From patchwork Thu Jan 31 18:55:34 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mimi Zohar X-Patchwork-Id: 10791213 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A20D746 for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43E0F3175E for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 37E7D3176A; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:42 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFBB93175E for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727914AbfAaS4l (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:41 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:54638 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728175AbfAaS4X (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:23 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x0VIs51Y034677 for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:22 -0500 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2qc5uku4h1-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:21 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:15 -0000 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x0VIuE3q20054198 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:15 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id CD45E4C044; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:14 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A19534C046; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:13 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.107.203]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:13 +0000 (GMT) From: Mimi Zohar To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, David Howells , Dave Young , Eric Biederman , Mimi Zohar Subject: [PATCH 1/3] selftest/ima: cleanup the kexec selftest Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:55:34 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.5 In-Reply-To: <1548960936-7800-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> References: <1548960936-7800-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19013118-0020-0000-0000-0000030F7AEA X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19013118-0021-0000-0000-000021607FB9 Message-Id: <1548960936-7800-2-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-01-31_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=860 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1901310141 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Remove the few bashisms in the script and use the complete option name for clarity. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel --- tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh index 1c10093fb526..74423c4229e2 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/sh # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ # Loading a kernel image via the kexec_load syscall should fail -# when the kerne is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled and the system +# when the kernel is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled and the system # is booted in secureboot mode. TEST="$0" @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ rc=0 ksft_skip=4 # kexec requires root privileges -if [ $UID != 0 ]; then +if [ $(id -ru) != 0 ]; then echo "$TEST: must be run as root" >&2 exit $ksft_skip fi @@ -33,17 +33,17 @@ secureboot=`hexdump $file | awk '{print substr($4,length($4),1)}'` # kexec_load should fail in secure boot mode KERNEL_IMAGE="/boot/vmlinuz-`uname -r`" -kexec -l $KERNEL_IMAGE &>> /dev/null -if [ $? == 0 ]; then - kexec -u - if [ "$secureboot" == "1" ]; then +kexec --load $KERNEL_IMAGE 2>&1 /dev/null +if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + kexec --unload + if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ]; then echo "$TEST: kexec_load succeeded [FAIL]" rc=1 else echo "$TEST: kexec_load succeeded [PASS]" fi else - if [ "$secureboot" == "1" ]; then + if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ]; then echo "$TEST: kexec_load failed [PASS]" else echo "$TEST: kexec_load failed [FAIL]" From patchwork Thu Jan 31 18:55:35 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mimi Zohar X-Patchwork-Id: 10791209 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 14F4B13B5 for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0E2B73175E for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 026BE31773; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:40 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94BD53175E for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728245AbfAaS4Z (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:25 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:57532 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728216AbfAaS4Y (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:24 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098409.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x0VIs6rj060245 for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:23 -0500 Received: from e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.101]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2qc5dx4deg-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:23 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp05.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:18 -0000 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x0VIuHv27471378 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:17 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C3614C04E; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:17 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D7404C04A; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:16 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.107.203]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:15 +0000 (GMT) From: Mimi Zohar To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, David Howells , Dave Young , Eric Biederman , Mimi Zohar Subject: [PATCH 2/3] scripts/ima: define a set of common functions Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:55:35 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.5 In-Reply-To: <1548960936-7800-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> References: <1548960936-7800-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19013118-0020-0000-0000-0000030F7AEB X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19013118-0021-0000-0000-000021607FBB Message-Id: <1548960936-7800-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-01-31_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=906 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1901310141 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Define and move get_secureboot_mode() to a common file for use by other tests. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel --- tools/testing/selftests/ima/common_lib.