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Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v6 1/6] crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound keys Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 16:38:28 +0100 Message-ID: <20240307153842.80033-2-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 DCP (Data Co-Processor) is able to derive private keys for a fused random seed, which can be referenced by handle but not accessed by the CPU. Similarly, DCP is able to store arbitrary keys in four dedicated key slots located in its secure memory area (internal SRAM). These keys can be used to perform AES encryption. Expose these derived keys and key slots through the crypto API via their handle. The main purpose is to add DCP-backed trusted keys. Other use cases are possible too (see similar existing paes implementations), but these should carefully be evaluated as e.g. enabling AF_ALG will give userspace full access to use keys. In scenarios with untrustworthy userspace, this will enable en-/decryption oracles. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir Acked-by: Herbert Xu Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/soc/fsl/dcp.h | 20 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/dcp.h diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c index 2b3ebe0db3a6..057d73c370b7 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ struct dcp_async_ctx { struct crypto_skcipher *fallback; unsigned int key_len; uint8_t key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + bool key_referenced; }; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx { @@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_TERM (1 << 13) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_INIT (1 << 12) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY (1 << 11) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY (1 << 10) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT (1 << 8) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_INIT (1 << 9) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_HASH (1 << 6) @@ -168,6 +171,8 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp; #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_ECB (0 << 4) #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_SELECT_AES128 (0 << 0) +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT 8 + static int mxs_dcp_start_dma(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx) { int dma_err; @@ -224,13 +229,16 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp; struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan]; struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + bool key_referenced = actx->key_referenced; int ret; - key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, - 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE); - ret = dma_mapping_error(sdcp->dev, key_phys); - if (ret) - return ret; + if (!key_referenced) { + key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key, + 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + ret = dma_mapping_error(sdcp->dev, key_phys); + if (ret) + return ret; + } src_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_in_buf, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); @@ -255,8 +263,12 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_INTERRUPT | MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_CIPHER; - /* Payload contains the key. */ - desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; + if (key_referenced) + /* Set OTP key bit to select the key via KEY_SELECT. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY; + else + /* Payload contains the key. */ + desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY; if (rctx->enc) desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT; @@ -270,6 +282,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, else desc->control1 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_CBC; + if (key_referenced) + desc->control1 |= sdcp->coh->aes_key[0] << MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT; + desc->next_cmd_addr = 0; desc->source = src_phys; desc->destination = dst_phys; @@ -284,9 +299,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx, err_dst: dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, src_phys, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE); err_src: - dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - + if (!key_referenced) + dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); return ret; } @@ -453,7 +468,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_enqueue(struct skcipher_request *req, int enc, int ecb) struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); int ret; - if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) + if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && !actx->key_referenced)) return mxs_dcp_block_fallback(req, enc); rctx->enc = enc; @@ -500,6 +515,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, * there can still be an operation in progress. */ actx->key_len = len; + actx->key_referenced = false; if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) { memcpy(actx->key, key, len); return 0; @@ -516,6 +532,32 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, return crypto_skcipher_setkey(actx->fallback, key, len); } +static int mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct dcp_async_ctx *actx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + + if (len != DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (key[0]) { + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE: + case DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP: + memcpy(actx->key, key, len); + actx->key_len = len; + actx->key_referenced = true; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static int mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) { const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm)); @@ -539,6 +581,13 @@ static void mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) crypto_free_skcipher(actx->fallback); } +static int mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct dcp_aes_req_ctx)); + + return 0; +} + /* * Hashing (SHA1/SHA256) */ @@ -889,6 +938,39 @@ static struct skcipher_alg dcp_aes_algs[] = { .