From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:30:49 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13557945 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 22CA7126F07; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:32:09 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.154 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993132; cv=none; b=aXfN77u53VvRsceSfzVxy1vYTK23Y8A5kwhl0z5OtpgIad0w4qKiDtUGB+lvvA+jkCwlg1RQrZYnMj1d1t2gblz4OaTP9uy6zojLv4QpQWym7+VOydmx0K1Kq0p+vmq1fWMNk9CXsuLdrtJwDK+xCEkls4kUMBgdIa/ev4gGU2I= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993132; c=relaxed/simple; bh=rKbM8A7s3icXmSAnkIY+SmGVA3ijDatDrRUHfMbCxtU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=K+FqR7xQxuGSoxAJnF6wk2FdGh2LGpVyGqw5H1Jnj0hHE1AOgb3ZkymhmTNIqwDLDf+TlHPCfjROsX+JSxcYEi5LK0GyGqAMuAoGpu2TqR7IeNDuMd9c3KdnK34eR9Bh9yTSc59yUDRn2UY8eW7sA0HFquNePlf0Rc7a56nxamo= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=huaweicloud.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.154 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=huaweicloud.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.51]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Tb9qZ2nS3z9xrMj; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:12:58 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.27]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9C6C1408CE; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:32:01 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S3; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:32:01 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:49 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-2-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S3 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxAF45Zw48Zw4xCry5ur1DAwb_yoW5AF4Dpa 95G3WDG34rury8Wr95Aa13A3yF9FyUWFy7W3yrK34IyFnxtr10qFn3Kry2kFy5CrW8Kr90 qF1jgrn0k3WayrJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBIb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUGw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUCwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV WxJVW8Jr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_ Gr1j6F4UJwAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I80ew Av7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUGwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCjc4AY 6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI7V AKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxVCj r7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVWrXVW8Jr1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr0_Gr1UMIIF0xvE 42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwCI42IY6I8E87Iv6x kF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJrUvcSsGvfC2KfnxnUUI43ZEXa7IU1cdbUUUUUU== X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfVQAAsq From: Roberto Sassu Change ima_inode_post_setattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_post_setattr hook (to be introduced). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- fs/attr.c | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 5a13f0c8495f..b53ae408ad4f 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); - ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry); + ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid); } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 86b57757c7b1..910a2f11a906 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry); + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); extern int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) } static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry) + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { return; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 870dde67707b..36c2938a5c69 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status * * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise. * @@ -636,7 +637,7 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry) + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:32:15 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:50 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-3-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S4 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxArykJw18XFy5AFyrXrykAFb_yoW5uF4fpa n8KasrGrWxJFy8ur97XFW3ua43K3yIgw1UXa9ag340vFn0qFnYqr13AF18ur1rZr95tF92 y3y7trW5A3WDtrDanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBIb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUXw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUCwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV WxJVW8Jr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_ Gr1j6F4UJwAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I80ew Av7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUGwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCjc4AY 6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI7V AKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxVCj r7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVWrXVW8Jr1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr0_Gr1UMIIF0xvE 42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwCI42IY6I8E87Iv6x kF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJrUvcSsGvfC2KfnxnUUI43ZEXa7IU1sa9DUUUUU== X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfVQABsr From: Roberto Sassu Change ima_file_mprotect() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the file_mprotect hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 5 +++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++++-- security/security.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 910a2f11a906..b66353f679e8 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); -extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot); +extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot); extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description); @@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, } static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - unsigned long prot) + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index cc1217ac2c6f..b3f5e8401056 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, /** * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change * @vma: vm_area_struct protection is set to - * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * @reqprot: protection requested by the application + * @prot: protection that will be applied by the kernel * * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore @@ -465,7 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, * * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS. */ -int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) +int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) { struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; struct file *file; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 7035ee35a393..78928d4c0db1 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2832,7 +2832,7 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); if (ret) return ret; - return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); + return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); } /** From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:30:51 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13557947 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6199512C556; 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dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=huaweicloud.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.51]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Tb9r61V62z9xrMY; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:13:26 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.27]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC65B1405A1; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:32:29 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S5; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:32:29 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:51 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S5 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxJFyDGF1DCryftr43tr48Crg_yoW5ZFyxpF s5Ga48G34FqFy7WryFyF47u39Y93y8WryUurWDK3Z2yFnxJr1xtFySyr1jvry5Zr48Kr1v qa1aqrs0k3W3trJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBSb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUWw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUCwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrVC2j2 WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE7xkE bVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20xvY0x 0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E 7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMIIF0x vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1lIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUFYFCUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfVQADsp From: Roberto Sassu Change ima_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_setxattr hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 11 +++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index b66353f679e8..077324309c11 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -188,8 +188,9 @@ static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); -extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags); extern int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl); @@ -212,10 +213,12 @@ static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return; } -static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, +static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len) + size_t xattr_value_len, + int flags) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 36c2938a5c69..cb2d0d11aa77 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -750,8 +750,9 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry, return -EACCES; } -int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; int digsig = 0; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 78928d4c0db1..ec572380d0cd 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2270,7 +2270,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (ret) return ret; - ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); + ret = ima_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (ret) return ret; return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:30:52 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13557948 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 548C0128390; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:32:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; 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spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.51]) by frasgout11.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Tb9wv5VKjz9yTLN; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:17:35 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.27]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B429114064F; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:32:43 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S6; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:32:43 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:52 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-5-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S6 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxCrWrXry3uw4rAF4fGF4fGrg_yoW5Gw15pF s3K3WUC348XFy7WryFyF9xC34SgrW7GrnrX3yrW3Z2yFnxJr18XFWfXF1j9345Cr48KF1v qFsFvwsxC3W5trDanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBmb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUJVWUCwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20x vY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I 3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMI IF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1l IxAIcVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMIIF0xvEx4 A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUFgAwUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf0QAAsh From: Roberto Sassu Change ima_inode_removexattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_removexattr hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 7 +++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 ++- security/security.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 077324309c11..678a03fddd7e 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -200,7 +200,9 @@ static inline int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, { return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); } -extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); + +extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name); #else static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { @@ -231,7 +233,8 @@ static inline int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; } -static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, +static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index cb2d0d11aa77..36abc84ba299 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } -int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) { int result; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ec572380d0cd..feb39de74385 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2431,7 +2431,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); if (ret) return ret; - ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + ret = ima_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); if (ret) return ret; return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:30:53 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:32:57 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:53 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-6-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S7 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW7Cw4DZF4rtr48KFy7Jw4DCFg_yoW8Kr43p3 Z8Ka4UGr9Ygry8CF97JFZxA34rW3sFgF4UWFZ3W3sFqF12qrn0vrZxCF1q9r1rKrWkAr15 u34jgrZIka4UtrJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBmb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUCVW8JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20x vY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I 3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMI IF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JFI_Gr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1l IxAIcVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMIIF0xvEx4 A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUFgAwUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf0gAAsi From: Roberto Sassu Change ima_post_read_file() definition, by making "void *buf" a "char *buf", so that it can be registered as implementation of the post_read_file hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 678a03fddd7e..31ef6c3c3207 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description); extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents); -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, +extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry); @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, return 0; } -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, +static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b3f5e8401056..02021ee467d3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, +int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:30:54 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13557950 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 989F712A14C; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:33:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.46 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993206; cv=none; b=KDZR4wpor7toREWxxFZOrh6Tr2zL4NVuEQN7wuMcNbYbf9TrdYCs1JxQtdGdVpjMIFO9OrbAJHvq1MS8oKmc2GEQdFbhBiVqD0okFktti63JgnNVY64+7PmfM3c/5m9E6EQ+GtCorgqULiIGHDgO120pc2soyR2a1Q8I9g8NZ9A= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:33:11 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S8; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:33:11 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:54 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-7-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S8 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxuF4DCFWkJF1xArWxCw17Jrb_yoW5Cw1Upa 95K3WkC34rWryUWr95GF4rZayFgFW8WryUX3yFgw1jyFnrtrnIqF1xK3yUCry5GrW8Grn0 qFnFvrn5Cr15A3DanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBmb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUCVW8JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20x vY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I 3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMI IF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JFI_Gr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1l IxAIcVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMIIF0xvEx4 A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUFgAwUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfXAAAsj From: Roberto Sassu Change evm_inode_post_setattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_post_setattr hook (to be introduced). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- fs/attr.c | 2 +- include/linux/evm.h | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index b53ae408ad4f..adeba0ec40f1 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); - evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid); + evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); } return error; diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 36ec884320d9..5cc386312b5a 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); -extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); +extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size); @@ -98,7 +99,8 @@ static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; } -static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) +static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { return; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index cc7956d7878b..ac34f21122cd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -870,6 +870,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, /** * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata + * @idmap: idmap of the idmapped mount * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status * @@ -879,7 +880,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ -void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) +void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + int ia_valid) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:33:25 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:55 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-8-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S9 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxGryfXF4ktFyktr1fAw4xZwb_yoW5CF1fpF Z8Ka48Gw1FqFyUWryvkF17uayvg3yrWryjkrWDK3WvyF9xJrnYqFyfKF4jyryrCr48KrnI qanFvrs09w15X3DanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBmb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUCVW8JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20x vY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I 3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMI IF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JFI_Gr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1l IxAIcVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4 A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUFgAwUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfXAABsi From: Roberto Sassu Change evm_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_setxattr hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/evm.