From patchwork Mon Jul 1 17:07:34 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13718472 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 61F2816D31E; Mon, 1 Jul 2024 17:07:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1719853667; cv=none; b=U4fpBX0yCCTX4wDTcYZYB76R+65vBl6DCuPQbF/unae5619lILcQEaMNd1DGkao6TJ1mtoew3cd2tBzhtNlgVaz5f4ZdvU5ubI/1ZbQqt7DVoLY2jUskx0hu3Pu1ygDd8rE9nvDwAk+AfA9Sz57WeDufMYjgOtZl2JxcA7jO/04= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1719853667; c=relaxed/simple; bh=n9Bt8sgeFilFYG9RUvitPHdBPbjhTJvSbKPS9z9tPgY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version; b=Zel9nwysVW/YH+VPJwNqpBkWJTdf0vqWEVCCXsStoD1WNQB9yuE8V+75pYMNgKUd9kwlujub10CdVxxI4TC4VsRYVIzMphrwCKBbYROAaZYEmJ5fKpUaYWaaNodd9mozV97xuht1o7R63Roxfpm6M+tFJ8ScW/4+fpEJ3tqWxgM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=BGmal9au; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="BGmal9au" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7631FC32781; Mon, 1 Jul 2024 17:07:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1719853666; bh=n9Bt8sgeFilFYG9RUvitPHdBPbjhTJvSbKPS9z9tPgY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=BGmal9auIq47e0v8F4t46Yxb0nOXiVNDLeC0GOBfJ88rMiHZL2k/oCaVMHk4/DlxY S8teHkxszwP8ycBPweWITsJENRhZHWPpdqK1aav9dHwbj591cJmMVF3xM7rE5vdRhB g4vPZfK0daYKtIpYswNfmPjOAH8QxkvTnd7jhgkNeqkCX9bPgmguRfdhYJvltQBB2q 1Hbp10fkNegIpMOk92HY0cA1Vc0/8A9vL2OgDx4H8/hLXcOIvYFyEFwn24U5Te3UOt xPDoGbn+2lZcOLF1XET1yDeGMjsuL10Y/a71pOmUCCnSSIzcYMkXQ3E7MhQh8y1sA7 1MEdovbjJ4VLQ== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Stefan Berger , stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Ard Biesheuvel , keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Check non-nullity of chip->auth Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2024 17:07:34 +0000 Message-ID: <20240701170735.109583-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.2 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 All exported functions lack the check for non-nullity of chip->auth. Add the guard for each. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/9f86a167074d9b522311715c567f1c19b88e3ad4.camel@kernel.org/ Cc: Stefan Berger Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 907ac9956a78..d833db20531a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -377,6 +377,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 len; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + if (!auth) + return; + /* * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros * before computing the HMAC @@ -449,6 +452,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_state sctx; + if (!auth) + return; + /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -639,6 +645,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; int slot; + if (!auth) + return; + slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); @@ -705,6 +714,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal); int parm_len, len, i, handles; + if (!auth) + return rc; + if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n"); goto out; @@ -824,8 +836,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response); */ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle); - memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth)); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!auth) + return; + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -907,6 +924,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) int rc; u32 null_key; + if (!auth) { + pr_warn_once("%s: encryption is not active\n", __func__); + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) goto out;