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh | 17 +++-------------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/ima/common_lib.sh diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ima/common_lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/common_lib.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..ae097a634da5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/common_lib.sh @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +get_secureboot_mode() +{ + EFIVARFS="/sys/firmware/efi/efivars" + # Make sure that efivars is mounted in the normal location + if ! grep -q "^\S\+ $EFIVARFS efivarfs" /proc/mounts; then + echo "$TEST: efivars is not mounted on $EFIVARFS" >&2 + exit $ksft_skip + fi + + # Get secureboot mode + file="$EFIVARFS/SecureBoot-*" + if [ ! -e $file ]; then + echo "$TEST: unknown secureboot mode" >&2 + exit $ksft_skip + fi + return `hexdump $file | awk '{print substr($4,length($4),1)}'` +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh index 74423c4229e2..5e3566738888 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_load.sh @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ # is booted in secureboot mode. TEST="$0" -EFIVARFS="/sys/firmware/efi/efivars" +. ./common_lib.sh rc=0 # Kselftest framework requirement - SKIP code is 4. @@ -17,19 +17,8 @@ if [ $(id -ru) != 0 ]; then exit $ksft_skip fi -# Make sure that efivars is mounted in the normal location -if ! grep -q "^\S\+ $EFIVARFS efivarfs" /proc/mounts; then - echo "$TEST: efivars is not mounted on $EFIVARFS" >&2 - exit $ksft_skip -fi - -# Get secureboot mode -file="$EFIVARFS/SecureBoot-*" -if [ ! -e $file ]; then - echo "$TEST: unknown secureboot mode" >&2 - exit $ksft_skip -fi -secureboot=`hexdump $file | awk '{print substr($4,length($4),1)}'` +get_secureboot_mode +secureboot=$? # kexec_load should fail in secure boot mode KERNEL_IMAGE="/boot/vmlinuz-`uname -r`" From patchwork Thu Jan 31 18:55:36 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mimi Zohar X-Patchwork-Id: 10791207 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE6EC13B5 for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5E6F3175E for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id C8B2B3176A; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:38 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08B6D3175E for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727943AbfAaS4g (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:36 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:50318 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727914AbfAaS4c (ORCPT ); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:32 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098404.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x0VIs8AB057717 for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:31 -0500 Received: from e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.99]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2qc5urk1cg-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:56:29 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp03.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:20 -0000 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06cxnps3074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x0VIuJXp54329458 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:19 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 89F9E4C050; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:19 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D7944C052; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:18 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.107.203]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 31 Jan 2019 18:56:18 +0000 (GMT) From: Mimi Zohar To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, David Howells , Dave Young , Eric Biederman , Mimi Zohar Subject: [PATCH 3/3] selftests/ima: kexec_file_load syscall test Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 13:55:36 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.5 In-Reply-To: <1548960936-7800-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> References: <1548960936-7800-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19013118-0012-0000-0000-000002EF9C02 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19013118-0013-0000-0000-00002126E894 Message-Id: <1548960936-7800-4-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-01-31_10:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1901310141 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The kernel can be configured to verify PE signed kernel images, IMA kernel image signatures, both types of signatures, or none. This test verifies only properly signed kernel images are loaded into memory, based on the kernel configuration and runtime policies. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel --- tools/testing/selftests/ima/Makefile | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_file_load.sh | 250 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 251 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_file_load.sh diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ima/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/Makefile index 0b3adf5444b6..945fd203744c 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/ima/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ uname_M := $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not) ARCH ?= $(shell echo $(uname_M) | sed -e s/i.86/x86/ -e s/x86_64/x86/) ifeq ($(ARCH),x86) -TEST_PROGS := test_kexec_load.sh +TEST_PROGS := test_kexec_load.sh test_kexec_file_load.sh include ../lib.mk diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_file_load.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_file_load.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..70819662ed6f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ima/test_kexec_file_load.sh @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +# +# Loading a kernel image via the kexec_file_load syscall can verify either +# the IMA signature stored in the security.ima xattr or the PE signature, +# both signatures depending on the IMA policy, or none. +# +# To determine whether the kernel image is signed, this test depends +# on pesign and getfattr. This test also requires the kernel to be +# built with CONFIG_IKCONFIG enabled and either CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC +# enabled or access to the extract-ikconfig script. + +VERBOSE=1 +EXTRACT_IKCONFIG=$(ls /lib/modules/`uname -r`/source/scripts/extract-ikconfig) +IKCONFIG=/tmp/config-`uname -r` +PROC_CONFIG="/proc/config.gz" +KERNEL_IMAGE="/boot/vmlinuz-`uname -r`" +PESIGN=/usr/bin/pesign +GETFATTR=/usr/bin/getfattr + +TEST="$0" +. ./common_lib.sh + +# Kselftest framework requirement - SKIP code is 4. +ksft_skip=4 + +kconfig_enabled() +{ + RC=0 + egrep -q $1 $IKCONFIG + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + RC=1 + fi + return $RC +} + +# policy rule format: action func= [appraise_type=] +check_ima_policy() +{ + IMA_POLICY=/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy + + RC=0 + if [ $# -eq 3 ]; then + grep -e $2 $IMA_POLICY | grep -e "^$1.