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++- security/security.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 5cc386312b5a..7de24c1ada90 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size); + const void *value, size_t size, int flags); extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size) + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index ac34f21122cd..12ba3207fd31 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -581,6 +581,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length + * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations * * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated, * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have @@ -590,7 +591,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, */ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len) + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index feb39de74385..16361f75c2ae 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = ima_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (ret) return ret; - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); + return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); } /** From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:30:56 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13557952 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 49AE1132C08; 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dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=huaweicloud.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.51]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Tb9sM2fNxz9xw3r; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:14:31 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.27]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8FD41404DB; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:33:39 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S10; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:33:39 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:56 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-9-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S10 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxGw4rCrWDuFW7AFWUJr1xuFg_yoW5tF4kpF Z8K3WDCw1rtFyUWryvyF4xu34v9ayrWryjkrWDKw1IyFn3tr92qryxAr1jvryrJr48GFnY qa1avrsYga43X3DanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBmb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUCVW8JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20x vY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I 3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMI IF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JFI_Gr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1l IxAIcVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4 A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUFgAwUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf1AAAsk From: Roberto Sassu Change evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as implementation of the inode_post_setxattr hook. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/evm.h | 8 +++++--- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 +++- security/security.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 7de24c1ada90..3faabdd47852 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len); + size_t xattr_value_len, + int flags); extern int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name); extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); @@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { - return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0); + return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); } int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, @@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len) + size_t xattr_value_len, + int flags) { return; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 12ba3207fd31..d35143179699 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length + * @flags: flags to pass into filesystem operations * * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change. * @@ -761,7 +762,8 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) * i_mutex lock. */ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, + int flags) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 16361f75c2ae..7c240d768a76 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2368,7 +2368,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); - evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); + evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); } /** From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:30:57 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13557953 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8C1D385263; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:34:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; 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spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.51]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Tb9yH2ldXz9yB7M; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:18:47 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.27]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E95541405A2; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:33:53 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S11; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:33:53 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:57 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-10-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAXUCQD6M1lUHGHAg--.4426S11 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxZryUJr13tr1rKw1DCF1kGrg_yoW5uF1UpF 43G3ZxGr4rXFyxWr1vkFs8ua1S9FWfurW7JrW0gw1SyFn2qrn2gFyxKr1jkF15GrWUGrnF qFsFvrs8Wr15ArJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBmb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUCVW8JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrV C2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE 7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20x vY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I 3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMI IF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JFI_Gr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1l IxAIcVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4 A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUFgAwUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf1AABsl From: Roberto Sassu Add the idmap parameter to the definition, so that evm_inode_setattr() can be registered as this hook implementation. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++- security/security.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 76458b6d53da..b00b16d58413 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_readlink, struct dentry *dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 7c240d768a76..671472b34bbf 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2216,7 +2216,7 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); + ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); if (ret) return ret; return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a6bf90ace84c..cedb4cbf072e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3136,7 +3136,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return rc; } -static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) +static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 0fdbf04cc258..1b6abfdf7173 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1233,12 +1233,14 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) /** * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes + * @idmap: idmap of the mount * @dentry: the object * @iattr: for the force flag * * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise */ -static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) +static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *iattr) { struct smk_audit_info ad; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:35:11 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:58 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-11-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S2 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxurWUGr4fGFWUKrWkWryDJrb_yoWrAw13pF WrK3Z8K34rWFW7Wr1kJF47ua1SgFy5urWUXrWFgwnFyFnrtw1aqF43Ka4jkr13GrW8Gr9I q3ZFvrsxCr15Aw7anT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUkvb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4 vEj48ve4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Gr0_Xr1l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7Cj xVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVCY1x 0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02 F40Ex7xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r106r15McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4I kC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK 82IYc2Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGw C20s026x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxG rwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r4j6ryUMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr 1UMIIF0xvE42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVW3JVWrJr1lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAI cVC2z280aVCY1x0267AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UQZ2-UUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfXgAAsh From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_setattr hook. At inode_setattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At inode_post_setattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified file attributes and other file metadata. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful file attribute change. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner --- fs/attr.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++ security/security.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index adeba0ec40f1..990e1b3a3c91 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); + security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); } diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index b00b16d58413..a0e9e48015a4 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index d0eb20f90b26..56c841aa3994 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -361,6 +361,8 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); +void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + int ia_valid); int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path); int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, @@ -879,6 +881,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; } +static inline void +security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + int ia_valid) +{ } + static inline int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { return 0; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 671472b34bbf..8b8a03291a8e 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2223,6 +2223,22 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); +/** + * security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: file + * @ia_valid: file attributes set + * + * Update inode security field after successful setting file attributes. + */ +void security_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + int ia_valid) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return; + call_void_hook(inode_post_setattr, idmap, dentry, ia_valid); +} + /** * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed * @path: file From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:30:59 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13557955 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BF7F112C55E; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:35:34 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.46 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993336; cv=none; b=nmUsEXxtLepMn+xLQB/D3ROYX5kzwmmHUTz5GwaIkZUjRJ/njawEzOJmeNABK9yGoC/JyxYIkzYFrJZMVGpoYKGaVucnxiXdFkOtNKDK4ykoNhy5gAuDd/53dS33XACo/cX1HOla7wu6ZnpHeLbw8drtw5g4SFr+yKcwVGDwTTI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:35:26 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S3; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:35:25 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:30:59 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-12-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S3 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxurWUGr4fGFWUKrW5Ar4DCFg_yoWrZr4DpF s8K3ZY9r4rXFy7WryktF1Uuw4S9FWfWry7J3y2gw1IvFnrJr1IqrZIkF1UCry5JryjgF1q q3ZFkrs5Cr15JwUanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBSb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUGw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6r4UJVWxJr1le2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8CrVC2j2 WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_JrI_JrylYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4IE7xkE bVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k20xvY0x 0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI8I3I0E 7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48JMIIF0x vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Gr0_Xr1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26r4UJVWxJr1lIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUOpnQUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfXgABsg From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_removexattr hook. At inode_removexattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At inode_post_removexattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed xattr removed and other file metadata. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful xattr removal. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner --- fs/xattr.c | 9 +++++---- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++ security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 09d927603433..f891c260a971 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -552,11 +552,12 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, goto out; error = __vfs_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); + if (error) + return error; - if (!error) { - fsnotify_xattr(dentry); - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); - } + fsnotify_xattr(dentry); + security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); + evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); out: return error; diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index a0e9e48015a4..f849f7d5bb53 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listxattr, struct dentry *dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 56c841aa3994..84ae03690340 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry); int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); +void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry); int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, @@ -942,6 +943,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); } +static inline void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *name) +{ } + static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) { return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 8b8a03291a8e..0f0f2c11ef73 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2453,6 +2453,20 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); } +/** + * security_inode_post_removexattr() - Update the inode after a removexattr op + * @dentry: file + * @name: xattr name + * + * Update the inode after a successful removexattr operation. + */ +void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return; + call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name); +} + /** * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required * @dentry: associated dentry From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:00 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558040 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 51D0512C817; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:35:49 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; 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spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.51]) by frasgout11.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4TbB0F05L5z9yTLW; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:20:29 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.47]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5BA981406BE; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:35:40 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S4; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:35:39 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:00 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-13-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S4 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxCw4xGF4DKw4kCrW7Kr17Wrg_yoWrurW8pF ZYy3WUGFW8GFy7Wrn7AF47ua4Sg39agryUWFZ5W3s0yF1vqrnYgFs0yr1Ykr15JrZ5JFyI q3Wa9rW3Cr1DZrJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBIb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUXw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6F4UJVW0owAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I80ew Av7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUGVWUXwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCjc4AY 6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI7V AKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxVCj r7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVWrXVW8Jr1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY 6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aV CY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcJvcSsGvfC2KfnxnUUI43ZEXa7IUbp6wtUUUUU== X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf2AAAso From: Roberto Sassu In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS. Based on policy, IMA calculates the digest of the file content and extends the TPM with the digest, verifies the file's integrity based on the digest, and/or includes the file digest in the audit log. LSMs could similarly take action depending on the file content and the access mask requested with open(). The new hook returns a value and can cause the open to be aborted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner --- fs/namei.c | 2 ++ fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 4e0de939fea1..ef867f1d6704 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -3639,6 +3639,8 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd, error = may_open(idmap, &nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag); if (!error && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED)) error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file); + if (!error) + error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode); if (!error) error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode); if (!error && do_truncate) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index b7c7a9273ea0..e44d8239545b 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -877,6 +877,12 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, goto out; } + host_err = security_file_post_open(file, may_flags); + if (host_err) { + fput(file); + goto out; + } + host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags); if (host_err) { fput(file); diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index f849f7d5bb53..3c84942d2818 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 84ae03690340..97f2212c13b6 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -411,6 +411,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); int security_file_receive(struct file *file); int security_file_open(struct file *file); +int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask); int security_file_truncate(struct file *file); int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task); @@ -1074,6 +1075,11 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file) return 0; } +static inline int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) { return 0; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 0f0f2c11ef73..5b442032c273 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2967,6 +2967,23 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file) return fsnotify_open_perm(file); } +/** + * security_file_post_open() - Evaluate a file after it has been opened + * @file: the file + * @mask: access mask + * + * Evaluate an opened file and the access mask requested with open(). The hook + * is useful for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to + * make decisions. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + return call_int_hook(file_post_open, 0, file, mask); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open); + /** * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed * @file: file From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:01 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558041 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1B1B7133410; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:36:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.46 ARC-Seal: i=1; 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spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.29]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4TbB0c6bbnz9yB7M; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:20:48 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.47]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4AA771405A2; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:35:54 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S5; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:35:53 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:01 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-14-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S5 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxurWUGr4fGFWUKw15Ar1UJrb_yoW5try7pF Z8t3WUGFW5JF17Wrn7Aa9rua4Sg393Kr9rWrZ5W34rtF1DJr9YgFsxCr1DuF1DJrW8Jr10 q3W2grW3Gr1DArJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBIb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUWw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV W8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6F4UJVW0owAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I80ew Av7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUGVWUXwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCjc4AY 6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI7V AKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxVCj r7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVWrXVW8Jr1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI42IY 6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z280aV CY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcJvcSsGvfC2KfnxnUUI43ZEXa7IUbHa0PUUUUU== X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfYgAAsd From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the file_release hook. IMA calculates at file close the new digest of the file content and writes it to security.ima, so that appraisal at next file access succeeds. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- fs/file_table.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++ security/security.c | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index b991f90571b4..725407f374fa 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file) eventpoll_release(file); locks_remove_file(file); + security_file_release(file); ima_file_free(file); if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) { if (file->f_op->fasync) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 3c84942d2818..7f9e9240606e 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernfs_init_security, struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_release, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 97f2212c13b6..2997348afcb7 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn); int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask); int security_file_alloc(struct file *file); +void security_file_release(struct file *file); void security_file_free(struct file *file); int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, @@ -1008,6 +1009,9 @@ static inline int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) return 0; } +static inline void security_file_release(struct file *file) +{ } + static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file) { } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5b442032c273..145e3141339c 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2719,6 +2719,17 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) return rc; } +/** + * security_file_release() - Perform actions before releasing the file ref + * @file: the file + * + * Perform actions before releasing the last reference to a file. + */ +void security_file_release(struct file *file) +{ + call_void_hook(file_release, file); +} + /** * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob * @file: the file From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:02 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558042 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1A5F712DD8A; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:36:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.23 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993383; cv=none; b=DA3LpkUHC9eyDnlR04140RlSC98UnOjyyyTqpoCYOa07QpRp6XTc8AhiCAdXYLmjRTS8T1KWDZq8GJ5akAN+Tr3vHRPXLOcIQqvCGp98IR1T5VkQa/3DCEzE0VXx9kbPg1wEpjJoqT+8RjjmZoPJuEnQbiUbz4suOoG08uE3Hj4= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993383; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:36:07 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:02 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-15-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S6 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxWr43Xr48uryrGF43ur4xCrg_yoWrWFyUpa 18tFnxGrWrGFy3Wr1kAFsrCa4SvrW5u3y7JFZ0gwnIyFnxtrnYqF4S9r1Y9r9xGrWUKryI va17tr43Gr4Utr7anT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBqb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVW8Jr0_Cr1UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26F4UJVW0owAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I 80ewAv7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUGVWUXwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCj c4AY6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28Icx kI7VAKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2Iq xVCjr7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVWrXVW8Jr1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIx AIcVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Gr1j6F4UJwCI 42IY6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Jr0_JF4lIxAIcVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1lIxAIcVC2z2 80aVCY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcJvcSsGvfC2KfnxnUUI43ZEXa7IUbGXdUUUUUU== X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf2wAAsr From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the path_post_mknod hook. IMA-appraisal requires all existing files in policy to have a file hash/signature stored in security.ima. An exception is made for empty files created by mknod, by tagging them as new files. LSMs could also take some action after files are created. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger --- fs/namei.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++ security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index ef867f1d6704..9280aa5d60a7 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -4063,6 +4063,11 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode, dentry, mode, 0); break; } + + if (error) + goto out2; + + security_path_post_mknod(idmap, dentry); out2: done_path_create(&path, dentry); if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) { diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 7f9e9240606e..dba5d8204dc5 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mkdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_rmdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mknod, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, path_post_mknod, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_truncate, const struct path *path) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_symlink, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 2997348afcb7..977dd9f7f51a 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1893,6 +1893,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, unsigned int dev); +void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry); int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path); int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name); @@ -1927,6 +1928,10 @@ static inline int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *den return 0; } +static inline void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry) +{ } + static inline int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) { return 0; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 145e3141339c..b55f9ad294cc 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1801,6 +1801,20 @@ int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); +/** + * security_path_post_mknod() - Update inode security field after file creation + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: new file + * + * Update inode security field after a file has been created. + */ +void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return; + call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry); +} + /** * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed * @dir: parent directory From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:03 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558043 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0373E12DD8A; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:36:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.46 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993391; cv=none; b=K3l4qZCwdhbSiX54S6VgslyxyCnZgij3VQevqCqxDFmjUpuSzxIwHfzUxaqKQ0YM/2m8w3MbnZUXmpjMZKs3cyedL/Bu3pEc4RYKFfK4DX7HkNbA/fPfTeb8dklkPd/rPARff4hIOZQ7u2OYxOGM8BkgDRvQRHejtvGLCfjIJ0Q= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:36:22 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S7; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:36:21 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:03 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-16-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S7 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxWFyUZFy3urWkKr1rZrWrKrg_yoWrWry5pF WxK3W5Gws5XFy7Wr1vyF4Uuw1Sgay5WrW7JrZagw1DAFn7tr1ftF1Skr12kF13JrW8G342 q3ZFkrZxGr1UtrJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVWxJr0_GcWl84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAF wI0_Cr1j6rxdM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7 xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r106r15McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Y z7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2 Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s02 6x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42 IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r4j6ryUMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcWlIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UdfHUUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf2wABsq From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook. As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security xattr. LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be canceled. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger --- fs/namei.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 9280aa5d60a7..c7ac7fdf0f25 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -3705,6 +3705,7 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE; spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); } + security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index dba5d8204dc5..87f60b47dfca 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_create_tmpfile, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 977dd9f7f51a..1cb604282617 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode); int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode); +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode); int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); @@ -811,6 +813,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, return 0; } +static inline void +security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode) +{ } + static inline int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b55f9ad294cc..59d49e5c2671 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2014,6 +2014,21 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); +/** + * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile + * + * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created. + */ +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return; + call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode); +} + /** * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed * @old_dentry: existing file From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:04 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558044 Received: from frasgout11.his.huawei.com (frasgout11.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C9D8312836D; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:36:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.23 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993409; cv=none; b=GLAHMyjYvtZHghcIQZBc3DKpM6xRYmkimXHJYZN+NbX3TpdVpb/SCllbC2dT2O+dahQE+/TfZ9/IZ1BZAscAX8L4ImZ7X6gYgL7X0bMqgjXeNDPFcBc1QS2EoONi0o9hQgZaPYoSU4YqMtDCuvdBxCuzquKuQz+1m8f4f8MU+Wg= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:36:36 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S8; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:36:35 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:04 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-17-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S8 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxurWUXFy3Kw1DWF43Ary3XFb_yoWrAw1rpF 4ft3Zak3yrXFy7WryktF4DC34SqFWF9ry7J3y0gwnayFn7tr1jqFsIkF1YkFyrArW8GF1q ga1a9rsxC345Jr7anT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVWxJr0_GcWl84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAF wI0_Cr1j6rxdM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7 xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r106r15McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Y z7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2 Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s02 6x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42 IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r4j6ryUMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcWlIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UdfHUUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfZAAAsb From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_set_acl hook. At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified POSIX ACL and other file metadata. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL change. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner --- fs/posix_acl.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++ security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c index e1af20893ebe..7556ee9f8a51 100644 --- a/fs/posix_acl.c +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c @@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, error = -EIO; if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); + security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); } diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 87f60b47dfca..b0125c99f80a 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 1cb604282617..c372797e1617 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl); +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl); int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name); int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, @@ -915,6 +917,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; } +static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ } + static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 59d49e5c2671..f7df58bd5f13 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2351,6 +2351,23 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); } +/** + * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set + * @dentry: file + * @acl_name: acl name + * @kacl: acl struct + * + * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry. + * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name. + */ +void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return; + call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl); +} + /** * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed * @idmap: idmap of the mount From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:05 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558045 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1B448128382; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:37:02 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.154 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993425; cv=none; b=fVBZVpqQz7aGk6s/e5ci3cZtDos4i3LCeRVEKWXypZl+teH2MZhFEBgYZZss7ozNT+j+8xV4beNQvtYGE1u11YZO9CZTrIGTONAAh05SsqUzb61JWHJeWPlRCt24vEWg0eN3mLtshrNaPCfcARSKZNvJgLlnapx/iP509IvPtjY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:36:50 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S9; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:36:49 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:05 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-18-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S9 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxurWUXFy3Kw1DWF43CrW3Wrg_yoWrCw17pF 43K3Z8Wr4rXFy7WryktFWUuw4SvFWFgry7A3y2gwn2vFn7tr1jqFsxKFyjkry5ArW8KF1q qF1aqrsxC345Jr7anT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVWxJr0_GcWl84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAF wI0_Cr1j6rxdM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7 xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r106r15McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Y z7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2 Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s02 6x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42 IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r4j6ryUMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcWlIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UdfHUUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf3wAAsv From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the inode_post_remove_acl hook. At inode_remove_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At inode_post_remove_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed POSIX ACL removed and other file metadata. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL removal. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner --- fs/posix_acl.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++++++ security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c index 7556ee9f8a51..0d2371240c1b 100644 --- a/fs/posix_acl.c +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c @@ -1246,6 +1246,7 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, error = -EIO; if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); + security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); } diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index b0125c99f80a..7e414ba26333 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_need_killpriv, struct dentry *dentry) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_killpriv, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index c372797e1617..4b03c76b91f1 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -378,6 +378,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name); int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name); +void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name); void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); @@ -936,6 +939,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; } +static inline void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name) +{ } + static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f7df58bd5f13..23cdf35b6070 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2414,6 +2414,23 @@ int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); } +/** + * security_inode_post_remove_acl() - Update inode security after rm posix acls + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: file + * @acl_name: acl name + * + * Update inode security data after successfully removing posix acls on + * @dentry in @idmap. The posix acls are identified by @acl_name. + */ +void security_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return; + call_void_hook(inode_post_remove_acl, idmap, dentry, acl_name); +} + /** * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation * @dentry: file From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:06 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558046 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A6198134CDA; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:37:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.154 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; 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spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.29]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Tb9xH3M3Fz9y0jg; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:17:55 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.47]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0E99C14059E; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:37:04 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S10; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:37:03 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:06 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-19-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S10 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxGr43CFW3trWxuFWDCr1Dtrb_yoWruF4fpa y5K3W5t3ykGFyaqrZ3AF12kayrK3y8Kry7K39xWr1jyFnYqw4xXr42kFn8CrW5ZryrJryI va17ZrW3GF1qyrJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVWxJr0_GcWl84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAF wI0_Cr1j6rxdM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7 xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r106r15McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Y z7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2 Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s02 6x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42 IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r4j6ryUMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcWlIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UdfHUUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf3wABsu From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the key_post_create_or_update hook. Depending on policy, IMA measures the key content after creation or update, so that remote verifiers are aware of the operation. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful key creation or update. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Paul Moore --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 +++ include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ security/keys/key.c | 7 ++++++- security/security.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 7e414ba26333..7e4683035d34 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_free, struct key *key) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_permission, key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_getsecurity, struct key *key, char **buffer) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring, + struct key *key, const void *payload, size_t payload_len, + unsigned long flags, bool create) #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 4b03c76b91f1..8436f9abf43d 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2004,6 +2004,9 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key); int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm); int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer); +void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, + const void *payload, size_t payload_len, + unsigned long flags, bool create); #else @@ -2031,6 +2034,14 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) return 0; } +static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, + struct key *key, + const void *payload, + size_t payload_len, + unsigned long flags, + bool create) +{ } + #endif #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 5b10641debd5..31a8b9408b7c 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -930,6 +930,8 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, goto error_link_end; } + security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags, + true); ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags, true); @@ -963,10 +965,13 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); - if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) + if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { + security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, + flags, false); ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags, false); + } goto error_free_prep; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 23cdf35b6070..f8d9ebeb4c31 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -5456,6 +5456,25 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer) *buffer = NULL; return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, buffer); } + +/** + * security_key_post_create_or_update() - Notification of key create or update + * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to + * @key: created or updated key + * @payload: data used to instantiate or update the key + * @payload_len: length of payload + * @flags: key flags + * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated + * + * Notify the caller of a key creation or update. + */ +void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, + const void *payload, size_t payload_len, + unsigned long flags, bool create) +{ + call_void_hook(key_post_create_or_update, keyring, key, payload, + payload_len, flags, create); +} #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:07 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558047 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2D0931350EB; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:37:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.154 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993453; cv=none; b=R2rgFljw3NUefMl9+YrdNqM0bcYm8tbfXG6G4Q/tOt/TBUhIaIBex8K7xz/2fk7L0e4u3D8qK1K0d8I8EDIJDpv/u8GgT7EL9l2BRftZqafCYSmxXZwN04BTtMkijJgFATNYQ7kVo0e7bZD2eMDXzuuNT1rLGr37QUG7ICeY7ts= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707993453; c=relaxed/simple; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:37:17 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:07 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-20-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwA3LxjQ6M1l4QeNAg--.58293S11 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3Ar13WF1xZr45Kr1UuF43Awb_yoWxXw17pa 95KFW5Jry8Zr97CaykAF1xCa45K3yfGrW3WrsxCr1fCFn0vr4qvr47JF13Xry3WrWrJF4F grs2qr13Cw1qy37anT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW8JVW5JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVWxJr0_GcWl84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAF wI0_Cr1j6rxdM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7 xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r106r15McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Y z7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2 Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s02 6x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42 IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r4j6ryUMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcWlIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UdfHUUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfaAAAsX From: Roberto Sassu In preparation for removing the 'integrity' LSM, move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, and rename it to ima_kernel_module_request(). Rewrite the function documentation, to explain better what the problem is. Compile it conditionally if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled, and call it from security.c (removed afterwards with the move of IMA to the LSM infrastructure). Adding this hook cannot be avoided, since IMA has no control on the flags passed to crypto_alloc_sig() in public_key_verify_signature(), and thus cannot pass CRYPTO_NOLOAD, which solved the problem for EVM hashing with commit e2861fa71641 ("evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable"). EVM alone does not need to implement this hook, first because there is no mutex to deadlock, and second because even if it had it, there should be a recursive call. However, since verification from EVM can be initiated only by setting inode metadata, deadlock would occur if modprobe would do the same while loading a kernel module (which is unlikely). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Acked-by: Paul Moore Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 10 ++++++++ include/linux/integrity.h | 13 ---------- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 ------------------ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 31ef6c3c3207..0f9af283cbc8 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -256,4 +256,14 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func) return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) +extern int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); +#else +static inline int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index 2ea0f2f65ab6..ef0f63ef5ebc 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -42,17 +42,4 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */ -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - -extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); - -#else - -static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ - #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 895f4b9ce8c6..de603cf42ac7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -132,26 +132,3 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } - -/** - * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests - * @kmod_name: kernel module name - * - * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA - * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to - * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try - * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. - * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, - * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). - * - * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification - * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies - * also signed with digsig. - */ -int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) -{ - if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) - return -EINVAL; - - return 0; -} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 02021ee467d3..3891b83efdb3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -1091,6 +1091,39 @@ int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data); +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + +/** + * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests + * @kmod_name: kernel module name + * + * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe + * binary requires executing modprobe itself. Since the modprobe iint->mutex + * is already held when the signature verification is performed, a deadlock + * occurs as soon as modprobe is executed within the critical region, since + * the same lock cannot be taken again. + * + * This happens when public_key_verify_signature(), in case of RSA algorithm, + * use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an + * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name + * in order to load a kernel module with same name. + * + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and + * avoid the verification loop. + * + * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise. + */ +int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f8d9ebeb4c31..48dc3db4c834 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -3250,7 +3250,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); if (ret) return ret; - return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); + return ima_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); } /** From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:08 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558048 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1BD6412F5A0; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:38:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.154 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; 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spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.29]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Tb9z86ggPz9xqtf; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:19:32 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.47]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79C4C14059E; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:38:36 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwAHABmc6c1lwxGNAg--.11795S2; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:38:35 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:08 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-21-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwAHABmc6c1lwxGNAg--.11795S2 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoWfAFWrur4fXry5Gw4rAw4xJFb_yoW5JrWfuo WIqwsxJr4Fgr13GFWFkF1SyFs8Wws8G3yrJrWa9rZ8u3W2yw1UK340va17Ja4UXa1fKa1U W3s7J3yrZa18Jw1rn29KB7ZKAUJUUUUU529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUY07kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2ocxC64kIII0Yj41l84x0c7CEw4 AK67xGY2AK021l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvE14v26ryj6F1UM28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF 7I0E14v26F4UJVW0owA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVCY1x 0267AKxVWxJr0_GcWle2I262IYc4CY6c8Ij28IcVAaY2xG8wAqx4xG64xvF2IEw4CE5I8C rVC2j2WlYx0E2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Jrv_JF1lYx0Ex4A2jsIE14v26r1j6r4UMcvjeVCFs4 IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwACjcxG0xvY0x0EwIxGrwACI402YVCY1x02628vn2kIc2xKxwCF04k2 0xvY0x0EwIxGrwCFx2IqxVCFs4IE7xkEbVWUJVW8JwC20s026c02F40E14v26r1j6r18MI 8I3I0E7480Y4vE14v26r106r1rMI8E67AF67kF1VAFwI0_Wrv_Gr1UMIIYrxkI7VAKI48J MIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Xr0_Ar1lIxAIcVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF7I0E14v26F4UJVW0ow CI42IY6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_Zr0_Wr1UMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvE x4A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UGJPiUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfbAAAsT From: Roberto Sassu Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like 'integrity'). Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM, and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were hardcoded. Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(), which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm(). Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always executed to mark files as new, as before the move. A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod, inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub and kernel-internal tmpfs files. Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Acked-by: Chuck Lever Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- fs/file_table.c | 2 - fs/namei.c | 6 - fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 -- fs/open.c | 1 - include/linux/ima.h | 104 ------------------ include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 + security/integrity/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 78 +++++++++---- security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + security/keys/key.c | 9 +- security/security.c | 63 ++--------- .../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c | 3 + 14 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 200 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index 725407f374fa..1a0962981b48 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -368,7 +367,6 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file) locks_remove_file(file); security_file_release(file); - ima_file_free(file); if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) { if (file->f_op->fasync) file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index c7ac7fdf0f25..1bf7435cdf76 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -3641,8 +3640,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd, error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file); if (!error) error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode); - if (!error) - error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode); if (!error && do_truncate) error = handle_truncate(idmap, file); if (unlikely(error > 0)) { @@ -3706,7 +3703,6 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); } security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); - ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode); return 0; } @@ -4052,8 +4048,6 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode, case 0: case S_IFREG: error = vfs_create(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, true); - if (!error) - ima_post_path_mknod(idmap, dentry); break; case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK: error = vfs_mknod(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode, diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index e44d8239545b..4349dde92154 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -883,12 +882,6 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, goto out; } - host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags); - if (host_err) { - fput(file); - goto out; - } - if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE) file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH; else diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index a84d21e55c39..1cf05a1413aa 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 0f9af283cbc8..23ae24b60ecf 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -16,24 +16,6 @@ struct linux_binprm; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void); -extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); -extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct inode *inode); -extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); -extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); -extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot); -extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents); -extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description); -extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, - bool contents); -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_read_file_id id); -extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); @@ -58,68 +40,6 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void) return HASH_ALGO__LAST; } -static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct inode *inode) -{ -} - -static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_load_data_id id, - char *description) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, - bool contents) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_read_file_id id) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return; -} - static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -170,20 +90,6 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image) {} #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS -extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, - struct key *key, - const void *payload, size_t plen, - unsigned long flags, bool create); -#else -static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, - struct key *key, - const void *payload, - size_t plen, - unsigned long flags, - bool create) {} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, @@ -256,14 +162,4 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func) return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ - -#if defined(CONFIG_IMA) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) -extern int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); -#else -static inline int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -#endif #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h index f8aef9ade549..b3b7fd699b63 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { #define LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN 108 #define LSM_ID_BPF 109 #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 +#define LSM_ID_IMA 111 /* * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index d0ffe37dc1d6..92b63039c654 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -18,5 +18,6 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o +# The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below. obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/ obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index b98bfe9efd0c..475c32615006 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config IMA select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select SECURITY_PATH select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void); static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {} #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS +void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, + const void *payload, size_t plen, + unsigned long flags, bool create); +#endif + /* * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the * platform native format. The canonical format is defined as little-endian. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 3891b83efdb3..d0826e864c29 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Flag files that changed, based on i_version */ -void ima_file_free(struct file *file) +static void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { u32 secid; int ret; @@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, * * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS. */ -int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot) +static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) { struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; struct file *file; @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; u32 secid; @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) +static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; @@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) @@ -685,8 +684,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash); * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created * tmpfiles are in policy. */ -void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct inode *inode) +static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct inode *inode) + { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise; @@ -717,8 +717,7 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the * file data can be written later. */ -void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry) +static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; @@ -753,8 +752,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. */ -int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, - bool contents) +static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, + bool contents) { enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -803,8 +802,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) +static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, + enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -837,7 +836,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, * * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. */ -int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) +static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce; @@ -891,9 +890,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, - enum kernel_load_data_id load_id, - char *description) +static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, + enum kernel_load_data_id load_id, + char *description) { if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && @@ -1114,7 +1113,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data); * * Return: Zero if it is safe to load the kernel module, -EINVAL otherwise. */ -int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -1155,4 +1154,41 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) return error; } +static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod), +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request), +#endif +}; + +static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = { + .name = "ima", + .id = LSM_ID_IMA, +}; + +static int __init init_ima_lsm(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(ima) = { + .name = "ima", + .init = init_ima_lsm, + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, +}; + late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 9561db7cf6b4..59eaddd84434 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* iint action cache flags */ #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 31a8b9408b7c..560790038329 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include "internal.h" @@ -932,8 +931,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags, true); - ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, - flags, true); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); @@ -965,13 +962,9 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); - if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { + if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags, false); - ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, - payload, plen, - flags, false); - } goto error_free_prep; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 48dc3db4c834..a476af7f8aea 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0)) + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0)) /* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the @@ -1183,12 +1184,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file * */ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_bprm_check(bprm); + return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); } /** @@ -2896,13 +2892,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); + return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot), + flags); } /** @@ -2931,12 +2922,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); + return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); } /** @@ -3245,12 +3231,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) */ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); + return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); } /** @@ -3266,12 +3247,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); + return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); @@ -3291,12 +3267,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); + return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); @@ -3311,12 +3282,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); */ int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_load_data(id, contents); + return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); @@ -3338,13 +3304,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description) { - int ret; - - ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, - description); - if (ret) - return ret; - return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); + return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, + description); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c index 9df29b1e3497..17333787cb2f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c @@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules) case LSM_ID_LANDLOCK: name = "landlock"; break; + case LSM_ID_IMA: + name = "ima"; + break; default: name = "INVALID"; break; From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:09 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Roberto Sassu X-Patchwork-Id: 13558049 Received: from frasgout12.his.huawei.com (frasgout12.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.154]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C9A312FF73; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:38:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=14.137.139.154 ARC-Seal: i=1; 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spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=huaweicloud.com Received: from mail.maildlp.com (unknown [172.18.186.29]) by frasgout12.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Tb9zQ5XQsz9xxng; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:19:46 +0800 (CST) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [7.182.16.47]) by mail.maildlp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52B8714059B; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:38:50 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP1 (Coremail) with SMTP id LxC2BwAHABmc6c1lwxGNAg--.11795S3; Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:38:49 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 21/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:09 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-22-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwAHABmc6c1lwxGNAg--.11795S3 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoW3ZFWfKFy7uFykJryxGF4kZwb_yoWDAFy7pF s5K3WUC34rXFy7Wry0yFWDuwsY9ryYgry7X3y0ganayFn3Ar1jqFyftFy2yry5Cry8KF1v qF4qqrnxCr15trJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBFb4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUGw A2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0rcxS w2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW5JVW7JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxV WxJr0_GcWl84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAFwI0_ Cr1j6rxdM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7xfMc Ij6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1Y6r17McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Yz7v_ Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2Ij64 vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s026x8G jcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42IY6x IIjxv20xvE14v26ryj6F1UMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcWlIxAIcVCF 04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIEc7 CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UGZXrUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf5wAAsX From: Roberto Sassu A few additional IMA hooks are needed to reset the cached appraisal status, causing the file's integrity to be re-evaluated on next access. Register these IMA-appraisal only functions separately from the rest of IMA functions, as appraisal is a separate feature not necessarily enabled in the kernel configuration. Reuse the same approach as for other IMA functions, move hardcoded calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure. Declare the functions as static and register them as hook implementations in init_ima_appraise_lsm(), called by init_ima_lsm(). Also move the inline function ima_inode_remove_acl() from the public ima.h header to ima_appraise.c. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- fs/attr.c | 2 - include/linux/ima.h | 55 --------------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 38 +++++++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 1 + security/security.c | 13 ------- 6 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 990e1b3a3c91..7e97313e7f70 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include "internal.h" @@ -503,7 +502,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); - ima_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 23ae24b60ecf..0bae61a15b60 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -92,66 +92,11 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image) #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); -extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); -extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, int flags); -extern int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl); -static inline int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); -} - -extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name); #else static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { return 0; } - -static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return 0; -} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c0412100023e..a27fc10f84f7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len); int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len); +void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid); #else static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -385,6 +386,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +static inline void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid) +{ +} + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 36abc84ba299..076451109637 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -636,8 +636,8 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ -void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) +static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -750,9 +750,9 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry, return -EACCES; } -int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) +static int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; int digsig = 0; @@ -781,8 +781,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, return result; } -int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) +static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); @@ -790,8 +790,8 @@ int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } -int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name) +static int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) { int result; @@ -803,3 +803,23 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, } return result; } + +static int ima_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name) +{ + return ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); +} + +static struct security_hook_list ima_appraise_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, ima_inode_post_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, ima_inode_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, ima_inode_set_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, ima_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, ima_inode_remove_acl), +}; + +void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid) +{ + security_add_hooks(ima_appraise_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_appraise_hooks), + lsmid); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index d0826e864c29..b8b8891a9379 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = { static int __init init_ima_lsm(void) { security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid); + init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid); return 0; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index a476af7f8aea..0030af4afa9d 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -2309,9 +2308,6 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (ret == 1) ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); - if (ret) - return ret; - ret = ima_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (ret) return ret; return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); @@ -2339,9 +2335,6 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); - if (ret) - return ret; - ret = ima_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); if (ret) return ret; return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); @@ -2402,9 +2395,6 @@ int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); - if (ret) - return ret; - ret = ima_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); if (ret) return ret; return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); @@ -2504,9 +2494,6 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); if (ret == 1) ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); - if (ret) - return ret; - ret = ima_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); if (ret) return ret; return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:10 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:39:03 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 22/25] evm: Move to LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:10 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-23-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwAHABmc6c1lwxGNAg--.11795S4 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoWfuF47Cw1DKF47AFW3Aw1xGrg_yoW8ZFWkGo WIqwsrtF4kWr13JrW5Gw1xKFyvgay7GrWrJ3Z5C3yDC3W2vw18C34fCa13J3W5Xr1rGrW2 q3s7Z34jgF47Xr1kn29KB7ZKAUJUUUUU529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUYW7kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2048vs2IY020E87I2jVAFwI0_Jr yl82xGYIkIc2x26xkF7I0E14v26ryj6s0DM28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4vEj48v e4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Xr0_Ar1l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI 0_Cr1j6rxdM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6F4UJVW0owAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I80ew Av7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUXVWUAwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCjc4AY 6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI7V AKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxVCj r7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVWrXVW8Jr1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW5JVW7JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdMIIF0xvE 42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwCI42IY6I8E87Iv6x kF7I0E14v26F4UJVW0obIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUrdgADUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf5wABsW From: Roberto Sassu As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm' (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones. Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm(). Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public evm.h header to evm_main.c. Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure), evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(), evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not executed for private inodes. Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Christian Brauner Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- fs/attr.c | 2 - fs/posix_acl.c | 3 - fs/xattr.c | 2 - include/linux/evm.h | 113 ----------------- include/uapi/linux/lsm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 118 +++++++++++++++--- security/security.c | 43 ++----- .../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c | 3 + 8 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 7e97313e7f70..4d0d75953107 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include "internal.h" @@ -502,7 +501,6 @@ int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid); security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); - evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid); } return error; diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c index 0d2371240c1b..5c90239e3f2b 100644 --- a/fs/posix_acl.c +++ b/fs/posix_acl.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -1138,7 +1137,6 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); - evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl); } out_inode_unlock: @@ -1247,7 +1245,6 @@ int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); - evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); } out_inode_unlock: diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index f891c260a971..f8b643f91a98 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -557,7 +556,6 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, fsnotify_xattr(dentry); security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); out: return error; diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 3faabdd47852..cb481eccc967 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -21,45 +21,6 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); -extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); -extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); -extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags); -extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags); -extern int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name); -extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); -extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name); -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); -} -extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl); -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); -} -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); -} - int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count); @@ -94,80 +55,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, } #endif -static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, - const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name) -{ - return; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, - struct posix_acl *kacl) -{ - return; -} - static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h index b3b7fd699b63..33d8c9f4aa6b 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx { #define LSM_ID_BPF 109 #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK 110 #define LSM_ID_IMA 111 +#define LSM_ID_EVM 112 /* * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index d35143179699..0a089af83a45 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -589,9 +589,9 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ -int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) +static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, int flags) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; @@ -621,8 +621,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that * the current value is valid. */ -int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) { /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded @@ -672,9 +672,11 @@ static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is * valid. + * + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. */ -int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) +static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { enum integrity_status evm_status; @@ -713,6 +715,24 @@ int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, return -EPERM; } +/** + * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * + * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated + * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is + * valid. + * + * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure. + */ +static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name) +{ + return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL); +} + static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -761,9 +781,11 @@ bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's * i_mutex lock. */ -void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, - int flags) +static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, + size_t xattr_value_len, + int flags) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; @@ -782,6 +804,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } +/** + * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls + * + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting + * posix acls. + */ +static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, + struct posix_acl *kacl) +{ + return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0); +} + /** * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -792,7 +829,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. */ -void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, + const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; @@ -808,6 +846,22 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } +/** + * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @acl_name: name of the posix acl + * + * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after + * removing posix acls. + */ +static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, + const char *acl_name) +{ + evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name); +} + static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { @@ -831,8 +885,8 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ -int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - struct iattr *attr) +static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) { unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; @@ -883,8 +937,8 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ -void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, - int ia_valid) +static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; @@ -901,7 +955,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } -int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) return 1; /* Discard */ @@ -1004,4 +1058,36 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) return error; } +static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security), +}; + +static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = { + .name = "evm", + .id = LSM_ID_EVM, +}; + +static int __init init_evm_lsm(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid); + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_LSM(evm) = { + .name = "evm", + .init = init_evm_lsm, + .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, +}; + late_initcall(init_evm); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 0030af4afa9d..6b439242d117 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \ - (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0)) + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0)) /* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the @@ -1741,10 +1742,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if (!xattr_count) goto out; - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, - &xattr_count); - if (ret) - goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); out: for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--) @@ -2236,14 +2233,9 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); + return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); @@ -2308,9 +2300,7 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (ret == 1) ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags); + return ret; } /** @@ -2329,15 +2319,10 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, - kacl); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); + return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name, + kacl); } /** @@ -2390,14 +2375,9 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) { - int ret; - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); + return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); } /** @@ -2433,7 +2413,6 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); - evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); } /** @@ -2494,9 +2473,7 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name); if (ret == 1) ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); - if (ret) - return ret; - return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); + return ret; } /** @@ -2700,7 +2677,7 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) return rc; } - return evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(name); + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c index 17333787cb2f..4d5d4cee2586 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c @@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules) case LSM_ID_IMA: name = "ima"; break; + case LSM_ID_EVM: + name = "evm"; + break; default: name = "INVALID"; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:39:17 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 23/25] evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:11 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-24-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwAHABmc6c1lwxGNAg--.11795S5 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoWfGw4kWryfKw45JryxXF13urg_yoW8Jw4kKo WfXwsxGr4UWr1fAayrK3W2vFZru3yfGrWfArZ5XF4DC3W2y34DG34jkw15JFW3Xr4rGr4D C3srZa1kXFZ2qwn5n29KB7ZKAUJUUUUU529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUYW7kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2048vs2IY020E87I2jVAFwI0_Jr Wl82xGYIkIc2x26xkF7I0E14v26ryj6s0DM28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4vEj48v e4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Xr0_Ar1l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI 0_Cr1j6rxdM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E14v2 6F4UJVW0owAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I80ew Av7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUXVWUAwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCjc4AY 6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28IcxkI7V AKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2IqxVCj r7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVWrXVW8Jr1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIxAIcV C0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW5JVW7JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdMIIF0xvE 42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwCI42IY6I8E87Iv6x kF7I0E14v26F4UJVW0obIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUrfOzDUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfbQAAsS From: Roberto Sassu Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache, and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()). Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata, obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata, the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA policy. Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time). Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files are marked as new. Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer(). Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in the common integrity layer. Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in security_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/evm.h | 8 +-- security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 19 +++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 4 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 - security/security.c | 4 +- 8 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index cb481eccc967..d48d6da32315 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -12,15 +12,12 @@ #include #include -struct integrity_iint_cache; - #ifdef CONFIG_EVM extern int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen); extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); + size_t xattr_value_len); int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count); @@ -48,8 +45,7 @@ static inline int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen) static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, void *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) + size_t xattr_value_len) { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index fba9ee359bc9..861b3bacab82 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config EVM select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select SECURITY_PATH default n help EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 53bd7fec93fa..eb1a2c343bd7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -32,6 +32,25 @@ struct xattr_list { bool enabled; }; +#define EVM_NEW_FILE 0x00000001 +#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x00000002 + +/* EVM integrity metadata associated with an inode */ +struct evm_iint_cache { + unsigned long flags; + enum integrity_status evm_status:4; +}; + +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes; + +static inline struct evm_iint_cache *evm_iint_inode(const struct inode *inode) +{ + if (unlikely(!inode->i_security)) + return NULL; + + return inode->i_security + evm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode; +} + extern int evm_initialized; #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001 diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index b1ffd4cc0b44..7552d49d0725 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct evm_iint_cache *iint; int rc = 0; - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + iint = evm_iint_inode(inode); if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG)) return 1; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 0a089af83a45..81dbade5b9b3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -178,14 +178,14 @@ static int is_unsupported_fs(struct dentry *dentry) static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, char *xattr_value, - size_t xattr_value_len, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) + size_t xattr_value_len) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; struct evm_digest digest; - struct inode *inode; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode); int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0; if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || @@ -254,8 +254,6 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, digest.digest, digest.hdr.length); if (!rc) { - inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { if (iint) iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG; @@ -403,7 +401,6 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer, * @xattr_name: requested xattr * @xattr_value: requested xattr value * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length - * @iint: inode integrity metadata * * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length @@ -416,8 +413,7 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer, */ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, - void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) + void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; @@ -425,13 +421,8 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - if (!iint) { - iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); - if (!iint) - return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - } return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, iint); + xattr_value_len); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr); @@ -448,7 +439,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) return INTEGRITY_PASS; - return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); + return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } /* @@ -526,14 +517,14 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct evm_iint_cache *iint; /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ if (evm_hmac_disabled()) return 0; - iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); - if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) + iint = evm_iint_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)); + if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_NEW_FILE)) return 0; /* exception for pseudo filesystems */ @@ -735,9 +726,9 @@ static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct evm_iint_cache *iint; - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + iint = evm_iint_inode(inode); if (iint) iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } @@ -1019,6 +1010,42 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); +static int evm_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode); + + /* Called by security_inode_alloc(), it cannot be NULL. */ + iint->flags = 0UL; + iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + + return 0; +} + +static void evm_file_release(struct file *file) +{ + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode); + fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; + + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(mode & FMODE_WRITE)) + return; + + if (iint && atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) + iint->flags &= ~EVM_NEW_FILE; +} + +static void evm_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode); + + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + + if (iint) + iint->flags |= EVM_NEW_FILE; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 void __init evm_load_x509(void) { @@ -1071,6 +1098,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, evm_inode_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, evm_file_release), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, evm_post_path_mknod), }; static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = { @@ -1084,10 +1114,16 @@ static int __init init_evm_lsm(void) return 0; } +struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct evm_iint_cache), + .lbs_xattr_count = 1, +}; + DEFINE_LSM(evm) = { .name = "evm", .init = init_evm_lsm, .