populate_data_item_mod(&data); + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "populate_data_item_mod")) + goto close_prog; + } /* Test signature verification with system keyrings. */ if (data.data_len) { @@ -392,11 +437,25 @@ void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void) } close_prog: - _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "cleanup"); + _run_setup_process(tmp_dir, "cleanup", key_type, pkey_algo); if (!skel) return; skel->bss->monitored_pid = 0; - test_verify_pkcs7_sig__destroy(skel); + test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig__destroy(skel); +} + +void test_verify_pkcs7_sig(void) +{ + return test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig(PKEY_ID_PKCS7, ALGO__LAST); +} + +void test_verify_umd_sig(void) +{ + int i; + + /* Change the limit to ALGO__LAST when UMD supports PGP. */ + for (i = 0; i < 0; i++) + test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig(PKEY_ID_PGP, i); } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c similarity index 82% rename from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c rename to tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c index 7748cc23de8..e22b013a4e4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_umd_sig.c @@ -20,10 +20,14 @@ extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym; extern int bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr, struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr, struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) __ksym; +extern int bpf_verify_umd_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr, + struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr, + struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring) __ksym; __u32 monitored_pid; __u32 user_keyring_serial; __u64 system_keyring_id; +__u8 key_type; struct data { __u8 data[MAX_DATA_SIZE]; @@ -86,7 +90,19 @@ int BPF_PROG(bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) if (!trusted_keyring) return -ENOENT; - ret = bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(&data_ptr, &sig_ptr, trusted_keyring); + switch (key_type) { + case PKEY_ID_PKCS7: + ret = bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(&data_ptr, &sig_ptr, + trusted_keyring); + break; + case PKEY_ID_PGP: + ret = bpf_verify_umd_signature(&data_ptr, &sig_ptr, + trusted_keyring); + break; + default: + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + break; + } bpf_key_put(trusted_keyring); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh index ba08922b4a2..5f6e612aae9 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh @@ -26,13 +26,39 @@ subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid " +gpg_genkey_content_common="\ + Name-Real: eBPF_UMD_Test + Name-Comment: eBPF_UMD_Test + Name-Email: ebpf_umd_test@localhost + Expire-Date: 0 + Passphrase: abc + %commit +" +gpg_genkey_content_rsa="\ + Key-Type: RSA + Key-Length: 4096 + $gpg_genkey_content_common +" + +gpg_genkey_content_ecdsa_p256="\ + Key-Type: ECDSA + Key-Curve: NIST P-256 + $gpg_genkey_content_common +" + +gpg_genkey_content_ecdsa_p384="\ + Key-Type: ECDSA + Key-Curve: NIST P-384 + $gpg_genkey_content_common +" + usage() { - echo "Usage: $0 " + echo "Usage: $0 " exit 1 } -setup() +setup_pkcs7() { local tmp_dir="$1" @@ -52,11 +78,37 @@ setup() keyctl link $key_id $keyring_id } -cleanup() { +setup_pgp() +{ + local tmp_dir="$1" + local varname="gpg_genkey_content_$2" + + modprobe ecdsa_generic + + echo "${!varname}" > ${tmp_dir}/gpg.genkey + gpg --batch --generate-key ${tmp_dir}/gpg.genkey + + key_id=$(gpg --export eBPF_UMD_Test | keyctl padd asymmetric ebpf_testing_key @s) + keyring_id=$(keyctl newring ebpf_testing_keyring @s) + keyctl link $key_id $keyring_id +} + +cleanup_pkcs7() { + local tmp_dir="$1" + + keyctl unlink $(keyctl search @s asymmetric ebpf_testing_key) @s + keyctl unlink $(keyctl search @s keyring ebpf_testing_keyring) @s + rm -rf ${tmp_dir} +} + +cleanup_pgp() { local tmp_dir="$1" keyctl unlink $(keyctl search @s asymmetric ebpf_testing_key) @s keyctl unlink $(keyctl search @s keyring ebpf_testing_keyring) @s + key_fingerprint=$(gpg --fingerprint --with-colons eBPF_UMD_Test | awk -F ":" '$1 == "fpr" {print $(NF-1)}') + gpg --delete-secret-key --batch --yes $key_fingerprint + gpg --delete-key --batch --yes $key_fingerprint rm -rf ${tmp_dir} } @@ -75,17 +127,33 @@ catch() main() { - [[ $# -ne 2 ]] && usage + [[ $# -ne 4 ]] && usage local action="$1" - local tmp_dir="$2" + local key_type="$2" + local key_algo="$3" + local tmp_dir="$4" [[ ! -d "${tmp_dir}" ]] && echo "Directory ${tmp_dir} doesn't exist" && exit 1 if [[ "${action}" == "setup" ]]; then - setup "${tmp_dir}" + if [[ "${key_type}" == "pkcs7" ]]; then + setup_pkcs7 "${tmp_dir}" + elif [[ "${key_type}" == "pgp" ]]; then + setup_pgp "${tmp_dir}" "${key_algo}" + else + echo "Unknown key type: ${key_type}" + exit 1 + fi elif [[ "${action}" == "cleanup" ]]; then - cleanup "${tmp_dir}" + if [[ "${key_type}" == "pkcs7" ]]; then + cleanup_pkcs7 "${tmp_dir}" + elif [[ "${key_type}" == "pgp" ]]; then + cleanup_pgp "${tmp_dir}" + else + echo "Unknown key type: ${key_type}" + exit 1 + fi else echo "Unknown action: ${action}" exit 1 From patchwork Tue Apr 25 17:35:57 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13223627 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2FD79C77B73 for ; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 17:39:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234829AbjDYRje (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:39:34 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42316 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234882AbjDYRjc (ORCPT ); Tue, 25 Apr 2023 13:39:32 -0400 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A40A13FBE; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 10:39:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.229]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Q5TWn0Hpdz9xFg7; Wed, 26 Apr 2023 01:29:25 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S8; Tue, 25 Apr 2023 18:38:40 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jarkko@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org, mykolal@fb.com, shuah@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu Subject: [RFC][PATCH 6/6] KEYS: asymmetric: Add UMD handler Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2023 19:35:57 +0200 Message-Id: <20230425173557.724688-7-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20230425173557.724688-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwD3dADLD0hkGxlWAg--.5466S8 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3XF17Zr1UWFy8Cr1UuFW8tFb_yoW7Zw4fpa yF9rWrtFWrtw1Ska4rJr12gw4rAw48Ar4Sgw1Sq3W5uasrXw4kCrWIyF43WFy8JryxJFyr tFWkZFyUJrs5JaDanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUPlb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCY1x0262 kKe7AKxVW8ZVWrXwCF04k20xvY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s02 6c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_GF v_WrylIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvE c7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aV AFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVCY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZF pf9x07jxwIDUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQASBF1jj4x8NAACsg X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu Introduce the skeleton of the UMD handler, complete enough to talk with the new key and signature parsers in the kernel. Commands to parse keys and signatures are not implemented. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- .gitignore | 3 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 10 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 13 +++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_loader.c | 32 +++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_blob.S | 7 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_user.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 149 insertions(+) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_loader.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_blob.S create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_user.c diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 7f86e083790..f14e42b7273 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -174,3 +174,6 @@ sphinx_*/ # Rust analyzer configuration /rust-project.json + +# User mode driver for asymmetric keys and signatures +/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index d312feae88e..4b53667d209 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -107,4 +107,14 @@ config UMD_SIG_PARSER On success, the parser fills the signature from the UMD handler response. +config UMD_KEY_SIG_HANDLER + tristate "UMD handler for asymmetric keys and signatures" + depends on UMD_KEY_PARSER + help + This option introduces a UMD handler to parse data received from + the key and signature kernel parsers. + + It includes just the basic program structure, to be enhanced with + actual parsers. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index 060c699fbb2..d870cc04fcf 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -86,3 +86,16 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UMD_KEY_PARSER) += umd_key_parser.o # UMD signature parser # obj-$(CONFIG_UMD_SIG_PARSER) += umd_sig_parser.o + +# +# UMD handler for asymmetric keys and signatures +# +CC=klcc +userprogs := umd_key_sig_umh +umd_key_sig_umh-objs := umd_key_sig_umh_user.o +userldflags += -static + +$(obj)/umd_key_sig_umh_blob.o: $(obj)/umd_key_sig_umh + +obj-$(CONFIG_UMD_KEY_SIG_HANDLER) += umd_key_sig_user.o +umd_key_sig_user-objs += umd_key_sig_loader.o umd_key_sig_umh_blob.o diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_loader.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_loader.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b959a42b9fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_loader.c @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + * + * Implement the loader of the UMD handler. + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "umd_key.h" + +extern char umd_key_umh_start; +extern char umd_key_umh_end; + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + +static int __init umd_key_umh_init(void) +{ + return umd_mgmt_load(&key_ops, &umd_key_umh_start, &umd_key_umh_end); +} + +static void __exit umd_key_umh_exit(void) +{ + umd_mgmt_unload(&key_ops); +} + +module_init(umd_key_umh_init); +module_exit(umd_key_umh_exit); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_blob.S b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_blob.S new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..954cbe891bd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_blob.S @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + .section .init.rodata, "a" + .global umd_key_umh_start +umd_key_umh_start: + .incbin "crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh" + .global umd_key_umh_end +umd_key_umh_end: diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_user.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_user.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..21f53008762 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/umd_key_sig_umh_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH + * + * Author: Roberto Sassu + * + * Implement the UMD handler. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "umd_key_sig_umh.h" + +FILE *debug_f; + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + struct msg_in *in = NULL; + struct msg_out *out = NULL; + size_t in_len, out_len; + loff_t pos; + int ret = 0; + +#ifdef debug + debug_f = fopen("/dev/kmsg", "a"); + fprintf(debug_f, "<5>Started %s\n", argv[0]); + fflush(debug_f); +#endif + in = malloc(sizeof(*in)); + if (!in) + goto out; + + out = malloc(sizeof(*out)); + if (!out) + goto out; + + while (1) { + int n; + + in_len = sizeof(*in); + out_len = sizeof(*out); + + memset(in, 0, in_len); + memset(out, 0, out_len); + + pos = 0; + while (in_len) { + n = read(0, (void *)in + pos, in_len); + if (n <= 0) { + ret = -EIO; + goto out; + } + in_len -= n; + pos += n; + } + + switch (in->cmd) { + default: + out->ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + break; + } + + pos = 0; + while (out_len) { + n = write(1, (void *)out + pos, out_len); + if (n <= 0) { + ret = -EIO; + goto out; + } + out_len -= n; + pos += n; + } + } +out: + free(in); + free(out); +#ifdef debug + fclose(debug_f); +#endif + return ret; +}