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .init = mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm, .exit = mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-paes-dcp", + .base.cra_priority = 401, + .base.cra_alignmask = 15, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey, + .encrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_encrypt, + .decrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_decrypt, + .init = mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm, + }, { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(paes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-paes-dcp", + .base.cra_priority = 401, + .base.cra_alignmask = 15, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + + .min_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .max_keysize = DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE, + .setkey = mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey, + .encrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_encrypt, + .decrypt = mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_decrypt, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .init = mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm, }, }; diff --git a/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h b/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3ec335d8ca8b --- /dev/null +++ b/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + * + * Specifies paes key slot handles for NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) to be used + * with the crypto_skcipher_setkey(). + */ + +#ifndef MXS_DCP_H +#define MXS_DCP_H + +#define DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE 1 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0 0x00 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1 0x01 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2 0x02 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3 0x03 +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE 0xfe +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP 0xff + +#endif /* MXS_DCP_H */ From patchwork Thu Mar 7 15:38:29 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 13585941 Received: from mail-lj1-f173.google.com (mail-lj1-f173.google.com [209.85.208.173]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E08512FB25 for ; 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Thu, 07 Mar 2024 07:39:04 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost ([82.150.214.1]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id n24-20020a05640204d800b00566f92f1facsm6501964edw.36.2024.03.07.07.39.02 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 07 Mar 2024 07:39:04 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 2/6] KEYS: trusted: improve scalability of trust source config Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 16:38:29 +0100 Message-ID: <20240307153842.80033-3-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Enabling trusted keys requires at least one trust source implementation (currently TPM, TEE or CAAM) to be enabled. Currently, this is done by checking each trust source's config option individually. This does not scale when more trust sources like the one for DCP are added. Add config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS which is set to true by each trust source once its enabled and adapt the check for having at least one active trust source to use this option. Whenever a new trust source is added, it now needs to select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS. Signed-off-by: David Gstir --- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index dbfdd8536468..553dc117f385 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + bool + config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS @@ -9,6 +12,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM select ASN1_ENCODER select OID_REGISTRY select ASN1 + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as trusted key backend. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, @@ -20,6 +24,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE bool "TEE-based trusted keys" depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted key backend. @@ -29,10 +34,11 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM) as trusted key backend. -if !TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM && !TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE && !TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM -comment "No trust source selected!" +if !HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + comment "No trust source selected!" endif From patchwork Thu Mar 7 15:38:30 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 13585942 Received: from mail-ej1-f43.google.com (mail-ej1-f43.google.com [209.85.218.43]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4F7D312FB3E for ; Thu, 7 Mar 2024 15:39:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.218.43 