From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:49 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538218 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C25178682; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654244; cv=none; b=fl+puoN/ufWjkEPIPGKyqt2BxjlNewcBUSxSCjAYIGAyO5EixAw07pp15qBzaWxyslYkYo8pDLekSpnUAg4xaWmXoIeRaTQcU5cXusWcEIZ0gSEd4y1qRIP0vxM13nJASTJpT1Hey0Py1fagGzXxsgXrB2CjHQjoRtNBA+ksG5k= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654244; c=relaxed/simple; bh=xL1nKpqZLIeKliSD+xQUyqVmzNy5OAxU8KbgLk6atAg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=jGTaVumcNovGuNXgPImLD8jBJ6H0QqaeNxH/18KWFAqssnG5EzWyC4g6DnLgCd7d9/MqW9oGltu92OjyCCb0+HvVLC07dMZwANt49eiQDnBzZo5onsoLdWRhJ2YGgaiZdgWYu66v5Ac74l8WJ5zwbkpWF+c/ZGbsFH++B5bP+ok= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=BqjUiSZR; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="BqjUiSZR" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id EDCF92057C0D; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:21 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com EDCF92057C0D DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654241; bh=LTiRam5npkgbf4mW3Q6pe+eqiBaI/QeBWCFrYaYQye8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BqjUiSZRBllytXv9UqRaC+AZ8XVuBP3HM6l7O2tBVekjaOh2Q1XOt0skhjXgGLlsJ 2AmcKnicqHjQr8u3uT48oFJufl+2RuZyVr27tofxY14l5Z8f/zLoE3GZ+ccAq6EQ5l rUaX5oMTq3QYtnQIy68R8ilndLM87Z7LI0BlujFI= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:49 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-2-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs today. Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach, is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust of a current resource. The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which resource can be trusted. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review. + Introduce the concept of an ipe_context, a scoped way to introduce execution policies, used initially for allowing for kunit tests in isolation. v8: + Follow lsmname_hook_name convention for lsm hooks. + Move LSM blob accessors to ipe.c and mark LSM blobs as static. v9: + Remove ipe_context for simplification v10: + Add github url v11: + Correct github url + Move ipe before bpf v12: + Switch to use lsm_id instead of string for lsm name --- MAINTAINERS | 7 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 + security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++----- security/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/Makefile | 9 +++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 3 ++- 9 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/ipe/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/ipe/Makefile create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/ipe.h diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 8999497011a2..51464982297b 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10644,6 +10644,13 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git F: security/integrity/ F: security/integrity/ima/ +INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) +M: Fan Wu +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +T: git https://github.com/microsoft/ipe.git +F: security/ipe/ + INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER M: Antonino Daplas L: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h index f8aef9ade549..43e2fb32745a 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { #define LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN 108 #define LSM_ID_BPF 109 #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 +#define LSM_ID_IPE 111 /* * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 52c9af08ad35..cc7adfbb6b96 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" source "security/landlock/Kconfig" +source "security/ipe/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" @@ -233,11 +234,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 59f238490665..cc0982214b84 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe/ # Object integrity file lists obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/ diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e4875fb04883 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +# Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) configuration +# + +menuconfig SECURITY_IPE + bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM + allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access + control. A key feature of IPE is a customizable policy to allow + admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly. + + If unsure, answer N. diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f7a80d0f18f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + ipe.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b013aed15e73 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#include + +#include "ipe.h" + +static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { +}; + +static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { + .name = "ipe", + .id = LSM_ID_IPE, +}; + +static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { +}; + +/** + * ipe_init - Entry point of IPE. + * + * This is called at LSM init, which happens occurs early during kernel + * start up. During this phase, IPE registers its hooks and loads the + * builtin boot policy. + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -ENOMEM - Out of memory + */ +static int __init ipe_init(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), &ipe_lsmid); + + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { + .name = "ipe", + .init = ipe_init, + .blobs = &ipe_blobs, +}; diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a1c68d0fc2e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _IPE_H +#define _IPE_H + +#ifdef pr_fmt +#undef pr_fmt +#endif +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE: " fmt + +#include + +#endif /* _IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 0144a98d3712..ddf2e69cf8f2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0)) + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) ? 1 : 0)) /* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:50 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538219 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BE5278B67; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654245; cv=none; b=lXqbnB11HfM9RFQI5CV5Z918nXG6c08HkI+ll4U9RWs7LgeBpRqPXvMwTk7GsbQEymE0xpyx3IQ7lgnFx4vEXFpbIhyLcazRJIYsZ3ykUu7eeFh9osyG484kolQDCW9MzvugwPrXWftvwZUH+FmEyOmIMSLUN5tq+UTb0OoduuM= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654245; c=relaxed/simple; bh=LODodEMPN2USFSQQqYnd/rajy/lzjNAClfiqysf3rqo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=p2GB52OWDwEmFbrVqXXIM1/lAH8C5u0hl9FcCE8DshzN3VSGevYNZfSA+dgSvTfY3wgUvESte+y0nOn/PoX07HRpgtGuHoHjBatw0WwRu+XFx8A8eOPnKP1d7qQBSoSx60j1R9tnWLTlq17O6socDNFjDrMTJDXprBtdTF7BW/k= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=K1wUbFN+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="K1wUbFN+" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 086AB20B2001; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:21 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 086AB20B2001 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=XEDPtmeJ3LoXC+Qx8DBwmPt9/L/M9D20WhdqF8A6vnM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=K1wUbFN+WL89KpBRqrviZstNR/+FnxAJn4b89zrIy+YRHsj8iBU+05R69AQ94TiGd S3fwbOHhATGQ9nCf/n5kTK9x9GmQ5r88FZFnmbpzpEnKesof7gqYgP43EG0TFV9F2+ ftFS3DsnS/axSNQHMu0x/Hd17vnbMEhdJcf/pXH0= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 02/20] ipe: add policy parser Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:50 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-3-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers IPE's interpretation of the what the user trusts is accomplished through its policy. IPE's design is to not provide support for a single trust provider, but to support multiple providers to enable the end-user to choose the best one to seek their needs. This requires the policy to be rather flexible and modular so that integrity providers, like fs-verity, dm-verity, dm-integrity, or some other system, can plug into the policy with minimal code changes. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 + Fix a potential panic when a policy failed to load. + use pr_warn for a failure to parse instead of an audit record + Remove comments from headers + Add lockdep assertions to ipe_update_active_policy and ipe_activate_policy + Fix up warnings with checkpatch --strict + Use file_ns_capable for CAP_MAC_ADMIN for securityfs nodes. + Use memdup_user instead of kzalloc+simple_write_to_buffer. + Remove strict_parse command line parameter, as it is added by the sysctl command line. + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ v4: + Remove securityfs to reverse-dependency + Add SHA1 reverse dependency. + Add versioning scheme for IPE properties, and associated interface to query the versioning scheme. + Cause a parser to always return an error on unknown syntax. + Remove strict_parse option + Change active_policy interface from sysctl, to securityfs, and change scheme. v5: + Cause an error if a default action is not defined for each operation. + Minor function renames v6: + No changes v7: + Further split parser and userspace interface into two separate commits, for easier review. + Refactor policy parser to make code cleaner via introducing a more modular design, for easier extension of policy, and easier review. v8: + remove unnecessary pr_info emission on parser loading + add explicit newline to the pr_err emitted when a parser fails to load. v9: + switch to match table to parse policy + remove quote syntax and KERNEL_READ operation v10: + Fix memory leaks in parser + Fix typos and change code styles v11: + Fix code style issues v12: + Add __always_unused to an unused parameter + Simplify error case handling --- security/ipe/Makefile | 2 + security/ipe/policy.c | 101 ++++++++ security/ipe/policy.h | 83 ++++++ security/ipe/policy_parser.c | 487 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/policy_parser.h | 11 + 5 files changed, 684 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy.h create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_parser.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_parser.h diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index f7a80d0f18f8..c09aec4904f2 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -7,3 +7,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ ipe.o \ + policy.o \ + policy_parser.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f22a576a6d68 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "policy.h" +#include "policy_parser.h" + +/** + * ipe_free_policy - Deallocate a given IPE policy. + * @p: Supplies the policy to free. + * + * Safe to call on IS_ERR/NULL. + */ +void ipe_free_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p)) + return; + + free_parsed_policy(p->parsed); + /* + * p->text is allocated only when p->pkcs7 is not NULL + * otherwise it points to the plaintext data inside the pkcs7 + */ + if (!p->pkcs7) + kfree(p->text); + kfree(p->pkcs7); + kfree(p); +} + +static int set_pkcs7_data(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen __always_unused) +{ + struct ipe_policy *p = ctx; + + p->text = (const char *)data; + p->textlen = len; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_new_policy - Allocate and parse an ipe_policy structure. + * + * @text: Supplies a pointer to the plain-text policy to parse. + * @textlen: Supplies the length of @text. + * @pkcs7: Supplies a pointer to a pkcs7-signed IPE policy. + * @pkcs7len: Supplies the length of @pkcs7. + * + * @text/@textlen Should be NULL/0 if @pkcs7/@pkcs7len is set. + * + * Return: + * * !IS_ERR - Success + * * -EBADMSG - Policy is invalid + * * -ENOMEM - Out of memory + */ +struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, + const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *new = NULL; + + new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (!text) { + new->pkcs7len = pkcs7len; + new->pkcs7 = kmemdup(pkcs7, pkcs7len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new->pkcs7) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, new->pkcs7, pkcs7len, NULL, + VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, + set_pkcs7_data, new); + if (rc) + goto err; + } else { + new->textlen = textlen; + new->text = kstrdup(text, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new->text) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + } + + rc = parse_policy(new); + if (rc) + goto err; + + return new; +err: + ipe_free_policy(new); + return ERR_PTR(rc); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fb906f41522b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef _IPE_POLICY_H +#define _IPE_POLICY_H + +#include +#include + +enum ipe_op_type { + IPE_OP_EXEC = 0, + IPE_OP_FIRMWARE, + IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE, + IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE, + IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, + IPE_OP_POLICY, + IPE_OP_X509, + __IPE_OP_MAX, +}; + +#define IPE_OP_INVALID __IPE_OP_MAX + +enum ipe_action_type { + IPE_ACTION_ALLOW = 0, + IPE_ACTION_DENY, + __IPE_ACTION_MAX +}; + +#define IPE_ACTION_INVALID __IPE_ACTION_MAX + +enum ipe_prop_type { + __IPE_PROP_MAX +}; + +#define IPE_PROP_INVALID __IPE_PROP_MAX + +struct ipe_prop { + struct list_head next; + enum ipe_prop_type type; + void *value; +}; + +struct ipe_rule { + enum ipe_op_type op; + enum ipe_action_type action; + struct list_head props; + struct list_head next; +}; + +struct ipe_op_table { + struct list_head rules; + enum ipe_action_type default_action; +}; + +struct ipe_parsed_policy { + const char *name; + struct { + u16 major; + u16 minor; + u16 rev; + } version; + + enum ipe_action_type global_default_action; + + struct ipe_op_table rules[__IPE_OP_MAX]; +}; + +struct ipe_policy { + const char *pkcs7; + size_t pkcs7len; + + const char *text; + size_t textlen; + + struct ipe_parsed_policy *parsed; +}; + +struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, + const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len); +void ipe_free_policy(struct ipe_policy *pol); + +#endif /* _IPE_POLICY_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..612839b405f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c @@ -0,0 +1,487 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "policy.h" +#include "policy_parser.h" + +#define START_COMMENT '#' +#define IPE_POLICY_DELIM " \t" +#define IPE_LINE_DELIM "\n\r" + +/** + * new_parsed_policy - Allocate and initialize a parsed policy. + * + * Return: + * * !IS_ERR - OK + * * -ENOMEM - Out of memory + */ +static struct ipe_parsed_policy *new_parsed_policy(void) +{ + size_t i = 0; + struct ipe_parsed_policy *p = NULL; + struct ipe_op_table *t = NULL; + + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + p->global_default_action = IPE_ACTION_INVALID; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i) { + t = &p->rules[i]; + + t->default_action = IPE_ACTION_INVALID; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&t->rules); + } + + return p; +} + +/** + * remove_comment - Truncate all chars following START_COMMENT in a string. + * + * @line: Supplies a policy line string for preprocessing. + */ +static void remove_comment(char *line) +{ + line = strchr(line, START_COMMENT); + + if (line) + *line = '\0'; +} + +/** + * remove_trailing_spaces - Truncate all trailing spaces in a string. + * + * @line: Supplies a policy line string for preprocessing. + * + * Return: The length of truncated string. + */ +static size_t remove_trailing_spaces(char *line) +{ + size_t i = 0; + + i = strlen(line); + while (i > 0 && isspace(line[i - 1])) + i--; + + line[i] = '\0'; + + return i; +} + +/** + * parse_version - Parse policy version. + * @ver: Supplies a version string to be parsed. + * @p: Supplies the partial parsed policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * !0 - Standard errno + */ +static int parse_version(char *ver, struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t sep_count = 0; + char *token; + u16 *const cv[] = { &p->version.major, &p->version.minor, &p->version.rev }; + + while ((token = strsep(&ver, ".")) != NULL) { + /* prevent overflow */ + if (sep_count >= ARRAY_SIZE(cv)) + return -EBADMSG; + + rc = kstrtou16(token, 10, cv[sep_count]); + if (rc) + return rc; + + ++sep_count; + } + + /* prevent underflow */ + if (sep_count != ARRAY_SIZE(cv)) + return -EBADMSG; + + return 0; +} + +enum header_opt { + IPE_HEADER_POLICY_NAME = 0, + IPE_HEADER_POLICY_VERSION, + __IPE_HEADER_MAX +}; + +static const match_table_t header_tokens = { + {IPE_HEADER_POLICY_NAME, "policy_name=%s"}, + {IPE_HEADER_POLICY_VERSION, "policy_version=%s"}, + {__IPE_HEADER_MAX, NULL} +}; + +/** + * parse_header - Parse policy header information. + * @line: Supplies header line to be parsed. + * @p: Supplies the partial parsed policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * !0 - Standard errno + */ +static int parse_header(char *line, struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *t, *ver = NULL; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + size_t idx = 0; + + while ((t = strsep(&line, IPE_POLICY_DELIM)) != NULL) { + int token; + + if (*t == '\0') + continue; + if (idx >= __IPE_HEADER_MAX) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto out; + } + + token = match_token(t, header_tokens, args); + if (token != idx) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto out; + } + + switch (token) { + case IPE_HEADER_POLICY_NAME: + p->name = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!p->name) + rc = -ENOMEM; + break; + case IPE_HEADER_POLICY_VERSION: + ver = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!ver) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + break; + } + rc = parse_version(ver, p); + break; + default: + rc = -EBADMSG; + } + if (rc) + goto out; + ++idx; + } + + if (idx != __IPE_HEADER_MAX) + rc = -EBADMSG; + +out: + kfree(ver); + return rc; +} + +/** + * token_default - Determine if the given token is "DEFAULT". + * @token: Supplies the token string to be compared. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - The token is not "DEFAULT" + * * !0 - The token is "DEFAULT" + */ +static bool token_default(char *token) +{ + return !strcmp(token, "DEFAULT"); +} + +/** + * free_rule - Free the supplied ipe_rule struct. + * @r: Supplies the ipe_rule struct to be freed. + * + * Free a ipe_rule struct @r. Note @r must be removed from any lists before + * calling this function. + */ +static void free_rule(struct ipe_rule *r) +{ + struct ipe_prop *p, *t; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(r)) + return; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(p, t, &r->props, next) { + list_del(&p->next); + kfree(p); + } + + kfree(r); +} + +static const match_table_t operation_tokens = { + {IPE_OP_EXEC, "op=EXECUTE"}, + {IPE_OP_FIRMWARE, "op=FIRMWARE"}, + {IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE, "op=KMODULE"}, + {IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE, "op=KEXEC_IMAGE"}, + {IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, "op=KEXEC_INITRAMFS"}, + {IPE_OP_POLICY, "op=POLICY"}, + {IPE_OP_X509, "op=X509_CERT"}, + {IPE_OP_INVALID, NULL} +}; + +/** + * parse_operation - Parse the operation type given a token string. + * @t: Supplies the token string to be parsed. + * + * Return: The parsed operation type. + */ +static enum ipe_op_type parse_operation(char *t) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + + return match_token(t, operation_tokens, args); +} + +static const match_table_t action_tokens = { + {IPE_ACTION_ALLOW, "action=ALLOW"}, + {IPE_ACTION_DENY, "action=DENY"}, + {IPE_ACTION_INVALID, NULL} +}; + +/** + * parse_action - Parse the action type given a token string. + * @t: Supplies the token string to be parsed. + * + * Return: The parsed action type. + */ +static enum ipe_action_type parse_action(char *t) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + + return match_token(t, action_tokens, args); +} + +/** + * parse_property - Parse the property type given a token string. + * @t: Supplies the token string to be parsed. + * @r: Supplies the ipe_rule the parsed property will be associated with. + * + * Return: + * * !IS_ERR - OK + * * -ENOMEM - Out of memory + * * -EBADMSG - The supplied token cannot be parsed + */ +static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r) +{ + return -EBADMSG; +} + +/** + * parse_rule - parse a policy rule line. + * @line: Supplies rule line to be parsed. + * @p: Supplies the partial parsed policy. + * + * Return: + * * !IS_ERR - OK + * * -ENOMEM - Out of memory + * * -EBADMSG - Policy syntax error + */ +static int parse_rule(char *line, struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool first_token = true, is_default_rule = false; + bool op_parsed = false; + enum ipe_op_type op = IPE_OP_INVALID; + enum ipe_action_type action = IPE_ACTION_INVALID; + struct ipe_rule *r = NULL; + char *t; + + r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!r) + return -ENOMEM; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->next); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->props); + + while (t = strsep(&line, IPE_POLICY_DELIM), line) { + if (*t == '\0') + continue; + if (first_token && token_default(t)) { + is_default_rule = true; + } else { + if (!op_parsed) { + op = parse_operation(t); + if (op == IPE_OP_INVALID) + rc = -EBADMSG; + else + op_parsed = true; + } else { + rc = parse_property(t, r); + } + } + + if (rc) + goto err; + first_token = false; + } + + action = parse_action(t); + if (action == IPE_ACTION_INVALID) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto err; + } + + if (is_default_rule) { + if (!list_empty(&r->props)) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + } else if (op == IPE_OP_INVALID) { + if (p->global_default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) + rc = -EBADMSG; + else + p->global_default_action = action; + } else { + if (p->rules[op].default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) + rc = -EBADMSG; + else + p->rules[op].default_action = action; + } + } else if (op != IPE_OP_INVALID && action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) { + r->op = op; + r->action = action; + } else { + rc = -EBADMSG; + } + + if (rc) + goto err; + if (!is_default_rule) + list_add_tail(&r->next, &p->rules[op].rules); + else + free_rule(r); + + return rc; +err: + free_rule(r); + return rc; +} + +/** + * free_parsed_policy - free a parsed policy structure. + * @p: Supplies the parsed policy. + */ +void free_parsed_policy(struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + size_t i = 0; + struct ipe_rule *pp, *t; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p)) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i) + list_for_each_entry_safe(pp, t, &p->rules[i].rules, next) { + list_del(&pp->next); + free_rule(pp); + } + + kfree(p->name); + kfree(p); +} + +/** + * validate_policy - validate a parsed policy. + * @p: Supplies the fully parsed policy. + * + * Given a policy structure that was just parsed, validate that all + * necessary fields are present, initialized correctly. + * + * A parsed policy can be in an invalid state for use (a default was + * undefined) by just parsing the policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -EBADMSG - Policy is invalid + */ +static int validate_policy(const struct ipe_parsed_policy *p) +{ + size_t i = 0; + + if (p->global_default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->rules); ++i) { + if (p->rules[i].default_action == IPE_ACTION_INVALID) + return -EBADMSG; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * parse_policy - Given a string, parse the string into an IPE policy. + * @p: partially filled ipe_policy structure to populate with the result. + * it must have text and textlen set. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -EBADMSG - Policy is invalid + * * -ENOMEM - Out of Memory + */ +int parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t len; + char *policy = NULL, *dup = NULL; + char *line = NULL; + bool header_parsed = false; + struct ipe_parsed_policy *pp = NULL; + + if (!p->textlen) + return -EBADMSG; + + policy = kmemdup_nul(p->text, p->textlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!policy) + return -ENOMEM; + dup = policy; + + pp = new_parsed_policy(); + if (IS_ERR(pp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(pp); + goto out; + } + + while ((line = strsep(&policy, IPE_LINE_DELIM)) != NULL) { + remove_comment(line); + len = remove_trailing_spaces(line); + if (!len) + continue; + + if (!header_parsed) { + rc = parse_header(line, pp); + if (rc) + goto err; + header_parsed = true; + } else { + rc = parse_rule(line, pp); + if (rc) + goto err; + } + } + + if (!header_parsed || validate_policy(pp)) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto err; + } + + p->parsed = pp; + +out: + kfree(dup); + return rc; +err: + free_parsed_policy(pp); + goto out; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser.h b/security/ipe/policy_parser.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2b744103d06a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef _IPE_POLICY_PARSER_H +#define _IPE_POLICY_PARSER_H + +int parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p); +void free_parsed_policy(struct ipe_parsed_policy *p); + +#endif /* _IPE_POLICY_PARSER_H */ From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:51 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538221 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6CAD78B6D; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654245; cv=none; b=XjFD8S31On0xYI5VYCqgRXcpAParySWOGFTPtL6vCu0z58meNSqKIzgVROSAlPByxtGwMc+leymfUuXV7jfBFw+rw3IXDgQro2TtQcb4SK/6NPdhV4rYjU3i84bD5rKRfWXyc6t2E4q6lsYCpiQ+YU0BKjHU1PUaF7jzYoWa2yc= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654245; c=relaxed/simple; bh=tFaUeER30hosoJ+OPdSsgr1pXSqyKZEV/QNpQ5VRXqE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=Db6gM26LpuuOi5njZn4yEO/DXfuSrxh6hRbk3ff3bFxqkO32uNxBueYBE9yX5XI9gLfxJjEnigE/egKzocN0S7CPO6kX415cSiH0vFiScJn9XwPbgkjD6EwZDerh3ZFIQKo1dcF192cMnpO6AFm21OKcoqk5UmGQtdeDsxr3r3Q= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=e4BMtpEv; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="e4BMtpEv" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 1713F20B2003; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:21 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 1713F20B2003 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=RI94jOT/R/a54qYYhDK+OanuSVzhv0ZoCkBytf6U4PQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=e4BMtpEv0x+VEYI/SgN/yn03yyjnw6/RrRl9pcTgCG88Av9CPgpq1jn4UOma1aWxd fm1HEwyXtTEZY0K/YT05k3D/98mpVrPl737keon90rYs2PGhFAOqDBUhVqkFeV1VXz 6cxJIbibPvjWhUUH5igN5jAd6ya8EPh4g6wWGxuI= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:51 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-4-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers IPE must have a centralized function to evaluate incoming callers against IPE's policy. This iteration of the policy for against the rules for that specific caller is known as the evaluation loop. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. +Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, + reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review. + Propagating changes to support the new ipe_context structure in the evaluation loop. v8: + Remove ipe_hook enumeration; hooks can be correlated via syscall record. v9: + Remove ipe_context related code and simplify the evaluation loop. v10: + Split eval part and boot_verified part v11: + Fix code style issues v12: + Correct an rcu_read_unlock usage + Add a WARN to unknown op during evaluation --- security/ipe/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/eval.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/eval.h | 24 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/eval.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/eval.h diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index c09aec4904f2..57fe922cf1fc 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + eval.o \ ipe.o \ policy.o \ policy_parser.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..af56815ed0fa --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "eval.h" +#include "policy.h" + +struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; + +/** + * evaluate_property - Analyze @ctx against a property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the property to be evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the @p + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the @p + */ +static bool evaluate_property(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + struct ipe_prop *p) +{ + return false; +} + +/** + * ipe_evaluate_event - Analyze @ctx against the current active policy. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated. + * + * This is the loop where all policy evaluation happens against IPE policy. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * -EACCES - @ctx did not pass evaluation. + * * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + bool match = false; + enum ipe_action_type action; + struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; + const struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL; + const struct ipe_op_table *rules = NULL; + struct ipe_prop *prop = NULL; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + pol = rcu_dereference(ipe_active_policy); + if (!pol) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return 0; + } + + if (ctx->op == IPE_OP_INVALID) { + if (pol->parsed->global_default_action == IPE_ACTION_DENY) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return -EACCES; + } + if (pol->parsed->global_default_action == IPE_ACTION_INVALID) + WARN(1, "no default rule set for unknown op, ALLOW it"); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return 0; + } + + rules = &pol->parsed->rules[ctx->op]; + + list_for_each_entry(rule, &rules->rules, next) { + match = true; + + list_for_each_entry(prop, &rule->props, next) { + match = evaluate_property(ctx, prop); + if (!match) + break; + } + + if (match) + break; + } + + if (match) + action = rule->action; + else if (rules->default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) + action = rules->default_action; + else + action = pol->parsed->global_default_action; + + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (action == IPE_ACTION_DENY) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6b434515968f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _IPE_EVAL_H +#define _IPE_EVAL_H + +#include +#include + +#include "policy.h" + +extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; + +struct ipe_eval_ctx { + enum ipe_op_type op; + + const struct file *file; +}; + +int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx); + +#endif /* _IPE_EVAL_H */ From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:52 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538222 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EBA02762D6; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654245; cv=none; b=OwoFrzWLGtcvPKXfh3lEyBCUNnagQZaVBVnoyfl44ERGkXvZO1auiMcp40qV7L5OGV2AHxWIY6OVooPJS2w8rfVjEDX7/1qTXA+bvxM1Suv8PEars+gPKOHKQ9fepbZPyICOEYLK/CQ+GpSuBpomN0m1ZhK/O7hoLMk7EGXUdBM= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654245; c=relaxed/simple; bh=XQVge2kj4rUWlB557kVzuiQGZDjqfWxqK2fdHkqWT8s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=O+gPNTJqzbdDaRwXR5Jvnpk2AEaiqv19SKV9YjCQnRlIPasjHR2HtogKooKvGC9hz0PzG7nL8ZIuDRRyRqoRxI0cqF+p09peZgizUVy/jJZ+3c1cEF8S0dchwthlmghO/vBWaU7UHjxfng4qkl/7A1gArCyBQW6ESZKpS5jP0UQ= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=HLyXhse+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="HLyXhse+" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 2664A20B2005; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 2664A20B2005 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=hcYzKcvwL4kCnoiyUlMaq/OFhn9cfPHZcYXyIutYFE4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=HLyXhse+j1Q1od5rEgTWo/PxqexV7prjOK5Lbad488Id8I+0n6Pmhe+luYoH3VNUj HPqfV3dFQSGZ0o4POikB7QHoWES/F2Zzz13zxiF5MUOCYx3C8kYpr+7m83LUASnHXo 21d+NWCelQqwa09FX5CxAgP/GI1M1onPT8Pt7+5I= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:52 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-5-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for bprm_check_security, file_mprotect, mmap_file, kernel_load_data, and kernel_read_data. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation, the audit system, the evaluation loop and access control hooks into separate commits. v8: + Rename hook functions to follow the lsmname_hook_name convention + Remove ipe_hook enumeration, can be derived from correlation with syscall audit record. v9: + Minor changes for adapting to the new parser v10: + Remove @reqprot part v11: + Fix code style issues v12: + Correct WARN usages --- security/ipe/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/eval.c | 14 ++++ security/ipe/eval.h | 3 + security/ipe/hooks.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 25 ++++++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 6 ++ 6 files changed, 232 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/hooks.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/hooks.h diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 57fe922cf1fc..d7f2870d7c09 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ eval.o \ + hooks.o \ ipe.o \ policy.o \ policy_parser.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index af56815ed0fa..4f425afffcad 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -16,6 +16,20 @@ struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; +/** + * build_eval_ctx - Build an evaluation context. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. + * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file to associated with the evaluation. + * @op: Supplies the IPE policy operation associated with the evaluation. + */ +void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, + const struct file *file, + enum ipe_op_type op) +{ + ctx->file = file; + ctx->op = op; +} + /** * evaluate_property - Analyze @ctx against a property. * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated. diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 6b434515968f..cfdf3c8dfe8a 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #include "policy.h" +#define IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT ((struct ipe_eval_ctx){ 0 }) + extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; struct ipe_eval_ctx { @@ -19,6 +21,7 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx { const struct file *file; }; +void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *file, enum ipe_op_type op); int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx); #endif /* _IPE_EVAL_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3aec88c074e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "hooks.h" +#include "eval.h" + +/** + * ipe_bprm_check_security - ipe security hook function for bprm check. + * @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file + * being evaluated. + * + * This LSM hook is called when a binary is loaded through the exec + * family of system calls. + * Return: + * *0 - OK + * *!0 - Error + */ +int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT; + + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, IPE_OP_EXEC); + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); +} + +/** + * ipe_mmap_file - ipe security hook function for mmap check. + * @f: File being mmap'd. Can be NULL in the case of anonymous memory. + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode. + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and + * system configuration. + * @flags: Unused. + * + * This hook is called when a file is loaded through the mmap + * family of system calls. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT; + + if (prot & PROT_EXEC) { + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, f, IPE_OP_EXEC); + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_file_mprotect - ipe security hook function for mprotect check. + * @vma: Existing virtual memory area created by mmap or similar. + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode. + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and + * system configuration. + * + * This LSM hook is called when a mmap'd region of memory is changing + * its protections via mprotect. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, + unsigned long prot) +{ + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT; + + /* Already Executable */ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) + return 0; + + if (prot & PROT_EXEC) { + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, vma->vm_file, IPE_OP_EXEC); + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * ipe_kernel_read_file - ipe security hook function for kernel read. + * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file structure being read in from disk. + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read. + * @contents: Unused. + * + * This LSM hook is called when a file is being read in from disk from + * the kernel. + * + * Return: + * 0 - OK + * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) +{ + enum ipe_op_type op; + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT; + + switch (id) { + case READING_FIRMWARE: + op = IPE_OP_FIRMWARE; + break; + case READING_MODULE: + op = IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE; + break; + case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: + op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS; + break; + case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE; + break; + case READING_POLICY: + op = IPE_OP_POLICY; + break; + case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE: + op = IPE_OP_X509; + break; + default: + op = IPE_OP_INVALID; + WARN(1, "no rule setup for kernel_read_file enum %d", id); + } + + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, file, op); + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); +} + +/** + * ipe_kernel_load_data - ipe security hook function for kernel load data. + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read. + * @contents: Unused. + * + * This LSM hook is called when a buffer is being read in from disk. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) +{ + enum ipe_op_type op; + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_FIRMWARE: + op = IPE_OP_FIRMWARE; + break; + case LOADING_MODULE: + op = IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE; + break; + case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS: + op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS; + break; + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE; + break; + case LOADING_POLICY: + op = IPE_OP_POLICY; + break; + case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE: + op = IPE_OP_X509; + break; + default: + op = IPE_OP_INVALID; + WARN(1, "no rule setup for kernel_load_data enum %d", id); + } + + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op); + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..23205452f758 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#ifndef _IPE_HOOKS_H +#define _IPE_HOOKS_H + +#include +#include +#include + +int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm); + +int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags); + +int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot); + +int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents); + +int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); + +#endif /* _IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index b013aed15e73..22bd95116087 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include #include "ipe.h" +#include "hooks.h" static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { }; @@ -15,6 +16,11 @@ static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { }; static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_kernel_read_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_kernel_load_data), }; /** From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:53 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538223 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA8467AE58; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:24 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654247; cv=none; b=TRoFg1JJybm+0VC2tjOu0g/87whaOKSMgtLsL+9nymxPBDe8o1xnasiOSR0J8fiU32IpdVpihRPBiesQ+nx3/cIu2TA2uc9F1HBwk9PEhGMGHvUx6A12w6WEEZzSjp8a4pHG7SYpBDk8uy5HaUHT6cwdem63e1yNY9WV1W1OPcY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654247; c=relaxed/simple; bh=0RImSfWDsuyQqbPQ7O0zuTEsVGxwEIfo2Pi/EPZFoTo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=ps/rhGejO1JIStjD60J1ise5JYXF04ODRJSKXv4shiKQY/DxGAGSw9k+AfJzAJRShlL2/rQLyZMMdvHPW7D0nnDOE1h1DtDduVxpx+IdGg9ZIHC3qRm1QLe8BvbwPTG0V16L/qXYrUP4Pqku8YxIujQAcXacT1JyQK8PlKhG2N8= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=kb3osDtA; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="kb3osDtA" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 3453420B2007; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 3453420B2007 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=EWbimXT3r5uH71kUC3HLmOsJ78VUidHK3BehWmfo0EE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=kb3osDtAmHwsOccuH9u6TwU95Jq8JuBfHnVuQZHYmd26ntOZz8M+uWn+Y3ybxzpAN B/hiT0nHXepAgKg417YnwMJC06UjaF8Wa03agztD+UqzRFqE2kvIp4nmlGHcftqHCP O0DOL0rH2JeRXb7Z/u9Z9gfBbUMXbJZ5LNMD40uI= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 05/20] initramfs|security: Add security hook to initramfs unpack Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:53 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-6-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs. Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting. This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational in the critical boot phase. Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v1-v11: + Not present v12: + Introduced --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++++ init/initramfs.c | 3 +++ security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 185924c56378..b247388786a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -425,3 +425,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, unpack_initramfs_security, void) +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index d0eb20f90b26..1545c69edc1b 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2167,4 +2167,14 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +extern void security_unpack_initramfs(void); +#else +static inline void security_unpack_initramfs(void) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */ diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c index 76deb48c38cb..075a5794cde5 100644 --- a/init/initramfs.c +++ b/init/initramfs.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static __initdata bool csum_present; static __initdata u32 io_csum; @@ -720,6 +721,8 @@ static void __init do_populate_rootfs(void *unused, async_cookie_t cookie) #endif } + security_unpack_initramfs(); + done: /* * If the initrd region is overlapped with crashkernel reserved region, diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ddf2e69cf8f2..2a527d4c69bc 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -5581,3 +5581,15 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); } #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +/** + * security_unpack_initramfs() - Notify LSM that initramfs has been loaded + * + * Tells the LSM the initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs. + */ +void security_unpack_initramfs(void) +{ + call_void_hook(unpack_initramfs_security); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:54 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538224 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AB8DF7AE64; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:24 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654247; cv=none; b=Y+kN0W49NOARe4+3qVu0t03h0GEv6+6bFvdCib9hYSlXWl6IP+ew5HAkyTYhjyqwVDhnvuGRG5lOuODUScCVNv6OQb2/ZbnaEWGJ69QkBH6faj1MRnLfYhVasreztcqWTJx4nd/gkKevuXk2qRGUNfEBLbR1Mux/TzEtzGlnzS0= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654247; c=relaxed/simple; bh=gVHsfI1hdXwrv55SKZ9DjXOQ0gJJG8eF5axil3JDPBI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=pCkhd7h2Zi3YomvJYi7QY7a6ITm8UJuhv5ZxUGkSpI2+E6oZxk54lWfz3+J/9vWao10r7J4RCoXkpS8RI5fH9q3pGV9MmzvFJ/ycEdSolxei+9giQY/0RfblKmTnvIYMWAcJi3kFFczZf/fsFFYnm1yVw66WUl2+YPse6+2bsjs= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=aad2sg6m; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="aad2sg6m" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 41B9820B2009; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 41B9820B2009 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=Dj7s7TKXi7tggAz1EoYiw6d0qfj1qjT6bJT1M8cM8Js=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=aad2sg6mVx63/2SuqPTZ+/kwX8UoafaWW8I8HcARCS0tENmj0EsigABKRd5dGUIp7 3E0Ug4XwKU4lLcSzRgL7BRZ42vF/SG20nESiS8jdfsunJ2pmT83ociEPYNngZx8GQv 0c1rzH9qY/ityAnsWul/qG2lsnq6iL3JHrG6RqG0= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu , Deven Bowers Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:54 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-7-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: IPE is designed to provide system level trust guarantees, this usually implies that trust starts from bootup with a hardware root of trust, which validates the bootloader. After this, the bootloader verifies the kernel and the initramfs. As there's no currently supported integrity method for initramfs, and it's typically already verified by the bootloader. This patch introduces a new IPE property `boot_verified` which allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for files from initramfs. The implementation of this feature utilizes the newly added `unpack_initramfs` hook. This hook marks the superblock of the rootfs after the initramfs has been unpacked into it. Since the rootfs is never unmounted during system operation, it is advised to switch to a different policy that doesn't rely on the `boot_verified` property after the real rootfs is in charge. This ensures that the trust policies remain relevant and effective throughout the system's operation. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: +No Changes v3: + Remove useless caching system + Move ipe_load_properties to this match + Minor changes from checkpatch --strict warnings v4: + Remove comments from headers that was missed previously. + Grammatical corrections. v5: + No significant changes v6: + No changes v7: + Reword and refactor patch 04/12 to [09/16], based on changes in the underlying system. + Add common audit function for boolean values + Use common audit function as implementation. v8: + No changes v9: + No changes v10: + Replace struct file with struct super_block v11: + Fix code style issues v12: + Switch to use unpack_initramfs hook and security blob --- security/ipe/eval.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/ipe/eval.h | 9 +++++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 8 +++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 4 +++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 14 ++++++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 3 ++ security/ipe/policy.h | 2 ++ security/ipe/policy_parser.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++- 8 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 4f425afffcad..546bbc52a071 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -16,6 +16,24 @@ struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; +#define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb) + +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +/** + * build_ipe_sb_ctx - Build from_initramfs field of an evaluation context. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. + * @file: Supplies the file struct of the file triggered IPE event. + */ +static void build_ipe_sb_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *const file) +{ + ctx->from_initramfs = ipe_sb(FILE_SUPERBLOCK(file))->is_initramfs; +} +#else +static void build_ipe_sb_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *const file) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + /** * build_eval_ctx - Build an evaluation context. * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. @@ -28,8 +46,49 @@ void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, { ctx->file = file; ctx->op = op; + + if (file) + build_ipe_sb_ctx(ctx, file); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +/** + * evaluate_boot_verified_true - Evaluate @ctx for the boot verified property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the @p + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the @p + */ +static bool evaluate_boot_verified_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return ctx->from_initramfs; } +/** + * evaluate_boot_verified_false - Evaluate @ctx for the boot verified property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the @p + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the @p + */ +static bool evaluate_boot_verified_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return !evaluate_boot_verified_true(ctx); +} +#else +static bool evaluate_boot_verified_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return false; +} + +static bool evaluate_boot_verified_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + /** * evaluate_property - Analyze @ctx against a property. * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated. @@ -42,7 +101,14 @@ void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, static bool evaluate_property(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, struct ipe_prop *p) { - return false; + switch (p->type) { + case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE: + return evaluate_boot_verified_false(ctx); + case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE: + return evaluate_boot_verified_true(ctx); + default: + return false; + } } /** diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index cfdf3c8dfe8a..7d79fdb63bbf 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -15,10 +15,19 @@ extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +struct ipe_sb { + bool is_initramfs; +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + struct ipe_eval_ctx { enum ipe_op_type op; const struct file *file; +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD + bool from_initramfs; +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ }; void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *file, enum ipe_op_type op); diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index 3aec88c074e1..8ee105bf7bad 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -181,3 +182,10 @@ int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op); return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void) +{ + ipe_sb(current->fs->root.mnt->mnt_sb)->is_initramfs = true; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index 23205452f758..3b1bb0a6e89c 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -22,4 +22,8 @@ int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void); +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + #endif /* _IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 22bd95116087..ed3acf6174d8 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -5,9 +5,13 @@ #include #include "ipe.h" +#include "eval.h" #include "hooks.h" static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct ipe_sb), +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ }; static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { @@ -15,12 +19,22 @@ static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { .id = LSM_ID_IPE, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +struct ipe_sb *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb) +{ + return sb->s_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_superblock; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_file_mprotect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_kernel_load_data), +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unpack_initramfs_security, ipe_unpack_initramfs), +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ }; /** diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index a1c68d0fc2e0..f1e7c3222b6d 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -12,5 +12,8 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPE: " fmt #include +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD +struct ipe_sb *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb); +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ #endif /* _IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h index fb906f41522b..fb48024bb63e 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.h +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ enum ipe_action_type { #define IPE_ACTION_INVALID __IPE_ACTION_MAX enum ipe_prop_type { + IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE, + IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE, __IPE_PROP_MAX }; diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c index 612839b405f4..cce15f0eb645 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c @@ -265,6 +265,14 @@ static enum ipe_action_type parse_action(char *t) return match_token(t, action_tokens, args); } +static const match_table_t property_tokens = { +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD + {IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE, "boot_verified=FALSE"}, + {IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE, "boot_verified=TRUE"}, +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + {IPE_PROP_INVALID, NULL} +}; + /** * parse_property - Parse the property type given a token string. * @t: Supplies the token string to be parsed. @@ -277,7 +285,34 @@ static enum ipe_action_type parse_action(char *t) */ static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r) { - return -EBADMSG; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + struct ipe_prop *p = NULL; + int rc = 0; + int token; + + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + token = match_token(t, property_tokens, args); + + switch (token) { + case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE: + case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE: + p->type = token; + break; + default: + rc = -EBADMSG; + break; + } + if (rc) + goto err; + list_add_tail(&p->next, &r->props); + + return rc; +err: + kfree(p); + return rc; } /** From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:55 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538225 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C06D1128369; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; 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spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="eKRU4ybE" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 4F5A820B200B; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 4F5A820B200B DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=MZIUTiZ4IP2Ll7W/ScSzaJN4C5rYzK2zFEdobpZtunU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=eKRU4ybEEAYVTcJ+3CYfX0iOCDUSsbZcW3FFJC+xe1rwPE9+Smgh+Gr0aUgZg/sc9 hb6VrsDZyQTIM9lmiRP0Mbr1Jcxaf9g6H4Wc/37pmxHnBLwtj5vUz3czZT46sESPQR 4A/MnsVD/6mdpkqr2P01SZpSgi6iQC4Mtj2mkdCc= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:55 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-8-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security file system might be in an unclean state when the intended deletion did not happen. This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state. Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v1-v8: + Not present v9: + Introduced v10: + No changes v11: + Fix code style issues v12: + No changes --- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/inode.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 1545c69edc1b..e994ac9cda91 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2029,6 +2029,7 @@ struct dentry *securityfs_create_symlink(const char *name, const char *target, const struct inode_operations *iops); extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry); +extern void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry); #else /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */ diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index 9e7cde913667..f21847badb7d 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -313,6 +313,31 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove); +static void remove_one(struct dentry *victim) +{ + simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); +} + +/** + * securityfs_recursive_remove - recursively removes a file or directory + * + * @dentry: a pointer to a the dentry of the file or directory to be removed. + * + * This function recursively removes a file or directory in securityfs that was + * previously created with a call to another securityfs function (like + * securityfs_create_file() or variants thereof.) + */ +void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry)) + return; + + simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count); + simple_recursive_removal(dentry, remove_one); + simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_recursive_remove); + #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY static struct dentry *lsm_dentry; static ssize_t lsm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:56 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538232 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEBAF1272C7; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654251; cv=none; b=nVF7avbTvtJRkK/o7iM1i7Jz4gDYEeYXeCsPLPco2S0b4UubKrJAH+NIQyxTHxdjF9+Ney1wWkn7lSu7YAHZv+oWcfCQgb7I2WPMTNzCUwrPbDbR84E0CMJXbuQ5qgsvmOi4zZhGXnizWHMqmUejliIWAXsbIKkwokZSor9wu3w= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654251; c=relaxed/simple; bh=nvTQAYe6ClKLywYsFl60TChrGrXR4TmMYD5qbQ5OSto=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; 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linux.microsoft.com 5D7D920B200D DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=n1T7fFPVsrxosq+Gy/4MwsLRi5hZV/83J4GqC56xZlM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=qUa0pet3z8lirYCbYybqJSCvQXrdvYOPWEMP/nSvzWZHa5q9zypzx5kfMrFvO4fOw qBxlhXnLCeuXiFDg331cO71b7nn18sHsBJz9Apu3dOairzUXB7peX3GCYOHKYmByUM ad6f7MQaCTGwqXMFN4mZ+jm7m/L8zNPtOBYblCk0= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:56 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-9-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers As is typical with LSMs, IPE uses securityfs as its interface with userspace. for a complete list of the interfaces and the respective inputs/outputs, please see the documentation under admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 + Fix a potential panic when a policy failed to load. + use pr_warn for a failure to parse instead of an audit record + Remove comments from headers + Add lockdep assertions to ipe_update_active_policy and ipe_activate_policy + Fix up warnings with checkpatch --strict + Use file_ns_capable for CAP_MAC_ADMIN for securityfs nodes. + Use memdup_user instead of kzalloc+simple_write_to_buffer. + Remove strict_parse command line parameter, as it is added by the sysctl command line. + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ v4: + Remove securityfs to reverse-dependency + Add SHA1 reverse dependency. + Add versioning scheme for IPE properties, and associated interface to query the versioning scheme. + Cause a parser to always return an error on unknown syntax. + Remove strict_parse option + Change active_policy interface from sysctl, to securityfs, and change scheme. v5: + Cause an error if a default action is not defined for each operation. + Minor function renames v6: + No changes v7: + Propagating changes to support the new ipe_context structure in the evaluation loop. + Further split the parser and userspace interface changes into separate commits. + "raw" was renamed to "pkcs7" and made read only + "raw"'s write functionality (update a policy) moved to "update" + introduced "version", "policy_name" nodes. + "content" renamed to "policy" + changes to allow the compiled-in policy to be treated identical to deployed-after-the-fact policies. v8: + Prevent securityfs initialization if the LSM is disabled v9: + Switch to securityfs_recursive_remove for policy folder deletion v10: + Simplify and correct concurrency + Fix typos v11: + Correct code comments v12: + Correct locking and remove redundant code --- security/ipe/Makefile | 2 + security/ipe/fs.c | 101 +++++++++ security/ipe/fs.h | 16 ++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 3 + security/ipe/ipe.h | 2 + security/ipe/policy.c | 123 ++++++++++ security/ipe/policy.h | 9 + security/ipe/policy_fs.c | 469 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 725 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/fs.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/fs.h create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_fs.c diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index d7f2870d7c09..cfbed03a8885 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ eval.o \ hooks.o \ + fs.o \ ipe.o \ policy.o \ + policy_fs.o \ policy_parser.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4949296caeb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "fs.h" +#include "policy.h" + +static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init; +static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init; +struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init; + +/** + * new_policy - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/new_policy". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t new_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *copy = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + copy = memdup_user_nul(data, len); + if (IS_ERR(copy)) + return PTR_ERR(copy); + + p = ipe_new_policy(NULL, 0, copy, len); + if (IS_ERR(p)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(p); + goto out; + } + + rc = ipe_new_policyfs_node(p); + +out: + if (rc < 0) + ipe_free_policy(p); + kfree(copy); + return (rc < 0) ? rc : len; +} + +static const struct file_operations np_fops = { + .write = new_policy, +}; + +/** + * ipe_init_securityfs - Initialize IPE's securityfs tree at fsinit. + * + * Return: + * * !0 - Error + * * 0 - OK + */ +static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) +{ + int rc = 0; + + if (!ipe_enabled) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + root = securityfs_create_dir("ipe", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(root)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(root); + goto err; + } + + policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root); + if (IS_ERR(policy_root)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(policy_root); + goto err; + } + + np = securityfs_create_file("new_policy", 0200, root, NULL, &np_fops); + if (IS_ERR(np)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(np); + goto err; + } + + return 0; +err: + securityfs_remove(np); + securityfs_remove(policy_root); + securityfs_remove(root); + return rc; +} + +fs_initcall(ipe_init_securityfs); diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.h b/security/ipe/fs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c1fc0ca4ae93 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/fs.