*$3" 2>&1 >/dev/null + else + grep -e $2 $IMA_POLICY | grep -e "^$1" 2>&1 >/dev/null + fi + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + RC=1 + fi + return $RC +} + +check_kconfig_options() +{ + # Attempt to get the kernel config first via proc, and then by + # extracting it from the kernel image using scripts/extract-ikconfig. + if [ ! -f $PROC_CONFIG ]; then + modprobe configs 2>/dev/null + fi + if [ -f $PROC_CONFIG ]; then + cat $PROC_CONFIG > $IKCONFIG + fi + + if [ ! -f $IKCONFIG ]; then + if [ ! -f $EXTRACT_IKCONFIG ]; then + echo "$TEST: requires access to extract-ikconfig" >&2 + exit $ksft_skip + fi + + $EXTRACT_IKCONFIG $KERNEL_IMAGE > $IKCONFIG + kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IKCONFIG=y" + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + echo "$TEST: requires the kernel to be built with CONFIG_IKCONFIG" >&2 + exit $ksft_skip + fi + fi + + kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG=y" + pe_sig_required=$? + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && [ $pe_sig_required -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] PE signed kernel image required" + fi + + kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS=y" + ima_sig_required=$? + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] IMA kernel image signature required" + fi + + kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y" + arch_policy=$? + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] architecture specific policy enabled" + fi + + kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING=y" + platform_keyring=$? + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && [ $platform_keyring -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] platform kerying enabled" + fi + + kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y" + ima_read_policy=$? + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && [ $ima_read_policy -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] userspace can read IMA policy" + fi + rm $IKCONFIG +} + +check_for_apps() +{ + if [ ! -f $PESIGN ]; then + PESIGN=$(which pesign 2>/dev/null) + if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: requires pesign" >&2 + exit $ksft_skip + else + echo "$TEST: [INFO] found $PESIGN" + fi + fi + + if [ ! -f $GETFATTR ]; then + GETFATTR=$(which getfattr 2>/dev/null) + if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: requires getfattr" >&2 + exit $ksft_skip + else + echo "$TEST: [INFO] found $GETFATTR" + fi + fi +} + +check_runtime() +{ + get_secureboot_mode + secureboot=$? + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && [ $secureboot -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] secure boot mode enabled" + fi + # The builtin "secure_boot" or custom policies might require an + # IMA signature. Check the runtime appraise policy rules + # (eg. /ima/policy). Policy rules are walked + # sequentially. As a result, a policy rule may be defined, + # but might not necessarily be used. This test assumes if a + # policy rule is specified, that is the intent. + if [ $ima_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_read_policy -eq 1 ]; then + check_ima_policy "appraise" "func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" \ + "appraise_type=imasig" + ima_sig_required=$? + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] IMA signature required" + fi + fi +} + +check_for_sigs() +{ + pe_signed=0 + $PESIGN -i $KERNEL_IMAGE --show-signature | grep -q "No signatures" + pe_signed=$? + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ]; then + if [ $pe_signed -eq 1 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] kexec kernel image PE signed" + else + echo "$TEST: [INFO] kexec kernel image not PE signed" + fi + fi + + ima_signed=0 + line=$($GETFATTR -n security.ima -e hex --absolute-names $KERNEL_IMAGE 2>&1) + echo $line | grep -q "security.ima=0x03" + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + ima_signed=1 + if [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] ; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] kexec kernel image IMA signed" + fi + elif [ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ]; then + echo "$TEST: [INFO] kexec kernel image not IMA signed" + fi +} + +kexec_file_load_test() +{ + succeed_msg="$TEST: kexec_file_load succeeded " + failed_msg="$TEST: kexec_file_load failed " + platformkey_msg="try enabling the CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING" + rc=0 + + line=$(kexec --load --kexec-file-syscall $KERNEL_IMAGE 2>&1) + + # kexec_file_load succeeded. In secureboot mode with an architecture + # specific policy, make sure either an IMA or PE signature exists. + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + kexec --unload --kexec-file-syscall + if [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] && \ + [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then + echo $succeed_msg "(missing sigs) [FAIL]" + rc=1 + elif [ $ima_sig_required -eq 1 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ]; then + echo $succeed_msg "(missing imasig) [FAIL]" + rc=1 + elif [ $pe_sig_required -eq 1 ] && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then + echo $succeed_msg "(missing PE sig) [FAIL]" + rc=1 + elif [ $ima_read_policy -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 0 ] \ + && [ $ima_signed -eq 0]; then + echo $succeed_msg "[UNKNOWN]" + else + echo $succeed_msg "[PASS]" + fi + return $rc + fi + + # Check the reason for the kexec_file_load failure + echo $line | grep -q "Required key not available" + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + rc=1 + if [ $platform_keyring -eq 0 ]; then + echo $failed_msg "(-ENOKEY)," $platformkey_msg + else + echo $failed_msg "(-ENOKEY)" + fi + elif [ $ima_sig_required -eq 1 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ]; then + echo $TEST: $failed_msg "[PASS]" + elif [ $pe_sig_required -eq 1 ] && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then + echo $TEST: $failed_msg "[PASS]" + elif [ $ima_read_policy -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 0 ] && \ + [ $ima_signed -eq 0]; then + echo $failed_msg "[UNKNOWN]" + else + echo $TEST: $failed_msg "[FAIL]" + rc=1 + fi + return $rc +} + +# kexec requires root privileges +if [ $(id -ru) != 0 ]; then + echo "$TEST: Requires root privileges" >&2 + exit $ksft_skip +fi + +check_kconfig_options +check_for_apps +check_runtime +check_for_sigs +kexec_file_load_test +rc=$? +exit $rc