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709825951; cv=none; b=NV/RmtEL4PMek+obKROji8IkPlOXAs+cTae14XfHmBjQPxPHNH5cUItDRbUm2sH9B4gIFcquvXkQHCBamUucKcKvoTuWl01Gg9XwVL7yLJNsvlSWqDu283eYqy+iqZ4ZwiFfFIEyQ5om2QihpDtFCjaa/EJ+RHaXLjgbUJjR6K0= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709825951; c=relaxed/simple; bh=QncUPRYZ1/CYCYhyhmJpQWMhEXrW22Wu4aIXU0R0uMQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=kWzEMRiKTWy97GVhfNZv4zXHVTaDHbjirixOWsswWPswfYWsWbywJPplLVzzsf5fKSrDuUZVh4LKIPmyn/0uo93s60wi05NUjPfonrxyvI4DL6GlwOo63p/nF0cy4fdEwtnp/FPIvlWkyKWCKFADPmQMlI2C5OY+zQG202Z2Yto= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=sigma-star.at; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sigma-star.at; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sigma-star.at header.i=@sigma-star.at header.b=dfDfcstx; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.218.43 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sigma-star.at header.i=@sigma-star.at header.b="dfDfcstx" Received: by mail-ej1-f43.google.com with SMTP id a640c23a62f3a-a3fb8b0b7acso141719866b.2 for ; Thu, 07 Mar 2024 07:39:08 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sigma-star.at; s=google; t=1709825947; x=1710430747; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=7+43UNz3ZD4+0KaV0Bg52Srm/cgHiNBjP2gurlBx03s=; b=dfDfcstxn8DTvtKpByMIwGPh5euw6hsB+cwwb39hKms1+lnibNdEsOIrhWv0P2P2tC 1UugVDTWlj/8/gE1OhUoKb3YdH1VG3LPB+cx+lQtt+rpEaNsMixJXLOv3GeHuno+b4Vk r3YZl0LJw0alhXdNshlO8EnAEeqBGk9Mf+yQLtSE1wQp61IRhzyvlbpOMefS0d+5n68C zS0EF73tI+5l/MZSw2EdbpXdyW3l5zZGxa4RgAqWqOmucRcXk7zDRTwFu0b+s/MsyPLX K5+t4l1HEinzNVwA0dbxRJe8IVPRWISYCE4bsoAmpsFrMorWeEf6U6ZIJ5oKfhDl6GTo nYYw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1709825947; x=1710430747; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=7+43UNz3ZD4+0KaV0Bg52Srm/cgHiNBjP2gurlBx03s=; b=KeY8MBj7aEr9BthBsir/MNBjScQh8JsRW3gH15D2oBAm2Kdqyrru/Iko/krE+Ujqb0 iusmoqxNkKDh3KSbHb9Ju99nVvog0QTC5lopyjbfb5N8Poq2YfVMVQVwp3JCBp+Hwooj 8MYZpc0nh416ixQbsBBcbCTDgBQuFwHegKVJbodv4INFeHBTgR038bguEUc82t831Q4o dUoVZ9kDVwHIMIigSAPIjXzakc9y85e1/Ur/oZJxlK2O+ws1KOBUhp7//gfMY5syYPY+ RMvSTqok57aWgB5oLb8YwQO5u2bYKErxvf9GkexzE0aYvtj+peKQLo4zMcXUGxelbXub fyzA== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCUK+ZwEawE507pJLmNZM/AD05LjI/35XTXE9v08MoBVL+9jumtEEn28uffb7YYHWpKv24v4fGV8FJyVR4oLioq+qfJ95gn3gFk= X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yw3dgl9zdkBlNTvKPDl/UpwB4H+auzgZVkc7dAXc6e25R0q2bgB vZuqJv2cJ8cSmo4/7AtFpEWDMcegQ4SrvMta4zBt7E7b1FuHH5hzjxqLEjqk844= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHwQGZ+21YXBNTZsvp8kM2bZDCIxNtiwH5MLr4OGXjxXZmnUAeFOgIOMP9Li8COktlQRvRhFg== X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:e2cb:b0:a45:c1a0:5c07 with SMTP id gr11-20020a170906e2cb00b00a45c1a05c07mr3143119ejb.17.1709825946773; Thu, 07 Mar 2024 07:39:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost ([82.150.214.1]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id s22-20020a170906501600b00a42e2bc82dbsm8316909ejj.169.2024.03.07.07.39.05 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 07 Mar 2024 07:39:06 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v6 3/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 16:38:30 +0100 Message-ID: <20240307153842.80033-4-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP. Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob mechanism similar to what CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and parsing the blob has to happen in software (i.e. the kernel). The software-based blob format used by DCP trusted keys encrypts the payload using AES-128-GCM with a freshly generated random key and nonce. The random key itself is AES-128-ECB encrypted using the DCP unique or OTP key. The DCP trusted key blob format is: /* * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. * * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1 * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it. * * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + * AES_BLOCK_SIZE. */ struct dcp_blob_fmt { __u8 fmt_version; __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __le32 payload_len; __u8 payload[]; } __packed; By default the unique key is used. It is also possible to use the OTP key. While the unique key should be unique it is not documented how this key is derived. Therefore selection the OTP key is supported as well via the use_otp_key module parameter. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- include/keys/trusted_dcp.h | 11 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 8 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 335 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_dcp.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9aaa42075b40 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + */ + +#ifndef TRUSTED_DCP_H +#define TRUSTED_DCP_H + +extern struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index 553dc117f385..1fb8aa001995 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM) as trusted key backend. +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP + bool "DCP-based trusted keys" + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS + default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS + help + Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend. + if !HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS comment "No trust source selected!" endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 735aa0bc08ef..f0f3b27f688b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o + +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) += trusted_dcp.