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _IPE_FS_H +#define _IPE_FS_H + +#include "policy.h" + +extern struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init; + +int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p); +void ipe_del_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p); + +#endif /* _IPE_FS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index ed3acf6174d8..034ee8cd6802 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ #include "eval.h" #include "hooks.h" +bool ipe_enabled; + static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct ipe_sb), @@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { static int __init ipe_init(void) { security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), &ipe_lsmid); + ipe_enabled = true; return 0; } diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index f1e7c3222b6d..1862c710dab8 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -16,4 +16,6 @@ struct ipe_sb *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb); #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +extern bool ipe_enabled; + #endif /* _IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c index f22a576a6d68..61fea3e38e11 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c @@ -7,9 +7,36 @@ #include #include "ipe.h" +#include "eval.h" +#include "fs.h" #include "policy.h" #include "policy_parser.h" +/* lock for synchronizing writers across ipe policy */ +DEFINE_MUTEX(ipe_policy_lock); + +/** + * ver_to_u64 - Convert an internal ipe_policy_version to a u64. + * @p: Policy to extract the version from. + * + * Bits (LSB is index 0): + * [48,32] -> Major + * [32,16] -> Minor + * [16, 0] -> Revision + * + * Return: u64 version of the embedded version structure. + */ +static inline u64 ver_to_u64(const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ + u64 r; + + r = (((u64)p->parsed->version.major) << 32) + | (((u64)p->parsed->version.minor) << 16) + | ((u64)(p->parsed->version.rev)); + + return r; +} + /** * ipe_free_policy - Deallocate a given IPE policy. * @p: Supplies the policy to free. @@ -21,6 +48,7 @@ void ipe_free_policy(struct ipe_policy *p) if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p)) return; + ipe_del_policyfs_node(p); free_parsed_policy(p->parsed); /* * p->text is allocated only when p->pkcs7 is not NULL @@ -43,6 +71,68 @@ static int set_pkcs7_data(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len, return 0; } +/** + * ipe_update_policy - parse a new policy and replace old with it. + * @root: Supplies a pointer to the securityfs inode saved the policy. + * @text: Supplies a pointer to the plain text policy. + * @textlen: Supplies the length of @text. + * @pkcs7: Supplies a pointer to a buffer containing a pkcs7 message. + * @pkcs7len: Supplies the length of @pkcs7len. + * + * @text/@textlen is mutually exclusive with @pkcs7/@pkcs7len - see + * ipe_new_policy. + * + * Context: Requires root->i_rwsem to be held. + * Return: + * * !IS_ERR - The existing policy saved in the inode before update + * * -ENOENT - Policy doesn't exist + * * -EINVAL - New policy is invalid + */ +struct ipe_policy *ipe_update_policy(struct inode *root, + const char *text, size_t textlen, + const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *old, *ap, *new = NULL; + + old = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private; + if (!old) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + + new = ipe_new_policy(text, textlen, pkcs7, pkcs7len); + if (IS_ERR(new)) + return new; + + if (strcmp(new->parsed->name, old->parsed->name)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + if (ver_to_u64(old) > ver_to_u64(new)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + root->i_private = new; + swap(new->policyfs, old->policyfs); + + mutex_lock(&ipe_policy_lock); + ap = rcu_dereference_protected(ipe_active_policy, + lockdep_is_held(&ipe_policy_lock)); + if (old == ap) { + rcu_assign_pointer(ipe_active_policy, new); + mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + } else { + mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); + } + + return old; +err: + ipe_free_policy(new); + return ERR_PTR(rc); +} + /** * ipe_new_policy - Allocate and parse an ipe_policy structure. * @@ -99,3 +189,36 @@ struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, ipe_free_policy(new); return ERR_PTR(rc); } + +/** + * ipe_set_active_pol - Make @p the active policy. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to make active. + * + * Context: Requires root->i_rwsem, which i_private has the policy, to be held. + * Return: + * * !IS_ERR - Success + * * -EINVAL - New active policy version is invalid + */ +int ipe_set_active_pol(const struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + struct ipe_policy *ap = NULL; + + mutex_lock(&ipe_policy_lock); + + ap = rcu_dereference_protected(ipe_active_policy, + lockdep_is_held(&ipe_policy_lock)); + if (ap == p) { + mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); + return 0; + } + if (ap && ver_to_u64(ap) > ver_to_u64(p)) { + mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); + return -EINVAL; + } + + rcu_assign_pointer(ipe_active_policy, p); + mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); + synchronize_rcu(); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h index fb48024bb63e..060ffdbc62d6 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.h +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include +#include enum ipe_op_type { IPE_OP_EXEC = 0, @@ -76,10 +77,18 @@ struct ipe_policy { size_t textlen; struct ipe_parsed_policy *parsed; + + struct dentry *policyfs; }; struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len); void ipe_free_policy(struct ipe_policy *pol); +struct ipe_policy *ipe_update_policy(struct inode *root, + const char *text, + size_t textlen, const char *pkcs7, + size_t pkcs7len); +int ipe_set_active_pol(const struct ipe_policy *p); +extern struct mutex ipe_policy_lock; #endif /* _IPE_POLICY_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_fs.c b/security/ipe/policy_fs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..abdf1ad843e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy_fs.c @@ -0,0 +1,469 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "policy.h" +#include "eval.h" +#include "fs.h" + +#define MAX_VERSION_SIZE ARRAY_SIZE("65535.65535.65535") + +/** + * ipefs_file - defines a file in securityfs. + */ +struct ipefs_file { + const char *name; + umode_t access; + const struct file_operations *fops; +}; + +/** + * read_pkcs7 - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/pkcs7". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the pkcs7 blob representing the policy + * on success. If the policy is unsigned (like the boot policy), this + * will return -ENOENT. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t read_pkcs7(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct inode *root = NULL; + const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent); + + inode_lock_shared(root); + p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private; + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + if (!p->pkcs7) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len); + +out: + inode_unlock_shared(root); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * read_policy - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/policy". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the plain-text version of the policy + * on success. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t read_policy(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct inode *root = NULL; + const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent); + + inode_lock_shared(root); + p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private; + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->text, p->textlen); + +out: + inode_unlock_shared(root); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * read_name: Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/name". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the policy_name attribute on success. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t read_name(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct inode *root = NULL; + const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent); + + inode_lock_shared(root); + p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private; + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, p->parsed->name, + strlen(p->parsed->name)); + +out: + inode_unlock_shared(root); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * read_version - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/version". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the version string on success. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t read_version(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + ssize_t rc = 0; + size_t strsize = 0; + struct inode *root = NULL; + const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + char buffer[MAX_VERSION_SIZE] = { 0 }; + + root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent); + + inode_lock_shared(root); + p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private; + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + strsize = scnprintf(buffer, ARRAY_SIZE(buffer), "%hu.%hu.%hu", + p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor, + p->parsed->version.rev); + + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, buffer, strsize); + +out: + inode_unlock_shared(root); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * setactive - Write handler for "ipe/policies/$name/active". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t setactive(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool value = false; + struct inode *root = NULL; + const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (!value) + return -EINVAL; + + root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent); + inode_lock(root); + + p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private; + if (!p) { + rc = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + rc = ipe_set_active_pol(p); + +out: + inode_unlock(root); + return (rc < 0) ? rc : len; +} + +/** + * getactive - Read handler for "ipe/policies/$name/active". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * @data will be populated with the 1 or 0 depending on if the + * corresponding policy is active. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t getactive(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + const char *str; + struct inode *root = NULL; + const struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + + root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent); + + inode_lock_shared(root); + p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private; + if (!p) { + inode_unlock_shared(root); + return -ENOENT; + } + inode_unlock_shared(root); + + str = (p == rcu_access_pointer(ipe_active_policy)) ? "1" : "0"; + rc = simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, str, 1); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * update_policy - Write handler for "ipe/policies/$name/update". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * On success this updates the policy represented by $name, + * in-place. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t update_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + char *copy = NULL; + struct inode *root = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *old = NULL; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + copy = memdup_user(data, len); + if (IS_ERR(copy)) + return PTR_ERR(copy); + + root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent); + inode_lock(root); + old = ipe_update_policy(root, NULL, 0, copy, len); + inode_unlock(root); + + kfree(copy); + if (IS_ERR(old)) + return PTR_ERR(old); + ipe_free_policy(old); + + return len; +} + +/** + * delete_policy - write handler for "ipe/policies/$name/delete". + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * On success this deletes the policy represented by $name. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t delete_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool value = false; + struct inode *root = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + struct ipe_policy *ap = NULL; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (!value) + return -EINVAL; + + root = d_inode(f->f_path.dentry->d_parent); + inode_lock(root); + p = (struct ipe_policy *)root->i_private; + if (!p) { + inode_unlock(root); + return -ENOENT; + } + + mutex_lock(&ipe_policy_lock); + ap = rcu_dereference_protected(ipe_active_policy, + lockdep_is_held(&ipe_policy_lock)); + if (p == ap) { + mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); + inode_unlock(root); + return -EPERM; + } + mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); + + root->i_private = NULL; + inode_unlock(root); + + ipe_free_policy(p); + return len; +} + +static const struct file_operations content_fops = { + .read = read_policy, +}; + +static const struct file_operations pkcs7_fops = { + .read = read_pkcs7, +}; + +static const struct file_operations name_fops = { + .read = read_name, +}; + +static const struct file_operations ver_fops = { + .read = read_version, +}; + +static const struct file_operations active_fops = { + .write = setactive, + .read = getactive, +}; + +static const struct file_operations update_fops = { + .write = update_policy, +}; + +static const struct file_operations delete_fops = { + .write = delete_policy, +}; + +/** + * policy_subdir - files under a policy subdirectory + */ +static const struct ipefs_file policy_subdir[] = { + { "pkcs7", 0444, &pkcs7_fops }, + { "policy", 0444, &content_fops }, + { "name", 0444, &name_fops }, + { "version", 0444, &ver_fops }, + { "active", 0600, &active_fops }, + { "update", 0200, &update_fops }, + { "delete", 0200, &delete_fops }, +}; + +/** + * ipe_del_policyfs_node - Delete a securityfs entry for @p. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to delete a securityfs entry for. + */ +void ipe_del_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + securityfs_recursive_remove(p->policyfs); + p->policyfs = NULL; +} + +/** + * ipe_new_policyfs_node - Create a securityfs entry for @p. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to create a securityfs entry for. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t i = 0; + struct dentry *d = NULL; + struct dentry *policyfs = NULL; + struct inode *root = NULL; + const struct ipefs_file *f = NULL; + + if (p->policyfs) + return 0; + + policyfs = securityfs_create_dir(p->parsed->name, policy_root); + if (IS_ERR(policyfs)) + return PTR_ERR(policyfs); + + root = d_inode(policyfs); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policy_subdir); ++i) { + f = &policy_subdir[i]; + + d = securityfs_create_file(f->name, f->access, policyfs, + NULL, f->fops); + if (IS_ERR(d)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(d); + goto err; + } + } + + inode_lock(root); + p->policyfs = policyfs; + root->i_private = p; + inode_unlock(root); + + return 0; +err: + securityfs_recursive_remove(policyfs); + return rc; +} From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:57 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538233 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9DCE07D41F; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654252; cv=none; b=Ivf6IR9oI3nCucxth37WbJ7BTu6Cph4K3M8m3KyCHemtiZ0HIpzdB889+xBJ9aq/pEpsfQF++StpE2q3O8D7+sKXfdP9hOj4msDgBEICq4ZMulvXxKQeDDtobIr+wuLDCKZJat3sy3XJpFT1iskvKSzg72h+GuTx74JtNbkTYoA= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 6D84820B200F DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=8xlQ5oHIkxQXTVT6bg92x3J+LqqlL3QMakxMR27fHWU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=HwQz8m51c9m17BN2ljZcn6qCciDH3slKmBbvL5mJK8W8tqUOc8LdVHy8GHkqIzLkp Q2aG7Tjp4OLhLqYIs8599xYbwiLBiIo3oOYzmnPUys0rvWsQHaQ309I0Jwctv+eeZ2 fmGiQGpBi4W1le/8FhSnpJG4GoYdjo28B4vUNdLA= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:57 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-10-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails, allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE itself. This patch introduces 3 new audit events. AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420) indicates the result of an IPE policy evaluation of a resource. AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421) indicates the current active IPE policy has been changed to another loaded policy. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) indicates a new IPE policy has been loaded into the kernel. This patch also adds support for success auditing, allowing users to identify why an allow decision was made for a resource. However, it is recommended to use this option with caution, as it is quite noisy. Here are some examples of the new audit record types: AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420): audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1 pid=297 comm="sh" path="/root/vol/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs" ino=3897 rule="op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW" audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1 pid=299 comm="sh" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0" ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY" audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1 pid=300 path="/tmp/tmpdp2h1lub/deny/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs" ino=131 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY" The above three records were generated when the active IPE policy only allows binaries from the initramfs to run. The three identical `hello` binary were placed at different locations, only the first hello from the rootfs(initramfs) was allowed. Field ipe_op followed by the IPE operation name associated with the log. Field ipe_hook followed by the name of the LSM hook that triggered the IPE event. Field enforcing followed by the enforcement state of IPE. (it will be introduced in the next commit) Field pid followed by the pid of the process that triggered the IPE event. Field comm followed by the command line program name of the process that triggered the IPE event. Field path followed by the file's path name. Field dev followed by the device name as found in /dev where the file is from. Note that for device mappers it will use the name `dm-X` instead of the name in /dev/mapper. For a file in a temp file system, which is not from a device, it will use `tmpfs` for the field. The implementation of this part is following another existing use case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE in security/lsm_audit.c Field ino followed by the file's inode number. Field rule followed by the IPE rule made the access decision. The whole rule must be audited because the decision is based on the combination of all property conditions in the rule. Along with the syscall audit event, user can know why a blocked happened. For example: audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1 pid=2138 comm="bash" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0" ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY" audit[1956]: SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=no exit=-13 a0=556790138df0 a1=556790135390 a2=5567901338b0 a3=ab2a41a67f4f1f4e items=1 ppid=147 pid=1956 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null) The above two records showed bash used execve to run "hello" and got blocked by IPE. Note that the IPE records are always prior to a SYSCALL record. AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421): audit: AUDIT1421 old_active_pol_name="Allow_All" old_active_pol_version=0.0.0 old_policy_digest=sha256:E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649 new_active_pol_name="boot_verified" new_active_pol_version=0.0.0 new_policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1 The above record showed the current IPE active policy switch from `Allow_All` to `boot_verified` along with the version and the hash digest of the two policies. Note IPE can only have one policy active at a time, all access decision evaluation is based on the current active policy. The normal procedure to deploy a policy is loading the policy to deploy into the kernel first, then switch the active policy to it. AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422): audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="boot_verified" policy_version=0.0.0 policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F2676 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1 The above record showed a new policy has been loaded into the kernel with the policy name, policy version and policy hash. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation, the audit system, the evaluation loop, and access control hooks into separate patches. + Further split audit system patch into two separate patches; one for include/uapi, and the usage of the new defines. + Split out the permissive functionality into another separate patch, for easier review. + Correct misuse of audit_log_n_untrusted string to audit_log_format + Use get_task_comm instead of comm directly. + Quote certain audit values + Remove unnecessary help text on choice options - these were previously indented at the wrong level + Correct a stale string constant (ctx_ns_enforce to ctx_enforce) v8: + Change dependency for CONFIG_AUDIT to CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL + Drop ctx_* prefix + Reuse, where appropriate, the audit fields from the field dictionary. This transforms: ctx_pathname -> path ctx_ino -> ino ctx_dev -> dev + Add audit records and event examples to commit description. + Remove new_audit_ctx, replace with audit_log_start. All data that would provided by new_audit_ctx is already present in the syscall audit record, that is always emitted on these actions. The audit records should be correlated as such. + Change audit types: + AUDIT_TRUST_RESULT -> AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS + This prevents overloading of the AVC type. + AUDIT_TRUST_POLICY_ACTIVATE -> AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE + AUDIT_TRUST_POLICY_LOAD -> AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD + There were no significant difference in meaning between these types. + Remove enforcing parameter passed from the context structure for AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS. + This field can be inferred from the SYSCALL audit event, based on the success field. + Remove all fields already captured in the syscall record. "hook", an IPE specific field, can be determined via the syscall field in the syscall record itself, so it has been removed. + ino, path, and dev in IPE's record refer to the subject of the syscall, while the syscall record refers to the calling process. + remove IPE prefix from policy load/policy activation events + fix a bug wherein a policy change audit record was not fired when updating a policy v9: + Merge the AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS definition with the audit support commit + Change the audit format of policy load and switch + Remove the ipe audit kernel switch v10: + Create AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE and AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD + Change field names per upstream feedback v11: + Fix style issues v12: + Add ipe_op, ipe_hook, and enforcing fields to AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS --- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 3 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 2 +- security/ipe/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/audit.c | 212 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/audit.h | 18 ++++ security/ipe/eval.c | 44 ++++++-- security/ipe/eval.h | 13 ++- security/ipe/fs.c | 70 ++++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 10 +- security/ipe/hooks.h | 11 ++ security/ipe/policy.c | 5 + 11 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/ipe/audit.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/audit.h diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h index d676ed2b246e..75e21a135483 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ #define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */ +#define AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS 1420 /* IPE denial or grant */ +#define AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE 1421 /* IPE config change */ +#define AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD 1422 /* IPE policy load */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700 #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799 diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index e4875fb04883..ac4d558e69d5 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ menuconfig SECURITY_IPE bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" - depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS + depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS && AUDIT && AUDITSYSCALL select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION help diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index cfbed03a8885..2279eaa3cea3 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ policy.o \ policy_fs.o \ policy_parser.o \ + audit.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79b7af25085c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "eval.h" +#include "hooks.h" +#include "policy.h" +#include "audit.h" + +#define ACTSTR(x) ((x) == IPE_ACTION_ALLOW ? "ALLOW" : "DENY") + +#define IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG "sha256" + +#define AUDIT_POLICY_LOAD_FMT "policy_name=\"%s\" policy_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\ + "policy_digest=" IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG ":" +#define AUDIT_OLD_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT "old_active_pol_name=\"%s\" "\ + "old_active_pol_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\ + "old_policy_digest=" IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG ":" +#define AUDIT_NEW_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT "new_active_pol_name=\"%s\" "\ + "new_active_pol_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\ + "new_policy_digest=" IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG ":" + +static const char *const audit_op_names[__IPE_OP_MAX + 1] = { + "EXECUTE", + "FIRMWARE", + "KMODULE", + "KEXEC_IMAGE", + "KEXEC_INITRAMFS", + "POLICY", + "X509_CERT", + "UNKNOWN", +}; + +static const char *const audit_hook_names[__IPE_HOOK_MAX] = { + "BPRM_CHECK", + "MMAP", + "MPROTECT", + "KERNEL_READ", + "KERNEL_LOAD", +}; + +static const char *const audit_prop_names[__IPE_PROP_MAX] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD + "boot_verified=FALSE", + "boot_verified=TRUE", +#endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +}; + +/** + * audit_rule - audit an IPE policy rule approximation. + * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit_buffer to append to. + * @r: Supplies a pointer to the ipe_rule to approximate a string form for. + */ +static void audit_rule(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct ipe_rule *r) +{ + const struct ipe_prop *ptr; + + audit_log_format(ab, " rule=\"%s ", audit_op_names[r->op]); + + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &r->props, next) + audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", audit_prop_names[ptr->type]); + + audit_log_format(ab, "action=%s\"", ACTSTR(r->action)); +} + +/** + * ipe_audit_match - audit a match for IPE policy. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the evaluation context that was used in the + * evaluation. + * @match_type: Supplies the scope of the match: rule, operation default, + * global default. + * @act: Supplies the IPE's evaluation decision, deny or allow. + * @r: Supplies a pointer to the rule that was matched, if possible. + */ +void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + enum ipe_match match_type, + enum ipe_action_type act, const struct ipe_rule *const r) +{ + struct inode *inode; + struct audit_buffer *ab; + const char *op = audit_op_names[ctx->op]; + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; + + if (act != IPE_ACTION_DENY && !READ_ONCE(success_audit)) + return; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, "ipe_op=%s ipe_hook=%s pid=%d comm=", + op, audit_hook_names[ctx->hook], + task_tgid_nr(current)); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); + + if (ctx->file) { + audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &ctx->file->f_path); + inode = file_inode(ctx->file); + if (inode) { + audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); + audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); + } + } + + if (match_type == IPE_MATCH_RULE) + audit_rule(ab, r); + else if (match_type == IPE_MATCH_TABLE) + audit_log_format(ab, " rule=\"DEFAULT op=%s action=%s\"", op, + ACTSTR(act)); + else + audit_log_format(ab, " rule=\"DEFAULT action=%s\"", + ACTSTR(act)); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} + +/** + * audit_policy - Audit a policy's name, version and thumbprint to @ab. + * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit buffer to append to. + * @audit_format: Supplies a pointer to the audit format string + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit. + */ +static void audit_policy(struct audit_buffer *ab, + const char *audit_format, + const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ + u8 *digest = NULL; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm); + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return; + + desc->tfm = tfm; + + digest = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) + goto out; + + if (crypto_shash_init(desc)) + goto out; + + if (crypto_shash_update(desc, p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len)) + goto out; + + if (crypto_shash_final(desc, digest)) + goto out; + + audit_log_format(ab, audit_format, p->parsed->name, + p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor, + p->parsed->version.rev); + audit_log_n_hex(ab, digest, crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm)); + +out: + kfree(digest); + crypto_free_shash(tfm); +} + +/** + * ipe_audit_policy_activation - Audit a policy being made the active policy. + * @op: Supplies a pointer to the previously activated policy to audit. + * @np: Supplies a pointer to the newly activated policy to audit. + */ +void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const op, + const struct ipe_policy *const np) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_policy(ab, AUDIT_OLD_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT, op); + audit_log_format(ab, " "); + audit_policy(ab, AUDIT_NEW_ACTIVE_POLICY_FMT, np); + audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u ses=%u lsm=ipe res=1", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), + audit_get_sessionid(current)); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} + +/** + * ipe_audit_policy_load - Audit a policy being loaded into the kernel. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the policy to audit. + */ +void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_policy(ab, AUDIT_POLICY_LOAD_FMT, p); + audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u ses=%u lsm=ipe res=1", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), + audit_get_sessionid(current)); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.h b/security/ipe/audit.