From patchwork Mon Apr 22 07:01:23 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dongsheng Yang X-Patchwork-Id: 13637736 Received: from mail-m17240.xmail.ntesmail.com (mail-m17240.xmail.ntesmail.com [45.195.17.240]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 37779482D7; Mon, 22 Apr 2024 07:08:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=45.195.17.240 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713769713; cv=none; b=GfqWcyx/08OQH5XTzc2usxxNF7JvfQ2QfTWUy1wauVYep+LeodyRUUR1tSus4zoieH/GdKtWCGVhTMyZvfGtU/wCeAts/1q0ElvEZFgdGI98sB3nc+H4Q7DFrvnp+PVgq6E/Y7E26q9XpFsSHQH9p6JGJEQVyWeR5hQkED/a9nk= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713769713; c=relaxed/simple; bh=rO9wuLUfiR4E6XZ84kDSGhF4Q7qepug3oReICZiQTPs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=aGpzXxb51xeiyrjT0sB/DFez3FPufAxJHSV+cbACJWMtceCY52ex9WdpZ98I/s0y1tp51KTlGHK9ZZebnKxUMDhF5W3aKm+N1rrnntlVPjE3vSx/5THEUxkQ8vTaA5mgp/ud7lZjCGlEOP2KkrqpwWA9wPOomKyawzskf18iaAM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=easystack.cn; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=easystack.cn; arc=none smtp.client-ip=45.195.17.240 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=easystack.cn Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=easystack.cn Received: from ubuntu-22-04.. (unknown [218.94.118.90]) by smtp.qiye.163.com (Hmail) with ESMTPA id 12BB186026B; Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:01:33 +0800 (CST) From: Dongsheng Yang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, axboe@kernel.dk Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org, David Gow , Maxime Ripard , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH] drivers: base: Free devm resources when unregistering a device Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 07:01:23 +0000 Message-Id: <20240422070125.52519-3-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240422070125.52519-1-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> References: <20240422070125.52519-1-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-HM-Spam-Status: e1kfGhgUHx5ZQUpXWQgPGg8OCBgUHx5ZQUlOS1dZFg8aDwILHllBWSg2Ly tZV1koWUFJQjdXWS1ZQUlXWQ8JGhUIEh9ZQVlCGkhKVkgeGUseSkpJGUIdSlUZERMWGhIXJBQOD1 lXWRgSC1lBWUlKQ1VCT1VKSkNVQktZV1kWGg8SFR0UWUFZT0tIVUpNT0lMTlVKS0tVSkJLS1kG X-HM-Tid: 0a8f049c2630023ckunm12bb186026b X-HM-MType: 1 X-HM-Sender-Digest: e1kMHhlZQR0aFwgeV1kSHx4VD1lBWUc6Mgw6Tgw*Czc9LxwBMhELGU8O NygKCQ5VSlVKTEpITE1CSUJIQ01MVTMWGhIXVR8UFRwIEx4VHFUCGhUcOx4aCAIIDxoYEFUYFUVZ V1kSC1lBWUlKQ1VCT1VKSkNVQktZV1kIAVlBT0NPQjcG From: David Gow In the current code, devres_release_all() only gets called if the device has a bus and has been probed. This leads to issues when using bus-less or driver-less devices where the device might never get freed if a managed resource holds a reference to the device. This is happening in the DRM framework for example. We should thus call devres_release_all() in the device_del() function to make sure that the device-managed actions are properly executed when the device is unregistered, even if it has neither a bus nor a driver. This is effectively the same change than commit 2f8d16a996da ("devres: release resources on device_del()") that got reverted by commit a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") over memory leaks concerns. This patch effectively combines the two commits mentioned above to release the resources both on device_del() and device_release() and get the best of both worlds. Fixes: a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") Signed-off-by: David Gow Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720-kunit-devm-inconsistencies-test-v3-3-6aa7e074f373@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/base/core.c | 11 +++++++++++ drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c | 2 -- drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c | 2 -- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index 3dff5037943e..6ceaf50f5a67 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -3817,6 +3817,17 @@ void device_del(struct device *dev) device_platform_notify_remove(dev); device_links_purge(dev); + /* + * If a device does not have a driver attached, we need to clean + * up any managed resources. We do this in device_release(), but + * it's never called (and we leak the device) if a managed + * resource holds a reference to the device. So release all + * managed resources here, like we do in driver_detach(). We + * still need to do so again in device_release() in case someone + * adds a new resource after this point, though. + */ + devres_release_all(dev); + bus_notify(dev, BUS_NOTIFY_REMOVED_DEVICE); kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_REMOVE); glue_dir = get_glue_dir(dev); diff --git a/drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c b/drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c index b6ebf1dcdffb..1ae5ce8bd366 100644 --- a/drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c +++ b/drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c @@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ static void platform_device_devm_register_get_unregister_with_devm_test(struct k struct test_priv *priv = test->priv; int ret; - kunit_skip(test, "This needs to be fixed in the core."); - pdev = platform_device_alloc(DEVICE_NAME, PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pdev); diff --git a/drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c b/drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c index 9a3e6cccae13..780d07455f57 100644 --- a/drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c +++ b/drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c @@ -78,8 +78,6 @@ static void root_device_devm_register_get_unregister_with_devm_test(struct kunit struct test_priv *priv = test->priv; int ret; - kunit_skip(test, "This needs to be fixed in the core."); - priv->dev = root_device_register(DEVICE_NAME); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, priv->dev); From patchwork Mon Apr 22 07:01:24 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dongsheng Yang X-Patchwork-Id: 13637877 Received: from mail-m12782.qiye.163.com (mail-m12782.qiye.163.com [115.236.127.82]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 37E2E4F213; Mon, 22 Apr 2024 08:18:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=115.236.127.82 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713773892; cv=none; b=AjUle09YsIg3+Sf7FVSbFr+kl1SQwkyntBJTX9AVc4CjkIuCH0Z74+f8+auspQDTPQUFJEqvcInrTJ2LkM+F1SxVB4zo+bUznYf51ZFBbIRMU7+4ffZfvCbRdkx15FVaYgep1/8fUC783SS0q1FsiY9u+1+UQdgIks7Lhu78/QI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713773892; c=relaxed/simple; bh=hK1pR1teR7regKqZMnBinJhZ56OjV/M+wxIscIgvv5E=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=aqvBqfuJwBY3CnLuKNkWW2P4lRb1UZpVCkRJkrF+mBj+DIs/uNTGddz+MnfClZY9OrgBbL3XxfX5JEXMraM0d+bWkV2M1B6SQGlSpFe5+q7/x5y0E6jL0LUUWtPz6Hw9/yMRs41aSiFcV/N3kCJzYdGmSr2HMVVS8BmxoKipg6w= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=easystack.cn; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=easystack.cn; arc=none smtp.client-ip=115.236.127.82 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=easystack.cn Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=easystack.cn Received: from ubuntu-22-04.. (unknown [218.94.118.90]) by smtp.qiye.163.com (Hmail) with ESMTPA id E72FF860209; Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:01:33 +0800 (CST) From: Dongsheng Yang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, axboe@kernel.dk Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org, Davidlohr Bueso , Dave Jiang , Vishal Verma Subject: [PATCH 2/3] cxl/memdev: Document security state in kern-doc Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 07:01:24 +0000 Message-Id: <20240422070125.52519-4-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240422070125.52519-1-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> References: <20240422070125.52519-1-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-HM-Spam-Status: e1kfGhgUHx5ZQUpXWQgPGg8OCBgUHx5ZQUlOS1dZFg8aDwILHllBWSg2Ly tZV1koWUFJQjdXWS1ZQUlXWQ8JGhUIEh9ZQVkaGUpDVhlDHx0fTENJS0NLGFUZERMWGhIXJBQOD1 lXWRgSC1lBWUlKQ1VCT1VKSkNVQktZV1kWGg8SFR0UWUFZT0tIVUpNT0lMTlVKS0tVSkJLS1kG X-HM-Tid: 0a8f049c2988023ckunme72ff860209 X-HM-MType: 1 X-HM-Sender-Digest: e1kMHhlZQR0aFwgeV1kSHx4VD1lBWUc6MxQ6Fww*Ljc1FRwRMhEtGU8s HU4KCyNVSlVKTEpITE1CSUJPTU9MVTMWGhIXVR8UFRwIEx4VHFUCGhUcOx4aCAIIDxoYEFUYFUVZ V1kSC1lBWUlKQ1VCT1VKSkNVQktZV1kIAVlBSUlLQjcG From: Davidlohr Bueso ... as is the case with all members of struct cxl_memdev_state. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-3-dave@stgolabs.net Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma --- drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h index 499113328586..f3aca828fbec 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h @@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct cxl_dev_state { * @next_persistent_bytes: persistent capacity change pending device reset * @event: event log driver state * @poison: poison driver state info + * @security: security driver state info * @fw: firmware upload / activation state * @mbox_send: @dev specific transport for transmitting mailbox commands * From patchwork Mon Apr 22 07:01:25 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dongsheng Yang X-Patchwork-Id: 13637875 Received: from mail-m11877.qiye.163.com (mail-m11877.qiye.163.com [115.236.118.77]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2956AD27D; Mon, 22 Apr 2024 08:18:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=115.236.118.77 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713773892; cv=none; b=eVR//xp3xXjY3V+Mk6+aZNt3gnBL1XyoZ2FPG/nodJ/yYGTLehK27afKoFzRbU8GczV7R7MO17mgAYuWPa3JPmcD2jPe4cBAKdcYaiqZyxAyw0X1/dQdb8VvCKcqeUfRYI41v0OxLRSTYz+Crgm5yJM/ZQNDQOnKxv0eHIpsV/Q= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1713773892; c=relaxed/simple; bh=+uhCAuMBch6NqAg0S0WaqlwhFKvYJe1RVreC07HCrK8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=D16+GPLr5O//ULilXIYBIPMLj9RwmdPnwDOWnvVXABkI97sMCx8kndzWfhlk6tWcOZk3cQ+XukbNrJ/rvnqnhLKxXHDwqr/OXZwPnsv7kwo5g2C8njQqr3Wwh80pkCIMyL8CInXmbd8DUivRzwyVrJKKkL6lBa9woXTrF8C/gtM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=easystack.cn; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=easystack.cn; arc=none smtp.client-ip=115.236.118.77 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=easystack.cn Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=easystack.cn Received: from ubuntu-22-04.. (unknown [218.94.118.90]) by smtp.qiye.163.com (Hmail) with ESMTPA id B1F8886025A; Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:01:34 +0800 (CST) From: Dongsheng Yang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, axboe@kernel.dk Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org, Davidlohr Bueso , Dave Jiang , Vishal Verma Subject: [PATCH 3/3] cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 07:01:25 +0000 Message-Id: <20240422070125.52519-5-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240422070125.52519-1-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> References: <20240422070125.52519-1-dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-HM-Spam-Status: e1kfGhgUHx5ZQUpXWQgPGg8OCBgUHx5ZQUlOS1dZFg8aDwILHllBWSg2Ly tZV1koWUFJQjdXWS1ZQUlXWQ8JGhUIEh9ZQVlDSk9KVh0eTU5NS0xIGUIfQlUZERMWGhIXJBQOD1 lXWRgSC1lBWUlKQ1VCT1VKSkNVQktZV1kWGg8SFR0UWUFZT0tIVUpNT0lMTlVKS0tVSkJLS1kG X-HM-Tid: 0a8f049c2c96023ckunmb1f8886025a X-HM-MType: 1 X-HM-Sender-Digest: e1kMHhlZQR0aFwgeV1kSHx4VD1lBWUc6Njo6PRw6CDcxARw0IhFKGQIa Fi9PCkhVSlVKTEpITE1CSUJOT0JDVTMWGhIXVR8UFRwIEx4VHFUCGhUcOx4aCAIIDxoYEFUYFUVZ V1kSC1lBWUlKQ1VCT1VKSkNVQktZV1kIAVlBTEJJSTcG From: Davidlohr Bueso If the device does not support Sanitize or Secure Erase commands, hide the respective sysfs interfaces such that the operation can never be attempted. In order to be generic, keep track of the enabled security commands found in the CEL - the driver does not support Security Passthrough. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-4-dave@stgolabs.net Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 6 ++-- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 19 +++++++++++ drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 15 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl index c4c4acb1f3b3..087f762ebfd5 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl @@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation. What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase @@ -101,7 +102,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation. What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/ diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c index d6d067fbee97..ca60bb8114f2 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c @@ -121,6 +121,45 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode) return false; } +static void cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_security_state *security, + u16 opcode) +{ + switch (opcode) { + case CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK, security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE: + set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, + security->enabled_cmds); + break; + default: + break; + } +} + static bool cxl_is_poison_command(u16 opcode) { #define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43 @@ -677,7 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel) u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode); struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode); - if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) { + if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) || + !cxl_is_security_command(opcode))) { dev_dbg(dev, "Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode); continue; @@ -689,6 +729,9 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel) if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&mds->poison, opcode); + if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) + cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(&mds->security, opcode); + dev_dbg(dev, "Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n", opcode); } } diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c index f99e7ec3cc40..14b547c07f54 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c @@ -477,9 +477,28 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = { .attrs = cxl_memdev_pmem_attributes, }; +static umode_t cxl_memdev_security_visible(struct kobject *kobj, + struct attribute *a, int n) +{ + struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj); + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev); + struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds); + + if (a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr && + !test_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, mds->security.enabled_cmds)) + return 0; + + if (a == &dev_attr_security_erase.attr && + !test_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE, mds->security.enabled_cmds)) + return 0; + + return a->mode; +} + static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = { .name = "security", .attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes, + .is_visible = cxl_memdev_security_visible, }; static const struct attribute_group *cxl_memdev_attribute_groups[] = { diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h index f3aca828fbec..706f8a6d1ef4 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h @@ -244,6 +244,19 @@ enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits { CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX }; +/* Device enabled security commands */ +enum security_cmd_enabled_bits { + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE, + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE, + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE, + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK, + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY, + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, + CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX +}; + /** * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info * @@ -346,6 +359,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state { * struct cxl_security_state - Device security state * * @state: state of last security operation + * @enabled_cmds: All security commands enabled in the CEL * @poll: polling for sanitization is enabled, device has no mbox irq support * @poll_tmo_secs: polling timeout * @poll_dwork: polling work item @@ -353,6 +367,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state { */ struct cxl_security_state { unsigned long state; + DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX); bool poll; int poll_tmo_secs; struct delayed_work poll_dwork;