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index fee1ab2c734d..5113aeae5628 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG"); static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)"); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam or dcp)"); static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) @@ -42,6 +43,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) { "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops }, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) + { "dcp", &dcp_trusted_key_ops }, +#endif }; DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4addf0970590 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1 +#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16 + +/** + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. + * + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1. + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, + * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in + * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, + * GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it. + * + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + + * DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN. + */ +struct dcp_blob_fmt { + __u8 fmt_version; + __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __le32 payload_len; + __u8 payload[]; +} __packed; + +static bool use_otp_key; +module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for sealing"); + +static bool skip_zk_test; +module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed"); + +static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len) +{ + return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN; +} + +static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool do_encrypt) +{ + struct skcipher_request *req = NULL; + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; + u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE]; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + int res = 0; + + if (use_otp_key) + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP; + else + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + res = PTR_ERR(tfm); + tfm = NULL; + goto out; + } + + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); + if (!req) { + res = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key)); + if (res < 0) + goto out; + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128, + NULL); + + if (do_encrypt) + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait); + else + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait); + +out: + skcipher_request_free(req); + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); + + return res; +} + +static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce, + bool do_encrypt) +{ + struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL; + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg; + struct crypto_aead *aead; + int ret; + + aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(aead)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(aead); + goto out; + } + + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret); + goto free_aead; + } + + aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!aead_req) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_aead; + } + + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len); + if (do_encrypt) { + /* + * If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag. + */ + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN); + } else { + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len); + } + + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce); + aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, + NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0); + + if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_req; + } + + if (do_encrypt) + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); + else + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); + +free_req: + aead_request_free(aead_req); +free_aead: + crypto_free_aead(aead); +out: + return ret; +} + +static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key) +{ + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false); +} + +static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key) +{ + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true); +} + +static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; + int blen, ret; + + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); + if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -E2BIG; + + b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION; + get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128); + + ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key, + b->nonce, true); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + b->payload_len = get_unaligned_le32(&p->key_len); + p->blob_len = blen; + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob; + int blen, ret; + + if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) { + pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n", + b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len); + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len); + if (blen != p->blob_len) { + pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen, + p->blob_len); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN, + b->blob_key, b->nonce, false); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; +out: + return ret; +} + +static int test_for_zero_key(void) +{ + static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x6f}; + void *buf = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (skip_zk_test) + goto out; + + buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) { + pr_err("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + } +out: + kfree(buf); + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_dcp_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (use_otp_key) + pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n"); + + ret = test_for_zero_key(); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret); + + return -EINVAL; + } + + return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +static void trusted_dcp_exit(void) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops = { + .exit = trusted_dcp_exit, + .init = trusted_dcp_init, + .seal = trusted_dcp_seal, + .unseal = trusted_dcp_unseal, + .migratable = 0, +}; From patchwork Thu Mar 7 15:38:31 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; 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Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 4/6] MAINTAINERS: add entry for DCP-based trusted keys Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 16:38:31 +0100 Message-ID: <20240307153842.80033-5-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 This covers trusted keys backed by NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) chip found in smaller i.MX SoCs. Signed-off-by: David Gstir Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- MAINTAINERS | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 976a5cea1577..ca7f42ca9338 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -12019,6 +12019,15 @@ S: Maintained F: include/keys/trusted_caam.h F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c +KEYS-TRUSTED-DCP +M: David Gstir +R: sigma star Kernel Team +L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org +L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +F: include/keys/trusted_dcp.h +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c + KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE M: Sumit Garg L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org From patchwork Thu Mar 7 15:38:32 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gstir X-Patchwork-Id: 13585944 Received: from mail-ed1-f48.google.com (mail-ed1-f48.google.com [209.85.208.48]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 29DEC130AF1 for ; Thu, 7 Mar 2024 15:39:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.208.48 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709825955; cv=none; b=uxDboTuK7ujhwz9QXO2RUZxEWfig7dwzf90CHXlKWCn0fVBtebQeSmRjRjWw5zn37quQld5t4t17sbz6MKqhX6pUzNNXMy9N20OHTK/T9uC8n7SIXIcIpMbBZdGFoSc0aZh9RD9i6oCHT3YGg23cS/JCceE0w4lzv4nqna5hAM8= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1709825955; c=relaxed/simple; bh=IoJ5PhDwmkZFYUe1jIRt3XY+XYejXNxDc1GhQecxiN0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Vj/jjz39BwzBENY36BC0HRUpyb4hNF8XbuKOJMxHbwP2JfMzR0+24oShPxhS8IBFbBwgR468uDDgaYVjuH1hqDz6ejw0cjlPzMLT8bzmZjs3hqq+6BWcz5S/1XF95liIRfOCecjVaFp0pWln0oU4lEiPRQcxpNhwKmCubGWNwgw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=sigma-star.at; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sigma-star.at; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sigma-star.at header.i=@sigma-star.at header.b=VAEefIaw; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.208.48 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=sigma-star.at Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=sigma-star.at header.i=@sigma-star.at header.b="VAEefIaw" Received: by mail-ed1-f48.google.com with SMTP id 4fb4d7f45d1cf-563c403719cso1287757a12.2 for ; Thu, 07 Mar 2024 07:39:12 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sigma-star.at; s=google; t=1709825951; x=1710430751; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=q95Pv5eUd7/PCCDIkGY46bAHfemcttBtSKECUmP8rbg=; b=VAEefIawjg3T0EMzO060miLSluQ2j4JanLZgMzl00mJvqwgSMPPKXwZ9BJepZgjYkQ QnE4IS13xqUFvGK/2SHXykv0Q2biLLRBi42Remc8PMD3TpTDfEqELcub0UTe3QMJ8bfz YexEZi0lkba5r3Cs+Pqm9bKpVZJoXHAxhuZRGHQTpHvayfDeftj1wvQKNU2Sceroy1NT 1KQEERpIUAQnwIsVZTSegM4nk9MruwD1nsyByloMl/GBV0to/nq/js1vzS9g0pU7QbJ6 4YVNTeaWfcXV9e8J7rHqVVrjXliJKq/rIXFJU2EOOfXSsGHEj1AV81nfKfFknFeDaqkG 9r+w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1709825951; x=1710430751; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=q95Pv5eUd7/PCCDIkGY46bAHfemcttBtSKECUmP8rbg=; b=LrVGCnrWZ4Q5Jw9GPxyk9xTa7be422YSuAJUBs39z/5iR14wVQwVQHrZSG7a9oIxZf xWgGtC/DONqzYAqeQx/VrEvneV0bXqeXYxVU+iFFufldrHA6DSwmLe2Y3POtXokZK15D 4VJovirh7ZbtsrpNL6qG3+SCkKsVTCc/qpN2Zpv+hk+eZwNx6spC/A2ja/rjcHhGoHh6 vHxtJqbPZ4vaaFUyUjWUOu3XubnKiI2xUVmZstoa32n5oVmgvAitVNy/spd7tbexreNG X1fc7GWaEKiyB/jxjrZp/94aeLDc2J3LlwMaePAvpcZfuYFvSRtKNA0WcK6TSC3xnOAV wb8w== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCV7nweZmDKNgoGC9JGNavvIqmhKTwdq9cjWDfb2jaMpbER+JFfWOWT2yq+Vl5ePJrHIamuG4Jz4UPpBjRg3HtbiY78uqamTMbs= X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YyzoKsN6FCywcouySH7AxOWnba+tON7tBvypaEmlm172Z/Vdd1c 9EHPyONAwq3KmckxbMntPTqih7QzsHJDTLLEI4/7YeCv0oHCeJ6Yy9y2OU3UlIs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IFQim0IlvlrKFx/Yx6UJFZNUGR3Suw118WkReabIIWNHe5La99iFLjJ/8OXFgt0a3qNMqW7EQ== X-Received: by 2002:a50:d514:0:b0:564:5c90:f521 with SMTP id u20-20020a50d514000000b005645c90f521mr115786edi.14.1709825951647; Thu, 07 Mar 2024 07:39:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost ([82.150.214.1]) by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id a26-20020a50c31a000000b00567f9d21b7csm1617918edb.94.2024.03.07.07.39.09 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 07 Mar 2024 07:39:11 -0800 (PST) From: David Gstir To: Mimi Zohar , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v6 5/6] docs: document DCP-backed trusted keys kernel params Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 16:38:32 +0100 Message-ID: <20240307153842.80033-6-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Document the kernel parameters trusted.dcp_use_otp_key and trusted.dcp_skip_zk_test for DCP-backed trusted keys. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 24c02c704049..b6944e57768a 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -6698,6 +6698,7 @@ - "tpm" - "tee" - "caam" + - "dcp" If not specified then it defaults to iterating through the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the first trust source as a backend which is initialized @@ -6713,6 +6714,18 @@ If not specified, "default" is used. In this case, the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust source. + trusted.dcp_use_otp_key + This is intended to be used in combination with + trusted.source=dcp and will select the DCP OTP key + instead of the DCP UNIQUE key blob encryption. + + trusted.dcp_skip_zk_test + This is intended to be used in combination with + trusted.source=dcp and will disable the check if all + the blob key is zero'ed. This is helpful for situations where + having this key zero'ed is acceptable. E.g. in testing + scenarios. + tsc= Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC. 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Miller" Cc: David Gstir , Shawn Guo , Jonathan Corbet , Sascha Hauer , Pengutronix Kernel Team , Fabio Estevam , NXP Linux Team , Ahmad Fatoum , sigma star Kernel Team , David Howells , Li Yang , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Paul E. McKenney" , Randy Dunlap , Catalin Marinas , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Tejun Heo , "Steven Rostedt (Google)" , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger , David Oberhollenzer Subject: [PATCH v6 6/6] docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new trust source Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 16:38:33 +0100 Message-ID: <20240307153842.80033-7-david@sigma-star.at> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.44.0 In-Reply-To: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> References: <20240307153842.80033-1-david@sigma-star.at> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new trust source: - Describe security properties of DCP trust source - Describe key usage - Document blob format Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer Signed-off-by: David Gstir --- .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index e989b9802f92..81fb3540bb20 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ safe. randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time. Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead. + (4) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt + in the on-chip fuses and is accessible to the DCP encryption engine only. + DCP provides two keys that can be used as root of trust: the OTP key + and the UNIQUE key. Default is to use the UNIQUE key, but selecting + the OTP key can be done via a module parameter (dcp_use_otp_key). + * Execution isolation (1) TPM @@ -57,6 +65,12 @@ safe. Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment. + (4) DCP + + Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution + environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there. + The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space. + * Optional binding to platform integrity state (1) TPM @@ -79,6 +93,11 @@ safe. Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs for platform integrity. + (4) DCP + + Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for + platform integrity. + * Interfaces and APIs (1) TPM @@ -94,6 +113,11 @@ safe. Interface is specific to silicon vendor. + (4) DCP + + Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in + ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``. + * Threat model The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given @@ -129,6 +153,13 @@ selected trust source: CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device is probed. + * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs) + + The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface, + so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have + a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled + to back the kernel RNG. + Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool. @@ -231,6 +262,19 @@ Usage:: CAAM-specific format. The key length for new keys is always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). +Trusted Keys usage: DCP +----------------------- + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format +specific to this DCP key-blob implementation. The key length for new keys is +always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + Encrypted Keys usage -------------------- @@ -426,3 +470,44 @@ string length. privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed string length. + +DCP Blob Format +--------------- + +The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its +AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing. +To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define +our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing +key stored in the key blob. + +Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit +blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to +encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM. + +The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES +encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce, +BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together +with a version number, payload length and authentication tag:: + + /* + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. + * + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1 + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, + * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in + * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, + * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it. + * + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + + * AES_BLOCK_SIZE. + */ + struct dcp_blob_fmt { + __u8 fmt_version; + __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; + __le32 payload_len; + __u8 payload[]; + } __packed;