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0ff5a06808de --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _IPE_AUDIT_H +#define _IPE_AUDIT_H + +#include "policy.h" + +void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + enum ipe_match match_type, + enum ipe_action_type act, const struct ipe_rule *const r); +void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p); +void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const op, + const struct ipe_policy *const np); + +#endif /* _IPE_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 546bbc52a071..85cccc3d0bdf 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -9,12 +9,15 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "ipe.h" #include "eval.h" #include "policy.h" +#include "audit.h" struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; +bool success_audit; #define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb) @@ -39,13 +42,16 @@ static void build_ipe_sb_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *const * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file to associated with the evaluation. * @op: Supplies the IPE policy operation associated with the evaluation. + * @hook: Supplies the LSM hook associated with the evaluation. */ void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *file, - enum ipe_op_type op) + enum ipe_op_type op, + enum ipe_hook_type hook) { ctx->file = file; ctx->op = op; + ctx->hook = hook; if (file) build_ipe_sb_ctx(ctx, file); @@ -126,6 +132,7 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) { bool match = false; enum ipe_action_type action; + enum ipe_match match_type; struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; const struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL; const struct ipe_op_table *rules = NULL; @@ -140,14 +147,15 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) } if (ctx->op == IPE_OP_INVALID) { - if (pol->parsed->global_default_action == IPE_ACTION_DENY) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - return -EACCES; - } - if (pol->parsed->global_default_action == IPE_ACTION_INVALID) + if (pol->parsed->global_default_action == IPE_ACTION_INVALID) { WARN(1, "no default rule set for unknown op, ALLOW it"); + action = IPE_ACTION_ALLOW; + } else { + action = pol->parsed->global_default_action; + } rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; + match_type = IPE_MATCH_GLOBAL; + goto eval; } rules = &pol->parsed->rules[ctx->op]; @@ -165,16 +173,32 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) break; } - if (match) + if (match) { action = rule->action; - else if (rules->default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) + match_type = IPE_MATCH_RULE; + } else if (rules->default_action != IPE_ACTION_INVALID) { action = rules->default_action; - else + match_type = IPE_MATCH_TABLE; + } else { action = pol->parsed->global_default_action; + match_type = IPE_MATCH_GLOBAL; + } rcu_read_unlock(); +eval: + ipe_audit_match(ctx, match_type, action, rule); + if (action == IPE_ACTION_DENY) return -EACCES; return 0; } + +/* Set the right module name */ +#ifdef KBUILD_MODNAME +#undef KBUILD_MODNAME +#define KBUILD_MODNAME "ipe" +#endif + +module_param(success_audit, bool, 0400); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(success_audit, "Start IPE with success auditing enabled"); diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 7d79fdb63bbf..0be9aadec9f8 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -10,10 +10,12 @@ #include #include "policy.h" +#include "hooks.h" #define IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT ((struct ipe_eval_ctx){ 0 }) extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; +extern bool success_audit; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD struct ipe_sb { @@ -23,6 +25,7 @@ struct ipe_sb { struct ipe_eval_ctx { enum ipe_op_type op; + enum ipe_hook_type hook; const struct file *file; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD @@ -30,7 +33,15 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx { #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ }; -void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *file, enum ipe_op_type op); +enum ipe_match { + IPE_MATCH_RULE = 0, + IPE_MATCH_TABLE, + IPE_MATCH_GLOBAL, + __IPE_MATCH_MAX +}; + +void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *file, + enum ipe_op_type op, enum ipe_hook_type hook); int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx); #endif /* _IPE_EVAL_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c index 4949296caeb5..95407997cf0c 100644 --- a/security/ipe/fs.c +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -8,11 +8,64 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "fs.h" +#include "eval.h" #include "policy.h" +#include "audit.h" static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init; struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init; +static struct dentry *audit_node __ro_after_init; + +/** + * setaudit - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t setaudit(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool value; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &value); + if (rc) + return rc; + + WRITE_ONCE(success_audit, value); + + return len; +} + +/** + * getaudit - Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t getaudit(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + const char *result; + + result = ((READ_ONCE(success_audit)) ? "1" : "0"); + + return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1); +} /** * new_policy - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/new_policy". @@ -46,6 +99,10 @@ static ssize_t new_policy(struct file *f, const char __user *data, } rc = ipe_new_policyfs_node(p); + if (rc) + goto out; + + ipe_audit_policy_load(p); out: if (rc < 0) @@ -58,6 +115,11 @@ static const struct file_operations np_fops = { .write = new_policy, }; +static const struct file_operations audit_fops = { + .write = setaudit, + .read = getaudit, +}; + /** * ipe_init_securityfs - Initialize IPE's securityfs tree at fsinit. * @@ -78,6 +140,13 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) goto err; } + audit_node = securityfs_create_file("success_audit", 0600, root, + NULL, &audit_fops); + if (IS_ERR(audit_node)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(audit_node); + goto err; + } + policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root); if (IS_ERR(policy_root)) { rc = PTR_ERR(policy_root); @@ -94,6 +163,7 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) err: securityfs_remove(np); securityfs_remove(policy_root); + securityfs_remove(audit_node); securityfs_remove(root); return rc; } diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index 8ee105bf7bad..ab762865a671 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT; - build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, IPE_OP_EXEC); + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, IPE_OP_EXEC, IPE_HOOK_BPRM_CHECK); return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); } @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT; if (prot & PROT_EXEC) { - build_eval_ctx(&ctx, f, IPE_OP_EXEC); + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, f, IPE_OP_EXEC, IPE_HOOK_MMAP); return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); } @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, return 0; if (prot & PROT_EXEC) { - build_eval_ctx(&ctx, vma->vm_file, IPE_OP_EXEC); + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, vma->vm_file, IPE_OP_EXEC, IPE_HOOK_MPROTECT); return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); } @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, WARN(1, "no rule setup for kernel_read_file enum %d", id); } - build_eval_ctx(&ctx, file, op); + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, file, op, IPE_HOOK_KERNEL_READ); return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); } @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) WARN(1, "no rule setup for kernel_load_data enum %d", id); } - build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op); + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op, IPE_HOOK_KERNEL_LOAD); return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx); } diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index 3b1bb0a6e89c..55fc0e35c13d 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -9,6 +9,17 @@ #include #include +enum ipe_hook_type { + IPE_HOOK_BPRM_CHECK = 0, + IPE_HOOK_MMAP, + IPE_HOOK_MPROTECT, + IPE_HOOK_KERNEL_READ, + IPE_HOOK_KERNEL_LOAD, + __IPE_HOOK_MAX +}; + +#define IPE_HOOK_INVALID __IPE_HOOK_MAX + int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm); int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c index 61fea3e38e11..a5e5173a6c46 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "fs.h" #include "policy.h" #include "policy_parser.h" +#include "audit.h" /* lock for synchronizing writers across ipe policy */ DEFINE_MUTEX(ipe_policy_lock); @@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ struct ipe_policy *ipe_update_policy(struct inode *root, root->i_private = new; swap(new->policyfs, old->policyfs); + ipe_audit_policy_load(new); mutex_lock(&ipe_policy_lock); ap = rcu_dereference_protected(ipe_active_policy, @@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ struct ipe_policy *ipe_update_policy(struct inode *root, rcu_assign_pointer(ipe_active_policy, new); mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); synchronize_rcu(); + ipe_audit_policy_activation(old, new); } else { mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); } @@ -220,5 +223,7 @@ int ipe_set_active_pol(const struct ipe_policy *p) mutex_unlock(&ipe_policy_lock); synchronize_rcu(); + ipe_audit_policy_activation(ap, p); + return 0; } From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:58 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538229 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E4BF81AD5; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654251; cv=none; b=IdUrb3SW+HfQyaf4XUj+WEDqI79mMUrj2MghoWxzOwIDzx8wGljj7xSEfwf7GcbfHDmHZcohi5vJ1KXdLx7rE0GqwiBtklWwoCXGtpacYUzOxe8dS2rPh5v7etSRzTEBKMOj9nghmJ8NovjGoeIWi+8zYbxL+RL3l5JDY2l6XDY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654251; c=relaxed/simple; bh=9aeIiHnMHduveEO8yprWRF3Ck2H9t1tqcMqcqPNXtuw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=VSnf4lx7ey6tOPTgPtUXcAMCycKxmpZsFOXKL+/mzHW287PKvAEER/4hD3cFN9lAuha4rmKpCP9ufxKFHqXRklKSSuIDKbFWIgrBxMSXlKtT7v0ySO52Cvd9Pu4tJrG0nfkdTk/jSJi4gvfmNoJZUkQryxbgElfiylmFpvJ4W/4= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=esbNmJLE; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="esbNmJLE" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 7BFC820B2011; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 7BFC820B2011 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=0ZkbZNUeaOznINx+xv0b0H1IOPh0q7nV0Eh4gNCr6+8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=esbNmJLEwvHcDb6RPWnKnWNL2f6H+xuIBcxYDR+j02ga7n4tD6H1wB6r61LgmT7f1 9dHP2Yg4gaqWpc1MGISE1FKcPoD9btTcqoJr7/6t8DhnyD0VoVZ44xb/+q8iddGwZR Vupd/JGG2uDYcl6W83YS/cGEkz7HMgUmXQni4z2g= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:58 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-11-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it effecting their programs. When the mode is changed, a 1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS be reported. This patch adds the following audit records: audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1 audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=1 old_enforcing=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1 The audit record only emit when the value from the user input is different from the current enforce value. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks, and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace interface to pass mailing list character limit v3: + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04. + Remove useless 0-initializations + Prefix extern variables with ipe_ + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are exposed through sysctls. + Add more prose to the IPE base config option help text. + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start. + Remove unnecessary caching system. + Remove comments from headers + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only. + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12 v4: + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now exposed through securityfs. + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function. v5: + fix minor grammatical errors + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record, reconstruct the exact rule. v6: + No changes v7: + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review. + Propagating changes to support the new ipe_context structure in the evaluation loop. + Split out permissive functionality into a separate patch for easier review. + Remove permissive switch compile-time configuration option - this is trivial to add later. v8: + Remove "IPE" prefix from permissive audit record + align fields to the linux-audit field dictionary. This causes the following fields to change: enforce -> permissive + Remove duplicated information correlated with syscall record, that will always be present in the audit event. + Change audit types: + AUDIT_TRUST_STATUS -> AUDIT_MAC_STATUS + There is no significant difference in meaning between these types. v9: + Clean up ipe_context related code v10: + Change audit format to comform with the existing format selinux is using + Remove the audit record emission during init to align with selinux, which does not perform this action. v11: + Remove redundant code v12: + Remove redundant code --- security/ipe/audit.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++-- security/ipe/audit.h | 1 + security/ipe/eval.c | 11 +++++-- security/ipe/eval.h | 1 + security/ipe/fs.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c index 79b7af25085c..ed390d32c641 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.c +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ "new_active_pol_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\ "new_policy_digest=" IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG ":" +#define AUDIT_ENFORCE_CHANGE_FMT "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u "\ + "enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1" + static const char *const audit_op_names[__IPE_OP_MAX + 1] = { "EXECUTE", "FIRMWARE", @@ -95,8 +98,8 @@ void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, if (!ab) return; - audit_log_format(ab, "ipe_op=%s ipe_hook=%s pid=%d comm=", - op, audit_hook_names[ctx->hook], + audit_log_format(ab, "ipe_op=%s ipe_hook=%s enforcing=%d pid=%d comm=", + op, audit_hook_names[ctx->hook], READ_ONCE(enforce), task_tgid_nr(current)); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); @@ -210,3 +213,23 @@ void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p) audit_log_end(ab); } + +/** + * ipe_audit_enforce - Audit a change in IPE's enforcement state. + * @new_enforce: The new value enforce to be set. + * @old_enforce: The old value currently in enforce. + */ +void ipe_audit_enforce(bool new_enforce, bool old_enforce) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, AUDIT_ENFORCE_CHANGE_FMT, new_enforce, old_enforce, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), + audit_get_sessionid(current)); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.h b/security/ipe/audit.h index 0ff5a06808de..914f001e5286 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.h +++ b/security/ipe/audit.h @@ -14,5 +14,6 @@ void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, void ipe_audit_policy_load(const struct ipe_policy *const p); void ipe_audit_policy_activation(const struct ipe_policy *const op, const struct ipe_policy *const np); +void ipe_audit_enforce(bool new_enforce, bool old_enforce); #endif /* _IPE_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 85cccc3d0bdf..49338b35f126 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; bool success_audit; +bool enforce = true; #define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb) @@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) const struct ipe_rule *rule = NULL; const struct ipe_op_table *rules = NULL; struct ipe_prop *prop = NULL; + int rc = 0; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -189,9 +191,12 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) ipe_audit_match(ctx, match_type, action, rule); if (action == IPE_ACTION_DENY) - return -EACCES; + rc = -EACCES; - return 0; + if (!READ_ONCE(enforce)) + rc = 0; + + return rc; } /* Set the right module name */ @@ -202,3 +207,5 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) module_param(success_audit, bool, 0400); MODULE_PARM_DESC(success_audit, "Start IPE with success auditing enabled"); +module_param(enforce, bool, 0400); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Start IPE in enforce or permissive mode"); diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 0be9aadec9f8..84adf1a0e514 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ extern struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; extern bool success_audit; +extern bool enforce; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD struct ipe_sb { diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c index 95407997cf0c..b16d87443a3b 100644 --- a/security/ipe/fs.c +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init; struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *audit_node __ro_after_init; +static struct dentry *enforce_node __ro_after_init; /** * setaudit - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit" @@ -67,6 +68,60 @@ static ssize_t getaudit(struct file *f, char __user *data, return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1); } +/** + * setenforce - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the write syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t setenforce(struct file *f, const char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + int rc = 0; + bool new_value, old_value; + + if (!file_ns_capable(f, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + old_value = READ_ONCE(enforce); + rc = kstrtobool_from_user(data, len, &new_value); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (new_value != old_value) { + ipe_audit_enforce(new_value, old_value); + WRITE_ONCE(enforce, new_value); + } + + return len; +} + +/** + * getenforce - Read handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/enforce" + * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. + * @data: Supplies a buffer passed to the read syscall. + * @len: Supplies the length of @data. + * @offset: unused. + * + * Return: + * * >0 - Success, Length of buffer written + * * <0 - Error + */ +static ssize_t getenforce(struct file *f, char __user *data, + size_t len, loff_t *offset) +{ + const char *result; + + result = ((READ_ONCE(enforce)) ? "1" : "0"); + + return simple_read_from_buffer(data, len, offset, result, 1); +} + /** * new_policy - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/new_policy". * @f: Supplies a file structure representing the securityfs node. @@ -120,6 +175,11 @@ static const struct file_operations audit_fops = { .read = getaudit, }; +static const struct file_operations enforce_fops = { + .write = setenforce, + .read = getenforce, +}; + /** * ipe_init_securityfs - Initialize IPE's securityfs tree at fsinit. * @@ -147,6 +207,13 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) goto err; } + enforce_node = securityfs_create_file("enforce", 0600, root, NULL, + &enforce_fops); + if (IS_ERR(enforce_node)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(enforce_node); + goto err; + } + policy_root = securityfs_create_dir("policies", root); if (IS_ERR(policy_root)) { rc = PTR_ERR(policy_root); @@ -163,6 +230,7 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) err: securityfs_remove(np); securityfs_remove(policy_root); + securityfs_remove(enforce_node); securityfs_remove(audit_node); securityfs_remove(root); return rc; From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:36:59 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538228 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F0C512A155; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654250; cv=none; b=GJMjMEowuyJ1zhzL2BvFKhSBazg2m3Oy2TSiBJ4kEld8n3ddGmOorOUMj99zB2DeYGnAgBmTe4tvhr2lNMmZ7TUkmSpaVyFvlFSsjPrUpM9YMEP+MijyWuGraa3GEf55oLd65BYErIIr8tZgml6qng2ECXdsAEQijlyhWvfaYA8= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654250; c=relaxed/simple; bh=+ENZ+MfA2jg3AJxZ+5ZpKo5wklYiCgif0lE8XHED+4Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=DLrSgY9FE38pnv/Ec47SsSsFoty+HKdi0N9NOcFAAP3GLhFNz4VrmgXv6j+HelnKj28AbaEtUj/cmGLdPbtbzje04wcWz0ebAqKXhWGFtrT8l6UaDPSArD56VOH2rnlLgBHUEsaEddrLr9ZxY8WkgTeNLjfrwX8hh5tLGb8B5pw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=VK0/Y3Vk; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="VK0/Y3Vk" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 8A2C620B2013; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 8A2C620B2013 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=6Ecult7n7jN9f/scYLIUPo3TZzzRRE+1+AfaBu0wcPg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=VK0/Y3VkJTAknFtjLMzefaUQqoGOlBtr+vKhTv4TpUtAQUycsA0kpoBIAyHz49S9Z 7pw5i/jBGrPhRY40bl3bMbQcKFOYnMBTHik3PnP0I0tvcOeO3kq/WvOXr+eiw7YXLQ ApLsCfstPrsV+XHwV20pguPG5MmGMYSK6JtllT+k= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 11/20] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:36:59 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-12-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers Some block devices have valuable security properties that is only accessible during the creation time. For example, when creating a dm-verity block device, the dm-verity's roothash and roothash signature, which are extreme important security metadata, are passed to the kernel. However, the roothash will be saved privately in dm-verity, which prevents the seucrity subsystem to easily access that information. Worse, in the current implementation the roothash signature will be discarded after the verification, making it impossible to utilize the roothash signature by the security subsystem. With this patch, an LSM blob is added to the block_device structure. This enables the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related to block devices within the security blob. For example, LSM can use the new LSM blob to save the roothash signature of a dm-verity, and LSM can make access decision based on the data inside the signature, like the signer ceritificate. The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock. The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct block_device is deallocated or freed. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler --- v2: + No Changes v3: + Minor style changes from checkpatch --strict v4: + No Changes v5: + Allow multiple callers to call security_bdev_setsecurity v6: + Simplify security_bdev_setsecurity break condition v7: + Squash all dm-verity related patches to two patches, the additions to dm-verity/fs, and the consumption of the additions. v8: + Split dm-verity related patches squashed in v7 to 3 commits based on topic: + New LSM hook + Consumption of hook outside LSM + Consumption of hook inside LSM. + change return of security_bdev_alloc / security_bdev_setsecurity to LSM_RET_DEFAULT instead of 0. + Change return code to -EOPNOTSUPP, bring inline with other setsecurity hooks. v9: + Add Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler + Remove unlikely when calling LSM hook + Make the security field dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY v10: + No changes v11: + No changes v12: + No changes --- block/bdev.c | 7 +++ include/linux/blk_types.h | 3 ++ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 ++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 22 ++++++++ security/security.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 137 insertions(+) diff --git a/block/bdev.c b/block/bdev.c index e9f1b12bd75c..c3bb5d6a030c 100644 --- a/block/bdev.c +++ b/block/bdev.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -307,6 +308,11 @@ static struct inode *bdev_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) if (!ei) return NULL; memset(&ei->bdev, 0, sizeof(ei->bdev)); + + if (security_bdev_alloc(&ei->bdev)) { + kmem_cache_free(bdev_cachep, ei); + return NULL; + } return &ei->vfs_inode; } @@ -316,6 +322,7 @@ static void bdev_free_inode(struct inode *inode) free_percpu(bdev->bd_stats); kfree(bdev->bd_meta_info); + security_bdev_free(bdev); if (!bdev_is_partition(bdev)) { if (bdev->bd_disk && bdev->bd_disk->bdi) diff --git a/include/linux/blk_types.h b/include/linux/blk_types.h index f288c94374b3..339647f8645a 100644 --- a/include/linux/blk_types.h +++ b/include/linux/blk_types.h @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ struct block_device { #endif bool bd_ro_warned; int bd_writers; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + void *security; +#endif /* * keep this out-of-line as it's both big and not needed in the fast * path diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index b247388786a9..480ea4e9892d 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -429,3 +429,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, unpack_initramfs_security, void) #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_alloc_security, struct block_device *bdev) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bdev_free_security, struct block_device *bdev) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_setsecurity, struct block_device *bdev, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index a2ade0ffe9e7..f1692179aa56 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes { int lbs_msg_msg; int lbs_task; int lbs_xattr_count; /* number of xattr slots in new_xattrs array */ + int lbs_bdev; }; /** diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index e994ac9cda91..75db557b5786 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -496,6 +496,11 @@ int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what); int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, size_t *uctx_len, void *val, size_t val_len, u64 id, u64 flags); +int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev); +void security_bdev_free(struct block_device *bdev); +int security_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, + const char *name, const void *value, + size_t size); #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) @@ -1439,6 +1444,23 @@ static inline int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + +static inline int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_bdev_free(struct block_device *bdev) +{ +} + +static inline int security_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, + const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 2a527d4c69bc..6f898d8c52b5 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) @@ -231,6 +232,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_xattr_count, &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_bdev, &blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); } /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ @@ -404,6 +406,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); init_debug("xattr slots = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); + init_debug("bdev blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); /* * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs @@ -736,6 +739,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) return 0; } +/** + * lsm_bdev_alloc - allocate a composite block_device blob + * @bdev: the block_device that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the block_device blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + if (blob_sizes.lbs_bdev == 0) { + bdev->security = NULL; + return 0; + } + + bdev->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_bdev, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bdev->security) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; +} + /** * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob * @task: the task that needs a blob @@ -5474,6 +5499,80 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); +/** + * security_bdev_alloc() - Allocate a block device LSM blob + * @bdev: block device + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to @bdev->security. The + * security field is initialized to NULL when the bdev structure is + * allocated. + * + * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. + */ +int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + int rc = 0; + + rc = lsm_bdev_alloc(bdev); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(bdev_alloc_security, 0, bdev); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_bdev_free(bdev); + + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(bdev_alloc_security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_alloc); + +/** + * security_bdev_free() - Free a block device's LSM blob + * @bdev: block device + * + * Deallocate the bdev security structure and set @bdev->security to NULL. + */ +void security_bdev_free(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + if (!bdev->security) + return; + + call_void_hook(bdev_free_security, bdev); + + kfree(bdev->security); + bdev->security = NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_free); + +/** + * security_bdev_setsecurity() - Set a security property of a block device + * @bdev: block device + * @name: security property name + * @value: security property value + * @size: length of the property value + * + * Set the security property associated with @name for @bdev from the security + * property value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. + * If a @name is not implemented for a hook, it should return -EOPNOTSUPP. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success. + */ +int security_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, + const char *name, const void *value, + size_t size) +{ + int rc = 0; + struct security_hook_list *p; + + hlist_for_each_entry(p, &security_hook_heads.bdev_setsecurity, list) { + rc = p->hook.bdev_setsecurity(bdev, name, value, size); + if (rc && rc != -EOPNOTSUPP) + return rc; + } + + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(bdev_setsecurity); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setsecurity); + #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS /** * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:00 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538227 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D0B512CD87; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654250; cv=none; b=ncXNAMheC9skD4JLf7ijxbhCVkaPmNmSk01UUH63fzP+rg+lTO86m1dfqaQMx2Z2bWdpotraF+VdmTqwxSWfryBWta576jjUgBqaM1HDlimsXmW/aSzZR9ZeTWZTdO3NiDsjil5jzTxseSTw2XKxAINsXz6qyESGRbTk2cRMMbY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 9987720B2015 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=Bn8u6PAyziVes0s1hsHk4jpq4JCxu5y2joWk5Bg0G+0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Rh9EW82UHPEc63gzo6A71jZ0RXefXsNEOrBrjIzHQOH6O3ROai3DR6IzwuFsQS52P d4VHrYnGT+n1wBbLsv7kWO69RcAyb6EztZUaAOv5rjr2HGBB6y4cCyX8SHskPEzgSY jtE6s7yVHZGWgBIbuhej61FM7JlaTjOKe10n4Bw0= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 12/20] dm verity: set DM_TARGET_SINGLETON feature flag Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:00 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-13-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: The device-mapper has a flag to mark targets as singleton, which is a required flag for immutable targets. Without this flag, multiple dm-verity targets can be added to a mapped device, which has no practical use cases and will let dm_table_get_immutable_target return NULL. This patch adds the missing flag, restricting only one dm-verity target per mapped device. Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v1-v10: + Not present v11: + Introduced v12: + No changes --- drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c index 14e58ae70521..66a850c02be4 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c @@ -1507,7 +1507,7 @@ int dm_verity_get_root_digest(struct dm_target *ti, u8 **root_digest, unsigned i static struct target_type verity_target = { .name = "verity", - .features = DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE, + .features = DM_TARGET_SINGLETON | DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE, .version = {1, 9, 0}, .module = THIS_MODULE, .ctr = verity_ctr, From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:01 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538226 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D68512DDB1; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654249; cv=none; b=SxG0e9zeN1UompBzQkz1uH92FfU5ryD8IxeAQGNeQZfxJiyC7ayuFxc8J3AfsU6vzqTeom/K1HHOWTryyHr8cphpZfy/roD+qvf2f9udpdtlKQcHZyueeaHKMLz/uiC2E5huxW+VB27zMBCOg9FZkcfCH+1lAt4qldmV8lkD9po= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654249; c=relaxed/simple; bh=eLIcp+RfhTmSVlQgiky/TjFgWoyQ2RKCvw2xGagb5Mg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=bYXuI5sleb02bVb2dWLDECmt17P/66g3SjN+d0WkkrBezPnU5zUlxPSGe5E1ADXA1Hok85wnt7CAhU07SwC/CrCoQT2B1WlFcQGRd9eMS8mXCSUBzrlqEcvzhNTbkSOH3+fuVk8+i5GcBc5bE4fthrSNc/92ul/Zotg0Stifr0I= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=Kc98gZRW; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="Kc98gZRW" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id A7F7C20B2000; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com A7F7C20B2000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=PtmOIQ7QWnbnzGtRuZgd0CdiM9rCu5SOwNE3ANWLE5o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Kc98gZRW0srsHTjaCzahcz71kDwclORU59tvva+3PQN+3ieolBmu31ER45H4z7Gsv uvg41k26PMjO6ACwXpa3u+3Jmjxk5FpNF7kKgCWodzlo3SCmQqk4SLR4WvTaWXE9Zk yCpBWElQg0pXCzDZmecTWqjyr+3Vs/S4wlvIXHQE= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 13/20] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:01 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-14-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: This patch adds a target finalize hook. The hook is triggered just before activating an inactive table of a mapped device. If it returns an error the __bind get cancelled. The dm-verity target will use this hook to attach the dm-verity's roothash metadata to the block_device struct of the mapped device. Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v1-v10: + Not present v11: + Introduced v12: + No changes --- drivers/md/dm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ include/linux/device-mapper.