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, + .blobs = &evm_blob_sizes, }; late_initcall(init_evm); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 076451109637..1dd6ee72a20a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, } status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, - rc < 0 ? 0 : rc, iint); + rc < 0 ? 0 : rc); switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 59eaddd84434..7a97c269a072 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000 #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000 #define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000 -#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000 #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 #define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 #define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000 diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 6b439242d117..de8a9a7b2a30 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1717,8 +1717,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, return 0; if (initxattrs) { - /* Allocate +1 for EVM and +1 as terminator. */ - new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 2, + /* Allocate +1 as terminator. */ + new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1, sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS); 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:39:31 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 24/25] ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:12 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-25-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwAHABmc6c1lwxGNAg--.11795S6 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoWfWr15tF15ZF1DXF4kCF4Uurg_yoW5Zr4Dto Zav39xJr4rWFyfCay8K3WSyFWkuw45K3y3CrZ5WFWDK3W7K34DW347Ww15JFy3ZrW5G39r Cwnrtw4UJF9rJ3Wkn29KB7ZKAUJUUUUU529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUYZ7kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2048vs2IY020E87I2jVAFwI0_JF 0E3s1l82xGYIkIc2x26xkF7I0E14v26ryj6s0DM28lY4IEw2IIxxk0rwA2F7IY1VAKz4vE j48ve4kI8wA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVAFwI0_Xr0_Ar1l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxV AFwI0_Cr1j6rxdM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Gr0_Cr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I0E 14v26F4UJVW0owAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG6I 80ewAv7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUXVWUAwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFVCj c4AY6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28Icx kI7VAKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2Iq xVCjr7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVWrXVW8Jr1lIxkGc2Ij64vIr41lIx AIcVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW5JVW7JwCI42IY6xIIjxv20xvEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdMIIF 0xvE42xK8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWUJVWUCwCI42IY6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwCI42IY6I8E87 Iv6xkF7I0E14v26F4UJVW0obIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUrCJmUUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQAOBF1jj5pfbQABsT From: Roberto Sassu Make the 'ima' LSM independent from the 'integrity' LSM by introducing IMA own integrity metadata (ima_iint_cache structure, with IMA-specific fields from the integrity_iint_cache structure), and by managing it directly from the 'ima' LSM. Create ima_iint.c and introduce the same integrity metadata management functions found in iint.c (renamed with ima_). However, instead of putting metadata in an rbtree, reserve space from IMA in the inode security blob for a pointer, and introduce the ima_inode_set_iint()/ima_inode_get_iint() primitives to store/retrieve that pointer. This improves search time from logarithmic to constant. Consequently, don't include the inode pointer as field in the ima_iint_cache structure, since the association with the inode is clear. Since the inode field is missing in ima_iint_cache, pass the extra inode parameter to ima_get_verity_digest(). Prefer storing the pointer instead of the entire ima_iint_cache structure, to avoid too much memory pressure. Use the same mechanism as before, a cache named ima_iint_cache (renamed from iint_cache), to quickly allocate a new ima_iint_cache structure when requested by the IMA policy. Create the new ima_iint_cache in ima_iintcache_init(), called by init_ima_lsm(), during the initialization of the 'ima' LSM. And, register ima_inode_free_security() to free the ima_iint_cache structure, if exists. Replace integrity_iint_cache with ima_iint_cache in various places of the IMA code. Also, replace integrity_inode_get() and integrity_iint_find(), respectively with ima_inode_get() and ima_iint_find(). Finally, move the remaining IMA-specific flags to security/integrity/ima/ima.h, since they are now unnecessary in the common integrity layer. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 23 +++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 27 +++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 ++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 53 ---------- 9 files changed, 308 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 2499f2485c04..b376d38b4ee6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # Measurement Architecture(IMA). # -obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima_iint.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index a27fc10f84f7..11d7c0332207 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; /* IMA event related data */ struct ima_event_data { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; struct file *file; const unsigned char *filename; struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value; @@ -119,6 +119,107 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr { u64 count; }; +/* IMA iint action cache flags */ +#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 +#define IMA_MEASURED 0x00000002 +#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x00000004 +#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x00000008 +/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x00000010 do not use this flag */ +#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020 +#define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040 +#define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080 +#define IMA_HASH 0x00000100 +#define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200 + +/* IMA iint policy rule cache flags */ +#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 +#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000 +#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000 +#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000 +#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 +#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 +#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000 +#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000 + +#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ + IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) +#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \ + IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \ + IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK) + +/* IMA iint subaction appraise cache flags */ +#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00001000 +#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00002000 +#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00004000 +#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00008000 +#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00010000 +#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00020000 +#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00040000 +#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000 +#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00100000 +#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00200000 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \ + IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE) +#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \ + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \ + IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED) + +/* IMA iint cache atomic_flags */ +#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR 0 +#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1 +#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 +#define IMA_DIGSIG 3 +#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 + +/* IMA integrity metadata associated with an inode */ +struct ima_iint_cache { + struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */ + u64 version; /* track inode changes */ + unsigned long flags; + unsigned long measured_pcrs; + unsigned long atomic_flags; + unsigned long real_ino; + dev_t real_dev; + enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4; + struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; +}; + +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes; + +static inline struct ima_iint_cache * +ima_inode_get_iint(const struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec; + + if (unlikely(!inode->i_security)) + return NULL; + + iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode; + return *iint_sec; +} + +static inline void ima_inode_set_iint(const struct inode *inode, + struct ima_iint_cache *iint) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache **iint_sec; + + if (unlikely(!inode->i_security)) + return; + + iint_sec = inode->i_security + ima_blob_sizes.lbs_inode; + *iint_sec = iint; +} + +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode); +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode); +void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode); +void __init ima_iintcache_init(void); + extern const int read_idmap[]; #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC @@ -152,8 +253,8 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data, struct ima_template_entry *entry); int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash); void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - const char *op, const char *cause); + struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op, + const char *cause); int ima_init_crypto(void); void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen); void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size); @@ -267,10 +368,10 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); -int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, - enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig); -void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, +int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo, + struct modsig *modsig); +void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, @@ -280,7 +381,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, int pcr, const char *func_data, bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len); -void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_template_entry **entry, @@ -318,17 +419,16 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE -int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr); -int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig); int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); -void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); -enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); +enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func); enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len); @@ -337,14 +437,14 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, void __init init_ima_appraise_lsm(const struct lsm_id *lsmid); #else -static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) { return 0; } static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, @@ -361,14 +461,13 @@ static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; } -static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) { } -static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache - *iint, - enum ima_hooks func) +static inline enum integrity_status +ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func) { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 597ea0c4d72f..b37d043d5748 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, * value is invalidated. */ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - const char *op, const char *cause) + struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const char *op, + const char *cause) { struct ima_template_entry *entry; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); @@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, allowed_algos); } -static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, + struct inode *inode, struct ima_max_digest_data *hash) { enum hash_algo alg; @@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * On failure, 'measure' policy rules will result in a file data * hash containing 0's. */ - digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(iint->inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg); + digest_len = fsverity_get_digest(inode, hash->digest, NULL, &alg); if (digest_len == 0) return false; @@ -237,9 +238,9 @@ static bool ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ -int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, - enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig) +int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo, + struct modsig *modsig) { const char *audit_cause = "failed"; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); @@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest)); if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) { - if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash)) { + if (!ima_get_verity_digest(iint, inode, &hash)) { audit_cause = "no-verity-digest"; result = -ENODATA; } @@ -338,8 +339,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Must be called with iint->mutex held. */ -void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, +void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc) @@ -382,7 +383,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, ima_free_template_entry(entry); } -void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +void ima_audit_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const unsigned char *filename) { struct audit_buffer *ab; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 1dd6ee72a20a..3497741caea9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -84,8 +84,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, NULL, NULL, NULL); } -static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) +static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct ima_iint_cache *iint) { int rc, offset; u8 algo = iint->ima_hash->algo; @@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, } /* Return specific func appraised cached result */ -enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func) { switch (func) { @@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } } -static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +static void ima_set_cache_status(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func, enum integrity_status status) { @@ -152,8 +151,7 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } } -static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - enum ima_hooks func) +static void ima_cache_flags(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func) { switch (func) { case MMAP_CHECK: @@ -276,7 +274,7 @@ static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ -static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) { @@ -443,7 +441,7 @@ static int modsig_verify(enum ima_hooks func, const struct modsig *modsig, * * Returns -EPERM if the hash is blacklisted. */ -int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +int ima_check_blacklist(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) { enum hash_algo hash_algo; @@ -477,8 +475,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ -int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig) @@ -603,7 +600,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, /* * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value */ -void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) +void ima_update_xattr(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) { struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); int rc = 0; @@ -640,7 +637,7 @@ static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; int action; if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) @@ -648,7 +645,7 @@ static void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return; action = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + iint = ima_iint_find(inode); if (iint) { set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); if (!action) @@ -674,12 +671,12 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + iint = ima_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) return; iint->measured_pcrs = 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e7c9c216c1c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Mimi Zohar + * + * File: ima_iint.c + * - implements the IMA hook: ima_inode_free + * - cache integrity information in the inode security blob + */ +#include + +#include "ima.h" + +static struct kmem_cache *ima_iint_cache __ro_after_init; + +/** + * ima_iint_find - Return the iint associated with an inode + * @inode: Pointer to the inode + * + * Return the IMA integrity information (iint) associated with an inode, if the + * inode was processed by IMA. + * + * Return: Found iint or NULL. + */ +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find(struct inode *inode) +{ + if (!IS_IMA(inode)) + return NULL; + + return ima_inode_get_iint(inode); +} + +#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH + 1) + +/* + * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures + * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint + * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs. + * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details. + */ +static inline void ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, + struct inode *inode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP + static struct lock_class_key ima_iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING]; + + int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING)) + depth = 0; + + lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &ima_iint_mutex_key[depth]); +#endif +} + +static void ima_iint_init_always(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, + struct inode *inode) +{ + iint->ima_hash = NULL; + iint->version = 0; + iint->flags = 0UL; + iint->atomic_flags = 0UL; + iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; + mutex_init(&iint->mutex); + ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode); +} + +static void ima_iint_free(struct ima_iint_cache *iint) +{ + kfree(iint->ima_hash); + mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex); + kmem_cache_free(ima_iint_cache, iint); +} + +/** + * ima_inode_get - Find or allocate an iint associated with an inode + * @inode: Pointer to the inode + * + * Find an iint associated with an inode, and allocate a new one if not found. + * Caller must lock i_mutex. + * + * Return: An iint on success, NULL on error. + */ +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + + iint = ima_iint_find(inode); + if (iint) + return iint; + + iint = kmem_cache_alloc(ima_iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); + if (!iint) + return NULL; + + ima_iint_init_always(iint, inode); + + inode->i_flags |= S_IMA; + ima_inode_set_iint(inode, iint); + + return iint; +} + +/** + * ima_inode_free - Called on inode free + * @inode: Pointer to the inode + * + * Free the iint associated with an inode. + */ +void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + + if (!IS_IMA(inode)) + return; + + iint = ima_iint_find(inode); + ima_inode_set_iint(inode, NULL); + + ima_iint_free(iint); +} + +static void ima_iint_init_once(void *foo) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint = (struct ima_iint_cache *)foo; + + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); +} + +void __init ima_iintcache_init(void) +{ + ima_iint_cache = + kmem_cache_create("ima_iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), + 0, SLAB_PANIC, ima_iint_init_once); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 63979aefc95f..393f5c7912d5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate"; const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; struct ima_template_entry *entry; - struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; + struct ima_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .filename = boot_aggregate_name }; struct ima_max_digest_data hash; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b8b8891a9379..c84e8c55333d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file, * */ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct ima_iint_cache *iint, int must_measure, char **pathbuf, const char **pathname, @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) { if (!iint) - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + iint = ima_iint_find(inode); /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags)) @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); } -static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; @@ -192,12 +192,12 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, static void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + iint = ima_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) return; @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *backing_inode, *inode = file_inode(file); - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL; char *pathbuf = NULL; char filename[NAME_MAX]; @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, inode_lock(inode); if (action) { - iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); + iint = ima_inode_get(inode); if (!iint) rc = -ENOMEM; } @@ -564,11 +564,11 @@ static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint; int rc, hash_algo; if (ima_policy_flag) { - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + iint = ima_iint_find(inode); if (iint) mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); } @@ -578,7 +578,6 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); memset(&tmp_iint, 0, sizeof(tmp_iint)); - tmp_iint.inode = inode; mutex_init(&tmp_iint.mutex); rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0, @@ -688,7 +687,7 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode) { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise; if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) @@ -700,7 +699,7 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return; /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ - iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); + iint = ima_inode_get(inode); if (!iint) return; @@ -719,7 +718,7 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, */ static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int must_appraise; @@ -732,7 +731,7 @@ static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) return; /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ - iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); + iint = ima_inode_get(inode); if (!iint) return; @@ -935,7 +934,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int ret = 0; const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; - struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {}; + struct ima_iint_cache iint = {}; struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint, .filename = eventname, .buf = buf, @@ -1172,6 +1171,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request), #endif + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, ima_inode_free), }; static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = { @@ -1181,15 +1181,21 @@ static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = { static int __init init_ima_lsm(void) { + ima_iintcache_init(); security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid); init_ima_appraise_lsm(&ima_lsmid); return 0; } +struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache *), +}; + DEFINE_LSM(ima) = { .name = "ima", .init = init_ima_lsm, .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, + .blobs = &ima_blob_sizes, }; late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index f69062617754..c0556907c2e6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ #define DONT_HASH 0x0200 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ - (a) >= (sizeof_field(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) + (a) >= (sizeof_field(struct ima_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) int ima_policy_flag; static int temp_ima_appraise; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 7a97c269a072..671fc50255f9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -20,59 +20,6 @@ #include #include -/* iint action cache flags */ -#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 -#define IMA_MEASURED 0x00000002 -#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x00000004 -#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x00000008 -/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x00000010 do not use this flag */ -#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020 -#define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040 -#define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080 -#define IMA_HASH 0x00000100 -#define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200 - -/* iint policy rule cache flags */ -#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 -#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000 -#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000 -#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000 -#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 -#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 -#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000 -#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000 - -#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ - IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) -#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \ - IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \ - IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK) - -/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */ -#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00001000 -#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00002000 -#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00004000 -#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00008000 -#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00010000 -#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00020000 -#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00040000 -#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000 -#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE 0x00100000 -#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED 0x00200000 -#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \ - IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE) -#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \ - IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \ - IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED) - -/* iint cache atomic_flags */ -#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR 0 -#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1 -#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 -#define IMA_DIGSIG 3 -#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 - enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, From patchwork Thu Feb 15 10:31:13 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; 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Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:39:45 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de, kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu , Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v10 25/25] integrity: Remove LSM Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:13 +0100 Message-Id: <20240215103113.2369171-26-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> References: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CM-TRANSID: LxC2BwAHABmc6c1lwxGNAg--.11795S7 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvJXoWxKFWxAw4fAw1DAFW7Gr4kZwb_yoWfuw4xpF W7KayUJr4rZFW0kF4vyFy5ur4fK34qgFZ7W34Ykw1kAFyqvrn0qFs8AryUuF1rGrWFq34I qr4akr45ZF1DtrJanT9S1TB71UUUUUUqnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDU0xBIdaVrnRJUUUBab4IE77IF4wAFF20E14v26rWj6s0DM7CY07I20VC2zVCF04k2 6cxKx2IYs7xG6rWj6s0DM7CIcVAFz4kK6r1j6r18M28IrcIa0xkI8VA2jI8067AKxVWUAV Cq3wA2048vs2IY020Ec7CjxVAFwI0_Xr0E3s1l8cAvFVAK0II2c7xJM28CjxkF64kEwVA0 rcxSw2x7M28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVW5JVW7JwA2z4x0Y4vE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267 AKxVWxJr0_GcWl84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv67AKxVW8JVWxJwA2z4x0Y4vEx4A2jsIEc7CjxVAF wI0_Cr1j6rxdM2AIxVAIcxkEcVAq07x20xvEncxIr21l5I8CrVACY4xI64kE6c02F40Ex7 xfMcIj6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1Y6r17McIj6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwAm72CE4IkC6x0Y z7v_Jr0_Gr1lF7xvr2IYc2Ij64vIr41lFIxGxcIEc7CjxVA2Y2ka0xkIwI1l42xK82IYc2 Ij64vIr41l4I8I3I0E4IkC6x0Yz7v_Jr0_Gr1lx2IqxVAqx4xG67AKxVWUJVWUGwC20s02 6x8GjcxK67AKxVWUGVWUWwC2zVAF1VAY17CE14v26rWY6r4UJwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI42 IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26ryj6F1UMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVWxJr0_GcWlIxAI cVCF04k26cxKx2IYs7xG6r1j6r1xMIIF0xvEx4A2jsIE14v26r4j6F4UMIIF0xvEx4A2js IEc7CjxVAFwI0_Cr1j6rxdYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07UWVbkUUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAgAOBF1jj5Zf6QAAsZ From: Roberto Sassu Since now IMA and EVM use their own integrity metadata, it is safe to remove the 'integrity' LSM, with its management of integrity metadata. Keep the iint.c file only for loading IMA and EVM keys at boot, and for creating the integrity directory in securityfs (we need to keep it for retrocompatibility reasons). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Paul Moore Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/integrity.h | 14 --- security/integrity/iint.c | 197 +-------------------------------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 25 ----- security/security.c | 2 - 4 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 236 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index ef0f63ef5ebc..459b79683783 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -19,24 +19,10 @@ enum integrity_status { INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN, }; -/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY -extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode); -extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode); extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void); #else -static inline struct integrity_iint_cache * - integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode) -{ - return NULL; -} - -static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) -{ - return; -} - static inline void integrity_load_keys(void) { } diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index d4419a2a1e24..068ac6c2ae1e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -6,207 +6,14 @@ * Mimi Zohar * * File: integrity_iint.c - * - implements the integrity hooks: integrity_inode_alloc, - * integrity_inode_free - * - cache integrity information associated with an inode - * using a rbtree tree. + * - initialize the integrity directory in securityfs + * - load IMA and EVM keys */ -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include #include -#include #include "integrity.h" -static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT; -static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock); -static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __ro_after_init; - struct dentry *integrity_dir; -/* - * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode - */ -static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; - - while (n) { - iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node); - - if (inode < iint->inode) - n = n->rb_left; - else if (inode > iint->inode) - n = n->rb_right; - else - return iint; - } - - return NULL; -} - -/* - * integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode - */ -struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - - if (!IS_IMA(inode)) - return NULL; - - read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); - iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); - read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); - - return iint; -} - -#define IMA_MAX_NESTING (FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH+1) - -/* - * It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it measures - * files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to annotate the iint - * mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to IMA + overlayfs. - * See ovl_lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key() for more details. - */ -static inline void iint_lockdep_annotate(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct inode *inode) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP - static struct lock_class_key iint_mutex_key[IMA_MAX_NESTING]; - - int depth = inode->i_sb->s_stack_depth; - - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(depth < 0 || depth >= IMA_MAX_NESTING)) - depth = 0; - - lockdep_set_class(&iint->mutex, &iint_mutex_key[depth]); -#endif -} - -static void iint_init_always(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct inode *inode) -{ - iint->ima_hash = NULL; - iint->version = 0; - iint->flags = 0UL; - iint->atomic_flags = 0UL; - iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - iint->measured_pcrs = 0; - mutex_init(&iint->mutex); - iint_lockdep_annotate(iint, inode); -} - -static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) -{ - kfree(iint->ima_hash); - mutex_destroy(&iint->mutex); - kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); -} - -/** - * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode - * @inode: pointer to the inode - * @return: allocated iint - * - * Caller must lock i_mutex - */ -struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct rb_node **p; - struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL; - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint; - - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); - if (iint) - return iint; - - iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); - if (!iint) - return NULL; - - iint_init_always(iint, inode); - - write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); - - p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; - while (*p) { - parent = *p; - test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache, - rb_node); - if (inode < test_iint->inode) { - p = &(*p)->rb_left; - } else if (inode > test_iint->inode) { - p = &(*p)->rb_right; - } else { - write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); - kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); - return test_iint; - } - } - - iint->inode = inode; - node = &iint->rb_node; - inode->i_flags |= S_IMA; - rb_link_node(node, parent, p); - rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree); - - write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); - return iint; -} - -/** - * integrity_inode_free - called on security_inode_free - * @inode: pointer to the inode - * - * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode. - */ -void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - - if (!IS_IMA(inode)) - return; - - write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); - iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); - rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree); - write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); - - iint_free(iint); -} - -static void iint_init_once(void *foo) -{ - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = (struct integrity_iint_cache *) foo; - - memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); -} - -static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) -{ - iint_cache = - kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache), - 0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once); - return 0; -} -DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = { - .name = "integrity", - .init = integrity_iintcache_init, - .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, -}; - - /* * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file * diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 671fc50255f9..50d6f798e613 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -102,31 +102,6 @@ struct ima_file_id { __u8 hash[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE]; } __packed; -/* integrity data associated with an inode */ -struct integrity_iint_cache { - struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ - struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */ - struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ - u64 version; /* track inode changes */ - unsigned long flags; - unsigned long measured_pcrs; - unsigned long atomic_flags; - unsigned long real_ino; - dev_t real_dev; - enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4; - enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; - enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; - enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4; - enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4; - enum integrity_status evm_status:4; - struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; -}; - -/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete - * integrity data associated with an inode. - */ -struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); - int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void *addr, unsigned long count); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index de8a9a7b2a30..4317bcd6ec6a 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -1598,7 +1597,6 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) */ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { - integrity_inode_free(inode); call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); /* * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and