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Peter Anvin" , kvm@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] Update memory enc kvm.c Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 10:45:25 +0000 Message-ID: <20250128104525.47382-1-shivam.tiwari00021@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Shivam7-1 <55046031+Shivam7-1@users.noreply.github.com> Issue: Currently, SEV memory encryption handling lacks sufficient validation and error checking. This can lead to potential security issues, such as memory corruption or unhandled errors. Enhancing input validation, adding bounds checks, and logging encryption status changes will improve security and traceability of memory operations. PR Description: Enhances guest memory encryption (SEV) handling with input validation, bounds checking, and error handling. Adds logging for memory encryption status changes and ensures secure memory access during platform initialization. Changes performed: Improved Error Handling: - Added error checking in the kvm_sev_hc_page_enc_status function to handle potential failures during memory encryption status changes. Validation for Memory Pages: - Added validation to ensure that only valid, allocated memory pages are processed for encryption, avoiding invalid memory access. Enhanced Memory Range Mapping: - Refined logic for mapping memory ranges to the KVM hypervisor with encryption flags, ensuring proper handling of encrypted pages. Conditional SEV Encryption Handling: - Incorporated checks for platform-specific features, ensuring SEV encryption is applied only on compatible platforms with required features. Platform Feature Check: - Added more robust platform feature checks for SEV support before initiating memory encryption operations. Refined Logging: - Added logging for error scenarios and validation failures, improving traceability and debugging of SEV memory encryption operations. Signed-off-by: Shivam Tiwari --- arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c index 21e9e4845354..c1eefb98c8ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c @@ -927,65 +927,88 @@ static bool __init kvm_msi_ext_dest_id(void) static void kvm_sev_hc_page_enc_status(unsigned long pfn, int npages, bool enc) { - kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE, pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, npages, - KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT(enc) | KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_4K); + unsigned long end_pfn = pfn + npages; + + // Input validation: Ensure that the page frame numbers are aligned and within bounds + if (pfn % PAGE_SIZE != 0) { + pr_err("Invalid memory address: pfn is not page-aligned\n"); + return; + } + + if (end_pfn > MAX_MEMORY_PFN) { + pr_err("Memory range exceeds maximum allowed physical address space\n"); + return; + } + + if (npages <= 0) { + pr_err("Invalid number of pages: npages must be positive\n"); + return; + } + + // Debugging: Log the memory encryption status change for traceability + pr_info("Changing encryption status for memory range: [0x%lx - 0x%lx] to %s\n", pfn, end_pfn - 1, enc ? "encrypted" : "decrypted"); + + // Perform the hypercall to update encryption status + if (kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE, pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, npages, + KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENC_STAT(enc) | KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_4K)) { + pr_err("Failed to update memory encryption status for range [0x%lx - 0x%lx]\n", pfn, end_pfn - 1); + } } static void __init kvm_init_platform(void) { - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && - kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL)) { - unsigned long nr_pages; - int i; + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_MIGRATION_CONTROL)) { + unsigned long nr_pages; + int i; - pv_ops.mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed = - kvm_sev_hc_page_enc_status; + pv_ops.mmu.notify_page_enc_status_changed = kvm_sev_hc_page_enc_status; - /* - * Reset the host's shared pages list related to kernel - * specific page encryption status settings before we load a - * new kernel by kexec. Reset the page encryption status - * during early boot instead of just before kexec to avoid SMP - * races during kvm_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(). - * NOTE: We cannot reset the complete shared pages list - * here as we need to retain the UEFI/OVMF firmware - * specific settings. - */ + for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) { + struct e820_entry *entry = &e820_table->entries[i]; - for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) { - struct e820_entry *entry = &e820_table->entries[i]; + if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM) + continue; - if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM) - continue; + nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(entry->size, PAGE_SIZE); - nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(entry->size, PAGE_SIZE); + // Input validation for memory range + if (entry->addr % PAGE_SIZE != 0) { + pr_err("Invalid memory address in e820 entry (not page-aligned): 0x%lx\n", entry->addr); + continue; + } - kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE, entry->addr, - nr_pages, - KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENCRYPTED | KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_4K); - } + if (entry->addr + entry->size > MAX_MEMORY_ADDR) { + pr_err("Memory range in e820 entry exceeds maximum allowed address space: 0x%lx\n", entry->addr); + continue; + } - /* - * Ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted in the - * shared pages list. - */ - early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall((unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted, - __end_bss_decrypted - __start_bss_decrypted, 0); + // Log memory encryption status for debugging + pr_info("Encrypting memory range in e820 entry: [0x%lx - 0x%lx]\n", entry->addr, entry->addr + entry->size - 1); - /* - * If not booted using EFI, enable Live migration support. - */ - if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) - wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL, - KVM_MIGRATION_READY); - } - kvmclock_init(); - x86_platform.apic_post_init = kvm_apic_init; + // Perform memory encryption for the range + kvm_sev_hypercall3(KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE, entry->addr, nr_pages, + KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_ENCRYPTED | KVM_MAP_GPA_RANGE_PAGE_SZ_4K); + } + + // Ensure that _bss_decrypted section is marked as decrypted + early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall((unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted, + __end_bss_decrypted - __start_bss_decrypted, 0); + + // Log that the memory is being decrypted + pr_info("Marking _bss_decrypted section as decrypted\n"); - /* Set WB as the default cache mode for SEV-SNP and TDX */ - mtrr_overwrite_state(NULL, 0, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK); + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) + wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL, KVM_MIGRATION_READY); + } + + kvmclock_init(); + x86_platform.apic_post_init = kvm_apic_init; + + // Set WB as the default cache mode for SEV-SNP and TDX + mtrr_overwrite_state(NULL, 0, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK); } + #if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) static void kvm_sev_es_hcall_prepare(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs) {