From patchwork Tue Oct 29 11:20:38 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jordan Rome X-Patchwork-Id: 13854745 Received: from mout.perfora.net (mout.perfora.net [74.208.4.196]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8EA520403E; Tue, 29 Oct 2024 11:21:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=74.208.4.196 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730200877; cv=none; b=a3XVrAVMH17uBl4qxvowWQptoS4s2TUKE/bcQIhy79U+lQVMUkwzrw+gwsGdRFvKjPdcNFecSVTEYbto+qkebqBm+nCsXeymitidR07hq4kqmeHMJR2IP5LvlmbTQbnMKOrQgduHWEYIAefXkNti04z4zHo95PcvzGtIDOPQElM= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1730200877; c=relaxed/simple; bh=pY5BTmvixJSnUXFdrCBOHwyLwnNYeJ3eAVoRCFLpiv0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version; 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b=bVyi3rKIerkYb1mCkMGI+nvIp7waqnUO9q4sUDdh6RyboEerkSs2C3DutdqMaVXt CEUJLM4n0JQwo8WR8s78VABXg3W6ALBt1HE99Zs2G4pylPbNci0IYpg9K1+mpv/ZH HKqdDMjt+t6zxdG7XCMf7sW/gYWJGpRnq0vW9rqvexXfFJqCvmHpxGI+qQP+y0D/W DtPoP480LWMSGqUCSXEgD527rkMGJAT0rdnkSxW8ciIj+JV/X8tY7fCY4XRMJuxKs YFREiT2zqOBbkyqmlaAZUBkSSDmN/B3atmNxkfthl+aM4T2WN8O6BvF3YJpLA+D6H hV2H370xrc8f7jbVSw== X-UI-Sender-Class: 55c96926-9e95-11ee-ae09-1f7a4046a0f6 Received: from localhost ([69.171.251.25]) by mrelay.perfora.net (mreueus002 [74.208.5.2]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0MGCIr-1t3JqW0gdT-006s3g; Tue, 29 Oct 2024 12:20:43 +0100 From: Jordan Rome To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrii Nakryiko , Kernel Team , Serge Hallyn , Yonghong Song Subject: [v3] security: add trace event for cap_capable Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 04:20:38 -0700 Message-ID: <20241029112038.1225847-1-linux@jordanrome.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.5 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:so5afXzKmBlfk/Fla5DEnSFEXWwvjB6LXJN9H/kdO6/VWsH8zuw oZjS70VVcN83wiYcM6nQZEo+1VF7iKg3rF5aYVOnr0HZsUNwN+47iHVTjW+7ijxpBz0828M FqC9rgwzBxCGzE1FNChiguqbETyRGwKkHM4PTP4R58zAdd9O2GRrGBQ2AnhNpimXT/oQwGj Ti0HqdU2DD/wMaiATBs3w== X-Spam-Flag: NO UI-OutboundReport: notjunk:1;M01:P0:yCBtADiG8us=;FYm8KI1y4def561+doMrOoZrJG6 jQ4OwIw0ObqGPdvnVEQcRRX0TMUzfHfZ3iFQ0jkPonvcHWl+rBWqtVgZjYDPHqZzDh6pf60Wa 2+QRxF3iiNiBAZr398c6efag/esbz2MaARbpV9LlKO8mnFX0XX+lDFIrFMfg1WJveOHNZ8Ug9 U4gPg0q8w8IpoYyfvnyphL4UOXUkJZ9Kk/Y+UeNL1L6fSPbb3icEue2hq71UcLzvZGvPU5FYm Nmd4Xa+3xg30kcUop2lgCTzYFs2riLxPo6Od2mRwqPazlxXodo7aSDgco2l1HOBIjzbyXVTyN 6jeRIZuKkN/HYssQe2HMIONjRCeDr39PbPnzJj0lCI/LEfHCWolMr3g/rTqVkIIyzQtXXtOgo AmvTAZ+rkJMk0644DxMcsCe27GequkBEy4/yNvQoiFElrhRkVsaR8K4gBFEvcDBR59ycS0lOW wTLwBs34ViIsXjYEbr4Zkt2CqdWw2qPfmHZlE/pq5R2FrF2+gf7CbymumypQpkcYWO1nS/Xq2 5yx33Kx0FvqZjrp6zYQ3N+4R95EocjpX2AOx75PSbcH/kMo5J8CoVGW8c6mf++Zg/qht5m/Jh Fb2maeU15/ktPgvX7J+7ZMVb3MaAmTP9XwNBABkeBr3XZEgCnikU3czEctRDMvnkkhwD230x5 q6Q7VBEDh4QrYQ43UOLfycc6Cm/zSL/TWRd2mWXC4VjKnKP6GKBP8qYRF4II8Dnf3AL+DosBd sW0o7Qu3qiNCBTbFgp1uZahuGHqCwDUfA== In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates) add a tracepoint that passes: - The credentials used - The user namespace of the resource being accessed - The user namespace in which the credential provides the capability to access the targeted resource - The capability to check for - Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h - The return value of the check Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + include/trace/events/capability.h | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/commoncap.c | 32 ++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h -- 2.43.5 diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index cc40a9d9b8cd..210e9076c858 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -4994,6 +4994,7 @@ M: Serge Hallyn L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org S: Supported F: include/linux/capability.h +F: include/trace/events/capability.h F: include/uapi/linux/capability.h F: kernel/capability.c F: security/commoncap.c diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e706ce690c38 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability + +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ) +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/** + * cap_capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular + * effective capability + * + * @cred: The credentials used + * @targ_ns: The user namespace of the resource being accessed + * @capable_ns: The user namespace in which the credential provides the + * capability to access the targeted resource. + * This will be NULL if ret is not 0. + * @cap: The capability to check for + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not + * + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c + */ +TRACE_EVENT(cap_capable, + + TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret), + + TP_ARGS(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret), + + TP_STRUCT__entry( + __field(const struct cred *, cred) + __field(struct user_namespace *, targ_ns) + __field(struct user_namespace *, capable_ns) + __field(int, cap) + __field(unsigned int, opts) + __field(int, ret) + ), + + TP_fast_assign( + __entry->cred = cred; + __entry->targ_ns = targ_ns; + __entry->capable_ns = capable_ns; + __entry->cap = cap; + __entry->opts = opts; + __entry->ret = ret; + ), + + TP_printk("cred %p, targ_ns %p, capable_ns %p, cap %d, opts %u, ret %d", + __entry->cred, __entry->targ_ns, __entry->capable_ns, __entry->cap, + __entry->opts, __entry->ret) +); + +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */ + +/* This part must be outside protection */ +#include diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 162d96b3a676..7287feee0683 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ #include #include +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS +#include + /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. @@ -52,7 +55,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) /** * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability * @cred: The credentials to use - * @targ_ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability + * @targ_ns: The user namespace of the resource being accessed * @cap: The capability to check for * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h * @@ -67,7 +70,11 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts) { - struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; + int ret = -EPERM; + struct user_namespace *capable_ns, *ns; + + capable_ns = NULL; + ns = targ_ns; /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target @@ -75,22 +82,30 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, */ for (;;) { /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ - if (ns == cred->user_ns) - return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; + if (ns == cred->user_ns) { + if (cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap)) { + capable_ns = ns; + ret = 0; + } + break; + } /* * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, * we're done searching. */ if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) - return -EPERM; + break; /* * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the * user namespace has all caps. */ - if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) - return 0; + if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) { + capable_ns = ns->parent; + ret = 0; + break; + } /* * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have @@ -99,7 +114,8 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, ns = ns->parent; } - /* We never get here */ + trace_cap_capable(cred, targ_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret); + return ret; } /**