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index 8dcabf84d866..15b46edae49f 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -2266,6 +2266,18 @@ static struct dm_table *__bind(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_table *t, goto out; } + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < t->num_targets; i++) { + struct dm_target *ti = dm_table_get_target(t, i); + + if (ti->type->finalize) { + ret = ti->type->finalize(ti); + if (ret) { + old_map = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto out; + } + } + } + old_map = rcu_dereference_protected(md->map, lockdep_is_held(&md->suspend_lock)); rcu_assign_pointer(md->map, (void *)t); md->immutable_target_type = dm_table_get_immutable_target_type(t); diff --git a/include/linux/device-mapper.h b/include/linux/device-mapper.h index 772ab4d74d94..627400b2d9af 100644 --- a/include/linux/device-mapper.h +++ b/include/linux/device-mapper.h @@ -160,6 +160,12 @@ typedef int (*dm_dax_zero_page_range_fn)(struct dm_target *ti, pgoff_t pgoff, */ typedef size_t (*dm_dax_recovery_write_fn)(struct dm_target *ti, pgoff_t pgoff, void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i); +/* + * Returns: + * < 0 : error + * = 0 : success + */ +typedef int (*dm_finalize_fn) (struct dm_target *target); void dm_error(const char *message); @@ -210,6 +216,7 @@ struct target_type { dm_dax_direct_access_fn direct_access; dm_dax_zero_page_range_fn dax_zero_page_range; dm_dax_recovery_write_fn dax_recovery_write; + dm_finalize_fn finalize; /* For internal device-mapper use. */ struct list_head list; From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:02 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538230 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D79012F586; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654252; cv=none; b=tsN8VdrVxrLYlcSHPS0KvWIf2aZy31vCPyKQTtO6ae/5zv/1vWcq/w6pH3YOcOuhig2U0N1DvvtG+/8g3PA66d94MtDnXtHycUKsN6GZxRYWqwTAnuUeOFrU1aSeM0IsWlPwJgwsXKk6HhEoHnD5ZZUrTRHx4D3ALM+KoSuUn88= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com B756020B2018 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=nj/OxR4HUy4AqI4w0LzWjoX4XndB+bND6lYikuWog/c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=C45FDi0ZUxIi6vxTCj5FnIxI3o2e7fI/+oph+zbieBOKFTEiT6iOZJdcNGlGbSZ08 FYg2BfC9G5g02O/zg7jbRguQOUjpFmTUfM79tCdNRFrkGYJEOUfKVrwT+p4jRa8ls4 E2JEVp2Td96mYkAvdG9znARWqqOqDF/ID7/Kj1tA= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 14/20] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:02 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-15-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers dm-verity provides a strong guarantee of a block device's integrity. As a generic way to check the integrity of a block device, it provides those integrity guarantees to its higher layers, including the filesystem level. An LSM that control access to a resource on the system based on the available integrity claims can use this transitive property of dm-verity, by querying the underlying block_device of a particular file. The digest and signature information need to be stored in the block device to fulfill the next requirement of authorization via LSM policy. This will enable the LSM to perform revocation of devices that are still mounted, prohibiting execution of files that are no longer authorized by the LSM in question. This patch added two security hook calls in dm-verity to save the dm-verity roothash and the roothash signature to the block device's LSM blobs. The hook calls are depended on CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY, which will be introduced in the next commit. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + No Changes v3: + No changes v4: + No changes v5: + No changes v6: + Fix an improper cleanup that can result in a leak v7: + Squash patch 08/12, 10/12 to [11/16] + Use part0 for block_device, to retrieve the block_device, when calling security_bdev_setsecurity v8: + Undo squash of 08/12, 10/12 - separating drivers/md/ from security/ & block/ + Use common-audit function for dmverity_signature. + Change implementation for storing the dm-verity digest to use the newly introduced dm_verity_digest structure introduced in patch 14/20. + Create new structure, dm_verity_digest, containing digest algorithm, size, and digest itself to pass to the LSM layer. V7 was missing the algorithm. + Create an associated public header containing this new structure and the key values for the LSM hook, specific to dm-verity. + Additional information added to commit, discussing the layering of the changes and how the information passed will be used. v9: + No changes v10: + No changes v11: + Add an optional field to save signature + Move the security hook call to the new finalize hook v12: + No changes --- drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/md/dm-verity.h | 6 +++ include/linux/dm-verity.h | 19 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/dm-verity.h diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c index 66a850c02be4..a07409c680d9 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ * access behavior. */ +#include "dm-core.h" #include "dm-verity.h" #include "dm-verity-fec.h" #include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h" @@ -22,6 +23,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include #define DM_MSG_PREFIX "verity" @@ -956,6 +960,17 @@ static void verity_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits) blk_limits_io_min(limits, limits->logical_block_size); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +static void verity_free_sig(struct dm_verity *v) +{ + kfree(v->root_digest_sig); +} +#else +static inline void verity_free_sig(struct dm_verity *v) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + static void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti) { struct dm_verity *v = ti->private; @@ -970,6 +985,7 @@ static void verity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti) kfree(v->salt); kfree(v->root_digest); kfree(v->zero_digest); + verity_free_sig(v); if (v->tfm) crypto_free_ahash(v->tfm); @@ -1161,6 +1177,25 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v, return r; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +static int verity_init_sig(struct dm_verity *v, const void *sig, + size_t sig_size) +{ + v->sig_size = sig_size; + v->root_digest_sig = kmalloc(v->sig_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!v->root_digest) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; +} +#else +static inline int verity_init_sig(struct dm_verity *v, const void *sig, + size_t sig_size) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + /* * Target parameters: * The current format is version 1. @@ -1369,6 +1404,13 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) ti->error = "Root hash verification failed"; goto bad; } + + r = verity_init_sig(v, verify_args.sig, verify_args.sig_size); + if (r < 0) { + ti->error = "Cannot allocate root digest signature"; + goto bad; + } + v->hash_per_block_bits = __fls((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) / v->digest_size); @@ -1505,6 +1547,32 @@ int dm_verity_get_root_digest(struct dm_target *ti, u8 **root_digest, unsigned i return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +static int verity_finalize(struct dm_target *ti) +{ + struct block_device *bdev; + struct dm_verity_digest root_digest; + struct dm_verity *v; + int r; + + v = ti->private; + bdev = dm_table_get_md(ti->table)->disk->part0; + root_digest.digest = v->root_digest; + root_digest.digest_len = v->digest_size; + root_digest.alg = v->alg_name; + + r = security_bdev_setsecurity(bdev, DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH_SEC_NAME, &root_digest, + sizeof(root_digest)); + if (r) + return r; + + return security_bdev_setsecurity(bdev, + DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME, + v->root_digest_sig, + v->sig_size); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + static struct target_type verity_target = { .name = "verity", .features = DM_TARGET_SINGLETON | DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE, @@ -1517,6 +1585,9 @@ static struct target_type verity_target = { .prepare_ioctl = verity_prepare_ioctl, .iterate_devices = verity_iterate_devices, .io_hints = verity_io_hints, +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + .finalize = verity_finalize, +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ }; module_dm(verity); diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h index f9d522c870e6..f41918e251f5 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity.h +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity.h @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ struct dm_verity { u8 *root_digest; /* digest of the root block */ u8 *salt; /* salt: its size is salt_size */ u8 *zero_digest; /* digest for a zero block */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + u8 *root_digest_sig; /* digest signature of the root block */ +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ unsigned int salt_size; sector_t data_start; /* data offset in 512-byte sectors */ sector_t hash_start; /* hash start in blocks */ @@ -55,6 +58,9 @@ struct dm_verity { bool hash_failed:1; /* set if hash of any block failed */ bool use_tasklet:1; /* try to verify in tasklet before work-queue */ unsigned int digest_size; /* digest size for the current hash algorithm */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + unsigned int sig_size; /* digest signature size */ +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ unsigned int ahash_reqsize;/* the size of temporary space for crypto */ enum verity_mode mode; /* mode for handling verification errors */ unsigned int corrupted_errs;/* Number of errors for corrupted blocks */ diff --git a/include/linux/dm-verity.h b/include/linux/dm-verity.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7d9753445534 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/dm-verity.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_DM_VERITY_H +#define _LINUX_DM_VERITY_H + +#include +#include +#include + +struct dm_verity_digest { + const char *alg; + const u8 *digest; + size_t digest_len; +}; + +#define DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME DM_NAME ".verity-signature" +#define DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH_SEC_NAME DM_NAME ".verity-roothash" + +#endif /* _LINUX_DM_VERITY_H */ From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:03 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538234 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3CAFF71B49; 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arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="WvrXp2Um" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id C547D20B201A; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com C547D20B201A DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=69/j553M2gH3SSN/ELYRwq9FhV89dp0Tjofq4ImyvtI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=WvrXp2UmfPLc6bGa0+Sm+pcvf3EMvzzrkh2/9GPl969wD59Y2aS5wrnTAcoiBWRS2 xJa+TCkUI2pLRpG47tAo11j/88Ot5R5nxX7ZI1CZXCr+jPo2JkiagkPkVw2SvpsvEX 6/CSXPGQZvuiyJU/+za+QNVyc6OiFhbyvBIXbJxY= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 15/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:03 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-16-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers Allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for a singular dm-verity volume, identified by roothash, through "dmverity_roothash" and all signed dm-verity volumes, through "dmverity_signature". Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + No Changes v3: + No changes v4: + No changes v5: + No changes v6: + Fix an improper cleanup that can result in a leak v7: + Squash patch 08/12, 10/12 to [11/16] v8: + Undo squash of 08/12, 10/12 - separating drivers/md/ from security/ & block/ + Use common-audit function for dmverity_signature. + Change implementation for storing the dm-verity digest to use the newly introduced dm_verity_digest structure introduced in patch 14/20. v9: + Adapt to the new parser v10: + Select the Kconfig when all dependencies are enabled v11: + No changes v12: + Refactor to use struct digest_info* instead of void* + Correct audit format --- security/ipe/Kconfig | 18 ++++++ security/ipe/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/audit.c | 37 ++++++++++- security/ipe/digest.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/digest.h | 26 ++++++++ security/ipe/eval.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/ipe/eval.h | 10 +++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 8 +++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 15 +++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 4 ++ security/ipe/policy.h | 3 + security/ipe/policy_parser.c | 26 +++++++- 13 files changed, 421 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/ipe/digest.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/digest.h diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index ac4d558e69d5..7afb1ce0cb99 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ menuconfig SECURITY_IPE depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS && AUDIT && AUDITSYSCALL select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + select IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY if DM_VERITY && DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG help This option enables the Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM allowing users to define a policy to enforce a trust-based access @@ -15,3 +16,20 @@ menuconfig SECURITY_IPE admins to reconfigure trust requirements on the fly. If unsure, answer N. + +if SECURITY_IPE +menu "IPE Trust Providers" + +config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + bool "Enable support for dm-verity volumes" + depends on DM_VERITY && DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + help + This option enables the properties 'dmverity_signature' and + 'dmverity_roothash' in IPE policy. These properties evaluates + to TRUE when a file is evaluated against a dm-verity volume + that was mounted with a signed root-hash or the volume's + root hash matches the supplied value in the policy. + +endmenu + +endif diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 2279eaa3cea3..66de53687d11 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + digest.o \ eval.o \ hooks.o \ fs.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c index ed390d32c641..a4ad8e888df0 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.c +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "hooks.h" #include "policy.h" #include "audit.h" +#include "digest.h" #define ACTSTR(x) ((x) == IPE_ACTION_ALLOW ? "ALLOW" : "DENY") @@ -54,8 +55,30 @@ static const char *const audit_prop_names[__IPE_PROP_MAX] = { "boot_verified=FALSE", "boot_verified=TRUE", #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + "dmverity_roothash=", + "dmverity_signature=FALSE", + "dmverity_signature=TRUE", +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +/** + * audit_dmv_roothash - audit a roothash of a dmverity volume. + * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit_buffer to append to. + * @rh: Supplies a pointer to the digest structure. + */ +static void audit_dmv_roothash(struct audit_buffer *ab, const void *rh) +{ + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", audit_prop_names[IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH]); + ipe_digest_audit(ab, rh); +} +#else +static void audit_dmv_roothash(struct audit_buffer *ab, const void *rh) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + /** * audit_rule - audit an IPE policy rule approximation. * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit_buffer to append to. @@ -67,8 +90,18 @@ static void audit_rule(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct ipe_rule *r) audit_log_format(ab, " rule=\"%s ", audit_op_names[r->op]); - list_for_each_entry(ptr, &r->props, next) - audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", audit_prop_names[ptr->type]); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &r->props, next) { + switch (ptr->type) { + case IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH: + audit_dmv_roothash(ab, ptr->value); + break; + default: + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", audit_prop_names[ptr->type]); + break; + } + + audit_log_format(ab, " "); + } audit_log_format(ab, "action=%s\"", ACTSTR(r->action)); } diff --git a/security/ipe/digest.c b/security/ipe/digest.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f6fde0b1fe74 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/digest.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include "digest.h" + +/** + * ipe_digest_parse - parse a digest in IPE's policy. + * @valstr: Supplies the string parsed from the policy. + * + * Digests in IPE are defined in a standard way: + * : + * + * Use this function to create a property to parse the digest + * consistently. The parsed digest will be saved in @value in IPE's + * policy. + * + * Return: The parsed digest_info structure. + */ +struct digest_info *ipe_digest_parse(const char *valstr) +{ + char *sep, *raw_digest; + size_t raw_digest_len; + int rc = 0; + char *alg = NULL; + u8 *digest = NULL; + struct digest_info *info = NULL; + + info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + sep = strchr(valstr, ':'); + if (!sep) { + rc = -EBADMSG; + goto err; + } + + alg = kstrndup(valstr, sep - valstr, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!alg) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + raw_digest = sep + 1; + raw_digest_len = strlen(raw_digest); + + info->digest_len = (raw_digest_len + 1) / 2; + digest = kzalloc(info->digest_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + rc = hex2bin(digest, raw_digest, info->digest_len); + if (rc < 0) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } + + info->alg = alg; + info->digest = digest; + return info; + +err: + kfree(alg); + kfree(digest); + kfree(info); + return ERR_PTR(rc); +} + +/** + * ipe_digest_eval - evaluate an IPE digest against another digest. + * @expected: Supplies the policy-provided digest value. + * @digest: Supplies the digest to compare against the policy digest value. + * + * Return: + * * true - digests match + * * false - digests do not match + */ +bool ipe_digest_eval(const struct digest_info *expected, + const struct digest_info *digest) +{ + return (expected->digest_len == digest->digest_len) && + (!strcmp(expected->alg, digest->alg)) && + (!memcmp(expected->digest, digest->digest, expected->digest_len)); +} + +/** + * ipe_digest_free - free an IPE digest. + * @info: Supplies a pointer the policy-provided digest to free. + */ +void ipe_digest_free(struct digest_info *info) +{ + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(info)) + return; + + kfree(info->alg); + kfree(info->digest); + kfree(info); +} + +/** + * ipe_digest_audit - audit a digest that was sourced from IPE's policy. + * @ab: Supplies the audit_buffer to append the formatted result. + * @info: Supplies a pointer to source the audit record from. + * + * Digests in IPE are defined in a standard way: + * : + * + * Use this function to create a property to audit the digest + * consistently. + */ +void ipe_digest_audit(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct digest_info *info) +{ + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, info->alg); + audit_log_format(ab, ":"); + audit_log_n_hex(ab, info->digest, info->digest_len); +} diff --git a/security/ipe/digest.h b/security/ipe/digest.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..13fa67071805 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/digest.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _IPE_DIGEST_H +#define _IPE_DIGEST_H + +#include +#include + +#include "policy.h" + +struct digest_info { + const char *alg; + const u8 *digest; + size_t digest_len; +}; + +struct digest_info *ipe_digest_parse(const char *valstr); +void ipe_digest_free(struct digest_info *digest_info); +void ipe_digest_audit(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct digest_info *val); +bool ipe_digest_eval(const struct digest_info *expected, + const struct digest_info *digest); + +#endif /* _IPE_DIGEST_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 49338b35f126..4e0fd1dc5808 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -15,10 +15,12 @@ #include "eval.h" #include "policy.h" #include "audit.h" +#include "digest.h" struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy; bool success_audit; bool enforce = true; +#define INO_BLOCK_DEV(ino) ((ino)->i_sb->s_bdev) #define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb) @@ -37,6 +39,22 @@ static void build_ipe_sb_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct file *const { } #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +/** + * build_ipe_bdev_ctx - Build ipe_bdev field of an evaluation context. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. + * @ino: Supplies the inode struct of the file triggered IPE event. + */ +static void build_ipe_bdev_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *const ino) +{ + if (INO_BLOCK_DEV(ino)) + ctx->ipe_bdev = ipe_bdev(INO_BLOCK_DEV(ino)); +} +#else +static void build_ipe_bdev_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *const ino) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ /** * build_eval_ctx - Build an evaluation context. @@ -54,8 +72,10 @@ void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, ctx->op = op; ctx->hook = hook; - if (file) + if (file) { build_ipe_sb_ctx(ctx, file); + build_ipe_bdev_ctx(ctx, d_real_inode(file->f_path.dentry)); + } } #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD @@ -96,6 +116,68 @@ static bool evaluate_boot_verified_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) } #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +/** + * evaluate_dmv_roothash - Evaluate @ctx against a dmv roothash property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the property being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the @p + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the @p + */ +static bool evaluate_dmv_roothash(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + struct ipe_prop *p) +{ + return !!ctx->ipe_bdev && + !!ctx->ipe_bdev->root_hash && + ipe_digest_eval(p->value, + ctx->ipe_bdev->root_hash); +} + +/** + * evaluate_dmv_sig_false: Analyze @ctx against a dmv sig false property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the property + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the property + */ +static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return !ctx->ipe_bdev || (!ctx->ipe_bdev->dm_verity_signed); +} + +/** + * evaluate_dmv_sig_true: Analyze @ctx against a dmv sig true property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the property + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the property + */ +static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return !evaluate_dmv_sig_false(ctx); +} +#else +static bool evaluate_dmv_roothash(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + struct ipe_prop *p) +{ + return false; +} + +static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return false; +} + +static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + /** * evaluate_property - Analyze @ctx against a property. * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated. @@ -113,6 +195,12 @@ static bool evaluate_property(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, return evaluate_boot_verified_false(ctx); case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE: return evaluate_boot_verified_true(ctx); + case IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH: + return evaluate_dmv_roothash(ctx, p); + case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE: + return evaluate_dmv_sig_false(ctx); + case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE: + return evaluate_dmv_sig_true(ctx); default: return false; } diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 84adf1a0e514..2c997d188508 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ struct ipe_sb { }; #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +struct ipe_bdev { + bool dm_verity_signed; + struct digest_info *root_hash; +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + struct ipe_eval_ctx { enum ipe_op_type op; enum ipe_hook_type hook; @@ -32,6 +39,9 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx { #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD bool from_initramfs; #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + const struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ }; enum ipe_match { diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index ab762865a671..50c5324dcd92 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -8,10 +8,14 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include "ipe.h" #include "hooks.h" #include "eval.h" +#include "digest.h" /** * ipe_bprm_check_security - ipe security hook function for bprm check. @@ -189,3 +193,66 @@ void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void) ipe_sb(current->fs->root.mnt->mnt_sb)->is_initramfs = true; } #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +/** + * ipe_bdev_free_security - free IPE's LSM blob of block_devices. + * @bdev: Supplies a pointer to a block_device that contains the structure + * to free. + */ +void ipe_bdev_free_security(struct block_device *bdev) +{ + struct ipe_bdev *blob = ipe_bdev(bdev); + + ipe_digest_free(blob->root_hash); +} + +/** + * ipe_bdev_setsecurity - save data from a bdev to IPE's LSM blob. + * @bdev: Supplies a pointer to a block_device that contains the LSM blob. + * @key: Supplies the string key that uniquely identifies the value. + * @value: Supplies the value to store. + * @len: The length of @value. + */ +int ipe_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, const char *key, + const void *value, size_t len) +{ + struct ipe_bdev *blob = ipe_bdev(bdev); + + if (!strcmp(key, DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH_SEC_NAME)) { + const struct dm_verity_digest *digest = value; + struct digest_info *info = NULL; + u8 *raw_digest = NULL; + char *alg = NULL; + + info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info) + return -ENOMEM; + + raw_digest = kmemdup(digest->digest, digest->digest_len, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!raw_digest) + goto err; + + alg = kstrdup(digest->alg, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!alg) + goto err; + + info->alg = alg; + info->digest = raw_digest; + info->digest_len = digest->digest_len; + blob->root_hash = info; + return 0; +err: + kfree(info); + kfree(raw_digest); + kfree(alg); + return -ENOMEM; + } else if (!strcmp(key, DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SEC_NAME)) { + blob->dm_verity_signed = true; + return 0; + } + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index 55fc0e35c13d..e114d633dcb4 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include enum ipe_hook_type { IPE_HOOK_BPRM_CHECK = 0, @@ -37,4 +38,11 @@ int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void); #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +void ipe_bdev_free_security(struct block_device *bdev); + +int ipe_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, const char *key, + const void *value, size_t len); +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + #endif /* _IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 034ee8cd6802..27a76aeabf1d 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "eval.h" #include "hooks.h" +#include "eval.h" bool ipe_enabled; @@ -14,6 +15,9 @@ static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct ipe_sb), #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + .lbs_bdev = sizeof(struct ipe_bdev), +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ }; static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { @@ -28,6 +32,13 @@ struct ipe_sb *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb) } #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b) +{ + return b->security + ipe_blobs.lbs_bdev; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file), @@ -37,6 +48,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD LSM_HOOK_INIT(unpack_initramfs_security, ipe_unpack_initramfs), #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_free_security, ipe_bdev_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_setsecurity, ipe_bdev_setsecurity), +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ }; /** diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index 1862c710dab8..03dab0dec54a 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -18,4 +18,8 @@ struct ipe_sb *ipe_sb(const struct super_block *sb); extern bool ipe_enabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY +struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b); +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + #endif /* _IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h index 060ffdbc62d6..fa59037c3fa4 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.h +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ enum ipe_action_type { enum ipe_prop_type { IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE, IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE, + IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH, + IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE, + IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE, __IPE_PROP_MAX }; diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c index cce15f0eb645..6cab7eef6052 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "policy.h" #include "policy_parser.h" +#include "digest.h" #define START_COMMENT '#' #define IPE_POLICY_DELIM " \t" @@ -216,6 +217,7 @@ static void free_rule(struct ipe_rule *r) list_for_each_entry_safe(p, t, &r->props, next) { list_del(&p->next); + ipe_digest_free(p->value); kfree(p); } @@ -270,6 +272,11 @@ static const match_table_t property_tokens = { {IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE, "boot_verified=FALSE"}, {IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE, "boot_verified=TRUE"}, #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY + {IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH, "dmverity_roothash=%s"}, + {IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE, "dmverity_signature=FALSE"}, + {IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE, "dmverity_signature=TRUE"}, +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ {IPE_PROP_INVALID, NULL} }; @@ -289,6 +296,7 @@ static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r) struct ipe_prop *p = NULL; int rc = 0; int token; + char *dup = NULL; p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) @@ -297,8 +305,22 @@ static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r) token = match_token(t, property_tokens, args); switch (token) { + case IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH: + dup = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!dup) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + p->value = ipe_digest_parse(dup); + if (IS_ERR(p->value)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(p->value); + goto err; + } + fallthrough; case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_FALSE: case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE: + case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE: + case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE: p->type = token; break; default: @@ -309,10 +331,12 @@ static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r) goto err; list_add_tail(&p->next, &r->props); +out: + kfree(dup); return rc; err: kfree(p); - return rc; + goto out; } /** From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:04 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538231 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1C1754276; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654252; cv=none; b=Trt4P+GqXJ5e5jSp+IG3+nZkuGEiBSlbgVrfEcwI6N0km06fJ27k/p4V4o0b56X4iXBb57SJy0AD2zbOJ6mH6tnp4r/lzeE5zi0zy7YWU8XbOBbjqJTjfm6tmuCXndw/b+p+6QClhHr2wRdMtWuz1kLKuEzGQcjKFubs1SKc5Sw= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com D415F20B201C DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=tz4qfp1c6YSioITNH1+lWqu+wc3n3uiMlxKLW6y7ajU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=iy7FvRafzFJ9bWkyJuugy+1SC0N9Tpmo1lx2fetxGSqHy2dhKtwfO/XBvrdhsuR5J lFo3bEOEATOpJ4qEZ0l0+myit/rwox5By6dtVDiTgSbS/w2oqi4nQ0N1t2V0aom1hB M0gFGUUqN6Y2AGSoSkYvw5Zar+Oi+bni8mybrRoA= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu , Deven Bowers Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 16/20] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:04 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-17-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: fsverity represents a mechanism to support both integrity and authenticity protection of a file, supporting both signed and unsigned digests. An LSM which controls access to a resource based on authenticity and integrity of said resource, can then use this data to make an informed decision on the authorization (provided by the LSM's policy) of said claim. This effectively allows the extension of a policy enforcement layer in LSM for fsverity, allowing for more granular control of how a particular authenticity claim can be used. For example, "all (built-in) signed fsverity files should be allowed to execute, but only these hashes are allowed to be loaded as kernel modules". This enforcement must be done in kernel space, as a userspace only solution would fail a simple litmus test: Download a self-contained malicious binary that never touches the userspace stack. This binary would still be able to execute. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v1-v6: + Not present v7: Introduced v8: + Split fs/verity/ changes and security/ changes into separate patches + Change signature of fsverity_create_info to accept non-const inode + Change signature of fsverity_verify_signature to accept non-const inode + Don't cast-away const from inode. + Digest functionality dropped in favor of: ("fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest") + Reworded commit description and title to match changes. + Fix a bug wherein no LSM implements the particular fsverity @name (or LSM is disabled), and returns -EOPNOTSUPP, causing errors. v9: + No changes v10: + Rename the signature blob key + Cleanup redundant code + Make the hook call depends on CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES v11: + No changes v12: + Add constification to the hook call --- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 2 +- fs/verity/open.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/fsverity.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h index a6a6b2749241..84a3608f2f9b 100644 --- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, unsigned int log_blocksize, const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size); -struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, +struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_descriptor *desc); void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi); diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c index 6c31a871b84b..f917023255c8 100644 --- a/fs/verity/open.c +++ b/fs/verity/open.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include "fsverity_private.h" #include +#include #include static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep; @@ -172,12 +173,28 @@ static int compute_file_digest(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg, return err; } +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES +static int fsverity_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc) +{ + return security_inode_setsecurity(inode, FS_VERITY_INODE_SEC_NAME, + desc->signature, + le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size), 0); +} +#else +static inline int fsverity_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY*/ + /* * Create a new fsverity_info from the given fsverity_descriptor (with optional * appended builtin signature), and check the signature if present. The * fsverity_descriptor must have already undergone basic validation. */ -struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, +struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_descriptor *desc) { struct fsverity_info *vi; @@ -242,6 +259,13 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, spin_lock_init(&vi->hash_page_init_lock); } + err = fsverity_inode_setsecurity(inode, desc); + if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) + err = 0; + + if (err) + goto fail; + return vi; fail: diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h index 1eb7eae580be..9666721baf15 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h @@ -319,4 +319,6 @@ static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#define FS_VERITY_INODE_SEC_NAME "fsverity.builtin-sig" + #endif /* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */ From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:05 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538236 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6F9813F007; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654253; cv=none; b=bcHq/y12JShmrpFC+yglNkm4IQG3quZz0E6YVK/yDN2+qy4WnibxzCq3pax7QLXk04Td0rLSBOB3zDoKfWRlQuz53vfbkgaociW04/dqrf/OBdO+Bv/S+/gUiLMdoqYD9yXYqARhQzU3lhujRYvqqFt8Cide00I/ogyDP+bv87s= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654253; c=relaxed/simple; bh=47d0KOwUo8zvzqM68yv/pcsfRHIoam5Yl/1T2vYHCXw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=Nn9Y3MqRaRVQlEGnJA+J6lwG7O/CQfeojJTYCgwuokUtGXhNhFUhO+ubgoWb2WsZSiyjMKikqk+KFrRvy4VlizK0qzM8dsWgMtoSIoqnA2+T4Vl1b9nael4wVV1DvOqes4Uz0KjxxufMrSEMlvbvc0leMgb5CGh+HULE9DiBgmw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=E+/7IrVK; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="E+/7IrVK" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id E231820B201E; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com E231820B201E DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=90YQ8e6N1UBebdYnb2d4lQ/x9uyYXZ0yeECAtCrXLzM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=E+/7IrVKUFsqF2Kut8Y0t1WCscAseVjaXnLRo5RKBrHIrDjIDk39JMyWI/jS7sXXv 6yVFdqMoRm49y9y2vTwrGBbgBaawFbaUlyEZ3mQ3Vb75469hPd0ZeGddonlmPfWReR 7lmaX5OWXoOYLKVTQHIy/9kkR7klf9IbXjL5PQRg= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu , Deven Bowers Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 17/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:05 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-18-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Enable IPE policy authors to indicate trust for a singular fsverity file, identified by the digest information, through "fsverity_digest" and all files using fsverity's builtin signatures via "fsverity_signature". This enables file-level integrity claims to be expressed in IPE, allowing individual files to be authorized, giving some flexibility for policy authors. Such file-level claims are important to be expressed for enforcing the integrity of packages, as well as address some of the scalability issues in a sole dm-verity based solution (# of loop back devices, etc). This solution cannot be done in userspace as the minimum threat that IPE should mitigate is an attacker downloads malicious payload with all required dependencies. These dependencies can lack the userspace check, bypassing the protection entirely. A similar attack succeeds if the userspace component is replaced with a version that does not perform the check. As a result, this can only be done in the common entry point - the kernel. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v1-v6: + Not present v7: Introduced v8: * Undo squash of 08/12, 10/12 - separating drivers/md/ from security/ * Use common-audit function for fsverity_signature. + Change fsverity implementation to use fsverity_get_digest + prevent unnecessary copy of fs-verity signature data, instead just check for presence of signature data. + Remove free_inode_security hook, as the digest is now acquired at runtime instead of via LSM blob. v9: + Adapt to the new parser v10: + Update the fsverity get digest call v11: + No changes v12: + Fix audit format + Simplify property evaluation --- security/ipe/Kconfig | 13 +++++ security/ipe/audit.c | 25 ++++++++ security/ipe/eval.c | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/ipe/eval.h | 10 ++++ security/ipe/hooks.c | 30 ++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 7 +++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 13 +++++ security/ipe/ipe.h | 3 + security/ipe/policy.h | 3 + security/ipe/policy_parser.c | 8 +++ 10 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index 7afb1ce0cb99..9dd5c4769d79 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -30,6 +30,19 @@ config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY that was mounted with a signed root-hash or the volume's root hash matches the supplied value in the policy. + If unsure, answer Y. + +config IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY + bool "Enable property for fs-verity files" + depends on FS_VERITY && FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES + help + This option enables the usage of properties "fsverity_signature" + and "fsverity_digest". These properties evaluates to TRUE when + a file is fsverity enabled and with a signed digest or its + diegst matches the supplied value in the policy. + + if unsure, answer Y. + endmenu endif diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c index a4ad8e888df0..7e3372be3214 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.c +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c @@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ static const char *const audit_prop_names[__IPE_PROP_MAX] = { "dmverity_signature=FALSE", "dmverity_signature=TRUE", #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY + "fsverity_digest=", + "fsverity_signature=FALSE", + "fsverity_signature=TRUE", +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ }; #ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY @@ -79,6 +84,23 @@ static void audit_dmv_roothash(struct audit_buffer *ab, const void *rh) } #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY +/** + * audit_fsv_digest - audit a digest of a fsverity file. + * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit_buffer to append to. + * @d: Supplies a pointer to the digest structure. + */ +static void audit_fsv_digest(struct audit_buffer *ab, const void *d) +{ + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", audit_prop_names[IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST]); + ipe_digest_audit(ab, d); +} +#else +static void audit_fsv_digest(struct audit_buffer *ab, const void *d) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ + /** * audit_rule - audit an IPE policy rule approximation. * @ab: Supplies a pointer to the audit_buffer to append to. @@ -95,6 +117,9 @@ static void audit_rule(struct audit_buffer *ab, const struct ipe_rule *r) case IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH: audit_dmv_roothash(ab, ptr->value); break; + case IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST: + audit_fsv_digest(ab, ptr->value); + break; default: audit_log_format(ab, "%s", audit_prop_names[ptr->type]); break; diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c index 4e0fd1dc5808..b31f39e44b09 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.c +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "ipe.h" #include "eval.h" @@ -56,6 +57,23 @@ static void build_ipe_bdev_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *con } #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY +/** + * build_ipe_inode_ctx - Build inode fields of an evaluation context. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. + * @ino: Supplies the inode struct of the file triggered IPE event. + */ +static void build_ipe_inode_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *const ino) +{ + ctx->ino = ino; + ctx->ipe_inode = ipe_inode(ctx->ino); +} +#else +static void build_ipe_inode_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, const struct inode *const ino) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ + /** * build_eval_ctx - Build an evaluation context. * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be populated. @@ -68,13 +86,17 @@ void build_eval_ctx(struct ipe_eval_ctx *ctx, enum ipe_op_type op, enum ipe_hook_type hook) { + struct inode *ino; + ctx->file = file; ctx->op = op; ctx->hook = hook; if (file) { build_ipe_sb_ctx(ctx, file); - build_ipe_bdev_ctx(ctx, d_real_inode(file->f_path.dentry)); + ino = d_real_inode(file->f_path.dentry); + build_ipe_bdev_ctx(ctx, ino); + build_ipe_inode_ctx(ctx, ino); } } @@ -178,6 +200,84 @@ static bool evaluate_dmv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) } #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY +/** + * evaluate_fsv_digest - Analyze @ctx against a fsv digest property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * @p: Supplies a pointer to the property being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the @p + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the @p + */ +static bool evaluate_fsv_digest(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + struct ipe_prop *p) +{ + enum hash_algo alg; + u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct digest_info info; + + if (!ctx->ino) + return false; + if (!fsverity_get_digest((struct inode *)ctx->ino, + digest, + NULL, + &alg)) + return false; + + info.alg = hash_algo_name[alg]; + info.digest = digest; + info.digest_len = hash_digest_size[alg]; + + return ipe_digest_eval(p->value, &info); +} + +/** + * evaluate_fsv_sig_false - Analyze @ctx against a fsv sig false property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the property + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the property + */ +static bool evaluate_fsv_sig_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return !ctx->ino || + !IS_VERITY(ctx->ino) || + !ctx->ipe_inode || + !ctx->ipe_inode->fs_verity_signed; +} + +/** + * evaluate_fsv_sig_true - Analyze @ctx against a fsv sig true property. + * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context being evaluated. + * + * Return: + * * true - The current @ctx match the property + * * false - The current @ctx doesn't match the property + */ +static bool evaluate_fsv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return !evaluate_fsv_sig_false(ctx); +} +#else +static bool evaluate_fsv_digest(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, + struct ipe_prop *p) +{ + return false; +} + +static bool evaluate_fsv_sig_false(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return false; +} + +static bool evaluate_fsv_sig_true(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ + /** * evaluate_property - Analyze @ctx against a property. * @ctx: Supplies a pointer to the context to be evaluated. @@ -201,6 +301,12 @@ static bool evaluate_property(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, return evaluate_dmv_sig_false(ctx); case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE: return evaluate_dmv_sig_true(ctx); + case IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST: + return evaluate_fsv_digest(ctx, p); + case IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_FALSE: + return evaluate_fsv_sig_false(ctx); + case IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_TRUE: + return evaluate_fsv_sig_true(ctx); default: return false; } diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.h b/security/ipe/eval.h index 2c997d188508..d1b3015f4443 100644 --- a/security/ipe/eval.h +++ b/security/ipe/eval.h @@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ struct ipe_bdev { }; #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY +struct ipe_inode { + bool fs_verity_signed; +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ + struct ipe_eval_ctx { enum ipe_op_type op; enum ipe_hook_type hook; @@ -42,6 +48,10 @@ struct ipe_eval_ctx { #ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY const struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev; #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY + const struct inode *ino; + const struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ }; enum ipe_match { diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c index 50c5324dcd92..64c1fa7de9aa 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c @@ -256,3 +256,33 @@ int ipe_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, const char *key, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY +/** + * ipe_inode_setsecurity - Sets fields of a inode security blob from @key. + * @inode: The inode to source the security blob from. + * @name: The name representing the information to be stored. + * @value: The value to be stored. + * @size: The size of @value. + * @flags: unused + * + * Saves fsverity signature & digest into inode security blob + * + * Return: + * * 0 - OK + * * !0 - Error + */ +int ipe_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, + int flags) +{ + struct ipe_inode *inode_sec = ipe_inode(inode); + + if (!strcmp(name, FS_VERITY_INODE_SEC_NAME)) { + inode_sec->fs_verity_signed = size > 0 && value; + return 0; + } + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h index e114d633dcb4..ba3b961cda05 100644 --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include enum ipe_hook_type { IPE_HOOK_BPRM_CHECK = 0, @@ -45,4 +46,10 @@ int ipe_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev, const char *key, const void *value, size_t len); #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY +int ipe_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, + int flags); +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ + #endif /* _IPE_HOOKS_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 27a76aeabf1d..e1eeb0646bf1 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY .lbs_bdev = sizeof(struct ipe_bdev), #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ipe_inode), +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ }; static const struct lsm_id ipe_lsmid = { @@ -39,6 +42,13 @@ struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b) } #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY +struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode(const struct inode *inode) +{ + return inode->i_security + ipe_blobs.lbs_inode; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ + static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file), @@ -52,6 +62,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_free_security, ipe_bdev_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bdev_setsecurity, ipe_bdev_setsecurity), #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, ipe_inode_setsecurity), +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ }; /** diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index 03dab0dec54a..e504e5ae275a 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -21,5 +21,8 @@ extern bool ipe_enabled; #ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b); #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY +struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode(const struct inode *inode); +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ #endif /* _IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h index fa59037c3fa4..9fecfc8e42bd 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.h +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ enum ipe_prop_type { IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH, IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE, IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE, + IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST, + IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_FALSE, + IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_TRUE, __IPE_PROP_MAX }; diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c index 6cab7eef6052..5c721e801cd7 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy_parser.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy_parser.c @@ -277,6 +277,11 @@ static const match_table_t property_tokens = { {IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE, "dmverity_signature=FALSE"}, {IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE, "dmverity_signature=TRUE"}, #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY + {IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST, "fsverity_digest=%s"}, + {IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_FALSE, "fsverity_signature=FALSE"}, + {IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_TRUE, "fsverity_signature=TRUE"}, +#endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY */ {IPE_PROP_INVALID, NULL} }; @@ -306,6 +311,7 @@ static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r) switch (token) { case IPE_PROP_DMV_ROOTHASH: + case IPE_PROP_FSV_DIGEST: dup = match_strdup(&args[0]); if (!dup) { rc = -ENOMEM; @@ -321,6 +327,8 @@ static int parse_property(char *t, struct ipe_rule *r) case IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED_TRUE: case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_FALSE: case IPE_PROP_DMV_SIG_TRUE: + case IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_FALSE: + case IPE_PROP_FSV_SIG_TRUE: p->type = token; break; default: From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:06 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538235 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 084F213BEB4; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654253; cv=none; b=Pr2sigvjwTdK5Fsf/yTVBTjJzYBtYCp6kzT8KQzTbs6rvjogJenYUjBuQEUIGXmxiNgytn9a8NabtsuhMsPhpc7l8Gt9LdHfXeY/cVnkCvxuP9AewLC3+fGf77TnbbySlSitbdqXuwH6iMYxtrzeDwepXzqYRhqYOXnvM7DOnwk= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654253; c=relaxed/simple; bh=un5ZiiwJ5ET2kRpRoWv6+MW+GVpLS29ru8zYnuiRV9Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=AhAS+9UiVVQxrJM9I7H0Nnmp1aky5nTyEsSUYc2rS1untnQR7bj1wLyAm/eimmAmfu3/TsnateRWiS4UsoR3LQDO1VRij9j7Ek8duMvFh3Z/SloYPCsKD4mfYMyGJkG0oog8QjXYxV0M8AZ7iHfAnpU11pzBCvdQwEkJRq6ldIw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=DVt8gzF4; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="DVt8gzF4" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id EF96B20B2020; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com EF96B20B2020 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654242; bh=4ORqcXrPqK6lw7+tvcbxclQKzT4jN0IPyhSQWXHxcWI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=DVt8gzF4UDkffh4ySAIZZNWwW9VhaWBUpbDxwlT/SkOgxcNcC83RPNiCrVz7eb42T ilrE7CN5cidRzibps741jYAIh2WssWizh6RAYzjHEuN6p5JE/1KfmkOfS5sC7Y2+Wu bZO8KIAilxWMVHdcFrJ4fA1swbB2CVpdOcJkX/e0= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 18/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:06 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-19-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers Enables an IPE policy to be enforced from kernel start, enabling access control based on trust from kernel startup. This is accomplished by transforming an IPE policy indicated by CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY into a c-string literal that is parsed at kernel startup as an unsigned policy. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + No Changes v3: + No Changes v4: + No Changes v5: + No Changes v6: + No Changes v7: + Move from 01/11 to 14/16 + Don't return errno directly. + Make output of script more user-friendly + Add escaping for tab and '?' + Mark argv pointer const + Invert return code check in the boot policy parsing code path. v8: + No significant changes. v9: + No changes v10: + Update the init part code for rcu changes in the eval loop patch v11: + Fix code style issues v12: + No changes --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + scripts/Makefile | 1 + scripts/ipe/Makefile | 2 + scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore | 2 + scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile | 5 ++ scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/.gitignore | 2 + security/ipe/Kconfig | 10 +++ security/ipe/Makefile | 11 +++ security/ipe/fs.c | 8 ++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 12 +++ 11 files changed, 199 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/Makefile create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c create mode 100644 security/ipe/.gitignore diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 51464982297b..d2f735eb9875 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10649,6 +10649,7 @@ M: Fan Wu L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org S: Supported T: git https://github.com/microsoft/ipe.git +F: scripts/ipe/ F: security/ipe/ INTEL 810/815 FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile index 576cf64be667..1dbaf3a49aef 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile +++ b/scripts/Makefile @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ targets += module.lds subdir-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS) += gcc-plugins subdir-$(CONFIG_MODVERSIONS) += genksyms subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += ipe # Let clean descend into subdirs subdir- += basic dtc gdb kconfig mod diff --git a/scripts/ipe/Makefile b/scripts/ipe/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e87553fbb8d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ipe/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +subdir-y := polgen diff --git a/scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore b/scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b6f05cf3dc0e --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +polgen diff --git a/scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile b/scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c20456a2f2e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +hostprogs-always-y := polgen +HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += \ + -I$(srctree)/include \ + -I$(srctree)/include/uapi \ diff --git a/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c b/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..40b6fe07f47b --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static void usage(const char *const name) +{ + printf("Usage: %s OutputFile (PolicyFile)\n", name); + exit(EINVAL); +} + +static int policy_to_buffer(const char *pathname, char **buffer, size_t *size) +{ + int rc = 0; + FILE *fd; + char *lbuf; + size_t fsize; + size_t read; + + fd = fopen(pathname, "r"); + if (!fd) { + rc = errno; + goto out; + } + + fseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END); + fsize = ftell(fd); + rewind(fd); + + lbuf = malloc(fsize); + if (!lbuf) { + rc = ENOMEM; + goto out_close; + } + + read = fread((void *)lbuf, sizeof(*lbuf), fsize, fd); + if (read != fsize) { + rc = -1; + goto out_free; + } + + *buffer = lbuf; + *size = fsize; + fclose(fd); + + return rc; + +out_free: + free(lbuf); +out_close: + fclose(fd); +out: + return rc; +} + +static int write_boot_policy(const char *pathname, const char *buf, size_t size) +{ + int rc = 0; + FILE *fd; + size_t i; + + fd = fopen(pathname, "w"); + if (!fd) { + rc = errno; + goto err; + } + + fprintf(fd, "/* This file is automatically generated."); + fprintf(fd, " Do not edit. */\n"); + fprintf(fd, "#include \n"); + fprintf(fd, "\nextern const char *const ipe_boot_policy;\n\n"); + fprintf(fd, "const char *const ipe_boot_policy =\n"); + + if (!buf || size == 0) { + fprintf(fd, "\tNULL;\n"); + fclose(fd); + return 0; + } + + fprintf(fd, "\t\""); + + for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) { + switch (buf[i]) { + case '"': + fprintf(fd, "\\\""); + break; + case '\'': + fprintf(fd, "'"); + break; + case '\n': + fprintf(fd, "\\n\"\n\t\""); + break; + case '\\': + fprintf(fd, "\\\\"); + break; + case '\t': + fprintf(fd, "\\t"); + break; + case '\?': + fprintf(fd, "\\?"); + break; + default: + fprintf(fd, "%c", buf[i]); + } + } + fprintf(fd, "\";\n"); + fclose(fd); + + return 0; + +err: + if (fd) + fclose(fd); + return rc; +} + +int main(int argc, const char *const argv[]) +{ + int rc = 0; + size_t len = 0; + char *policy = NULL; + + if (argc < 2) + usage(argv[0]); + + if (argc > 2) { + rc = policy_to_buffer(argv[2], &policy, &len); + if (rc != 0) + goto cleanup; + } + + rc = write_boot_policy(argv[1], policy, len); +cleanup: + if (policy) + free(policy); + if (rc != 0) + perror("An error occurred during policy conversion: "); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/ipe/.gitignore b/security/ipe/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..07313d3fd74a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +boot-policy.c diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index 9dd5c4769d79..a6c5d48dd0a3 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -18,6 +18,16 @@ menuconfig SECURITY_IPE If unsure, answer N. if SECURITY_IPE +config IPE_BOOT_POLICY + string "Integrity policy to apply on system startup" + help + This option specifies a filepath to a IPE policy that is compiled + into the kernel. This policy will be enforced until a policy update + is deployed via the $securityfs/ipe/policies/$policy_name/active + interface. + + If unsure, leave blank. + menu "IPE Trust Providers" config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 66de53687d11..ce23101b66ba 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -5,7 +5,16 @@ # Makefile for building the IPE module as part of the kernel tree. # +quiet_cmd_polgen = IPE_POL $(2) + cmd_polgen = scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen security/ipe/boot-policy.c $(2) + +targets += boot-policy.c + +$(obj)/boot-policy.c: scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen $(CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY) FORCE + $(call if_changed,polgen,$(CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY)) + obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ + boot-policy.o \ digest.o \ eval.o \ hooks.o \ @@ -15,3 +24,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ policy_fs.o \ policy_parser.o \ audit.o \ + +clean-files := boot-policy.c \ diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c index b16d87443a3b..8af6e39f9914 100644 --- a/security/ipe/fs.c +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static const struct file_operations enforce_fops = { static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) { int rc = 0; + struct ipe_policy *ap; if (!ipe_enabled) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -220,6 +221,13 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) goto err; } + ap = rcu_access_pointer(ipe_active_policy); + if (ap) { + rc = ipe_new_policyfs_node(ap); + if (rc) + goto err; + } + np = securityfs_create_file("new_policy", 0200, root, NULL, &np_fops); if (IS_ERR(np)) { rc = PTR_ERR(np); diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index e1eeb0646bf1..f13bdda9fa38 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "hooks.h" #include "eval.h" +extern const char *const ipe_boot_policy; bool ipe_enabled; static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __ro_after_init = { @@ -79,9 +80,20 @@ static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { */ static int __init ipe_init(void) { + struct ipe_policy *p = NULL; + security_add_hooks(ipe_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ipe_hooks), &ipe_lsmid); ipe_enabled = true; + if (ipe_boot_policy) { + p = ipe_new_policy(ipe_boot_policy, strlen(ipe_boot_policy), + NULL, 0); + if (IS_ERR(p)) + return PTR_ERR(p); + + rcu_assign_pointer(ipe_active_policy, p); + } + return 0; } From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:07 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538237 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02D221420D8; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654253; cv=none; b=GqfhJTth5jvB2v1Lv2viLSJezKUw18JUJNP50DEbAr7UxZCWveadm/bjCIZesbvyVQS3wRzre6cwk+L45706a5EMczwUBX59eNHXyC64ebHFU3aOqM9rfIRnrRXEkMsyCy/cNrD3lqsVsazzHjzGQHX2Cvqya3Nfs0S45v5Afag= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654253; c=relaxed/simple; bh=VImuLvBnTUvj8P0hQsQLTtntW1PnGu/Qu0LbpY0+9bA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=pn/ghzfEfVUsETX056a7iIMt+GHP7Iduh20YP2+pO9YjJoBi5z4jtk/Sz5beuJxfhe/5ogdnmRzHR0SI8XxLK54qPcvRs8oNzGAw7RcDNcHL9KKGj5G+y2wNoo8UCOqv3qlBB7/OnCtPKuyKUc4Ffe3c0VMZDDdKUrEq3pe9uns= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=KU2rHe6T; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="KU2rHe6T" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 0A69220B2023; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 0A69220B2023 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654243; bh=MJsTdwQcFey1Vh8/AeIe/OuBfhcvGETQ0nT2VI32jkM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=KU2rHe6T/WBpDFAcTzsG3ysdWfAruK1dX3lulyuGWWRRxdbObyc3zZtcV8Ufyah9N 74+dCWdXMfhZ6dMD+D2KF7qJ1L5ag/+wx7cTlWD5pEvq5KUD4lF2OfkdxMClqpfAd8 izOvd8UPE/1PuMbqYDHGe6/WbvwQg6ASMvahweZA= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 19/20] ipe: kunit test for parser Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:07 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-20-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers Add various happy/unhappy unit tests for both IPE's policy parser. Besides, a test suite for IPE functionality is available at https://github.com/microsoft/ipe/tree/test-suite Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v1-v6: + Not present v7: Introduced v8: + Remove the kunit tests with respect to the fsverity digest, as these require significant changes to work with the new method of acquiring the digest at runtime. v9: + Remove the kunit tests related to ipe_context v10: + No changes v11: + No changes v12: + No changes --- security/ipe/Kconfig | 17 +++ security/ipe/Makefile | 3 + security/ipe/policy_tests.c | 294 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 314 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_tests.c diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index a6c5d48dd0a3..ac04a9974297 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -55,4 +55,21 @@ config IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY endmenu +config SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST + bool "Build KUnit tests for IPE" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + depends on KUNIT=y + default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + help + This builds the IPE KUnit tests. + + KUnit tests run during boot and output the results to the debug log + in TAP format (https://testanything.org/). Only useful for kernel devs + running KUnit test harness and are not for inclusion into a + production build. + + For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general please refer + to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/. + + If unsure, say N. + endif diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index ce23101b66ba..def674e09e84 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile @@ -26,3 +26,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ audit.o \ clean-files := boot-policy.c \ + +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST) += \ + policy_tests.o \ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_tests.c b/security/ipe/policy_tests.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d67c42c9ca59 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/policy_tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "policy.h" +struct policy_case { + const char *const policy; + int errno; + const char *const desc; +}; + +static const struct policy_case policy_cases[] = { + { + "policy_name=allowall policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + 0, + "basic", + }, + { + "policy_name=trailing_comment policy_version=152.0.0 #This is comment\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + 0, + "trailing comment", + }, + { + "policy_name=allowallnewline policy_version=0.2.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "\n", + 0, + "trailing newline", + }, + { + "policy_name=carriagereturnlinefeed policy_version=0.0.1\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "\r\n", + 0, + "clrf newline", + }, + { + "policy_name=whitespace policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT\taction=ALLOW\n" + " \t DEFAULT \t op=EXECUTE action=DENY\n" + "op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n" + "# this is a\tcomment\t\t\t\t\n" + "DEFAULT \t op=KMODULE\t\t\t action=DENY\r\n" + "op=KMODULE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, + "various whitespaces and nested default", + }, + { + "policy_name=boot_verified policy_version=-1236.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT\taction=ALLOW\n", + -EINVAL, + "negative version", + }, + { + "policy_name=$@!*&^%%\\:;{}() policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + 0, + "special characters", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=999999.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -ERANGE, + "overflow version", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=255.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "incomplete version", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=111.0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "extra version", + }, + { + "", + -EBADMSG, + "0-length policy", + }, + { + "policy_name=test\0policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "random null in header", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "\0DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "incomplete policy from NULL", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=DENY\n\0" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW\n", + 0, + "NULL truncates policy", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=abc action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid property type", + }, + { + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "missing policy header", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n", + -EBADMSG, + "missing default definition", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "dmverity_signature=TRUE op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid rule ordering" + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "action=ALLOW op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid rule ordering (2)", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid version", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=UNKNOWN dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "unknown operation", + }, + { + "policy_name=asdvpolicy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n", + -EBADMSG, + "missing space after policy name", + }, + { + "policy_name=test\xFF\xEF policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW", + 0, + "expanded ascii", + }, + { + "policy_name=test\xFF\xEF policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=GOOD_DOG action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid property value (2)", + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.1.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW", + -EBADMSG, + "double header" + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n", + -EBADMSG, + "double default" + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=DENY\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW\n", + -EBADMSG, + "double operation default" + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=DEN\n", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid action value" + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action\n", + -EBADMSG, + "invalid action value (2)" + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "UNKNOWN value=true\n", + -EBADMSG, + "unrecognized statement" + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=1c0d7ee1f8343b7fbe418378e8eb22c061d7dec7 action=DENY\n", + -EBADMSG, + "old-style digest" + }, + { + "policy_name=test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + "DEFAULT action=ALLOW\n" + "op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=1c0d7ee1f8343b7fbe418378e8eb22c061d7dec7 action=DENY\n", + -EBADMSG, + "old-style digest" + } +}; + +static void pol_to_desc(const struct policy_case *c, char *desc) +{ + strscpy(desc, c->desc, KUNIT_PARAM_DESC_SIZE); +} + +KUNIT_ARRAY_PARAM(ipe_policies, policy_cases, pol_to_desc); + +/** + * ipe_parser_unsigned_test - Test the parser by passing unsigned policies. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. This test does not check the correctness + * of the policy, but ensures that errors are handled correctly. + */ +static void ipe_parser_unsigned_test(struct kunit *test) +{ + const struct policy_case *p = test->param_value; + struct ipe_policy *pol = ipe_new_policy(p->policy, strlen(p->policy), NULL, 0); + + if (p->errno) { + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, PTR_ERR(pol), p->errno); + return; + } + + KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol); + KUNIT_EXPECT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pol->parsed); + KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, pol->text, p->policy); + KUNIT_EXPECT_PTR_EQ(test, NULL, pol->pkcs7); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, pol->pkcs7len); + + ipe_free_policy(pol); +} + +/** + * ipe_parser_widestring_test - Ensure parser fail on a wide string policy. + * @test: Supplies a pointer to a kunit structure. + * + * This is called by the kunit harness. + */ +static void ipe_parser_widestring_test(struct kunit *test) +{ + struct ipe_policy *pol = NULL; + const unsigned short policy[] = L"policy_name=Test policy_version=0.0.0\n" + L"DEFAULT action=ALLOW"; + + pol = ipe_new_policy((const char *)policy, (ARRAY_SIZE(policy) - 1) * 2, NULL, 0); + KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pol)); + + ipe_free_policy(pol); +} + +static struct kunit_case ipe_parser_test_cases[] = { + KUNIT_CASE_PARAM(ipe_parser_unsigned_test, ipe_policies_gen_params), + KUNIT_CASE(ipe_parser_widestring_test), +}; + +static struct kunit_suite ipe_parser_test_suite = { + .name = "ipe-parser", + .test_cases = ipe_parser_test_cases, +}; + +kunit_test_suite(ipe_parser_test_suite); From patchwork Tue Jan 30 22:37:08 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Fan Wu X-Patchwork-Id: 13538238 X-Patchwork-Delegate: paul@paul-moore.com Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC97813EFEB; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 22:37:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654255; cv=none; b=g/ZOm+GYkrvizDNlREC3eVqQE70LNP1KndH1KiqxxQ0yxgLNxit7L2/XBP95xAMWNT8Opq3hLvUQNUhQFxGOWd+cQ/z7d/GGpfA8at0SAgmgBpsTv+n2Y4y0TzZOM2A6dXf2MuRFSymA8cNhcqwkKIh8N30p/DPSLrPKBcOq0Bk= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1706654255; c=relaxed/simple; bh=QTc+NHJroFAagZturg9/yJLyNVdVTVayATJ8rjTTGZg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References; b=HGCtV93ULtVJYjhZdPbrgomboKEdQkjherlQRYGC0Ze0GHP0rW7m7prU5Ed2ukT2RZxxlScLL8NyDXLME8q/y70fSrrlUbTL/1bc4eabRzdlLgnl4NErlXxZUqOkD7f/Kb92d/q/lkepHq0frlKjN2+/ZZHK5UrY3Sh3PhBzo6Y= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=Mio2a3Cd; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="Mio2a3Cd" Received: by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix, from userid 1052) id 1839F20B2002; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 1839F20B2002 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1706654243; bh=DCL15UUwj9cCXB6Q7wPYOmLWVFH2UB2bm8BM0LRy5RA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Mio2a3CdxFuuz4g3Yl3RlQulma8D2GNM1jQ/rZW01D3mZMUTVO/PAHy+5DuzbBjDT lgl1ppEK4+12jxjoO/D3upwvAshuB0UIFlJasMEr8e/1JME5wY9dURbwx16dv2e/ax JbJKTVTiG9G/lBvLbZQews5Y+7uWtCkanWt+a1m0= From: Fan Wu To: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Deven Bowers , Fan Wu Subject: [RFC PATCH v12 20/20] documentation: add ipe documentation Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:08 -0800 Message-Id: <1706654228-17180-21-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1706654228-17180-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: audit@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: From: Deven Bowers Add IPE's admin and developer documentation to the kernel tree. Co-developed-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers Signed-off-by: Fan Wu --- v2: + No Changes v3: + Add Acked-by + Fixup code block syntax + Fix a minor grammatical issue. v4: + Update documentation with the results of other code changes. v5: + No changes v6: + No changes v7: + Add additional developer-level documentation + Update admin-guide docs to reflect changes. + Drop Acked-by due to significant changes + Added section about audit events in admin-guide v8: + Correct terminology from "audit event" to "audit record" + Add associated documentation with the correct "audit event" terminology. + Add some context to the historical motivation for IPE and design philosophy. + Add some content about the securityfs layout in the policies directory. + Various spelling and grammatical corrections. v9: + Correct spelling of "pitfalls" + Update the docs w.r.t the new parser and new audit formats v10: + Refine user docs per upstream suggestions + Update audit events part v11: + No changes v12: + Update audit formats + Update initramfs related docs + Add test suite link --- Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst | 761 ++++++++++++++++++ .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 + Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/ipe.rst | 444 ++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 2 + 6 files changed, 1221 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/ipe.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst index a6ba95fbaa9f..ce63be6d64ad 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst @@ -47,3 +47,4 @@ subdirectories. tomoyo Yama SafeSetID + ipe diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..081a0514472e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst @@ -0,0 +1,761 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) +================================== + +.. NOTE:: + + This is the documentation for admins, system builders, or individuals + attempting to use IPE. If you're looking for more developer-focused + documentation about IPE please see `Documentation/security/ipe.rst` + +Overview +-------- + +IPE is a Linux Security Module which takes a complimentary approach to +access control. Whereas existing mandatory access control mechanisms +base their decisions on labels and paths, IPE instead determines +whether or not an operation should be allowed based on immutable +security properties of the system component the operation is being +performed on. + +IPE itself does not mandate how the security property should be +evaluated, but relies on an extensible set of external property providers +to evaluate the component. IPE makes its decision based on reference +values for the selected properties, specified in the IPE policy. + +The reference values represent the value that the policy writer and the +local system administrator (based on the policy signature) trust for the +system to accomplish the desired tasks. + +One such provider is for example dm-verity, which is able to represent +the integrity property of a partition (its immutable state) with a digest. + +To enable IPE, ensure that ``CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE`` (under +:menuselection:`Security -> Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)`) config +option is enabled. + +Use Cases +--------- + +IPE works best in fixed-function devices: devices in which their purpose +is clearly defined and not supposed to be changed (e.g. network firewall +device in a data center, an IoT device, etcetera), where all software and +configuration is built and provisioned by the system owner. + +IPE is a long-way off for use in general-purpose computing: the Linux +community as a whole tends to follow a decentralized trust model (known as +the web of trust), which IPE has no support for it yet. Instead, IPE +supports PKI (public key infrastructure), which generally designates a +set of trusted entities that provide a measure of absolute trust. + +Additionally, while most packages are signed today, the files inside +the packages (for instance, the executables), tend to be unsigned. This +makes it difficult to utilize IPE in systems where a package manager is +expected to be functional, without major changes to the package manager +and ecosystem behind it. + +DIGLIM [#diglim]_ is a system that when combined with IPE, could be used to +enable and support general-purpose computing use cases. + +Known Limitations +----------------- + +IPE cannot verify the integrity of anonymous executable memory, such as +the trampolines created by gcc closures and libffi (<3.4.2), or JIT'd code. +Unfortunately, as this is dynamically generated code, there is no way +for IPE to ensure the integrity of this code to form a trust basis. In all +cases, the return result for these operations will be whatever the admin +configures as the ``DEFAULT`` action for ``EXECUTE``. + +IPE cannot verify the integrity of programs written in interpreted +languages when these scripts are invoked by passing these program files +to the interpreter. This is because the way interpreters execute these +files; the scripts themselves are not evaluated as executable code +through one of IPE's hooks, but they are merely text files that are read +(as opposed to compiled executables) [#interpreters]_. + +Threat Model +------------ + +The threat type addressed by IPE is tampering of executable userspace +code beyond the initially booted kernel, and the initial verification of +kernel modules that are loaded in userspace through ``modprobe`` or +``insmod``. + +A bare-minimum example of a threat that should be mitigated by IPE, is +an untrusted (potentially malicious) binary that is downloaded and +bundled with all required dependencies (including a loader, libc, etc). +With IPE, this binary should not be allowed to be executed, not even any +of its dependencies. + +Tampering violates integrity, yet lack of trust is caused by being +unable to detect tampering (and by extent verifying the integrity). +IPE's role in mitigating this threat is to verify the integrity (and +authenticity) of all executable code and to deny their use if they +cannot be trusted (as integrity verification fails, or the authorization +check fails against the reference value in the policy). IPE generates +audit logs which may be utilized to detect and analyze failures +resulting from policy violation. + +Tampering threat scenarios include modification or replacement of +executable code by a range of actors including: + +- Actors with physical access to the hardware +- Actors with local network access to the system +- Actors with access to the deployment system +- Compromised internal systems under external control +- Malicious end users of the system +- Compromised end users of the system +- Remote (external) compromise of the system + +IPE does not mitigate threats arising from malicious but authorized +developers (with access to a signing certificate), or compromised +developer tools used by them (i.e. return-oriented programming attacks). +Additionally, IPE draws hard security boundary between userspace and +kernelspace. As a result, IPE does not provide any protections against a +kernel level exploit, and a kernel-level exploit can disable or tamper +with IPE's protections. + +Policy +------ + +IPE policy is a plain-text [#devdoc]_ policy composed of multiple statements +over several lines. There is one required line, at the top of the +policy, indicating the policy name, and the policy version, for +instance:: + + policy_name=Ex_Policy policy_version=0.0.0 + +The policy name is a unique key identifying this policy in a human +readable name. This is used to create nodes under securityfs as well as +uniquely identify policies to deploy new policies vs update existing +policies. + +The policy version indicates the current version of the policy (NOT the +policy syntax version). This is used to prevent rollback of policy to +potentially insecure previous versions of the policy. + +The next portion of IPE policy are rules. Rules are formed by key=value +pairs, known as properties. IPE rules require two properties: ``action``, +which determines what IPE does when it encounters a match against the +rule, and ``op``, which determines when the rule should be evaluated. +The ordering is significant, a rule must start with ``op``, and end with +``action``. Thus, a minimal rule is:: + + op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +This example will allow any execution. Additional properties are used to +restrict attributes about the files being evaluated. These properties +are intended to be descriptions of systems within the kernel that can +provide a measure of integrity verification, such that IPE can determine +the trust of the resource based on the value of the property. + +Rules are evaluated top-to-bottom. As a result, any revocation rules, +or denies should be placed early in the file to ensure that these rules +are evaluated before a rule with ``action=ALLOW``. + +IPE policy supports comments. The character '#' will function as a +comment, ignoring all characters to the right of '#' until the newline. + +The default behavior of IPE evaluations can also be expressed in policy, +through the ``DEFAULT`` statement. This can be done at a global level, +or a per-operation level:: + + # Global + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + + # Operation Specific + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +A default must be set for all known operations in IPE. If you want to +preserve older policies being compatible with newer kernels that can introduce +new operations, set a global default of ``ALLOW``, then override the +defaults on a per-operation basis (as above). + +With configurable policy-based LSMs, there's several issues with +enforcing the configurable policies at startup, around reading and +parsing the policy: + +1. The kernel *should* not read files from userspace, so directly reading + the policy file is prohibited. +2. The kernel command line has a character limit, and one kernel module + should not reserve the entire character limit for its own + configuration. +3. There are various boot loaders in the kernel ecosystem, so handing + off a memory block would be costly to maintain. + +As a result, IPE has addressed this problem through a concept of a "boot +policy". A boot policy is a minimal policy which is compiled into the +kernel. This policy is intended to get the system to a state where +userspace is set up and ready to receive commands, at which point a more +complex policy can be deployed via securityfs. The boot policy can be +specified via ``SECURITY_IPE_BOOT_POLICY`` config option, which accepts +a path to a plain-text version of the IPE policy to apply. This policy +will be compiled into the kernel. If not specified, IPE will be disabled +until a policy is deployed and activated through securityfs. + +Deploying Policies +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Policies can be deployed from userspace through securityfs. These policies +are signed through the PKCS#7 message format to enforce some level of +authorization of the policies (prohibiting an attacker from gaining +unconstrained root, and deploying an "allow all" policy). These +policies must be signed by a certificate that chains to the +``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``. With openssl, the policy can be signed by:: + + openssl smime -sign \ + -in "$MY_POLICY" \ + -signer "$MY_CERTIFICATE" \ + -inkey "$MY_PRIVATE_KEY" \ + -noattr \ + -nodetach \ + -nosmimecap \ + -outform der \ + -out "$MY_POLICY.p7b" + +Deploying the policies is done through securityfs, through the +``new_policy`` node. To deploy a policy, simply cat the file into the +securityfs node:: + + cat "$MY_POLICY.p7b" > /sys/kernel/security/ipe/new_policy + +Upon success, this will create one subdirectory under +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/``. The subdirectory will be the +``policy_name`` field of the policy deployed, so for the example above, +the directory will be ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/Ex_Policy``. +Within this directory, there will be seven files: ``pkcs7``, ``policy``, +``name``, ``version``, ``active``, ``update``, and ``delete``. + +The ``pkcs7`` file is read-only. Reading it returns the raw PKCS#7 data +that was provided to the kernel, representing the policy. If the policy being +read is the boot policy, this will return ``ENOENT``, as it is not signed. + +The ``policy`` file is read only. Reading it returns the PKCS#7 inner +content of the policy, which will be the plain text policy. + +The ``active`` file is used to set a policy as the currently active policy. +This file is rw, and accepts a value of ``"1"`` to set the policy as active. +Since only a single policy can be active at one time, all other policies +will be marked inactive. The policy being marked active must have a policy +version greater or equal to the currently-running version. + +The ``update`` file is used to update a policy that is already present +in the kernel. This file is write-only and accepts a PKCS#7 signed +policy. Two checks will always be performed on this policy: First, the +``policy_names`` must match with the updated version and the existing +version. Second the updated policy must have a policy version greater than +or equal to the currently-running version. This is to prevent rollback attacks. + +The ``delete`` file is used to remove a policy that is no longer needed. +This file is write-only and accepts a value of ``1`` to delete the policy. +On deletion, the securityfs node representing the policy will be removed. +However, delete the current active policy is not allowed and will return +an operation not permitted error. + +Similarly, writing to both ``update`` and ``new_policy`` could result in +bad message(policy syntax error) or file exists error. The latter error happens +when trying to deploy a policy with a ``policy_name`` while the kernel already +has a deployed policy with the same ``policy_name``. + +Deploying a policy will *not* cause IPE to start enforcing the policy. IPE will +only enforce the policy marked active. Note that only one policy can be active +at a time. + +Once deployment is successful, the policy can be activated, by writing file +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/active``. +For example, the ``Ex_Policy`` can be activated by:: + + echo 1 > "/sys/kernel/security/ipe/Ex_Policy/active" + +From above point on, ``Ex_Policy`` is now the enforced policy on the +system. + +IPE also provides a way to delete policies. This can be done via the +``delete`` securityfs node, ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/delete``. +Writing ``1`` to that file deletes the policy:: + + echo 1 > "/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/delete" + +There is only one requirement to delete a policy: the policy being deleted +must be inactive. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack), all + writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Modes +~~~~~ + +IPE supports two modes of operation: permissive (similar to SELinux's +permissive mode) and enforced. In permissive mode, all events are +checked and policy violations are logged, but the policy is not really +enforced. This allows users to test policies before enforcing them. + +The default mode is enforce, and can be changed via the kernel command +line parameter ``ipe.enforce=(0|1)``, or the securityfs node +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/enforce``. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack, etcetera), + all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Audit Events +~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +1420 AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Event Examples:: + + type=1420 audit(1653364370.067:61): ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=MMAP enforcing=1 pid=2241 comm="ld-linux.so" path="/deny/lib/libc.so.6" dev="sda2" ino=14549020 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY" + type=1300 audit(1653364370.067:61): SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=9 success=no exit=-13 a0=7f1105a28000 a1=195000 a2=5 a3=812 items=0 ppid=2219 pid=2241 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=2 comm="ld-linux.so" exe="/tmp/ipe-test/lib/ld-linux.so" subj=unconfined key=(null) + type=1327 audit(1653364370.067:61): 707974686F6E3300746573742F6D61696E2E7079002D6E00 + + type=1420 audit(1653364735.161:64): ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=MMAP enforcing=1 pid=2472 comm="mmap_test" rule="DEFAULT action=DENY" + type=1300 audit(1653364735.161:64): SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=9 success=no exit=-13 a0=0 a1=1000 a2=4 a3=21 items=0 ppid=2219 pid=2472 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=2 comm="mmap_test" exe="/root/overlake_test/upstream_test/vol_fsverity/bin/mmap_test" subj=unconfined key=(null) + type=1327 audit(1653364735.161:64): 707974686F6E3300746573742F6D61696E2E7079002D6E00 + +This event indicates that IPE made an access control decision; the IPE +specific record (1420) is always emitted in conjunction with a +``AUDITSYSCALL`` record. + +Determining whether IPE is in permissive or enforced mode can be derived +from ``success`` property and exit code of the ``AUDITSYSCALL`` record. + + +Field descriptions: + ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Field | Value Type | Optional? | Description of Value | ++===========+============+===========+=================================================================================+ +| ipe_op | string | No | The IPE operation name associated with the log | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| ipe_hook | string | No | The name of the LSM hook that triggered the IPE event | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| enforcing | integer | No | The current IPE enforcing state 1 is in enforcing mode, 0 is in permissive mode | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| pid | integer | No | The pid of the process that triggered the IPE event. | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| comm | string | No | The command line program name of the process that triggered the IPE event | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| path | string | Yes | The absolute path to the evaluated file | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| ino | integer | Yes | The inode number of the evaluated file | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| dev | string | Yes | The device name of the evaluated file, e.g. vda | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| rule | string | No | The matched policy rule | ++-----------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ + +1421 AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +Event Example:: + + type=1421 audit(1653425583.136:54): old_active_pol_name="Allow_All" old_active_pol_version=0.0.0 old_policy_digest=sha256:E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855 new_active_pol_name="boot_verified" new_active_pol_version=0.0.0 new_policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F26765076DD8EED7B8F4DB auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1 + type=1300 audit(1653425583.136:54): SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=1 success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=5596fcae1fb0 a2=2 a3=2 items=0 ppid=184 pid=229 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=4294967295 comm="python3" exe="/usr/bin/python3.10" key=(null) + type=1327 audit(1653425583.136:54): PROCTITLE proctitle=707974686F6E3300746573742F6D61696E2E7079002D66002E2 + +This event indicates that IPE switched the active poliy from one to another +along with the version and the hash digest of the two policies. +Note IPE can only have one policy active at a time, all access decision +evaluation is based on the current active policy. +The normal procedure to deploy a new policy is loading the policy to deploy +into the kernel first, then switch the active policy to it. + +This record will always be emitted in conjunction with a ``AUDITSYSCALL`` record for the ``write`` syscall. + ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| Field | Value Type | Optional? | Description of Value | ++========================+============+===========+===================================================+ +| old_active_pol_name | string | No | The name of previous active policy | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| old_active_pol_version | string | No | The version of previous active policy | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| old_policy_digest | string | No | The hash of previous active policy | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| new_active_pol_name | string | No | The name of current active policy | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| new_active_pol_version | string | No | The version of current active policy | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| new_policy_digest | string | No | The hash of current active policy | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| auid | integer | No | The login user ID | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| ses | integer | No | The login session ID | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| lsm | string | No | The lsm name associated with the event | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| res | integer | No | The result of the audited operation(success/fail) | ++------------------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ + +1422 AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +Event Example:: + + type=1422 audit(1653425529.927:53): policy_name="boot_verified" policy_version=0.0.0 policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F26765076DD8EED7B8F4DB auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1 + type=1300 audit(1653425529.927:53): arch=c000003e syscall=1 success=yes exit=2567 a0=3 a1=5596fcae1fb0 a2=a07 a3=2 items=0 ppid=184 pid=229 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=4294967295 comm="python3" exe="/usr/bin/python3.10" key=(null) + type=1327 audit(1653425529.927:53): PROCTITLE proctitle=707974686F6E3300746573742F6D61696E2E7079002D66002E2E + +This record indicates a new policy has been loaded into the kernel with the policy name, policy version and policy hash. + +This record will always be emitted in conjunction with a ``AUDITSYSCALL`` record for the ``write`` syscall. + ++----------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| Field | Value Type | Optional? | Description of Value | ++================+============+===========+===================================================+ +| policy_name | string | No | The policy_name | ++----------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| policy_version | string | No | The policy_version | ++----------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| policy_digest | string | No | The policy hash | ++----------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| auid | integer | No | The login user ID | ++----------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| ses | integer | No | The login session ID | ++----------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| lsm | string | No | The lsm name associated with the event | ++----------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ +| res | integer | No | The result of the audited operation(success/fail) | ++----------------+------------+-----------+---------------------------------------------------+ + + +1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +Event Examples:: + + type=1404 audit(1653425689.008:55): enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1 + type=1300 audit(1653425689.008:55): arch=c000003e syscall=1 success=yes exit=2 a0=1 a1=55c1065e5c60 a2=2 a3=0 items=0 ppid=405 pid=441 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=) + type=1327 audit(1653425689.008:55): proctitle="-bash" + + type=1404 audit(1653425689.008:55): enforcing=1 old_enforcing=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1 + type=1300 audit(1653425689.008:55): arch=c000003e syscall=1 success=yes exit=2 a0=1 a1=55c1065e5c60 a2=2 a3=0 items=0 ppid=405 pid=441 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=) + type=1327 audit(1653425689.008:55): proctitle="-bash" + +This record will always be emitted in conjunction with a ``AUDITSYSCALL`` record for the ``write`` syscall. + ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Field | Value Type | Optional? | Description of Value | ++===============+============+===========+=================================================================================================+ +| enforcing | integer | No | The enforcing state IPE is being switched to, 1 is in enforcing mode, 0 is in permissive mode | ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| old_enforcing | integer | No | The enforcing state IPE is being switched from, 1 is in enforcing mode, 0 is in permissive mode | ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| auid | integer | No | The login user ID | ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| ses | integer | No | The login session ID | ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| enabled | integer | No | The new TTY audit enabled setting | ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| old-enabled | integer | No | The old TTY audit enabled setting | ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| lsm | string | No | The lsm name associated with the event | ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| res | integer | No | The result of the audited operation(success/fail) | ++---------------+------------+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ + + +Success Auditing +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +IPE supports success auditing. When enabled, all events that pass IPE +policy and are not blocked will emit an audit event. This is disabled by +default, and can be enabled via the kernel command line +``ipe.success_audit=(0|1)`` or +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/success_audit`` securityfs file. + +This is *very* noisy, as IPE will check every userspace binary on the +system, but is useful for debugging policies. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack, etcetera), + all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Properties +---------- + +As explained above, IPE properties are ``key=value`` pairs expressed in +IPE policy. Two properties are built-into the policy parser: 'op' and +'action'. The other properties are deterministic attributes to express +across files. Currently those properties are: '``boot_verified``', +'``dmverity_signature``', '``dmverity_roothash``', '``fsverity_signature``', +'``fsverity_digest``'. A description of all properties supported by IPE +are listed below: + +op +~~ + +Indicates the operation for a rule to apply to. Must be in every rule, +as the first token. IPE supports the following operations: + + ``EXECUTE`` + + Pertains to any file attempting to be executed, or loaded as an + executable. + + ``FIRMWARE``: + + Pertains to firmware being loaded via the firmware_class interface. + This covers both the preallocated buffer and the firmware file + itself. + + ``KMODULE``: + + Pertains to loading kernel modules via ``modprobe`` or ``insmod``. + + ``KEXEC_IMAGE``: + + Pertains to kernel images loading via ``kexec``. + + ``KEXEC_INITRAMFS`` + + Pertains to initrd images loading via ``kexec --initrd``. + + ``POLICY``: + + Controls loading policies via reading a kernel-space initiated read. + + An example of such is loading IMA policies by writing the path + to the policy file to ``$securityfs/ima/policy`` + + ``X509_CERT``: + + Controls loading IMA certificates through the Kconfigs, + ``CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH`` and ``CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH``. + +action +~~~~~~ + + Determines what IPE should do when a rule matches. Must be in every + rule, as the final clause. Can be one of: + + ``ALLOW``: + + If the rule matches, explicitly allow access to the resource to proceed + without executing any more rules. + + ``DENY``: + + If the rule matches, explicitly prohibit access to the resource to + proceed without executing any more rules. + +boot_verified +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + This property can be utilized for authorization of files from initramfs. + It will only be available if ``CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD`` is enabled. + The format of this property is:: + + boot_verified=(TRUE|FALSE) + + + .. WARNING:: + + This property will trust files from initramfs(rootfs). It should + only be used during early booting stage. As the rootfs is never + unmounted, It is recommended to switch to another policy without + this property after the real rootfs takes over. + +dmverity_roothash +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + This property can be utilized for authorization or revocation of + specific dm-verity volumes, identified via sroot hash. It has a + dependency on the DM_VERITY module. This property is controlled by + the ``IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY`` config option, it will be automatically + selected when ``IPE_SECURITY``, ``DM_VERITY `` and + ``DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG`` are all enabled. + The format of this property is:: + + dmverity_roothash=DigestName:HexadecimalString + + The supported DigestNames for dmverity_roothash are [#dmveritydigests]_ [#securedigest]_ : + + + blake2b-512 + + blake2s-256 + + sha1 + + sha256 + + sha384 + + sha512 + + sha3-224 + + sha3-256 + + sha3-384 + + sha3-512 + + md4 + + md5 + + sm3 + + rmd160 + +dmverity_signature +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + This property can be utilized for authorization of all dm-verity + volumes that have a signed roothash that chains to a keyring + specified by dm-verity's configuration, either the system trusted + keyring, or the secondary keyring. It depends on + ``DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG`` config option and is controlled by + the ``IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY`` config option, it will be automatically + selected when ``IPE_SECURITY``, ``DM_VERITY `` and + ``DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG`` are all enabled. + The format of this property is:: + + dmverity_signature=(TRUE|FALSE) + +fsverity_digest +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + This property can be utilized for authorization or revocation of + specific fsverity enabled file, identified via its fsverity digest. + It depends on ``FS_VERITY`` config option and is controlled by + ``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY``. The format of this property is:: + + fsverity_digest=DigestName:HexadecimalString + + The supported DigestNames for dmverity_roothash are [#fsveritydigest] [#securedigest]_ : + + + sha256 + + sha512 + +fsverity_signature +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + This property can be utilized for authorization of all fsverity + enabled files that is verified by fsverity. The keyring that the + signature is verified against is subject to fsverity's configuration, + typically the fsverity keyring. It depends on + ``CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES`` and it is controlled by + the Kconfig ``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY``. The format of this + property is:: + + fsverity_signature=(TRUE|FALSE) + +Policy Examples +--------------- + +Allow all +~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name=Allow_All policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + +Allow only initramfs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name=Allow_All_Initramfs policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Allow any signed dm-verity volume and the initramfs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name=AllowSignedAndInitramfs policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Prohibit execution from a specific dm-verity volume +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name=AllowSignedAndInitramfs policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=sha256:cd2c5bae7c6c579edaae4353049d58eb5f2e8be0244bf05345bc8e5ed257baff action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Allow only a specific dm-verity volume +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name=AllowSignedAndInitramfs policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=sha256:401fcec5944823ae12f62726e8184407a5fa9599783f030dec146938 action=ALLOW + +Allow any signed fs-verity file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name=AllowSignedFSVerity policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Prohibit execution of a specific fs-verity file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name=ProhibitSpecificFSVF policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=sha256:fd88f2b8824e197f850bf4c5109bea5cf0ee38104f710843bb72da796ba5af9e action=DENY + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Additional Information +---------------------- + +- `Github Repository `_ +- `Design Documentation `_ + +FAQ +--- + +Q: + What's the difference between other LSMs which provide a measure of + trust-based access control? + +A: + + In general, there's two other LSMs that can provide similar functionality: + IMA, and Loadpin. + + IMA and IPE are functionally very similar. The significant difference between + the two is the policy. [#devdoc]_ + + Loadpin and IPE differ fairly dramatically, as Loadpin controls only the IPE + equivalent of ``KERNEL_READ``, whereas IPE is capable of controlling execution, + on top of ``KERNEL_READ``. The trust model is also different; Loadpin roots its + trust in the initial super-block, whereas trust in IPE is stemmed from kernel + itself (via ``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS``). + +----------- + +.. [#diglim] 1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/4d6932e96d774227b42721d9f645ba51@huawei.com/T/ + +.. [#interpreters] There is `some interest in solving this issue `_. + +.. [#devdoc] Please see `Documentation/security/ipe.rst` for more on this topic. + +.. [#fsveritydigest] These hash algorithms are based on values accepted by fsverity-utils; + IPE does not impose any restrictions on the digest algorithm itself; + thus, this list may be out of date. + +.. [#dmveritydigests] These hash algorithms are based on values accepted by dm-verity, + specifically ``crypto_alloc_ahash`` in ``verity_ctr``; ``veritysetup`` + does support more algorithms than the list above. IPE does not impose + any restrictions on the digest algorithm itself; thus, this list + may be out of date. + +.. [#securedigest] Please ensure you are using cryptographically secure hash functions; + just because something is *supported* does not mean it is *secure*. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 31b3a25680d0..3a3e0978e95d 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2282,6 +2282,18 @@ ipcmni_extend [KNL] Extend the maximum number of unique System V IPC identifiers from 32,768 to 16,777,216. + ipe.enforce= [IPE] + Format: + Determine whether IPE starts in permissive (0) or + enforce (1) mode. The default is enforce. + + ipe.success_audit= + [IPE] + Format: + Start IPE with success auditing enabled, emitting + an audit event when a binary is allowed. The default + is 0. + irqaffinity= [SMP] Set the default irq affinity mask The argument is a cpu list, as described above. diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst index 59f8fc106cb0..3e0a7114a862 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst @@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ Security Documentation digsig landlock secrets/index + ipe diff --git a/Documentation/security/ipe.rst b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9ac3d680fbdc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst @@ -0,0 +1,444 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) - Kernel Documentation +========================================================= + +.. NOTE:: + + This is documentation targeted at developers, instead of administrators. + If you're looking for documentation on the usage of IPE, please see + `Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst` + +Historical Motivation +--------------------- + +The original issue that prompted IPE's implementation was the creation +of a locked-down system. This system would be born-secure, and have +strong integrity guarantees over both the executable code, and specific +*data files* on the system, that were critical to its function. These +specific data files would not be readable unless they passed integrity +policy. A mandatory access control system would be present, and +as a result, xattrs would have to be protected. This lead to a selection +of what would provide the integrity claims. At the time, there were two +main mechanisms considered that could guarantee integrity for the system +with these requirements: + + 1. IMA + EVM Signatures + 2. DM-Verity + +Both options were carefully considered, however the choice to use DM-Verity +over IMA+EVM as the *integrity mechanism* in the original use case of IPE +was due to three main reasons: + + 1. Protection of additional attack vectors: + + * With IMA+EVM, without an encryption solution, the system is vulnerable + to offline attack against the aforementioned specific data files. + + Unlike executables, read operations (like those on the protected data + files), cannot be enforced to be globally integrity verified. This means + there must be some form of selector to determine whether a read should + enforce the integrity policy, or it should not. + + At the time, this was done with mandatory access control labels. An IMA + policy would indicate what labels required integrity verification, which + presented an issue: EVM would protect the label, but if an attacker could + modify filesystem offline, the attacker could wipe all the xattrs - + including the SELinux labels that would be used to determine whether the + file should be subject to integrity policy. + + With DM-Verity, as the xattrs are saved as part of the merkel tree, if + offline mount occurs against the filesystem protected by dm-verity, the + checksum no longer matches and the file fails to be read. + + * As userspace binaries are paged in Linux, dm-verity also offers the + additional protection against a hostile block device. In such an attack, + the block device reports the appropriate content for the IMA hash + initially, passing the required integrity check. Then, on the page fault + that accesses the real data, will report the attacker's payload. Since + dm-verity will check the data when the page fault occurs (and the disk + access), this attack is mitigated. + + 2. Performance: + + * dm-verity provides integrity verification on demand as blocks are + read versus requiring the entire file being read into memory for + validation. + + 3. Simplicity of signing: + + * No need for two signatures (IMA, then EVM): one signature covers + an entire block device. + * Signatures can be stored externally to the filesystem metadata. + * The signature supports an x.509-based signing infrastructure. + +The next step was to choose a *policy* to enforce the integrity mechanism. +The minimum requirements for the policy were: + + 1. The policy itself must be integrity verified (preventing trivial + attack against it). + 2. The policy itself must be resistant to rollback attacks. + 3. The policy enforcement must have a permissive-like mode. + 4. The policy must be able to be updated, in its entirety, without + a reboot. + 5. Policy updates must be atomic. + 6. The policy must support *revocations* of previously authored + components. + 7. The policy must be auditable, at any point-of-time. + +IMA, as the only integrity policy mechanism at the time, was +considered against these list of requirements, and did not fulfill +all of the minimum requirements. Extending IMA to cover these +requirements was considered, but ultimately discarded for a +two reasons: + + 1. Regression risk; many of these changes would result in + dramatic code changes to IMA, which is already present in the + kernel, and therefore might impact users. + + 2. IMA was used in the system for measurement and attestation; + separation of measurement policy from local integrity policy + enforcement was considered favorable. + +Due to these reasons, it was decided that a new LSM should be created, +whose responsibility would be only the local integrity policy enforcement. + +Role and Scope +-------------- + +IPE, as its name implies, is fundamentally an integrity policy enforcement +solution; IPE does not mandate how integrity is provided, but instead +leaves that decision to the system administrator to set the security bar, +via the mechanisms that they select that suit their individual needs. +There are several different integrity solutions that provide a different +level of security guarantees; and IPE allows sysadmins to express policy for +theoretically all of them. + +IPE does not have an inherent mechanism to ensure integrity on its own. +Instead, there are more effective layers available for building systems that +can guarantee integrity. It's important to note that the mechanism for proving +integrity is independent of the policy for enforcing that integrity claim. + +Therefore, IPE was designed around: + + 1. Easy integrations with integrity providers. + 2. Ease of use for platform administrators/sysadmins. + +Design Rationale: +----------------- + +IPE was designed after evaluating existing integrity policy solutions +in other operating systems and environments. In this survey of other +implementations, there were a few pitfalls identified: + + 1. Policies were not readable by humans, usually requiring a binary + intermediary format. + 2. A single, non-customizable action was implicitly taken as a default. + 3. Debugging the policy required manual steps to determine what rule was violated. + 4. Authoring a policy required an in-depth knowledge of the larger system, + or operating system. + +IPE attempts to avoid all of these pitfalls. + +Policy +~~~~~~ + +Plain Text +^^^^^^^^^^ + +IPE's policy is plain-text. This introduces slightly larger policy files than +other LSMs, but solves two major problems that occurs with some integrity policy +solutions on other platforms. + +The first issue is one of code maintenance and duplication. To author policies, +the policy has to be some form of string representation (be it structured, +through XML, JSON, YAML, etcetera), to allow the policy author to understand +what is being written. In a hypothetical binary policy design, a serializer +is necessary to write the policy from the human readable form, to the binary +form, and a deserializer is needed to interpret the binary form into a data +structure in the kernel. + +Eventually, another deserializer will be needed to transform the binary from +back into the human-readable form with as much information preserved. This is because a +user of this access control system will have to keep a lookup table of a checksum +and the original file itself to try to understand what policies have been deployed +on this system and what policies have not. For a single user, this may be alright, +as old policies can be discarded almost immediately after the update takes hold. +For users that manage computer fleets in the thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, +with multiple different operating systems, and multiple different operational needs, +this quickly becomes an issue, as stale policies from years ago may be present, +quickly resulting in the need to recover the policy or fund extensive infrastructure +to track what each policy contains. + +With now three separate serializer/deserializers, maintenance becomes costly. If the +policy avoids the binary format, there is only one required serializer: from the +human-readable form to the data structure in kernel, saving on code maintenance, +and retaining operability. + +The second issue with a binary format is one of transparency. As IPE controls +access based on the trust of the system's resources, it's policy must also be +trusted to be changed. This is done through signatures, resulting in needing +signing as a process. Signing, as a process, is typically done with a +high security bar, as anything signed can be used to attack integrity +enforcement systems. It is also important that, when signing something, that +the signer is aware of what they are signing. A binary policy can cause +obfuscation of that fact; what signers see is an opaque binary blob. A +plain-text policy, on the other hand, the signers see the actual policy +submitted for signing. + +Boot Policy +~~~~~~~~~~~ + +IPE, if configured appropriately, is able to enforce a policy as soon as a +kernel is booted and usermode starts. That implies some level of storage +of the policy to apply the minute usermode starts. Generally, that storage +can be handled in one of three ways: + + 1. The policy file(s) live on disk and the kernel loads the policy prior + to an code path that would result in an enforcement decision. + 2. The policy file(s) are passed by the bootloader to the kernel, who + parses the policy. + 3. There is a policy file that is compiled into the kernel that is + parsed and enforced on initialization. + +The first option has problems: the kernel reading files from userspace +is typically discouraged and very uncommon in the kernel. + +The second option also has problems: Linux supports a variety of bootloaders +across its entire ecosystem - every bootloader would have to support this +new methodology or there must be an independent source. It would likely +result in more drastic changes to the kernel startup than necessary. + +The third option is the best but it's important to be aware that the policy +will take disk space against the kernel it's compiled in. It's important to +keep this policy generalized enough that userspace can load a new, more +complicated policy, but restrictive enough that it will not overauthorize +and cause security issues. + +The initramfs provides a way that this bootup path can be established. The +kernel starts with a minimal policy, that trusts the initramfs only. Inside +the initramfs, when the real rootfs is mounted, but not yet transferred to, +it deploys and activates a policy that trusts the new root filesystem. +This prevents overauthorization at any step, and keeps the kernel policy +to a minimal size. + +Startup +^^^^^^^ + +Not every system, however starts with an initramfs, so the startup policy +compiled into the kernel will need some flexibility to express how trust +is established for the next phase of the bootup. To this end, if we just +make the compiled-in policy a full IPE policy, it allows system builders +to express the first stage bootup requirements appropriately. + +Updatable, Rebootless Policy +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +As requirements change over time (vulnerabilities are found in previously +trusted applications, keys roll, etcetera). Updating a kernel to change the +meet those security goals is not always a suitable option, as updates are not +always risk-free, and blocking a security update leaves systems vulnerable. +This means IPE requires a policy that can be completely updated (allowing +revocations of existing policy) from a source external to the kernel (allowing +policies to be updated without updating the kernel). + +Additionally, since the kernel is stateless between invocations, and reading +policy files off the disk from kernel space is a bad idea(tm), then the +policy updates have to be done rebootlessly. + +To allow an update from an external source, it could be potentially malicious, +so this policy needs to have a way to be identified as trusted. This is +done via a signature chained to a trust source in the kernel. Arbitrarily, +this is the ``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``, a keyring that is initially +populated at kernel compile-time, as this matches the expectation that the +author of the compiled-in policy described above is the same entity that can +deploy policy updates. + +Anti-Rollback / Anti-Replay +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Over time, vulnerabilities are found and trusted resources may not be +trusted anymore. IPE's policy has no exception to this. There can be +instances where a mistaken policy author deploys an insecure policy, +before correcting it with a secure policy. + +Assuming that as soon as the insecure policy is signed, and an attacker +acquires the insecure policy, IPE needs a way to prevent rollback +from the secure policy update to the insecure policy update. + +Initially, IPE's policy can have a policy_version that states the +minimum required version across all policies that can be active on +the system. This will prevent rollback while the system is live. + +.. WARNING:: + + However, since the kernel is stateless across boots, this policy + version will be reset to 0.0.0 on the next boot. System builders + need to be aware of this, and ensure the new secure policies are + deployed ASAP after a boot to ensure that the window of + opportunity is minimal for an attacker to deploy the insecure policy. + +Implicit Actions: +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The issue of implicit actions only becomes visible when you consider +a mixed level of security bars across multiple operations in a system. +For example, consider a system that has strong integrity guarantees +over both the executable code, and specific *data files* on the system, +that were critical to its function. In this system, three types of policies +are possible: + + 1. A policy in which failure to match any rules in the policy results + in the action being denied. + 2. A policy in which failure to match any rules in the policy results + in the action being allowed. + 3. A policy in which the action taken when no rules are matched is + specified by the policy author. + +The first option could make a policy like this:: + + op=EXECUTE integrity_verified=YES action=ALLOW + +In the example system, this works well for the executables, as all +executables should have integrity guarantees, without exception. The +issue becomes with the second requirement about specific data files. +This would result in a policy like this (assuming each line is +evaluated in order):: + + op=EXECUTE integrity_verified=YES action=ALLOW + + op=READ integrity_verified=NO label=critical_t action=DENY + op=READ action=ALLOW + +This is somewhat clear if you read the docs, understand the policy +is executed in order and that the default is a denial; however, the +last line effectively changes that default to an ALLOW. This is +required, because in a realistic system, there are some unverified +reads (imagine appending to a log file). + +The second option, matching no rules results in an allow, is clearer +for the specific data files:: + + op=READ integrity_verified=NO label=critical_t action=DENY + +And, like the first option, falls short with the opposite scenario, +effectively needing to override the default:: + + op=EXECUTE integrity_verified=YES action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE action=DENY + + op=READ integrity_verified=NO label=critical_t action=DENY + +This leaves the third option. Instead of making users be clever +and override the default with an empty rule, force the end-user +to consider what the appropriate default should be for their +scenario and explicitly state it:: + + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=DENY + op=EXECUTE integrity_verified=YES action=ALLOW + + DEFAULT op=READ action=ALLOW + op=READ integrity_verified=NO label=critical_t action=DENY + +Policy Debugging: +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +When developing a policy, it is useful to know what line of the policy +is being violated to reduce debugging costs; narrowing the scope of the +investigation to the exact line that resulted in the action. Some integrity +policy systems do not provide this information, instead providing the +information that was used in the evaluation. This then requires a correlation +with the policy to evaluate what went wrong. + +Instead, IPE just emits the rule that was matched. This limits the scope +of the investigation to the exact policy line (in the case of a specific +rule), or the section (in the case of a DEFAULT). This decreases iteration +and investigation times when policy failures are observed while evaluating +policies. + +IPE's policy engine is also designed in a way that it makes it obvious to +a human of how to investigate a policy failure. Each line is evaluated in +the sequence that is written, so the algorithm is very simple to follow +for humans to recreate the steps and could have caused the failure. In other +surveyed systems, optimizations occur (sorting rules, for instance) when loading +the policy. In those systems, it requires multiple steps to debug, and the +algorithm may not always be clear to the end-user without reading the code first. + +Simplified Policy: +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Finally, IPE's policy is designed for sysadmins, not kernel developers. Instead +of covering individual LSM hooks (or syscalls), IPE covers operations. This means +instead of sysadmins needing to know that the syscalls ``mmap``, ``mprotect``, +``execve``, and ``uselib`` must have rules protecting them, they must simple know +that they want to restrict code execution. This limits the amount of bypasses that +could occur due to a lack of knowledge of the underlying system; whereas the +maintainers of IPE, being kernel developers can make the correct choice to determine +whether something maps to these operations, and under what conditions. + +Implementation Notes +-------------------- + +Anonymous Memory +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Anonymous memory isn't treated any differently from any other access in IPE. +When anonymous memory is mapped with ``+X``, it still comes into the ``file_mmap`` +or ``file_mprotect`` hook, but with a ``NULL`` file object. This is submitted to +the evaluation, like any other file, however, all current trust mechanisms will +return false as there is nothing to evaluate. This means anonymous memory +execution is subject to whatever the ``DEFAULT`` is for ``EXECUTE``. + +.. WARNING:: + + This also occurs with the ``kernel_load_data`` hook, which is used by signed + and compressed kernel modules. Using signed and compressed kernel modules with + IPE will always result in the ``DEFAULT`` action for ``KMODULE``. + +Securityfs Interface +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The per-policy securityfs tree is somewhat unique. For example, for +a standard securityfs policy tree:: + + MyPolicy + |- active + |- delete + |- name + |- pkcs7 + |- policy + |- update + |- version + +The policy is stored in the ``->i_private`` data of the MyPolicy inode. + +Tests +----- + +IPE has KUnit Tests for the policy parser. Recommended kunitconfig:: + + CONFIG_KUNIT=y + CONFIG_SECURITY=y + CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y + CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y + CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION=y + CONFIG_FS_VERITY=y + CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y + CONFIG_BLOCK=y + CONFIG_MD=y + CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DM=y + CONFIG_DM_VERITY=y + CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG=y + CONFIG_NET=y + CONFIG_AUDIT=y + CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=y + CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=y + + CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE=y + CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY=y + CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY=y + CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE_KUNIT_TEST=y + +In addition, IPE has a python based integration +`test suite `_ that +can test both user interfaces and enforcement functionalities. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d2f735eb9875..883f16dedcb9 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10649,6 +10649,8 @@ M: Fan Wu L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org S: Supported T: git https://github.com/microsoft/ipe.git +F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst +F: Documentation/security/ipe.rst F: scripts/ipe/ F: security/ipe/